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

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Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit

ANTHONY BRIGGMAN

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For Kelly

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Portions of this book have appeared previously in press, in revised forms, as 'Measuring Justin's Approach to the Spirit: Trinitarian Conviction and Binitarian Orientation,' *VC* 63 (2009): 107–37; 'The Holy Spirit as the Unction of Christ in Irenaeus,' *JTS* 61 (2010): 171–93; 'Dating Irenaeus' Acquisition of Theophilus' Correspondence *To Autolycus*: A Pneumatological Perspective,' *SP* 45 (2010): 397–402; 'Re-evaluating Angelomorphism in Irenaeus: The Case of *Proof* 10,' *JTS* 61 (2010): 583–95; and as 'Revisiting Irenaeus' Philosophical Acumen,' *VC* 65 (2011): 115–24.

Contents

Abbreviations

1 *Apol*	Justin, *First Apology*
2 *Apol*	Justin, *Second Apology*
ACW	Ancient Christian Writers
AH	Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*
ANF	The Ante-Nicene Fathers
Aug	*Augustinianum*
AugStud	*Augustinian Studies*
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina
CQ	*The Classical Quarterly*
CyF	*Ciencia y Fe*
Dial	Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho*
EHPR	Etude d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses
Emb	Athenagoras, *Embassy for the Christians*
FotC	The Fathers of the Church
Greg	*Gregorianum*
HMS	Heythrop Monograph Series
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
IKZ	*Internationale kirkliche Zeitschrift*
ITQ	*Irish Theological Quarterly*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JrnRel	*Journal of Religion*
JSS	*Journal of Semitic Studies*
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
NRT	*Nouvelle Revue Théologique*
NV	*Nova et Vetera*
OECS	Oxford Early Christian Studies
PA	Origen, *On First Principles*
PO	Patrologia Orientalis
Prax	Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*
Prf	Irenaeus, *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*
REA	*Revue des études Anciennes*
RevBib	*Revue Biblique*

ROC	*Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*
RSPhTh	*Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*
RSR	*Recherches de Science Religieuse*
RTAM	*Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*
SBLSP	*Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers*
SC	Sources Chrétiennes
SJT	*Scottish Journal of Theology*
SP	*Studia Patristica*
SVTQ	*St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*
Tim	Plato, *Timaeus*
Trin	Novatian, *On the Trinity*
TS	*Theological Studies*
TSAJ	Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism / Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum
TSK	*Theologische Studien und Kritiken; eine Zeitschrift für das gesamte Gebiet der Theologie*
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen
VC	*Vigiliae Christianae*
VCS	Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kunde der Alteren Kirche*

Preface

Since the middle of the twentieth century patristic scholars have demonstrated a growing appreciation for the indebtedness of early Christian theology, especially but not exclusively that of the first two centuries, to Second Temple Jewish forms of thought often having only a minor presence in the New Testament.[1] Though numerous attempts have been made, it has proven almost impossible to establish a definite connection between the Jewish traditions used by these early Christian theologies and a particular Jewish community or a particular Jewish source, other than in a vague way to the Hebrew Scriptures. The usual approach now is to locate a Jewish motif within a particular geographic provenance or to trace the presence of a Jewish motif through extra-canonical Jewish or non-Jewish sources in an effort to identify the manner in which a motif may have been mediated to a later author. Thus, Jean Daniélou's broad description of these theologies as 'Christian thought expressing itself in forms borrowed from Judaism' remains apt.[2] So too does his description of these theologies as 'Jewish Christian' remain valid—as long as scholarly narratives minimizing or neglecting altogether the influence of Jewish sources upon early Christian thought remain dominant.[3]

Our ability to recognize the influence of Second Temple Judaism upon early Christian theology has received immeasurable benefit from the investigations into that period, beginning early in the previous century but abounding in its latter half. These investigations have ranged broadly, addressing such topics as apocalypticism, asceticism, mysticism, angelomorphism, Hellenizing influences, wisdom literature, and the significance of angels, exalted patriarchs, and mediatorial figures, to name a few. Of particular import to this study is the great deal of attention that has focused upon the concept of spirit, including its connections to angelic beings, the figure of Wisdom, and other traditions.[4]

[1] An excellent discussion of the changes in the approach to Jewish-Christian relations in the first four centuries can be found in the Introduction to Becker and Reed (2003: 1–24).

[2] Daniélou (1964: 9).

[3] Despite its inability to account for much of early Christian theology, the still dominant scholarly narrative holds that Christian theology emerged from a synthesis of Greek philosophy and early Christian tradition beginning with the apologists in the second century and continuing through the late fourth or early fifth centuries. See, for example, Von Harnack (1958, 2: 169–77; 3: 170–1).

[4] Various facets of the Second Temple understanding of Spirit have been brought to light by such scholars as: Schoemaker, *JBL* 23 (1904: 13–67) Dix, *JTS*, 28 (1926: 233–50); Anderson, *JSS* 7 (1962: 293–303); Larcher (1969); Isaacs (1976); Manns (1983); Sekki (1989); Levison (1997).

The significance of Jewish traditions of the Spirit to early Christian pneumatology was recognized as early as the third quarter of the twentieth century in Christian Oeyen's studies on Clement of Alexandria and Justin Martyr.[5] Yet it seems that Oeyen was ahead of his time, for his studies had little influence upon scholarship until recent days.[6] By the end of the twentieth century, however, the receptivity of scholars to such an influence had changed dramatically. John R. Levison called for studies on early Christian pneumatology to utilize Israelite and early Jewish texts that present the Spirit as an angelic being in order to understand early Christian texts in which the divine Spirit may be interpreted as an angelic being.[7] Alan F. Segal went one step farther when he wrote, 'Though Christianity's theology is trinitarian, it may not have appeared so in its original context. For one thing, Christian mention of the "Holy Spirit" would neither have been considered unique nor heretical by the rabbis.'[8] Segal's observation was noted by Michel René Barnes, whose subsequent research into this field led him to offer two major theses in the first-fruits of his work.[9] First, 'early Christian pneumatology receives, continues and develops Jewish pneumatology, or perhaps more accurately, early Christian pneumatologies receive, continue and develop Jewish pneumatologies.' Second, 'at the beginning of the third century the Jewish theological superstructure for Christian pneumatology is rejected.'[10]

The present study on Irenaeus' pneumatology follows in the path of this scholarship, for much of it demonstrates that Irenaeus' theology of the Holy Spirit consists of a combination of Jewish traditions with New Testament doctrine. Irenaeus assigned creative activity to the Spirit and identified the Spirit with the figure of Wisdom and one of the Hands of God—moves which correlate with Jewish traditions of the Spirit. His incorporation of these traditions produced the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the period, even within early Christianity as a whole. Moreover, the repudiation of each of these traditions by the theologians of the third and early fourth centuries contributed to the frequent devaluation of the Spirit in their writings.

[5] Oeyen, *IKZ* 55 (1965: 102–20); Oeyen, *IKZ* 56 (1966: 27–47); and Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 (1972: 215–21).

[6] Oeyen's studies feature prominently in the work of Bucur, *VC* 61 (2007: 381–413); Bucur, *JrnRel* 88 (2008: 190–208); as well as my own, Briggman, *VC* 63 (2009: 107–37).

[7] Levison, *SBLSP* 34 (1995: 464–93, here 464). Levison's call was anticipated by Gieschen, *SBLSP* 33 (1994: 790–803), and responded to by Bucur, VCS 95 (2009).

[8] Segal (1999: 73–95).

[9] Barnes, *AugStud* 39 (2008: 169–86). The above-printed quotation by Segal introduces Barnes' article.

[10] Ibid. p. 170 for both quotations.

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Introduction

This study is the result of a long-held interest in early Christian pneumatology. The development of doctrine intrigues me. The second-century ascription of the title Wisdom to the Holy Spirit and its subsequent repudiation in the third century caught my attention. My curiosity centered upon why the association of Wisdom with the Spirit, an established aspect of Israelite thought, was rejected with relative ease and rapidity at the turn of the century. The association of Christ and Wisdom in the New Testament writings played a role of course, but that association did not dissuade the identification of the Spirit with Wisdom by Theophilus nor by Irenaeus, whose high regard for Scripture is beyond doubt. I soon discovered that a solid explanation for this development did not exist.[1] Moreover, I realized that work needed to be done on the presence of this identification in the second century before we could address its subsequent disappearance.

My thoughts naturally turned to Irenaeus, the writer who made the most use of the identification of the Spirit and Wisdom. Many aspects of Irenaeus' theology have received considerable attention and undergone thorough analyses; his pneumatology has not. Though H.B. Swete's comments early last century initiated a high regard in general for his doctrine of the Holy Spirit,[2] that regard has not been universal[3] nor has an adequate volume of literature

[1] As of then; Michel René Barnes has since suggested that Origen appropriated Wisdom passages (*e.g.*, Wisd. 7:25) to the Son in order to combat a 'Jewish-Christian hyper-pneumatology.' He notes a similar move with regard to Tertullian's attribution of Prov. 8:22 and Ps. 33:6 to the Son, citing a general lack of interest in Jewish-Christian theological motifs as the reason why Tertullian is not interested in ascribing creative activity to the Spirit (Barnes 2008: 183–4).

[2] 'On the whole . . . the pneumatology of Irenaeus is a great advance on all earlier Christian teaching outside the canon . . . On the mission of the Holy Spirit or the Paraclete he is particularly full and clear.' Swete (1912: 92–3).

[3] For instance: A. von Harnack disparaged Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit, questioning the clarity of his conception of the Spirit's activity and the degree to which he distinguished the Spirit's identity, going so far as to declare, 'the personality of the Spirit vanishes' in *AH* 3.18.3 (vol. 2 (1958): 267 n. 2; I offer a different reading of *AH* 3.18.3 in chapter 4, p.70 n. 45). A. Orbe views Irenaeus as referring to the spirit or power common to the Father and Son in the passages that refer to the anointing of the Son by the Father with the Spirit (in this way, we can see that he agrees with von Harnack's interpretation of *AH* 3.18.3). Thus, the most prolific writer on Irenaeus often produces non-Trinitarian interpretations of passages, diminishing the identity

supported it.[4] As I discovered how limited were the previous studies on Irenaeus' account of the Holy Spirit, I determined to expand the parameters of this project.

The purpose of this study is threefold. The first is to provide an in-depth examination of certain principal, often distinctive, aspects of Irenaeus' account of the Holy Spirit. Second, I desire to demonstrate that Irenaeus' theology of the Holy Spirit consists of a combination of Jewish traditions with New Testament doctrine. This combination produces the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the period, even within early Christianity as a whole. My third purpose is to show Irenaeus to be the first author, following the New Testament writings, to construct a theological account in which binitarian logic does not diminish either the identity or activity of the Holy Spirit. I will examine the thought of Justin Martyr to show Christian thinkers of this period often utilized Jewish traditions of the Spirit in a way that weakened the distinction between the identity and activity of the Spirit and that of the Word.[5] This effect contrasts with Irenaeus' utilization of Jewish traditions, which strengthens the distinction of the identity and activity of the Spirit, reinforcing his Trinitarian account.

My initial interest, broadly understood to be the developments in pneumatology that occurred within the second and third centuries, has remained at

or activity of the Holy Spirit—e.g. Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 676–7); and *Greg* 65 (1984: 5–52, here 41, 43). Even F.R.M. Hitchcock, who defended Irenaeus' Trinitarianism in the *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* against von Harnack's denigration, seems constrained to acknowledge Irenaeus' understanding of the Spirit in *Against Heresies* as less than adequate (*Hermathena* 14 (1907): 307–37, here 337).

[4] While discussions pertaining to Irenaeus' conception of the Spirit appear in numerous works, just two studies have focused on Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit. At the beginning of the last century A. d'Alès published 'La Doctrine de l'Esprit en saint Irénée,' *RSR* 14 (1924: 497–538), a large portion of which focuses on grace not the Spirit. D'Alès, moreover, subverts his work by reading much of Irenaeus through the lens of scholasticism. H.-J. Jaschke produced the only book-length study of the pneumatology of Irenaeus in his volume that devotes more than half of its pages to this subject: *Der Heilige Geist im Bekenntnis der Kirche: Eine Studie zur Pneumatologie des Irenäus von Lyon im Ausgang vom altchristlichen Glaubensbekenntnis* (1976). The strength of Jaschke's study resides in the fact that he touches on many different aspects of Irenaeus' thought, but this strength is also its weakness. The very breadth of his study prevents an in-depth consideration of any aspect of Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit. This observation is not intended to reflect negatively on his work, for his approach makes sense given that his analysis is the first of its kind. He provides a map of Irenaeus' pneumatology, a very helpful aid to future students of Irenaeus, including myself.

I would be remiss to not mention the Introduction that J.A. Robinson provided to his translation of the apostolic preaching (St. Irenaeus 1920: 1–68). This Introduction contains a lengthy discussion on Irenaeus' doctrine of the Holy Spirit (pp. 24–68) that includes some of the most insightful observations on the topic to date.

[5] Justin serves as a good example for this study for three reasons. First the size of his writings permits a better understanding of his logic in comparison to smaller works. Second, both men lived in the East and West, and so would have theoretically been exposed to similar traditions. Third, Irenaeus knew at least some of Justin's works (*see*, for example, *AH* 4.6.2 and 5.26.2).

the forefront of my mind throughout this work. Two major transitions occurred during this time period. My comparison of Justin's thought to that of Irenaeus illustrates the first. While several studies entail the recognition that the accounts of the Holy Spirit provided by early Christian writers have a logical and traditional basis,[6] it is also true that throughout the second century the theology of the Spirit received far less attention than that of the Word.[7] The first transition, then, can be seen in the difference between the theological accounts of the Spirit offered by earlier writers of the second century including Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras, and the account of the Spirit offered by Irenaeus in *Against Heresies* 3–5 and his *Proof*.[8] In this later portion of the writings of Irenaeus we find the earliest theological account that secures the distinct identity and activity of the Spirit.[9]

The second major transition can be seen in the difference between the Jewish-Christian pneumatology of Irenaeus and the repudiation of the Jewish idioms that sustained this theology by Origen and Tertullian at the turn of the third century.[10] I intend for this study to be not only an essay on Irenaeus' theology of the Holy Spirit, but also to be a basis for future analyses of later pneumatological accounts. In particular, I hope this explication of Irenaeus' pneumatological reasoning will better enable us to recognize and evaluate how the loss of Jewish traditions of the Spirit affected theological accounts in the third and early fourth centuries, accounts that do not incorporate themes central to Irenaeus' pneumatology, and how the reappearance of some of these traditional motifs affected late fourth-century theologies.

A few topics peculiar to the study of Irenaeus need to be addressed before I conclude this introduction with a discussion of the chapters that constitute this study. The coherence of Irenaeus' thought was first questioned by H.H. Wendt in 1882.[11] Wendt argued Irenaeus maintained two incompatible

[6] 'Early Christian pneumatologies receive, continue and develop Jewish pneumatologies' (Barnes, *AugStud* 39 2008: 170). In addition, see among others: Gieschen, *SBLSP* 33 (1994: 790–803); Levison, *SBLSP* 34 (1995: 464–93); Stuckenbruck (2004: 308–20); Bucur, *VC* 61 (2007: 381–413) and *JBL* 127 (2008: 183–204). For a discussion of studies on the Spirit in Justin see chapter 1, p. 9 n.1.

[7] '. . . Christianity of the period was much more concerned with the relationship between Father and the Son. The concept of the "Holy Spirit" was not a source for the same kind of speculation' (Segal 1999: 79).

[8] The reader will find that I believe a dramatic difference exists in the understanding of the Spirit apparent in *AH* 1 and 2 in comparison to his understanding from *AH* 3 and afterward.

[9] Swete observed, '[Irenaeus'] chief interest lies in the Incarnation of the Son, but the doctrine of the Spirit is not overlooked, and for the first time it takes its place in an orderly scheme of Christian teaching' (Swete 1912: 86).

[10] 'With [the rejection of the Jewish theological superstructure] the old Jewish-Christian pneumatologies are set aside, and Christian pneumatology is developed on the basis of other theological superstructures' (Barnes, *AugStud* 39 2008: 170; *see* 180–6 for Origen and Tertullian).

[11] *Die christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit* (Göttingen, 1882). The failure to recognize the intellectual unity and theological programme within Irenaeus' thought often led to a low regard for his theology as a whole. For instance, J. Quasten wrote, 'The whole work

strains of thought with regard to the original state of humanity, one that involved the notion of a continual growth and increase toward perfection in which the Fall plays a positive role, and another that involved the notion of an original perfection lost at the Fall.[12] Many have followed Wendt's evaluation of Irenaeus' thought, including Adolf von Harnack[13] and most importantly, Friedrich Loofs.[14] The discernment of incompatible lines of thought in Irenaeus' work became the logical grounds for Loofs' source-critical[15] division of *Against Heresies* which leads him to regard Irenaeus as a mere compiler of the ideas that came before him. Irenaeus, according to Loofs, 'was as a theological writer much smaller' than we had supposed.[16]

Loofs' theory and evaluation did not go unchallenged for long. A few years after Loofs' work D.B. Reynders wrote, '*Adverses haereses* is the fruit of a great work . . . If it lacks a little order and if it repeats itself, it is neither without unity nor without erudition nor without method . . . Irenaeus has taken a position (on the problem of God, the world, and knowledge) too firm and too perceptive to be something other than the spontaneous expression of his psychology.'[17]Other studies followed over the succeeding decades, each substantiating the coherence of Irenaeus' thought and the unity of his work.[18] It was left to Philippe Bacq, however, to conclusively establish the unity of Irenaeus' writing, as well as the harmonious existence of the two debated strains of thought, with his analysis of the fourth Book of *Against Heresies*.[19]

Three decades ago Aloys Grillmeier wrote, 'Now that Irenaeus scholarship has once again come back to recognizing the inner unity of the theology of the

suffers from a lack of clear arrangement and unity of thought. Prolixity and frequent repetition make its perusal wearisome. . . . Evidently he did not have the ability to shape his materials into a homogenous whole' (Quasten 1950, vol. 1: 289).

[12] Wendt (1882: 21–6, 29). These lines of thought were first raised by L. Duncker who discussed the image and likeness of God in Irenaeus, but he affirmed the internal consistency of his logic (Duncker 1843: 99–104).

[13] Von Harnack (1958, vol 2: 269–74, esp. 274 n.1).

[14] Loofs (1930: 1–4).

[15] A. Benoît (1960: 38) has noted the parallel between the rise of the source-critical and form-critical treatments of Scripture and the application of these approaches to Irenaeus. Though Benoît critiqued the merit of Loofs' approach (1960: 33–5), Marrou has shown that Benoît himself failed to grasp the unity of Irenaeus' thought (Marrou, *REA* 65 1963: 452–6).

[16] Loofs (1930: 432).

[17] Reynders, *RTAM* 7 (1935: 5–27, here 26–7).

[18] F.R.M. Hitchcock, *JTS* 38 (1937: 130–9, 255–66) soon offered a stringent critique of Loofs' methodology and conclusions. G. Wingren then proposed a harmonious reading of the two lines of thought previously assessed as irreconcilable (Wingren 1959: esp. 26–32, 50–4, 52 n. 33, on 27 n.78). A. Rousseau aligned himself with Wingren and declared, 'If one wants to have some chance of getting back to the thought of a writer, one ought not *first* seek to discover in him borrowings and plagiarisms—as if it would suffice to make then a simple subtraction so that the residue thus obtained represents the contribution belonging to the author!' (SC 152 1969: 190).

[19] Bacq (1978), see esp. his appendix devoted to *AH* 4. 37–9, pp. 363–88, which includes a discussion of past scholarship on this issue, pp. 364–9.

Bishop of Lyons . . . '[20] If Grillmeier could make such a statement before Bacq's work, surely this particular episode in the history of scholarship has now drawn to a close and we have arrived at the point at which it no longer needs to play a role in the study of Irenaeus.[21]

The dating of *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* relative to the composition of *Against Heresies* has yet to be settled. For many years the consensus held that Irenaeus wrote *Proof* after *Against Heresies*.[22] The main support for this determination came from the fact that *Prf* 99 refers to the denunciation of heretics that occurred in 'Refutation and Overthrow of Knowledge falsely so-called,' the longer title for *Against Heresies*, thus indicating *Proof* was written second. Yves-Marie Blanchard, however, questioned the originality of *Prf* 99–100, contending the natural ending of the work is *Prf* 98.[23] Having negated the reference to *Against Heresies*, Blanchard contended *Proof* is the earlier work.[24] He argued that an 'exegetical method founded on the Christological reinterpretation of Jewish Scriptures'[25] relegates *Proof* to a preceding era in which this style of argumentation was the norm, that of the Apologists. Blanchard's evaluation of *Prf* 99–100 may be correct,[26] but his stylistic comparison with earlier writers is not decisive, and is persuasive only if no other substantial observation suggests a later relative date.

Over the course of time, however, a number of comparisons have been drawn between certain discussions in *Against Heresies* and *Proof* that suggest portions of the theology in *Proof* is more advanced. If we accept the premise

[20] Grillmeier (1975, vol. 1: 98).

[21] Just as the failure to recognize the intellectual unity and theological programme within Irenaeus' thought often led to a low regard for his theology as a whole, as the recognition of his intellectual unity grew, disparagement of his thought diminished. So we hear H.U. von Balthasar say, 'Irenaeus' work marks the birth of Christian theology. With it, theology merges as a reflection on the world of revealed facts, a reflection which is not just a tentative, partial approximation but achieves the miracle of a complete and organized image in the mind of faith' (von Balthazar 1984, vol. 2: 31).

[22] Among others: von Harnack in *Des heiligen Irenäus Schrift zum Erweise der apostolischen Verkündigung* (1907: 55); Hitchcock, *JTS* 9 (1908: 284–9, here 284–6); Swete (1912: 85); Robinson (1920: 2); Smith believes a later dating of *Proof* is more probable, but he reserves final judgment (St Irenaeus 1952: 117 n. 18); Fantino (1986: 49); Rousseau, SC 406 (1995: 352–3).

[23] Blanchard (1993: 113 n. 2).

[24] Behr follows Blanchard in dating *Proof* prior to *Against Heresies* (St Irenaeus of Lyons 1997: 118 n. 229); and (2001: 112).

[25] Blanchard (1993: 116). According to Blanchard, *Proof* bears a striking resemblance to the works of Justin and the *Epistle of Barnabas* and he contends it 'is in direct continuity with the exegetical tradition honored' by them (pp. 114–17; quotation at p. 117).

[26] In addition to his form-critical analysis, Blanchard (1993: 113 n. 2) argues that the anti-heretical statements in *Prf* 99–100 betray a later desire to deploy this text in opposition to Gnosticism. This contention does not take into consideration the fact that the opening chapters, *Prf* 2–3, also contain anti-heretical statements. This being the case, we could argue just as well that the presence of anti-heretical comments in *Prf* 2–3 and 99–100 form a natural *inclusio*, which supports the originality of *Prf* 99–100. For a similar statement that focuses on different aspects of these chapters, see Rousseau, SC 406 (1995: 77–8); for Rousseau's critique and rejection of Blanchard's argument, *see* pp. 352–3.

that a more advanced theological account (for example a more concise or better articulated or more developed statement) is a more mature one, then we may offer an opinion on the relative dating of the two statements. Hitchcock believed *Proof* 'to assign greater importance to the Being of the Son' than *Against Heresies*,[27] and held that it also throws 'more light on the problem of the relations of the Divine Persons to One Another.'[28] Swete offered the more sweeping opinion, '[*Proof*] repeats all the chief doctrinal points of [*Against Heresies*], and sometimes throws further light on them.'[29] Behr has observed that Irenaeus' 'most detailed and sustained' protological discussion occurs in *Prf* 11–15.[30] Michel René Barnes has pointed out that 'the concept (and not simply the title) of the Son figures more directly in Irenaeus' exposition' contained in *Proof* than it does in *Against Heresies*, and that *Prf* 47 contains 'one of Irenaeus' strongest statements of the full divinity of the Second Person, and the strongest statement of the full divinity of the "Son" specifically.'[31] In addition to these observations, I will argue in this study that Irenaeus' most advanced use of Ps. 33:6 occurs in *Prf* 5 where it serves as the textual support for his most detailed and developed statement of the creative activity of the Spirit.[32] The combination of these observations suggests we have cause to believe *Proof* was at the very least written later in his composition of *Against Heresies*.[33]

The reader will discover that a central premise of this study is the recognition that Irenaeus' thought developed as he wrote *Against Heresies* and then *Proof*. While observing the close approximation of *AH* 2.34.2 to 4.38.1–3, Adelin Rousseau remarked that when

> Irenaeus is writing his second book, he possesses already in his mind, with an astonishing precision, the developments that he will cause to appear in the fourth. One has the feeling that *Adversus haereses* must have been strongly thought out

[27] Hitchcock, *Hermathena* 14 (1907: 309).
[28] Hitchcock, *JTS* 9 (1908: 284).
[29] Swete (1912: 85); following von Harnack and Hitchcock.
[30] Behr (2000: 86, 107). This does not dissuade Behr from dating *Proof* earlier.
[31] Barnes, *NV* 7 (2009: 67–106, here 87); Barnes qualifies his comments on *Prf* 47 by acknowledging the possibility of a later gloss. Earlier in this article Barnes states that certain 'differences between doctrines in books of *Against Heresies* and the *Demonstration* make more sense if the *Demonstration* is later' (p. 72).
[32] See chapter 2, pp. 33–5, and the Excursus, pp. 97–103.
[33] The possibility that *Proof* was composed during the last two books of *Against Heresies* or after the completion of that whole work was suggested long ago by Bardenhewer (1913, vol. 1: 409).

In chapter 5, the reader will discover that I believe the presence of the Hands of God motif in Irenaeus is due to his reception of Theophilus' *To Autolycus* during the course of his composition of *AH* 3. This argument bears on the relative dating of *Proof*. Since Hands language occurs in *Prf* 11, the work cannot be dated prior to the later portion of *AH* 3 where an incipient form of the Hands motif first occurs in *Against Heresies*. Otherwise the absence of Hands language in *AH* 1 and 2, its emergence in *AH* 3, and full-fledged utilization in *AH* 4 and 5, cannot be explained. C.E. Hill has recently placed the writing of *Proof* soon after the completion of *AH* 3 (at the very latest prior to the composition of *AH* 5.33.4) (Hill 2006: 76 n.13, 76–7).

> first, then quickly written. Such a view does not favor of course the thesis still rather generally admitted according to which Books III, IV, and V would only be successive extensions made to a work which, originally, must have consisted of only Books I and II.[34]

Rousseau may be correct that Irenaeus conceptualized the project as a whole, in fact I agree with such an opinion. The general understanding, however, is that Irenaeus wrote *Against Heresies* and *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* over the course of some twenty years.[35] Rousseau's statement leaves little room for the acquisition of new sources, reflection upon the ideas in those sources, or even the maturation of Irenaeus' thought over that course of time. It would be better to affirm that a broad conceptualization or a general outline of the five books of *Against Heresies* existed from the start, while at the same time leaving room for a certain degree of formation with regard to the specific content of each portion of his work at the time of its composition. This study starts from this understanding, and its analyses and conclusions support this position.

It is left for me to offer a brief outline of this work. As I mentioned above, this study begins in chapter 1 with an examination of Justin Martyr's understanding of the Spirit. The objective of that analysis is twofold. The first objective is to provide the reader with an example of the pneumatological milieu that existed at the commencement of Irenaeus' writing. The second is to provide a basis from which to compare and contrast Irenaeus' pneumatology and Trinitarian logic.

The next six chapters will progress according to the literary structure of Irenaeus' work. So, for example, chapter 2 deals with the theology of the Spirit found in *AH* 1 and 2, chapters 3 and 4 deal with *AH* 3, and so on. Though I am not always consistent, I make an effort to address in any given chapter only the thought that occurs in that Book of *Against Heresies* or what has come beforehand. This approach reflects my belief that the literary structure largely agrees with the chronological composition of the work.

Chapter 2 contains my discussions of *AH* 1 and 2, as I just mentioned. In comparison to what we find in the subsequent parts of Irenaeus' work, these books contain little to comment upon. On the whole, his thought here is more primitive than later, and reflects the minimal development of pneumatology to this point in Christian history. Nevertheless, we find lines of thought that persist and occur in more developed form later in his thought.

[34] Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 343–4). Rousseau's conclusion is not as straightforward as he thinks. The similarity between these passages can also be explained by supposing that Irenaeus reflected upon and drew from *AH* 2 as he composed *AH* 4.

[35] See for example, Fantino (1986: 48–9). Fantino suggests the dates for the composition of *Against Heresies* as between AD 177 and AD 189, and *Proof* as around AD 190/200. The inability to determine accurate dates keeps us from arriving at an exact determination of how long the composition took Irenaeus.

The content of chapters 3 and 4 reflect the veritable explosion of pneumatological reasoning that we discover in *AH* 3. This growth in Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit is best characterized as a flowering in which numerous shoots, aspects of his thought, emerge at once. While linear development exists, and will be highlighted in this study, the logic we find in *AH* 3 cannot be adequately described as only a linear development of *AH* 1 and 2. Many aspects of his pneumatology appear in *AH* 3 that receive no earlier expression in the first two Books.

Certain aspects of Irenaeus' pneumatology in *AH* 3 are important, even foundational, to his broader theology and polemic, but are relatively less important to his pneumatology itself. These less important features of his theology of the Spirit still warrant our brief consideration, since they are evidence of the dramatic pneumatological expansion that occurs in this Book. Chapter 3 documents these aspects of his thought. On the other hand, some aspects of Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit in *AH* 3 continue to appear in one form or another over the course of his pneumatological development and throughout this study. Chapter 4 considers these themes.

Chapter 5 details two central and distinctive aspects of Irenaeus' theology of the Holy Spirit: the identification of the Spirit as one of the Hands of God and as Wisdom. Both of these identifications fall into the larger category of the Spirit as Creator tradition, for in each case the identification indicates a particular role in creation. As a Hand of God, the Spirit is involved in the formation of Adam. As Wisdom, the Spirit is responsible for the harmonious character of creation as a whole. It is my belief that Irenaeus' attribution of creative activity to the Spirit is the most important aspect of his pneumatology: it secures the divinity of the Holy Spirit, because the work of creation belongs to God alone, while also distinguishing the identity of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son.

Chapter 6 analyzes, for the most part, the salvific role ascribed to the Holy Spirit in *AH* 5. This chapter contains a narrative that ties together many aspects of Irenaeus' pneumatology examined in previous chapters. It addresses the perfection of the human being by the reception of the Holy Spirit; the identification of Irenaeus' threefold concept of perfection, including the approximation of the uncreated One by the human being in the possession of eternal existence which renders the believer 'like' God; the modulation of temporal life to eternal life by means of the power/grace given by the Spirit; and the idea that the Spirit becomes more closely united to believers over the course of the divine economy, a notion that aligns with the movement of the economy from animation to vivification.

Finally, chapter 7 challenges two errant readings of Irenaeus. The first is the notion that, on occasion, Irenaeus identifies the pre-existent Christ as the Holy Spirit. The second is the determination that angelomorphism exists in *Prf* 10. This chapter confirms the Trinitarian logic of Irenaeus' theology. Since these notions have no place in Irenaeus' thought, neither does the binitarian orientation that often attends them.

1

Justin Martyr and the Pneumatology of the Mid-Second Century

Past attempts to determine whether Justin Martyr recognized the Spirit to be distinct in activity and identity have resulted in a general description of Justin's reasoning as confused.[1] Yet, the studies that rendered this description have not provided a sufficient explanation for that confusion, which I understand to be the result of the coexistence of statements of indistinct activity, statements of indistinct identity, and statements of Trinitarian faith. The failure to explain the coexistence of these statements is itself the result of incomplete analyses of Justin's understanding of the activity of the Spirit and Word, a deficiency that has prevented previous scholars from recognizing two features of Justin's thought. First, they have not recognized the extent to which Justin's failure to distinguish the activity of the Spirit and Word pervades his writing. Second, they have not recognized the connection between his regular failure to distinguish their activity and his occasional failure to distinguish their identities. These two observations are the starting point of this chapter, and a demonstration and evaluation of their significance form its content.

[1] Past studies may be divided into three categories. First, there are those who hold the belief that a degree of confusion appears in Justin's work with regard to the function of the Word and Spirit, even though their identities remain distinct. Here we may place Swete (1912: 38–9) and Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 465 and 476–7). Second, there are those who believe that a degree of confusion appears in Justin's work with regard to the function of the Word and Spirit and also with regard to their identities. Here we may place Barnard (1967: 102, 103, 105), Osborn (1973: 88, 89), Rordorf, *Aug* 20 (1980: 285–97, here 293, 296), and even G.N. Stanton, who despite arguing that Justin possesses a 'rich understanding of the Spirit' still finds a 'lack of precision concerning the role of the Spirit' in 1 *Apol* 33. (He later refers to 1 *Apol* 33.9 and 36.1, and suggests that Justin awkwardly grafted his convictions about the Logos onto traditional phraseology relating to the Spirit (Stanton 2004: 322, 331).) The third category belongs to D. Vigne, for he alone stands against this general perception of confusion. Vigne argues that in comparison to his Trinitarian faith, the passages in which Justin confounds the Spirit with the Word are rare and unconvincing. In particular, the confusion caused by 1 *Apol* 33.6 and 36.1 is resolved by the experience they designate: 'to be inhabited by the prophetic Spirit, is for Justin to live in and according to the Word' (Vigne 2000: 341).

In this chapter I will argue that in Justin's thought binitarian logic exists in tension alongside Trinitarian belief, a combination that obscures the activity and identity of the Spirit, and which explains the confusion scholars have attributed to him. I have divided it into three sections by which I hope to clarify Justin's understanding of the relationship between the Spirit and the Word. In the first, I will establish his Trinitarian convictions in order to provide a baseline from which to work. In the second, I will document his failure to distinguish between the activity of the Spirit and that of the Word, which is evidence of a binitarian tendency in conflict with Trinitarian convictions. And in the third, I will demonstrate the presence of a Spirit-Christology[2] in his accounts of the Incarnation (1 *Apol* 33) and of the bestowal of spiritual gifts (*Dial* 87–88), which is evidence of his subordination of Trinitarian convictions to a binitarian orientation.

Erwin Goodenough's work on the relationship of the Word and Spirit in Justin is the most relevant to this present study. I will engage three of his conclusions. First, he determined that Justin's confusion of the function of the Holy Spirit with that of the Word does not have to prevent their distinction.[3] Second, the confusion of function between the Spirit and Word is the direct result[4] of Justin's tendency to consider the Spirit an aspect or activity of the Word.[5] And third, the confusion is the indirect result of the ubiquity of the concept of the Spirit in Hellenism and Judaism, which negated the need for its introduction or defense in his works.[6]

[2] Bucur, *ZNW* 98 (2007: 120–42, 121 n.7) provides a convenient definition: in this study, Spirit-Christology 'refers to the use of "spirit" language to designate Christ—whether in reference to his divinity as opposed to his humanity, or as a personal title.' As Bucur observes, M. Simonetti draws this distinction (Simonetti, *Aug* 12 1972: 201–32, esp. 201–3). By Spirit-Christology I am not referring to the action of the Holy Spirit upon and with Jesus in the incarnation that is prevalent in contemporary discussions of Trinitarian doctrine. I will discuss this activity of the Spirit in chapter 4, where we will consider the Spirit as the Unction of Christ.

In his combination of binitarianism with Spirit-Christology Justin is not alone; Bucur has uncovered its presence in both the *Shepherd of Hermas* and the writings of Clement of Alexandria. His discussions of these authors have recently been brought together in his *Angelomorphic Pneumatology*, which also addresses Justin. I take the similarity of our readings of Justin (which were arrived at independently) as mutually confirming.

[3] Goodenough (1923; repr. 1968: 235–6). Barnard alone, among the authors already mentioned, seems tempted to make a case against this point though even he acknowledges that the possibility of Justin's 'believing in the Spirit distinct from the Father and the Son' cannot be excluded (Barnard 1967: 104).

[4] Concerning the direct cause for the confusion of function, it would seem that Barnard and Rordorf proffer similar determinations, and Osborn perhaps goes one step farther when speaking of prophetic activity: Barnard (1967: 104); Rordorf, *Aug* 20 (1980: 293); Osborn (1973: 88–9).

[5] Goodenough, (1923; repr. 1968: 180, 185). He concluded, 'Justin regarded the Holy Spirit as a Person, the third in divine rank, but allowed himself to speak impersonally of the Spirit when he found the impersonal language more convenient.' Justin's 'impersonal' references to the Spirit would be when he speaks of the Spirit as an 'aspect or activity of the Logos.'

[6] Goodenough, (1923; repr. 1968: 187–8); *contra* Semisch's theory that the Christian conception of the Spirit was too idiomatic for Justin to attempt to present it to 'outsiders.' The evaluations of Barnard (1967: 106) and Stanton (2004: 330) would agree with Goodenough here, while Lebreton's statement (1928, vol. 2: 472) noted that the Father and Son, rather than the

I will agree with his first conclusion that Justin's confusion of function does not have to prevent the distinction of the Holy Spirit and Word. Yet, I shall also show that he does not distinguish their identity or activity in two passages. I will offer new explanations for his second and third conclusions, which suggest the direct and indirect causes for Justin's confusion. I shall argue the direct cause of the lack of clarity in Justin's approach to the Spirit is not due to Justin's tendency to consider the Spirit an aspect or activity of the Word (his second conclusion), but rather stems from a conflict between a binitarian tendency[7] and a Trinitarian confession. This conflict is apparent in his regular failure to differentiate their activity and his occasional failure to differentiate their identity, both of which occur alongside clear statements of Trinitarian belief. And I shall show that the indirect cause of his failure to distinguish, two times, the identities of the Word and Spirit, lies in his conception of both the Spirit and the Word as Powers, and not in the ubiquity of the concept of the Spirit in Hellenism and Judaism (his third conclusion). We turn now to the first section of this chapter: Justin's 'Trinitarian Convictions'.

1.1 TRINITARIAN CONVICTIONS

Several formulaic statements of faith included amongst Justin's writings exhibit his Trinitarian beliefs. In addition to these formulaic statements that reflect his liturgical experience,[8] he also expresses his Trinitarian convictions through a few of his own logical constructs. We will discuss the formulae first and then move on to his constructs.

1 *Apol* 61.3 and 10–13 reveal that early Baptismal ceremonies involved 'a washing in water in the name of God, the Father and Ruler of the universe, and

Spirit, were the primary focus of Justin's polemic. Vigne alone attempts to dismiss the issue in its entirety by positing a paucity of passages involved (2000: 341; he acknowledges only 1 *Apol* 33.6 and 36.1). As will be seen, however, Justin's failure to distinguish between the activity of the Spirit and the activity of the Word occurs throughout his work, including his discussion of prophetic activity, which undermines Vigne's conclusion (2000: 347) that Justin's pneumatology is powerfully articulated because of its strong link with prophecy.

[7] The term binitarian 'points to a bifurcation of the divinity (as opposed to "Unitarian"), while preserving a monotheistic worldview ("binitarian monotheism," as opposed to "dualism")' (Bucur, *ZNW* 98 2007: 121 n. 6). Examples of binitarianism may be found in Segal (1977: see esp. his comments on Justin, 220–5).

A 'binitarian tendency' is not an uncommon feature of this period's theology. C. Stead (1994: 156) states, 'the origin and function [of the Holy Spirit] are much less clearly worked out [than that of the Logos], and sometimes He almost disappears behind the Logos, so that historians of doctrine can speak of a "binitarian" tendency in the second century'.

[8] Lebreton, Kelly, and Rordorf note passages that refer to an existing tradition, and locate Justin's Trinitarian statements in the life of the early Church: Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 472–3); Kelly, (1960: 71–3); Rordorf, *Aug* 20 (1980: 286–9).

of our savior, Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit.'[9] The Eucharistic liturgy familiar to Justin contains similar references to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[10] His clearest affirmation of a Trinitarian faith, however, emanates from a reflection on early Christian worship services. Refuting the charge of atheism, Justin writes:

> we worship the Maker of the universe . . . (and) we will show that we worship with reason, having learned that he is the Son of the true God, holding him in the second place (χώρᾳ), and the prophetic Spirit in the third rank (τάξει).[11]

Here, Justin both affirms the belief of early Christians in God ('Indeed atheists we are not'), and differentiates the Father, Son, and Spirit according to their rank. The hierarchical ascription of rank to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit was a common way to differentiate the Three in second-century theological accounts, as the presence of similar expressions in Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and, even a little later, Origen indicates.[12] Indeed, we may go so far as to say that a hierarchical understanding of Trinitarian relations was the norm during this period.[13]

In addition to statements based upon his liturgical experience, Justin offers some original expressions that reveal his Trinitarian beliefs. Two passages show Justin himself thinks of the Spirit as having a distinct identity: 1 *Apol* 60.6–7 and *Dial* 36.6.

> (1 *Apol* 60.6–7) And as to [Plato's] speaking of a 'third,' since, as we said before, he read what was spoken by Moses, 'the Spirit of God is borne over the waters.' For indeed he gives second place to the Word from God, who he said 'was *X*-wise in the universe,' and third (place) to the Spirit who was said to be borne over the water, saying, 'And the third around the third.'[14]

[9] 1 *Apol* 61.3. Quotations of Justin come from Miroslav Marcovich's *Iustini Martyris Apologiae pro Christianis* (1994), and *Iustini Martyris Dialogus cum Tryphone* (1997). All translations of Justin are mine unless otherwise noted.

[10] 1 *Apol* 65.3 and 67.2; I will consider these passages in more detail later in this study.

[11] 1 *Apol* 13.1, 3.

[12] Goodenough's contention that a system of ranking is 'entirely incompatible with a doctrine of the Trinity' reflects a fourth-century perspective and lacks credibility given its widespread usage (Goodenough, 1923; repr. 1968: 186). Clement of Alexandria (*Quis Dives* 42.20) and Origen (*PA* 1.3.5) exhibit hierarchical understandings; Athenagoras uses τάξει to differentiate the members of the Trinity in *Emb* 10.5. Origen's understanding of hierarchy involves the ascription of degrees of divinity to the Three that does not occur in earlier uses of hierarchy.

[13] The pitfalls of using rank to differentiate the members of the Trinity were not clear in the second century, which explains why systems of ranking were utilized during that period of Christian theology. By the time Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo constructed their Trinitarian accounts, the perils of ranking the members of the Godhead had manifested themselves in subordinationist theologies in the third and early fourth centuries. This made ranking an untenable way to maintain Trinitarian diversity. Therefore, this statement by Justin embodies a typical, and sufficient, expression of Trinitarianism for the period.

[14] 1 *Apol* 60.6–7 For 'And the third around the third,' *see* Ps-Plato, *Ep.* 2.38e. I understand 'third (place)' (χώρα) to parallel third rank (τάξις) in 1 *Apol* 13.3.

> (*Dial* 36.6) After that the princes in heaven, seeing that he was without beauty, honor, or glory in appearance, and not recognizing him they asked, 'Who is this King of Glory?' And the Holy Spirit answered them, either in the name of the Father or in his own, 'The Lord of Powers. He is this King of Glory.'

Lebreton's comments on these passages are insightful. With regard to the selection from 1 *Apol* 60.6–7, he observes that Justin believes he has found 'un vestige défiguré' of the Mosaic writings in a quotation from *Timaeus*: 'he placed him as an *X* in the universe.'[15] Justin combines this selection from Timaeus with one from Ps-Plato ('And the third around the third.') to produce a statement that refers to both the Word and the Spirit, but neither *Timaeus* 36bc nor Ps-Plato *Ep* 2.38e refers to the spirit. According to Lebreton, Justin's exegesis is 'violente et arbitraire.' We do not find here the thought of Plato or the author of the letter, rather the thought of Justin appears even more clearly by means of the change he makes to his source. The alteration to the text reveals Justin will go to any length to find references to the Father, the Word, and the Spirit. Such resolution demonstrates his commitment to Trinitarian belief.[16]

Dial 36 consists of several Old Testament quotations meant to show, as 36.2 states, that 'Christ is called by parable *God*, and *Lord of Powers*, and *of Jacob* by the Holy Spirit.' A crucial phrase occurs in 36.6: 'the Holy Spirit … either in the name of the Father or in his own.' This expression cannot be understood if Justin does not conceive of the being of the Spirit in the same way that he conceives of the being of the Father.[17] Therefore, the reference to the name of the Spirit in contradistinction to that of the Father involves the distinction of the Spirit.

Justin also distinguishes the activity of the Spirit by attributing to the Spirit a special role in testifying to the deity and sovereignty of the Father and Son.[18] *Dial* 56.15 is the most interesting statement having to do with this particular activity. Prior to this passage Trypho challenges Justin to prove that another God, the Word, exists besides the Creator.[19] Justin responds with several passages from Scripture, including Ps. 110.1 and 45.7–8, to affirm the Holy Spirit called one other than the Creator, 'Lord.'[20] Then in *Dial* 56.15 Justin

[15] Lebreton, among others, suggests *Tim* 36bc as the source for this quotation; I find Barnard's addition of *Tim* 34ab unconvincing as it lacks the crucial reference to *χî* and Justin's discussion offers no conceptual parallels to 34ab (Barnard, ACW 56 1997: 169 n. 357).

[16] Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 475–6). Goodenough (1923; rep. 1968: 184) and Barnard (1967: 104) use this passage to make the same point.

[17] Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 476). Though we will discuss Justin's frequent conflation of prophetic agency, it does not occur in this passage; for the idea that the Spirit testifies about Christ includes the distinction of the Spirit from Christ.

[18] Based perhaps on 1 Cor. 12:3.

[19] *Dial* 56.12.

[20] *Dial* 56.14.

restricts the number of divine beings by challenging Trypho to state whether the 'Holy Spirit calls God and Lord any other besides the Father of all things and his Christ.'[21] Thus, the Holy Spirit holds a unique position of importance: his activity stands behind the texts of Scripture Justin uses to illustrate the divinity of the Father and his Word. Moreover, the casual manner in which Justin affirms statements about the Holy Spirit indicates that such an understanding of the importance of the Spirit is not a contested, or even a foreign, concept to the Jews as represented by Trypho.

Thus, Justin's writings evince his Trinitarian convictions in his references to the liturgy of the early Church, in his testimony concerning Christian beliefs, and in passages containing his own theological constructions. He considers the Spirit to be distinct in identity from the Father and the Son, and he regards the Spirit as following the Father and Son in rank, but grouped with them. He also distinguishes the activity of the Spirit when he refers to the testimony of the Spirit about the Father and the Son. The following sections will explore and explain, nonetheless, how Justin's account of the Spirit does not provide adequate support for his Trinitarian convictions.

1.2 THE INDISTINCT ACTIVITY OF SPIRIT AND WORD: BINITARIANISM IN CONFLICT WITH TRINITARIANISM

Despite the Trinitarian convictions documented in the first section of this study, Justin seldom ascribes distinct activity to the Spirit. Though many have described Justin's theology of the Spirit as confused because of his failure to distinguish the activities of the Spirit and Word, no one has demonstrated that Justin consistently fails to distinguish the activity of the Spirit. As a result, the binitarian orientation in Justin's logic has gone unnoticed. This has kept us from recognizing that the inadequacies of his approach to the Spirit are explained by the existence of a binitarian *schema* alongside Justin's Trinitarian beliefs. In this section of this chapter I will examine four discussions in which Justin does not distinguish the work of the Spirit and Word—evidence of a persistent binitarian tendency.

1.2.1 Rebuking the People of God

Several times in 1 *Apol* 63 and once in *Dial* 38.2, Justin uses the term ἐλέγχω to say the Spirit rebukes the Hebrews for not knowing God or his Word. In

[21] See also *Dial* 32.3, 33.2, 36.2, 36.6, 61.1, 124.4.

1 *Apol* 63, however, he does not limit his use of the word to the Holy Spirit, for he also attributes this activity to Jesus.[22]

> (1 *Apol* 63.2–3) Wherefore the prophetic Spirit through Isaiah, the prophet mentioned before, rebuked (ἐλέγχον) them … And Jesus Christ, because the Jews did not know what is the Father and what the Son, rebuking (ἐλέγχων) them likewise even said himself …
>
> (1 *Apol* 63.12–13) Wherefore the prophetic Spirit also rebuked (ἐλέγχον) them saying … and Jesus again, as we have shown, in their presence said …
>
> (1 *Apol* 63.14) Therefore the Jews having always supposed that the Father of the universe had spoken to Moses, though the one who spoke to him was the Son of God, who is called both Angel and Apostle, are rightly rebuked (ἐλέγχονται) by the prophetic Spirit and by Christ himself, since they knew neither the Father nor the Son.

As the chapter progresses, Justin intensifies the rebuke of the Jews by piling up ever more evidence for their guilt and by presenting the Spirit and Jesus as increasingly united in their confrontation of the Hebrew position. The rebuke of the Spirit in 1 *Apol* 63.2 is followed by Jesus' rebuke in 63.3, which Justin qualifies with ὁμοίως ('likewise') to accentuate their engagement in the same activity. Justin repeats the shared rebuke in 1 *Apol* 63.12–13, where the phrase 'and Jesus again, as we have shown' returns the reader to the earlier description of Jesus' activity in 1 *Apol* 63.3, thereby continuing to call attention to the joint nature of that activity. At the height of his argument against the Jews, Justin presents their activity as the most united: the Jews 'are rebuked by the prophetic Spirit and by Christ himself.' The deliberate manner in which Justin uses language to relate the Spirit and the Incarnate Word in their activity indicates that his presentation of their unity in the activity of the rebuke is not coincidental. Though Justin differentiates the Spirit and Christ throughout this passage, he intends to ascribe to them the same activity.

1.2.2 The Mechanism of Prayer

Justin does not discriminate between the roles of the Spirit and the Son in one of the most common features of the Christian life when he writes that believers pray through the Spirit and the Son, without distinguishing the function of

[22] Cf. Stanton (2004: 328). As Stanton points out, when Justin uses the term ἐλέγχω, the subject is the 'prophetic Spirit,' but Stanton has not noted that when he uses the term ὀνειδίξω (*Dial* 37.2 and 124.4) to refer to a parallel activity, the subject is the 'holy Spirit.' Though this observation is worth making, its significance remains unclear.

either one. In his well-known description of the celebration of the Eucharist the officiant 'sends forth praise and glory to the Father of all things through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.'[23] Then comes the formula, 'we bless the Maker of all through his Son, Jesus Christ, and through the Holy Spirit.'[24]

Such statements may not be as revealing as other instances considered in this study, because Justin's understanding may reflect the ambiguity of New Testament passages with regard to the roles of the Son and the Spirit in prayer. In John 15:16, Jesus directs his followers to make their requests to the Father in his name, and in Eph. 5:20 believers should be 'giving thanks always for all things to God the Father in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.' Eph. 6:18 bears a similar thought with regard to the Spirit: 'with all prayer and petition pray at all times in the Spirit.'[25]

Texts like these could account for Justin's approach, yet the liturgical practices Justin recounts have heightened the similarity of the roles of the Son and the Spirit. New Testament writings never instruct believers to pray in the name of the Holy Spirit, but that phrase is present in Justin as seen in the quotation from 1 *Apol* 65.3. While this move may indicate a desire to value the work and position of both the Son and the Spirit, the lack of differentiation in their roles limits the degree to which we may distinguish them.[26]

1.2.3 Adorning the Mind

> (*Dial* 4.1) 'Is there, then' [the Old Man] asked, 'in our mind such and so great a power–does not [the mind] quickly comprehend through the perception of the senses? Or will the human mind see God when not adorned (κεκοσμημένος) by the Holy Spirit?'
>
> (*Dial* 7.1) Long before the time of all those called philosophers, a long time ago, there were those who were blessed and righteous and loved by God, who spoke by the divine Spirit and declared things to come… And they call them prophets… who spoke only that which they heard and saw when filled (πληρωθέντες) by the Holy Spirit.

[23] 1 *Apol* 65.3: διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου ἀναπέμπει.

[24] 1 *Apol* 67.2: εὐλογοῦμεν… διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ιεσοῦ χριστοῦ καὶ διὰ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου.

[25] John 15:16. ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου; Eph. 5:20: ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ; Eph. 6:18: ἐν πνεύματι. The use of ἐν in these New Testament selections but διὰ by Justin should not cause concern since each preposition refers to both the Son and the Spirit–so the roles are not distinguished by means of particular prepositions. Moreover, Col. 3:17 uses both prepositions to convey the same idea, revealing a certain degree of overlap in meaning and convention: 'And whatever you do, in word or in deed, do it all in the name of the Lord Jesus (ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου Ἰησοῦ), giving thanks to God the Father through him (δι' αὐτοῦ).'

[26] Cf. Kretschmar (1956: 190).

The earliest chapters of *Dial* feature the Spirit. *Dial* 4.1 contains Justin's conversion narrative in which he declares, through the voice of the Old Man, that the Holy Spirit adorns the human mind in order to overcome its inability to see God. The statement of the Spirit's adorning activity in 4.1 follows *Dial* 3.7, where the philosophers cannot 'speculate correctly or speak truly of God'—those who have never seen or heard God can have no knowledge of him. The adorning activity of the Spirit in *Dial* 4.1 enables one to see God and, the reader presumes, also enables one to hear from God. When in *Dial* 7.1 Justin continues the discussion of 4.1 and defines the prophetic prediction of future events as being what 'the prophets heard and saw when filled by the Holy Spirit,' he states that the adorning of the Spirit referred to in 4.1 has the same effect as the filling of the Spirit in 7.1. *Dial* 4.1 and 7.1 establish, then, that adorning activity is that activity, that particular 'filling,' whereby the Spirit empowers a person to hear and see divine things—the necessary precondition for one to 'speculate correctly or speak truly of God.' Therefore, the Spirit is a source of knowledge other than the human mind, the source of knowledge that grants insight into divine things.[27] The prophets, filled with the adorning Spirit, possess the source of knowledge needed for correct speaking and speculation, that the aforementioned philosophers do not. The activity of the Spirit in *Dial* 4.1 resembles the activity of Christ in *Dial* 7.3:[28]

> Above all, pray for the gates of light to be opened for you, for [these truths] are neither visible nor comprehensible, unless God and his Christ give understanding (δῷ συνιέναι).

Justin's reference to the activity of 'God and his Christ' at the end of *Dial* 7.3 prompts one to question whether Justin distinguishes the adorning activity of the Spirit in 4.1 and 7.1 from the activity of 'God and his Christ' in 7.3. In the last sentence of 7.3 Justin writes that knowledge of God and creation 'are neither visible nor comprehensible, unless God and his Christ give understanding.' God and Christ also act as a source of knowledge other than the human mind, a source that grants an insight similar to the Spirit's, into divine things.

I have shown that the adorning or filling of the Spirit is the difference between the philosophers who cannot see and hear God in *Dial* 3.7 and the prophets who foretell what they have seen and heard in 7.1. In this regard, Justin's use of κοσμέω for the activity of the Spirit in *Dial* 4.1 conveys the same idea as πληρόω in 7.1. On the other hand, the role Christ plays in 7.3 is less

[27] van Winden (1971: 70–1).

[28] Stanton considers *Dial* 4.1 and 7.1, but he misses the connection between the adorning activity of the Holy Spirit in 4.1 and the activity of the prophets (filled by the Spirit) in 7.1. What is more important for our present study, he misses the resemblance between the adorning activity of the Holy Spirit in 4.1 and the activity of Christ in 7.3, stating instead that the activity of the Holy Spirit in 4.1 'foreshadows' that of Christ in 7.3 (Stanton 2004: 323–4).

clear. The difficulty stems from whether δίδωμι–συνίημι (in 7.3) should be understood to parallel κοσμέω (4.1) and πληρόω (7.1). In 7.3 Justin says the unbelieving prophets who are filled (ἐμπίπλημι) with an erring and unclean spirit have never done miracles as true prophets have done. Here ἐμπίπλημι parallels the filling (πληρόω) of the true prophets with the Holy Spirit in 7.1. *Dial* 7.3 ends with the Old Man imploring Justin to pray for the opening of the gates of light, thereby avoiding the blindness characterizing the false prophets, for things 'are neither visible nor comprehensible, unless God and his Christ give understanding.' Since the understanding given by God and Christ would enable the one who prays to be 'with sight,' this activity would seem to have the same effect as the adorning and filling activity of the Spirit.

Good reason exists, however, not to rush to the conclusion that Justin attributes to them the same activity: δίδωμι–συνίημι could just as well distinguish the activity of 'God and his Christ' from the activity of the Spirit defined by κοσμέω and πληρόω. Justin would then be positing one activity in which the involvement of all three persons is distinct, but such an explanation would surpass Justin's grasp of activity within the Godhead.[29] Therefore, since the effect of the Spirit's adorning activity in *Dial* 4.1 is identical to the activity of 'God and his Christ,' and since Justin does not indicate that the various verbs are intended to function as a means of differentiation, we ought to conclude that Justin conceives of the adorning activity as belonging to the Spirit and to 'God and his Christ' without distinction.

1.2.4 The Inspiration of Prophecy

The frequent use of the title 'prophetic Spirit' by Justin would seem to suggest that he considers the Spirit's role in producing prophecy to be a distinguishing activity.[30] Justin's statements, however, about the agency of the Word and Spirit in the production of prophecy do not support such a conclusion. While Justin's discussion of this topic in 1 *Apol* 33.9 is more succinct, 1 *Apol* 36–51 is more significant. 1 *Apol* 38–51 unpacks the statement made in 36.1–2:

[29] Fundamental to such an account is an explanation of how the Three are united as One, and how the One is differentiated as Three. Only after one can articulate the diversity and unity of the members of the Godhead, can one express how the Three can engage in one activity and remain distinct. I hope to show in the final section of this chapter that Justin's logic is far from being able to express the fundamental feature necessary to this reasoning.

[30] The title 'prophetic Spirit' is Justin's most common way to refer to the Spirit of God. There is no reason to think that Justin conceives of more than one Spirit: a 'holy Spirit,' a 'prophetic Spirit,' etc. We find confirmation of this in the fact that he understands the seven spirits of Isa. 11:1–3, including the spirit of foreknowledge/prophecy, to refer to the one Spirit of God (*Dial* 39.2 and 87.2; see Section 1.3.2).

> But when you hear the sayings of the prophets spoken as if from a person, you should not believe they are spoken from the inspired persons themselves, but from the divine Word who moves them. For sometimes He speaks as one announcing future things that are to be; sometimes He speaks as if from the person of God the Father and Master of all; sometimes as if from the person of Christ; sometimes as if from the person of the people answering the Lord and His Father.[31]

In this pericope Justin explains that the divine Word moves the prophets in the process of inspiration by communicating with them under four different personae. In the sections that follow, however, he says it is the 'prophetic Spirit' who communicates with the prophets under the same four personae. First, the prophetic Spirit 'speaks from the person of Christ' in 1 *Apol* 38.1.[32] Second, 1 *Apol* 39–43 contains Justin's discussion about the communication of 'future things that are to be.' The initial lines of 39.1 open the discussion, 'when as one prophesying future things, the prophetic Spirit says things that are to be;' and the opening lines of section 42.1 initiate the conclusion of the discussion, 'when the prophetic Spirit speaks of future things that are to be.'[33] Third, the holy prophetic Spirit speaks 'as if from [the person of] God the Master and Father of all things' in 1 *Apol* 44–5.[34] And fourth, in 1 *Apol* 47.1 Justin notes the prophetic Spirit said words that 'were spoken as if from the person of the people.'[35] 1 *Apol* 48.4 and 49.1 combine to refer again to the Spirit predicting 'as if from the person of Christ himself.'[36] The presence of nearly identical wordings with regard to the activity of the Spirit in the sections following 1 *Apol* 36 as we find for the Word in 1 *Apol* 36.1–2 warrants the

[31] *Ὅταν δὲ τὰς λέξεις τῶν προφητῶν λεγομένας ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου ἀκούητε, μὴ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμπεπνευσμένων λέγεσθαι νομίσητε, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτοὺς θείου Λόγου· Ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ ὡς προαγγελτικῶς τὰ μέλλοντα γενήσεσθαι λέγει, | ποτὲ δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ δεσπότου πάντων καὶ πατρὸς θεοῦ φθέγγεται, ποτὲ δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ποτὲ δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου λαῶν ἀποκρινομένων τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτου·*. Though on occasion producing a stilted translation, I have always rendered *ἀπό* as 'from' in order to highlight the continuity in Justin's language.

[32] *Ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ Χριστοῦ λέγῃ*. In 1 *Apol* 37.1, Justin introduces a quotation saying, 'the words were spoken from the person of the Father through the aforementioned prophet Isaiah.' The most recent quotation of Isaiah occurs in 35.5 where Marcovich supplies *τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα* to clarify the ambiguity with regard to the subject of *λέγει*. However, this attribution is not clear-cut given the fact that references to the divine Word as the agent of inspiration bracket this passage (in 1 *Apol* 36.1, and esp. 1 *Apol* 33.9 where 'none other than the divine Word' inspires). Thus, 'from the person of the Father' in 1 *Apol* 37.1 could be given first place in this discussion. Nevertheless, I have chosen not to include it because it lacks the explicit reference to the 'prophetic Spirit' that occurs in the other locations—a problematic deficiency since the previous reference to the inspiring agent of Isaiah remains uncertain.

[33] 1 *Apol* 39.1: *Ὅταν δὲ ὡς προφητεῦον τὰ μέλλοντα γίνεσθαι λαλῇ τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα*; and 42.1: *Ὅταν δὲ τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα τὰ μέλλοντα γίνεσθαι . . . λέγῃ*.

[34] 1 *Apol* 44.2: *ὡς ἀπὸ <προσώπου> τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου θεοῦ*.

[35] 1 *Apol* 47.1: *εἴρηνται . . . ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου λαῶν*.

[36] 1 *Apol* 49.1: *ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

conclusion that Justin intends to assign the same activity of revelation to both the Spirit and Word in 1 *Apol.*

The failure to distinguish between the Spirit and the Word in the activity of inspiration is not limited to 1 *Apol* but also occurs in his *Dial.*[37] Two observations illustrate this fact. First, a survey of the text reveals that of the nineteen different verbs Justin uses in *Dial* to refer to the Spirit or the Word as the agents behind revelation, eleven are used of the Spirit alone, two of the Word alone, and five of both the Spirit and the Word.[38] So, while in *Dial* Justin uses more verbs to refer to the agency of the Spirit than that of the Word, at least seven, and possibly eight, of the nineteen verbs apply to the Word. This reveals considerable overlap in the language he uses to discuss revelatory activity.

Second, the more interesting, and perhaps more illuminating, observation stems from the fact that Justin refers only to the Spirit as the agent of revelation in the early portion of *Dial*, but changes his practice at the moment he begins a focused argument for the divinity of the Word in *Dial* 55–62. There, the majority of his references are to the Word as the agent of revelation. References to the Spirit as the agent of revelation predominate once again when the divinity of the Word ceases to be his primary concern, though the revelatory activity of the Word remains present.[39] Justin's emphasis on the revelatory agency of the Word during the course of his argument serves as a secondary justification for the Word's divinity. The fact that he makes use of this additional device highlights the freedom with which he alternates the activity of revelation in *Dial* when it suits his purpose.[40]

Justin's ascription of prophetic agency to both the Spirit and the Word attenuates the significance of prophetic activity for our understanding of Justin's conception of the Spirit. It also diminishes how much the title 'prophetic Spirit,' his most frequent name for the Holy Spirit, differentiates the Spirit from the Word.[41] Nevertheless, the ever-present title 'prophetic Spirit' ought to be recognized as Justin's attempt to say something distinct

[37] Justin makes no statements applicable to this discussion in 2 *Apol.*

[38] See the chart appended to the end of this essay. In addition to the five verbs that are used for both the Spirit and the Word, Justin uses λογίζομαι in *Dial* 56.14 with regard to the Spirit, in parallel with ὀνομάζω in *Dial* 56.13 with regard to the Word. Thus, of the nineteen words used in *Dial*, six could be used for both the Spirit and the Word.

[39] According to my count, Justin refers to the Spirit as the agent of revelation nine times in *Dial* 1–54; to the Spirit seven times and to the Word eight times in *Dial* 55–62; to the Word twice in *Dial* 63, which may be seen as a continuation of *Dial* 55–62 or the beginning of the discussion of the Word's incarnation; to the Spirit eleven times and to the Word six times in *Dial* 64–142.

[40] That the ascription of prophetic activity to the Word is an aspect of Justin's argument in *Dial* weighs against Lebreton's proposal that Justin attributes this activity to the Word when his readers are more receptive to that idea than to the inspiration of the Spirit—that is, the Greek readers of 1 *Apol* (Lebreton 1928, vol. 2: 464–5).

[41] *Contra*, Vigne (2000). At the root of Vigne's argument lies the understanding that the Spirit possesses a peculiar link to the concept of prophecy in Justin's mind. This analysis undermines such a determination.

about the activity of the Spirit,[42] even if he fails in this attempt.[43] Therefore, Justin attributes prophetic agency to both the Spirit and the Word, negating much of its ability to distinguish between the Spirit and the Word. Distinct, however, the Spirit and the Word do remain in these discussions, even if with little justification.

Justin fails to distinguish between the activity of the Spirit and the Word in each of these four examples, which serves as evidence for his binitarian orientation. Yet, the recognition of this binitarian *schema* cannot lead us to discount that he continues to affirm their distinction, even if his logic entails no justification for doing so. We must affirm, then, that in these passages he manifests a binitarian theological account alongside Trinitarian theological convictions. We may attribute this discord between logic and affirmation to the early Christian transition from binitarian to Trinitarian theological accounts.[44] Given this state of transition, it should not surprise the reader to find in Justin elements of a binitarian orientation that extend beyond the failure to distinguish the activity of the Spirit and the Word to a failure to distinguish the identity of the Spirit and the Word. The last section of this study will document two such occurrences, wherein Spirit-Christology further reveals a binitarian tendency in Justin.

1.3 SPIRIT-CHRISTOLOGY IN 1 APOL 33 AND DIAL 87–88: THE SUBORDINATION OF TRINITARIAN CONVICTION TO BINITARIAN ORIENTATION

The final section of this chapter will show that Justin twice fails to differentiate the identities of the Word and Spirit, and that we should recognize both of these occasions as instances of Spirit-Christology. We have already found a binitarian tendency in Justin by observing his frequent failure to distinguish the activity of the Spirit from that of the Word. The presence of Spirit-Christology in 1 *Apol* 33 and *Dial* 87–88 should be understood as rare

[42] Though I remain unconvinced by Vigne's argument (2000: 343) that the title 'prophetic Spirit' is equivalent to that of 'holy Spirit', I commend his desire to understand the significance of the title, rather than to assume its obvious character. For previous attempts to understand the title 'prophetic Spirit' see Robinson (1920: 25) and Grant (1993: 12).

[43] The distinction Justin intends to present contradicts Osborn's statement (1973: 89) that 'from the subject matter of prophecy it is clear that only the logos can be its author'. On the other hand, it reaffirms Goodenough's critique of von Engelhardt, who 'referred prophetic inspiration ultimately to the Logos, and considered the Holy Spirit to be only the personal agent whom the Logos used for that purpose. Von Engelhardt adduces no evidence for the suggestion because there is none to adduce' (Goodenough 1923; repr. 1968: 181).

[44] Segal (1999: 79).

occurrences in which Justin subordinates his Trinitarian convictions to a binitarian orientation. We will see that the binitarian tendency that manifests itself in Justin's failure to distinguish between the activity of the Spirit and the activity of the Word, twice manifests itself as a binitarian account of the Godhead.

Goodenough's analysis of *Dial* 128 went a long way toward finding in Justin a doctrine of Spirit-Christology when he showed Justin understands the Word to be classed among irreducible Powers, a certain category of angels, since they share origin and function.[45] His contention that Justin conceived of the origin of the Holy Spirit along the same lines—the Spirit, like the Word, went forth as a Power from the Father—would have completed the picture if he had been able to produce a text in which Justin affirms the Spirit to be a Power. He could not do so, leaving him to argue for the connection, and that but weakly: 'Justin had but one theory for the generation of Divine Beings, that of emanation from the One Divine Source . . . There is no reason for trying to imagine for Justin a different sort of emanation of the Holy Spirit.'[46] He could produce no more compelling evidence for this assertion than a reference to 1 *Apol* 6.2: 'we worship and revere both that one and the Son from Him, who came and taught us these things, and the army of good angels, who follow and are like him, and the prophetic Spirit, honoring (him) in reason and truth.'[47]

We now may supplement Goodenough's classification of the Word as an irreducible Power with the later essay of Christian Oeyen, which showed that Justin's references to δυνάμεις in *Dial* 87 ought to be identified with the Spirit.[48] Though he himself does not make the connection, Oeyen's study completes Goodenough's work. It enables us to discern that for Justin both the

[45] Goodenough (1923; repr. 1968: 148–50, 155–9); he focuses on *Dial* 128.3–4. According to Goodenough, as a result of its common origin with these Powers, the will of God alone determines the unique rank of the Word (*Dial* 93.2, 'he who loves God . . . will, because God wishes, revere that angel who is loved by the same Lord and God'). C. Oeyen added to this conversation by pointing out that Justin distances himself from the idea of reducibility that is conveyed in *Dial* 128.3, and which would be an early form of modalism (Oeyen, *SP* 11. 2 1972: 215–21, here 221 n. 2). He also notes that the Word is only ever referred to as 'power' in the singular, concluding: 'while the one Holy Spirit and the seven powers are identical, the Son is the first, separated from all others' (p. 221).

[46] Goodenough (1923; repr. 1968: 185).

[47] Ibid. 186. The weakness in Goodenough's use of this passage lies in the fact that its association of the Spirit with the good angels is not explicit. In using it, Goodenough does not prove, but rather assumes, Justin would not have placed the Spirit after the angels unless they shared their origin, and to a certain degree, their identity.

Robinson's view (1920: 27) that Justin's 'immediate purpose was to show what a wealth of spiritual powers Christianity could set out in contrast to the "many gods"—the demons—of the heathen world' runs counter to Justin's desire to differentiate the true God from other spiritual beings not deserving worship.

[48] Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 (1972: esp. 219–1). This study follows his work on corresponding concepts in Clement of Alexandria (Oeyen, *IKZ* 55 1965 and *IKZ* 56 1966). Bucur's articles mentioned above build upon Oeyen.

Word and the Spirit belong to a category of heavenly beings called 'Powers,' a class also inhabited by certain angelic beings. This common origin and to a certain degree, identity, shared by the Word, the Spirit, and Angelic beings, as powers emanating from the Father, accounts for Justin's insertion of the angels into 1 *Apol* 6.2. Recognizing Justin's mutual classification of the Word and the Spirit as 'Powers' forms the basis for the final stage of this discussion: the identification of texts exhibiting a Spirit-Christology that involves the subordination of Trinitarian beliefs to binitarian logic. We now turn to consider 1 *Apol* 33 and *Dial* 87.[49]

1.3.1 The Incarnation

1 *Apol* 33.6 reads:

> Therefore the Spirit and the Power that is from God should be understood according to custom as nothing other than the Word (who is also the First-begotten of God)... this one (the Word/Power/Spirit), when it came upon the virgin and overshadowed her, caused her to conceive not by intercourse, but by power.

The binitarianism evinced in Justin's failure to distinguish the activity of the Spirit from that of the Word finds its most explicit expression in Justin's statement that the Holy Spirit and Power from God mentioned in the annunciation narrative are none other than the Word. Moreover, the phrase 'according to custom' suggests Justin's interpretation was a common tradition within the Jewish-Christian community of the early Church.[50]

The significance of Justin's classification of the Word and Spirit among the Powers now becomes clear. In 1 *Apol* 32 he lays the groundwork for his conclusions in 1 *Apol* 33 when he says the Incarnation occurs through the agency of the Word because of its status as the first Power. Justin's reference to the testimony of Moses in 1 *Apol* 33.6 refers to the quotation of Gen. 49:10

[49] The broader conceptual background for this discussion can be found in the work of Levison, esp. *SBLSP* 34 (1995), Gieschen, *SBLSP* 33 (1994) and (1998: esp. 114–19) and Bucur (2009). Simonetti's earlier essay, *Aug* 12 (1972: 201–32), should not be overlooked.

[50] Cf. Kelly (1960: 146–49, esp. 149). Justin's appeal to tradition to support his interpretation suggests an awareness of a competing tradition that did not identify the Holy Spirit, the Power, and the Word, or at least the recognition that the annunciation narrative could be read in a way that would not necessitate their identification. Evidence for a competing tradition may be found in Ignatius, *To the Ephesians* 18.2, 'The fact is, our God Jesus Christ was conceived by Mary according to God's dispensation of the seed of David, it is true, but also of the Holy Spirit.' Unless otherwise noted, quotations of Ignatius are from J.A. Kleist, *The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St Ignatius of Antioch* (ACW 1; New York: Paulist Press, 1946).

which he explicates in 1 *Apol* 32. The portion of that analysis which interests us most is his elucidation of 'blood of the grape' in 1 *Apol* 32.8–11.[51] Justin contends that 'blood' signifies the Messiah would be human, but the idea that the blood comes from 'the grape,' as opposed to a human being, indicates that Jesus did not come from human seed but from the power of God. Having eliminated the possibility of conception by human agency, the Word as the first power after God the Father and Master of all then becomes the agent of its own incarnation.

This interpretation of Gen. 49:10 followed by the end of 1 *Apol* 32 and the whole of 1 *Apol* 33 forms Justin's account of how 'being made flesh, he became human.'[52] Within this account, the equation of the Holy Spirit, Power, and Word in 1 *Apol* 33.6 is central to the success of his present argument. By identifying these three, Justin attempts to obviate the dissonance between his exegesis of Gen. 49:10 in 1 *Apol* 32.8–11, which consigns the Incarnation to the activity of the Word, and his quotation of the New Testament narratives concerning Mary's impregnation in 1 *Apol* 33.4–6, which associate the same activity with the Holy Spirit and the Power of God.

Preeminent in Justin's analysis of the Incarnation of the Word in 1 *Apol* 32 and 33 is his identification of the Word as a Power of God. In 1 *Apol* 32.9 the Word is *πρώτη δύναμις μετὰ τὸν πατέρα πάντων*, 'the First Power after the Father of all,' who himself was empowered to accomplish the divine impregnation of the virgin Mary.[53] In 1 *Apol* 33.6 comes the equation of the Word and Power already mentioned, which identifies the Word as the one 'who is also the First-begotten of God,[54] as Moses, the previously mentioned prophet, testified.' This reference to the testimony of Moses sends us back to Justin's explication of Gen. 49:10 in order to understand what Justin means by 'First-begotten of God.' We find there the only statement to which he could be referring, that the Word is 'the First Power after the Father of All.' Therefore, Justin's discussion of the Incarnation ends where it began, emphasizing all along the identification of the Word as a Power, or the First Power of God.

These references to the Word as Power combined with his understanding of the Spirit as Power enables Justin to take the next step and assert the Word to be Spirit: Word = Power = Spirit is the same as Word = Spirit—a statement of Spirit-Christology.[55] We are now able to add content to Goodenough's suspicion, stemming from 1 *Apol* 33.6, that Justin 'had no clear notion' of a

[51] Barnard (1997: 150 n. 229).
[52] 1 *Apol* 32.9.
[53] On the empowerment of the Word, see Goodenough (1923; repr. 1968: 236–7).
[54] *Πρωτότοκος τῷ θεῷ*.
[55] Lebreton is on the right track when he suggests that the confusion in this passage is possible because of the lack of clarity the terms 'spirit' and 'power' possess, especially in the first centuries of the Church (Lebreton 1928, vol. 2: 477).

'metaphysical or functional distinction.'[56] Justin's failure to distinguish the identities and activities of the Spirit and the Word in 1 *Apol* 33.6 rests upon their common classification as Powers.

At this point I will offer a cautionary note. Barnard states that 1 *Apol* 33.6 'seems decisive proof, at least on the surface, that for Justin Spirit and Logos were two names for the same person.'[57] He qualifies this assertion with the phrase 'at least on the surface,' and he even goes on to say that this understanding 'does not exclude the possibility of his believing in *the* Spirit distinct from the Father and the Son.'[58] Nevertheless, saying, 'for Justin Spirit and Logos were two names for the same person,' though true to Justin's thought in 1 *Apol* 33, borders on the brink of generalization. Such a generalization would fail to reflect the majority of cases in Justin's writing in which he affirms the distinction of the Spirit and the Word while failing to distinguish their activity. In other words, his incipient theological account, defined by a binitarian framework, is unable to express his Trinitarian faith—a faith, nevertheless, which remains Trinitarian.

1.3.2 The Bestowal of Spiritual Gifts

Dial 39 and 87 contain similar lists of spiritual gifts.[59] The difference between the list of spiritual gifts presented in *Dial* 39.2 and those presented in *Dial* 87.2 can be explained by Justin's dependence on Isa. 11 alone in *Dial* 87.2, but on both 1 Cor. 12 and Isa. 11:2–3 in *Dial* 39.2. Stanton writes, 'three allusions to 1 Corinthians 12 are woven into the list (of gifts in 39.2): "healing" recalls 1 Cor. 12:9b;

[56] Goodenough (1923; repr. 1968: 236). Recognizing the presence of a Spirit-Christology in Justin's thought negates the need to suggest that the identification of the Spirit and Word reveals an attempt by Justin to avoid the notion of the Spirit's superiority over the Word, which Goodenough says would accompany a doctrine in which the activity of the Spirit renders Mary pregnant. Justin gives no indication that he intends to avoid such a 'parental relation' by means of his argument, neither should we understand its purpose as such.

According to Stanton (2004: 331) anyone who interprets 1 *Apol* 33.6 as confirming 'that for Justin the Spirit and the Logos were two names for the same person proposes a conclusion that outruns the evidence'. He bases this determination, however, on an inaccurate understanding of Goodenough, whose observation (1923; repr. 1968: 181) with regard to the paucity of evidence for such a conclusion refers to the notion that Justin fails to distinguish the Spirit and Word in his references to prophetic agency. Goodenough's analysis of 1 *Apol* 33.6 in pp. 235–6 are of a different character altogether, as my quotations indicate. Swete's assessment (1912: 38) is accurate: 'while [Justin] usually distinguishes the Spirit of prophecy from the Logos, he fails to draw this distinction in reference to the Conception'.

[57] Barnard (1967: 104).

[58] Ibid. 104; author's emphasis.

[59] Many have commented upon the roles that Christ and the Spirit play in the distribution of spiritual gifts in these chapters of the *Dialogue*. See, for instance, Goodenough (1968: 186); Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 478); Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 (1922: 215–21); Osborn (1973: 92); Morgan-Wynne, *VC* 38 (1984: 172–7, here 174–5); Skarsaune (1987: 196–7, 274–6); Vigne (2000: 339–41); Stanton (2004: 332–4).

"foreknowledge" is just Justin's interpretation of "prophecy" in 1 Cor. 12:10b; and "teaching" alludes to 1 Cor. 12:28.'[60] But while Isa. 11:2–3 refers to the Spirit alone and 1 Cor. 12:11 attributes the distribution of the gifts to the activity and volition of the Spirit, *Dial* 39.4 quotes Ps. 68:19 to assert the primacy of Christ in this activity following his ascension: 'These are the words: "he ascended on high; he made captivity captive; he gave gifts to men".'[61] *Dial* 39.4 offers no explanation for this departure from Isa. 11:2–3 and especially 1 Cor. 12. *Dial* 87, however, contains a similar reading, though based upon Isa. 11:1–3 alone, that clarifies Justin's approach.

Dial 87.2 begins with the quotation of Isa. 11:1–3 which Trypho uses to challenge the preexistence of Christ: 'How can it be shown that he was preexisting, who through the powers of the Holy Spirit, which the Scripture of Isaiah enumerates, is filled as if he was lacking them?' Trypho's question follows from the determination that preexistence rests upon Christ's possession of the powers of the Holy Spirit. In order for Justin to demonstrate continuity between the pre- and post-incarnate states of being he must show Christ to be linked with the powers of the Holy Spirit at all times, in particular his pre-incarnate possession of those powers. If the powers are bestowed upon Christ at some time during his incarnation, at his baptism for instance or even at the moment of his birth, then according to Trypho his preexistence cannot be affirmed, leaving Justin to work with an adoptionist theology. In response to Trypho, Justin asserts Christ's continual possession of the powers by stating in *Dial* 87.3 and 87.5 that the powers 'find an end on' Christ.

> (*Dial* 87.3) The scriptures say these powers of the Spirit, the ones enumerated, have come on him (Christ) not as if he was lacking them, but as if intending to find their rest on that one, that is to find an end on him.[62]
>
> (*Dial* 87.5) The Spirit rested, therefore, that is ceased, when that one (Christ) came. After which <by means of> this economy [the powers] were bound to cease among you, and while taking rest in this one they will occur again in time among his people; gifts will occur as has been prophesied, which from the grace of the power of his Spirit may be given to those who believe in him, by his knowledge of the worth of each one.[63]

[60] Stanton (2004: 332).

[61] Skarsaune suggests Justin's quotation of Ps. 68:19 comes from Eph. 4:8, it is then appropriate to note Eph. 4:7 emphasizes Christ's role in the giving of gifts (1987: 100).

[62] *Ταύτας τὰς κατηριθμημένας τοῦ πνεύματος δυνάμεις οὐχ ὡς ἐνδεοῦς αὐτοῦ τούτων ὄντος φησὶν ὁ Λόγος ἐπεληλυθέναι ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἀνάπαυσιν μελλουσῶν ποιεῖσθαι, τουτέστιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πέρας ποιεῖσθαι.*

[63] *Ἀνεπαύσατο οὖν, τουτέστιν ἐπαύσατο, ἐλθόντος ἐκείνου, μεθ᾽ ὃν <διὰ> τῆς οἰκονομίας ταύτης παύσασθαι ἔδει αὐτὰ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀνάπαυσιν λαβόντα πάλιν <ἐπελθεῖν> τοῖς ἐν χρόνῳ ἀνθρώποις αὐτοῦ γενομένοις, ὡς ἐπεπροφήτευτο γενήσεσθαι δόματα, ἃ ἀπὸ τῆς χάριτος τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκείνου τοῖς ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν πιστεύουσι δίδωσιν, ὡς ἄξιον ἕκαστον ἐπίσταται.*

Dial 87.5 expands upon the introductory statement of 87.3, which states Christ did not receive the powers listed in Isa. 11:1–3 'as if he was lacking them,' but rather as if they found 'an end on him.' Justin offers an interpretation of the text of Isaiah which he believes does not jeopardize the preexistence of Christ – an interpretation that affirms Christ's pre-possession of the powers of the Holy Spirit. The key movement in the explanation of *Dial* 87.5 is Justin's interpretation of the 'resting of the powers' in Isa. 11:1–3 as 'ceasing.' 'Rest' should not be interpreted as indicating any addition of powers, rather 'rest' means that the powers 'cease.' By 'cease' Justin intends to convey that Christ did not lack the powers—that he already possessed them.

Scholars, however, have not explained how Justin's conception of these powers 'ending' or 'ceasing' in the person of Christ explains their continual possession by Christ. Skarsaune comes close to broaching the subject:

> One should expect an interpretation (of Isa. 11:1–3) along the lines of John 1:32f (... *καὶ ἔμεινεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν*): the Spirit should find its lasting *rest* in Jesus, i.e., abide permanently on him... But this exegesis of *ἀναπαύσεται* is only hinted at by Justin. The main thrust of his argument in *Dial* 87 goes in another direction: *ἀνάπαυσιν ποιεῖσθαι* means *πέρας ποιεῖσθαι*.[64]

He then associates this exegetical maneuver with Justin's conception of the relationship between Jesus and John—John's activity ceases at Jesus' coming.[65] Nevertheless, what Justin means by *ἐπ' αὐτοῦ πέρας ποιεῖσθαι* ('to find an end on him') remains unexplained. I believe the answer lies in Justin's identification of Christ as a Power combined with Oeyen's study that identifies the Spirit with power language and the grouping of seven Powers in particular in *Dial* 87.

Oeyen argues from *Dial* 87.2–3 that the seven spirits enumerated in the quotation of Isa. 11:1–3, and referred to by both Trypho and Justin as 'Powers of the Holy Spirit', appear to be a 'definite number of higher hypostases' rather than 'an accidental naming of several powers among many others.'[66] Justin's alternating references in *Dial* 87.3–4 to 'Powers of the spirit' and to various 'spirits' with regard to the seven spirits listed in Isa. 11:1–3 shows he uses the words 'Power' and 'Spirit' to refer to the same reality.[67] Furthermore, Justin coordinates 'Power' and 'Powers' in *Dial* 88.1: 'it was not because he lacked

[64] Skarsaune (1987: 196–7); author's emphasis.
[65] *Dial* 49–51.
[66] Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 (1972: 218).
[67] Ibid. 219.

Power that it was prophesied that the Powers enumerated by Isaiah would come on him, but because they (the Powers) will no longer exist.'[68] In so doing, he summarizes the understanding with which he worked throughout *Dial* 87: the one Power and the seven Powers of the Spirit are

> the same reality, which is at the same time one and sevenfold; the one power is the fullness, which contains all seven powers and brings them to unity. In the end (88.1) the argument that governs the whole interpretation is repeated once more: Christ does not need the power of the Spirit, which came down on him at the Jordan, but it comes, in order to find its rest on him.[69]

Oeyen calls attention to *Dial* 116.1 where Justin refers to the angel of God that stands against the devil as the 'power of God who was sent to us through Jesus Christ.' He then states, 'This power can only be the Holy Spirit… Justin understands the Holy Spirit both as one power only, as well as a group of seven powers.'[70] Therefore, in *Dial* 87 and 88, Justin conceives of the seven 'Spirits' or 'Powers' referred to in Isa. 11:1–3 as identified with the 'Powers' or 'Power' of the Holy Spirit, and indeed, with the Holy Spirit itself.[71]

Thus, the 'Powers of the Holy Spirit' which must at all times be continually possessed by Christ refer to the Holy Spirit. Yet, we still have not determined how 'find an end on him' in *Dial* 87.3 and 'that is, ceased' in *Dial* 87.5 explain Christ's continual possession of the Spirit without affirming that the Spirit is ever added to Christ. Spirit-Christology meets both these interpretive conditions. In *Dial* 87 and 88, Christ is the incarnation of the Spirit-Power-Word, whom we have encountered as the agent of the incarnation in 1 *Apol* 33.6.

Justin uses the phrases *τουτέστιν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ πέρας ποιεῖσθαι* ('that is to find an end on him;' *Dial* 87.3) and *τουτέστιν ἐπαύσατο* ('that is ceased;' *Dial* 87.5) to explain the resting of the Spirit at the time of the Incarnation. The rest, that is 'ceasing' or 'ending,' of the Spirit involves the understanding that the one who once acted among the Jews ceases to act among them at the time of the Incarnation because that one, as Christ, now acts among those who believe in Christ.[72] This is why Justin states in *Dial* 87.5 that the gifts, which will occur among the followers of Christ, come 'from the grace of the power of his Spirit.'

[68] *Dial* 88.1: *οὐ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐνδεῆ δυνάμεως ἐπεπροφήτευτο ἐλεύσεσθαι ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς κατηριθμημένας ὑπο Ἡσαΐου, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐπέκεινα μὴ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.*

[69] Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 (1972: 220).

[70] Ibid. 220–21. For various interpretations of *Dial* 116.1 see the references listed by Oeyen, p. 220 n. 7. For an interpretation of the power as Christ, see Barbel (1941: 59–60).

[71] Oeyen argues Justin is identifying the Holy Spirit with the Sabai which, according to Second Temple Jewish traditions, are the highest class of angelic beings consisting of seven powers or spirits (Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 1972: 215–19).

[72] Justin's use of the terms 'gifts' in *Dial* 87.5 and 'charisms' in 88.1 emphasizes the new orientation of this activity in the new economy. Cf. Oeyen, *SP* 11.2 (1972: 219); Morgan-Wynne, *VC* 38 (1984: 177 n. 8).

With this phrase Justin signals that the same one who once acted among the Jews now acts as Christ among his followers. The incarnation of this one Spirit-Power-Word does not entail any notion by which the Spirit is added to Christ and affirms that Christ never lacks the Spirit. Therefore, recognizing the rubric of Spirit-Christology in *Dial* 87 and 88 explains why Justin does not understand the resting of the Spirit on Christ along the lines of Jn. 1:32, as Skarsaune would expect. The Spirit does not 'accompany' the Incarnate Word, rather it is the Spirit/Word who becomes incarnate—an argument that secures the pre-existence of Christ.

We may now explain Justin's apparent departure in *Dial* 39.2 from the references to the Spirit in Isa. 11 and 1 Cor. 12. If Justin intends his reference to Christ in 39.2 to be the Incarnate Spirit/Word, as he does in *Dial* 87, then it makes sense for him to use texts speaking of the gift-giving activity of the Spirit to support the gift-giving activity of the Christ. Nothing in 39.2 hinders or prevents this interpretation. At no time does Justin refer to the pre-incarnate identity of the Christ, permitting *Dial* 87 to guide our understanding of the parallel passage in 39.2. Therefore, Spirit-Christology enables us to grasp the reasoning of 39.2. The gift-giving activity of Christ did not exclude the gift-giving activity of the Spirit, but embodied it; the same understanding we find in 87.5.

Spirit-Christology also explains Justin's insistence on the symbolic nature of the baptismal accounts. *Dial* 88.4 states, 'he went to the river, we know, not as if he needed to be baptized or (needed) the Spirit who came on him in the form of a dove'—an assertion he sets up by stating in 88.2, 'as soon as [Christ] was born he possessed his Powers.' Justin eschews any interpretation of the baptismal accounts that ascribe to the resting of the Spirit on Christ any effect other than a symbolic confirmation of Christ's identity for the sake of other human beings because the logic of *Dial* 87 entails the presence of the Spirit in Christ already.[73] His position that the resting of the Spirit on Christ at his baptism has no effect permits Justin to continue to affirm that Christ does not receive the Spirit at his baptism. Since there is no effect, there is no reason to think that anything real happened. Therefore, the symbolic interpretation of the baptismal narrative in *Dial* 88 coordinates the Trinitarian theophany of the baptismal story, as presented in the New Testament writings, with the binitarian logic of Spirit-Christology underlying Justin's thought in *Dial* 87 and 88.[74]

[73] *Dial* 88.4 and 9 emphasize the symbolic interpretation. My argument seems to coincide with Skarsaune's proposal that *Dial* 87 and 88 reveal Justin to be interacting with two different sources, the second and apparently more influential 'regards Christ as endowed with his full *dynamis* from his birth' (1987: 197–9, here p. 199).

[74] Irenaeus' mature second-century theology, which is Trinitarian in logic, contrasts with Justin's symbolic interpretation. In *AH* 3.9.3 he interprets the descent of the dove in the baptismal narrative as indicating the Spirit's anointing of Christ. He quotes Isa. 11:1–3 to support his interpretation. *See* chapter 4, pp. 59–77 for my discussion of Irenaeus' account of the Spirit's anointing of Jesus.

In his consideration of the baptismal account of *Dial* 88.3, Stanton focuses his attention on the phrase that recounts Christ's entrance into the river: 'Jesus went down into the water and fire was ignited in the Jordan.' He concludes that fire 'evokes the Spirit.' Though he recognizes that Justin's reference to fire does not belong to the synoptic tradition, Stanton tries to bolster his conclusion with references to Matt. 3:11 and Luke 3:16 ('he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire').[75] If Justin did intend to associate fire with the Spirit, it would suggest that he does not consider the baptismal account to be purely symbolic, because it makes little sense to transmit a tradition that draws attention to the descent of the Spirit when arguing that the descent had no effect.

Stanton's association of *Dial* 88.3 with Matt. 3:11 and Luke 3:16 possesses several weaknesses, despite the fact that a basic similarity exists in their common topic of baptism and the common references to the Spirit and fire. The foremost flaw is the fact that Jesus was baptized with John's baptism, a baptism of repentance. Baptism with the Spirit and fire is that which Jesus will offer to his followers, not what he experienced. One could argue that Justin recognized this difference but casts Jesus' baptism as being similar to the baptism his own followers would later experience in order to establish continuity between Christ and his followers. But Justin presents the baptismal narrative in order to differentiate the Christ from all other men, especially the prophets of Israel who had possessed a portion of the Spirit in the past, not to establish continuity between Jesus and his followers. Thus, the notion that Justin intends to evoke the Spirit by his reference to fire cannot be supported by these verses in Matthew and Luke.

Stanton's treatment also fails to consider Skarsaune's contention that the presence of fire at Jesus' baptism follows the tradition of the *Sibylline Oracles*. *Sib* 6.4–7 reads, 'when [Jesus] had washed in the streams of the river Jordan, which moves with gleaming foot, sweeping the waves. He will escape the fire and be the first to see delightful God coming in the Spirit on the white wings of the dove.'[76] Skarsaune suggests Justin was probably not aware of the original meaning of the passage which intended to show that 'Jesus as God's Son was tested by the fire, but not made God's Son by his baptism'—the fire proved who Jesus was.[77] While Skarsaune's interpretation of what the Sibyl intended to convey (by the reference to fire) is not as evident as his statements imply, it would seem that *Sib* 6.4–7 does contain the tradition to which Justin refers. Therefore, Skarsaune may be correct that Justin's use of the story to simply proclaim Jesus' identity indicates he was unaware of its original meaning, for according to Justin, the baptism does not prove or test Jesus to be God's Son. More importantly for this present study, Skarsaune's argument that Justin

[75] Stanton (2004: 324).

[76] 'Sibylline Oracles,' (1983: here, 407).

[77] Skarsaune (1987: 392). Vigne attributes the fire in the Jordan to a Jewish-Christian milieu that Justin incorporates, corrects, and critiques (1992: 74, 310–11).

used the tradition to proclaim Jesus' identity alone undermines Stanton's suggestion that Justin's reference to fire 'evokes the Spirit.' Therefore, Justin's understanding of the baptismal account remains altogether symbolic, which permits its assimilation into a binitarian orientation.

We have found 1 *Apol* 33.6 and *Dial* 87–88 to be instances of Spirit-Christology, wherein the Spirit and Word/Christ are identified. At times, then, binitarianism leads Justin's logic to jeopardize his Trinitarian convictions. As with his failure to distinguish the activity of the Spirit and Word, these occurrences ought to be understood as reflecting the transition of earliest Christian theologies from binitarian to Trinitarian theological accounts. In acknowledging the transitional nature of Justin's thought, it is important to recognize that his rare binitarian accounts of the Godhead are very much the exceptions that prove the rule. Justin's commitment to Trinitarian belief is firm; it is just that his logic is not well enough developed to support his convictions, which results in occasional instances of Spirit-Christology.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter suggests the following alternatives to the three-point summary of Goodenough's conclusions that I offered earlier. First, confusion of function does not prevent Justin's distinction of the Word and Spirit in identity, though Justin does fail to distinguish their identity in 1 *Apol* 33.6 and *Dial* 87–88. Second, the direct cause of the lack of clarity in Justin's approach to the Spirit stems from a conflict between a binitarian tendency and a Trinitarian confession. This is evident from his regular failure to differentiate the activity of the Word and the Spirit and his occasional failure to differentiate their identities, both of which occur alongside clear statements of Trinitarian belief. Third, the indirect cause of the lack of clarity in Justin's approach to the Spirit lies in his utilization of a traditional understanding of the Word and Spirit as Powers.

Now that we have found evidence in Justin's thought for the existence of binitarian logic alongside Trinitarian belief, I would like to return to my point of departure. It is appropriate to classify Justin's understanding of the Spirit as confused, given his inability to construct a theology of the Spirit that possesses distinct conceptions of activity and identity. His theological account does not support the Trinitarian convictions his confessional statements confirm. In so finding, we cannot lose perspective and condemn a theologian of the second century for failing to meet the standards of the fourth century, a long-standing habit often found in earlier works. Neither, however, ought we to attribute to Justin a more developed approach to the Spirit than he, in fact, evinces. Binitarianism and Trinitarianism exist in tension within Justin to the detriment of the Holy Spirit who remains partially eclipsed by the Word.

This is the pneumatological milieu of the mid-second century. This is the state of pneumatological reasoning which Irenaeus encounters, from which he can draw, with which he has to work, and which he must overcome.

2

The Beginning of a Pneumatology

The previous consideration of Justin Martyr's understanding of the Spirit introduced the reader to the pneumatological arena in which Irenaeus began to write. The primitive state of pneumatology prior to Irenaeus required him to develop his own theology to convey the distinct activity and identity of the Spirit. He accomplishes little of this construction though in the first Book of *Against Heresies*.[1] *Against Heresies* 1 finds its way into this study more by way of what it does not contain than by what it does.

2.1 AGAINST HERESIES 1

2.1.1 The Spirit as Creator[2]

The Spirit as Creator theme will play a significant role later in Irenaeus' thought but it finds only the briefest of mentions in *AH* 1.22.1. Irenaeus begins his statement of the Rule of Truth found in that section with a discussion of the creative activity of God and his Word. He offers two supporting texts that will reappear in his accounts of God's creativity: Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) and John 1:3. Soon after he quotes these two verses, Irenaeus makes his first reference to the creative activity of the Spirit:

[1] Greek and Latin quotations of *Against Heresies* are taken from Irénée de Lyon, *Contre les Hérésies* in 10 volumes (Sources Chrétiennes; eds A Rousseau et al.; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965–82). Armenian quotations of *AH* 4 and 5 are taken from Irenäus, *Gegen die Häretiker* (1910). Translations of *AH* are mine, unless otherwise noted. Armenian quotations of *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* are taken from Irenaeus, *Εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος*; *The Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, with Seven Fragments* (tr. 1917, repr. 1989). Unless otherwise noted, translations of *Prf* are from St Irenaeus of Lyons, *On the Apostolic Preaching* (1997).

[2] I am indebted to Michel Barnes for directing my attention to the Spirit as Creator motif and its general significance in early pneumatologies. For a brief discussion of this tradition, see Barnes, *AugStud* 39 (2008: 171–4).

> Not by angels, nor by any powers which were separated from his thought (did he make); for the God of all things needs nothing. But in fact by his Word and Spirit he makes all things, disposing and governing and giving all of them existence.[3]

J. Armitage Robinson has suggested that Irenaeus' ascription of creative agency in 1.22.1 to both the Word and Spirit follows from Ps. 33:6: 'Here the Word and the Spirit seem to be brought together merely because they have occurred in the quotation, and there is no further reference to the Holy Spirit in the context.'[4] Robinson's reading, however, does not agree with Irenaeus' own comments before and after the verses. These comments make it clear that he means for Ps. 33:6 and John 1:3 to substantiate only the creative activity of the Word: 'There is one God almighty, who created all things by his Word . . . (and then) Now, the Father made all things by him.' It may be that Robinson overlooks Irenaeus' explicit use of these passages as proof-texts for the activity of the Word alone because he fails to recognize that Irenaeus' understanding of the creative activity of the Spirit develops over the course of his writing. Such a misconception would encourage him to interpret this passage in *AH* 1.22.1 in light of the later, more mature interpretation of Ps. 33:6 that occurs in *Prf* 5.[5]

In fact, however, Irenaeus' use of Ps. 33:6 does develop over the course of his writing. He quotes Ps. 33:6 three times. As we have just seen, the verse is used to substantiate the creative activity of the Word in *AH* 1.22.1. In 3.8.3, the second passage in which we find Ps. 33:6, the verse again supports the creative agency of the Word alone. There Ps. 33:6 follows quotations of John 1:3 and Ps. 33:9 (32:9 LXX). Irenaeus uses Ps. 33:6 to interpret Ps. 33:9: 'Whom, therefore, did [God] command (in Ps. 33:9)? The Word, of course, "by whom," he says, "the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the breath of his mouth" [Ps. 33:6].' Only in *Prf* 5, his most detailed and mature statement of the Spirit as Creator doctrine, does he use Ps. 33:6 to substantiate the activity of the Spirit. This change in Irenaeus' utilization of Ps. 33:6 reveals and reflects the development of his understanding of the Spirit's role in creation.[6]

[3] *AH* 1.22.1: *non per Angelos neque per Virtutes aliquas abscissas ab eius sententia, nihil enim indiget omnium Deus, sed et per Verbum et Spiritum suum omnia faciens et disponens et gubernans et omnibus esse praestans.*

[4] Robinson (1920: 49).

[5] It is clear from Robinson's method that he does not recognize the development that occurs in Irenaeus' thought with regard to the use of Ps. 33:6. He appropriates the variant form of Ps. 33:6 (which lacks 'of his mouth') that occurs later in *Prf* 5 to justify his statement that Irenaeus does not identify the Word and Spirit earlier in *AH* 1.22.1 (Robinson 1920: 49–50).

[6] For more on the change in Irenaeus' use of Ps. 33:6 and its significance see the Excursus that follows chapter 4.

In *AH* 1.22.1, then, Irenaeus provides support for the creative activity of the Word in the form of Ps. 33:6 and John 1:3, but he offers no justification for his inclusion of the Spirit as an agent of creation. The contrast between his ability to give textual support for the creative activity of the Word and his inability to do the same for the Spirit suggests he is familiar with a tradition that attributes creative activity to the Spirit but for which he is unable to tender Scriptural grounds at this point in his writing. This judgment finds support in his later statements with regard to the creativity of the Spirit where he quotes either a verse to support the creative activity of the Spirit, or uses different verbs to distinguish between the roles of the Word and Spirit in creation.[7] The absence of either of these elements in *AH* 1.22.1 is telling when compared to his later discussions.

At this point, Irenaeus was either relatively uninterested in the Spirit's creative activity or unable to express a tradition at least somewhat familiar to him. Such possibilities do not have to exclude each other. Nevertheless, we should exclude the possibility that Irenaeus would not have been interested in setting forth a proper understanding of the Spirit as Creator. So much is clear from the proximity of *AH* 1.22.1 to his discussion of the Barbeliote heresy.

The discussion of the Barbeliote notions of creativity that we find in *AH* 1.29.4 suggests that the brief reference to the Spirit's creative activity in 1.22.1 is due to his present inability to explain the Spirit's role. In *AH* 1.29.4, Irenaeus recounts the Barbeliote ideas with regard to the Holy Spirit, whom they also entitle Wisdom or Prounikos.[8] Here, Irenaeus says the Barbeliotes involve the Holy Spirit in creation as the one who generates a work called the 'First-Ruler, the Maker of this creation.' He then describes the activities of this First-Ruler:

> he stole (a) great power from his Mother . . . and made the firmament of the heavens, in which they say he also dwells. And since he is Ignorance, he made those Powers which are below him, and the Angels, and the firmament, and all terrestrial things.

Irenaeus was aware of the Barbeliote notion that the work of the Holy Spirit resulted in the creation of the firmament and all earthly things, as well as the making of Powers inferior to First-Ruler. It is difficult to imagine, then, that he would not have elaborated upon his understanding of the Spirit's creative activity in *AH* 1.22.1 if he had been able to do so—the heretical Barbeliote notions involving the Spirit in creation warranted a

[7] He utilizes various passages from scripture in his later writings to support the Spirit's creativity, for instance: Prov. 3 and 8 in *AH* 4.20.3, Ps. 33:6 in *Prf* 5. The nearest example of his coordination of particular verbs with the Word and Spirit occurs in *AH* 2.30.9. I will touch on *AH* 2.30.9 in chapter 3, but will examine his coordination of particular verbs with the creative agency of the Spirit as Wisdom in chapter 5.

[8] For a summary of the possible derivations of 'Prounikos' (*prunicum*) see St. Irenaeus of Lyons, *Against the Heresies*, (1992: 260 n.11).

corrective.[9] That Irenaeus could not provide an adequate corrective is further confirmed by recognizing that he could have challenged the Barbeliote ascription of the creation of powers to First-Ruler by utilizing Ps. 33:6 in accord with its traditional Spirit as Creator usage. In Theophilus, for instance, the Spirit creates the Power(s) of heaven.[10] Irenaeus uses Ps. 33:6 in just this way in *Prf* 5 and I can only imagine that he would have done so here if he could have.

Therefore, we have strong reason to believe that when Irenaeus composed *AH* 1.22.1 he possessed some awareness of a doctrinal tradition that involved the Spirit in God's creative activity, but his inability to explain the Spirit's role in creation reveals the immature state of his thought. He did not possess the more detailed understanding of the Spirit's role in creation that we find in texts before him,[11] nor the deeper understanding of the Spirit as Creator tradition evident later in his writing.[12] We can surmise, then, that Irenaeus did not yet have access to a source that provided logical and Scriptural support for the tradition—a source that would have augmented his understanding, enabling him to make polemical use of the tradition in the first Book of *AH*.

His limited apprehension of the Spirit as Creator tradition does not mean that his reference to the tradition in *AH* 1.22.1 is accidental. The purpose for which he appropriates the tradition shows that its use is deliberate. As with several later references to the creative activity of the Spirit, Irenaeus employs the tradition here to affirm that the one Creator God needs no help to create, because the Word and Spirit are the divine agents of his creation. Indeed, his next use of the tradition in *AH* 2.30.9 includes this very point. Thus, the fact that Irenaeus mentions the Spirit's involvement in creation without providing any logical or Scriptural support reveals the primitive state of his understanding. On the other hand, his appropriation of the tradition in a way that agrees with his later usage shows that its presence in *AH* 1.22.1 is deliberate and purposeful. In the earliest stage of his pneumatological development, he has already associated the tradition with his argument that creative activity belongs to the Creator God alone.

Irenaeus' use of the tradition to argue that God needs no help to create is itself traditional. Passages in Justin and Theophilus show this to be the case. In *Dial* 62.3 Justin derides an Israelite doctrine that regards God as speaking the words of Gen. 1:26 to the angels in order to assign to them the creation of the human body. Justin responds to these theories in *Dial* 62.4 by declaring the Son to be the Father's dialogue partner in Gen. 1:26. This implies the Son's

[9] While Irenaeus' various statements of the Rule of Truth (including that of *AH* 1.22.1) are more positive than polemical, they remain engaged with a polemic—in contrast, perhaps, to being governed by a polemic.

[10] e.g. Theophilus, *Autol* 1.7.

[11] e.g. Theophilus, *Autol* 1.7 and 2.18.

[12] e.g. his use of Ps. 33:6 in *Prf* 5.

involvement in creation, and, given the context, the creation of Adam in particular. In *Autol* 2.18 Theophilus states that the dialogue found in Gen. 1:26 makes it appear that God needs help to create. Theophilus argues that this is not the case, however, because Gen. 1:26 shows that God speaks to his Word and Wisdom.[13] They alone join him in creation, no one else. Both Justin and Theophilus make the same basic argument as Irenaeus: God needs no help to create because of the agency of his Word who is Wisdom (Justin), or because of the agency of his Word and Wisdom (Theophilus).

Insofar as Justin refers to angels, it is more likely that Irenaeus depended on his discussion.[14] Nevertheless, Justin fails to mention the Spirit, while even in this earliest of references, Irenaeus refers to the agency of both the Word and Spirit. The inclusion of the creative activity of the Spirit in addition to the Word returns us to Theophilus. Yet the undeveloped state of Irenaeus' thought in *AH* 1 and 2 with regard to the Spirit's creative activity, when compared to the more advanced state of Theophilus' reasoning, indicates Irenaeus had not acquired *Autol* 1 and 2 until *AH* 3.[15] Thus, the following conclusions emerge. First, *Dial* 62.4 lacks a reference to the agency of the Spirit, but is directed against the participation of angels in creation as is *AH* 1.22.1. Justin's comments could have served as a springboard for Irenaeus' use of the activity of both the Word and Spirit to combat the notion that God needs help in creation, but evidence for the connection is minimal. Second, *Autol* 2.18 shows that Irenaeus' ascription of creative activity to the Spirit accords with pneumatological trajectories we see in other writers, but the rudimentary quality of Irenaeus' thought negates the possibility of his present dependence on Theophilus in particular. Therefore, we should regard Irenaeus' appropriation of the creative activity of the Spirit in *AH* 1.22.1 as traditional, insofar as it accords with texts that came before him, even though we are unable to determine dependence.

One final point, before we turn our attention to *AH* 2. The logic that enables the reference to the creative agency of the Word and Spirit to be

[13] *Autol* 2.18: 'For when God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," he first discloses the worth of man. For God having made all things by the Word, and having reckoned them all mere bye-works, reckons the creation of man to be the only work worthy of his own Hands. Moreover, God is found, as if needing help, to say, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." But to no one else than to his own Word and to his own Wisdom did He say, "Let us make"' (my translation with reference to the ANF). Quotations from Theophilus are taken from Théophile d'Antioche, *Trois livres à Autolycus*, SC 20 (1948). Translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.

[14] *Dial* 62.3.

[15] The Excursus after chapter 4 details this argument. Comparing Irenaeus' understanding of the creative agency of the Spirit to the understanding of Theophilus is a good way to track the pneumatological development of Irenaeus. In *AH* 1 and 2, the account provided by Irenaeus is far less developed than Theophilus. By the time of *AH* 4, Irenaeus' reasoning is more developed than his predecessor. Interestingly, it seems that his reception of Theophilus' *Autol* is the primary stimulus for this development.

polemically effective entails the understanding that the Word and Spirit stand united with the Father—unlike the angels and powers 'which have been separated from his thought.'[16] After all, Irenaeus' point is to affirm that God alone creates. Therefore, this early utilization of the Spirit as Creator tradition in *AH* 1.22.1 involves, and in effect produces, a fundamental statement on the divinity of the Spirit. Moreover, the Spirit's divinity is at least equal to that of the Word—the Spirit is not subordinate to the Word, as in Origen.[17]

As this study progresses, I will have occasion to point out that Irenaeus' conception of the Trinity can be represented as an isosceles triangle. The Father as the source of all things stands preeminent in relation to his Word and Spirit, his Hands, who minister to him and function as his agents with respect to creation. Irenaeus conceived of a hierarchical relationship within the Trinity. Such a hierarchy, however, does not consist of gradations in divinity.

2.2 AGAINST HERESIES 2

Against Heresies 2 contains Irenaeus' first real intimations of a theology of the Spirit, and while elementary, they are a step toward the more advanced deliberations we will find later in his work. This is not to say we find a mature pneumatological statement in *AH* 2; indeed, Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit seldom manifests itself, and in some cases reveals itself to be rudimentary. Nonetheless, his comments in Book 2 show his thought has already advanced beyond those of his predecessors. He conceives of the Holy Spirit as distinct from and yet categorized with the Son, and he ascribes distinct activity to the Spirit.[18] The very fact that this Book contains an elemental doctrine of the Spirit suggests Irenaeus recognized the importance of inserting a theology of the Spirit into his polemic. His remarks, then, are significant not only for what he says, but also because he chooses to say anything at all.

The following investigations into *AH* 2 demonstrate two essential points. First, Irenaeus classifies the Holy Spirit as the Creator rather than as a creature, thus securing the divine status of the Spirit. Second, Irenaeus also uses the

[16] *AH* 1.22.1: *abscissas ab eius sententia*.

[17] 'The parallelism of their action shows sufficiently that they are equal.' (d'Alès, 'La Doctrine *RSR* 6 1924: 499–500). Seen in contrast to, for instance, Origen, *PA* 1.3.5, discussed in the conclusion.

[18] I will reserve my discussion of Irenaeus' identification of the Spirit as Wisdom for the fourth chapter of this study. When discussing the development of Irenaeus' pneumatology, however, it is important to note that the identification first occurs in *AH* 2.30.9. As I will show later, the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom involves the attribution of a particular role in creation to the Spirit: the Spirit as Wisdom produces the harmony that exists in all of creation. Irenaeus expounds upon this idea in 2.25.1–2, and then applies the verbs connected with this particular effect to Wisdom in *AH* 2.30.9. As a result, as early as *AH* 2 Irenaeus distinguishes the creative activity of the Spirit as Wisdom from the creative activity of the Word.

term 'Spirit' (*spiritus* or πνεῦμα) to refer to that which is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (in line with the statement of John 4:24, 'God is Spirit'). It is this identification of God's being as Spirit that enables Irenaeus to declare that one God created all things. Both of these points are fundamental to Irenaeus' thought. Their recognition is necessary to a proper interpretation of his theology of the Holy Spirit.

2.2.1 The Divinity of the Holy Spirit

Irenaeus differentiates the human from the divine in chapter 28 of *AH* 2. In so doing, he distinguishes the perfect Word and Spirit from human beings, who experience perpetual growth and increase.[19] While this reasoning sets the Word and Spirit on the divine side of the Creator-creature divide, it does not offer a logical basis to distinguish the Word and Spirit from each other. Nevertheless, a comparison of what Irenaeus says about the production of the Word and does not say about the production of the Spirit suggests a basis for their distinction.

2.2.1.1 The Distinction of the Word and Spirit from Humanity

In *AH* 2.28.1 Irenaeus contends that in the fashioning of humanity the Creator has given increase to the creature. The Father calls human beings to move from inferior, lesser things toward the greater, which are in the presence of God. In *AH* 2.28.3 he establishes increase to be characteristic of creatures when he explains that certain aspects of knowledge, in this and the future age, must always be left to God, so that God should always teach and human beings should always learn. Between these two sections resides *AH* 2.28.2, in which Irenaeus contrasts that which is created with the one who creates, thus defining both.

> Moreover, we ought to leave [questions] such as this[20] to God who made us, knowing well that the Scriptures are indeed perfect, because, of course, they were spoken by the Word of God and his Spirit; we on the other hand, to the degree that we are inferior to and more recent than the Word of God and his Spirit, to this degree also we lack the knowledge of his mysteries.[21]

[19] In Irenaeus' thought, the concept of growth and increase is characteristic of the creature, distinguishing the creature from the Creator. *See*: Wingren (1959: 32–3, 204, 210); see also the comments on *AH* 4.11.1–2 by Bacq (1978: 94–97, esp. the long n. 2 on 96–7), and Behr (2000: 37, 116–27).

[20] Referring to unexplainable issues in Scripture.

[21] *AH* 2.28.2. The last portion of the quotation reads: *nos autem, secundum quod minores sumus et novissimi a Verbo Dei et Spiritu eius, secundum hoc et scientia mysteriorum eius indigemus.*

Irenaeus opens with a reference to God as Creator but then shifts to his immediate argument with regard to the human ability to understand Scripture. He establishes by implication that both the Word of God and the Spirit should be understood to be perfect (*perfectae*), otherwise his ascription of perfection to the Scriptures would not naturally follow from the fact that they were spoken by the Word and Spirit. No Greek fragments of this passage remain, though in this context *perfectae* would have been the natural translation for τέλειαι.

While easily translated 'perfect,' τέλειος also includes the idea of 'complete' or 'fulfilled.'[22] The use of τέλειος would then link this discussion to the surrounding statements in *AH* 2.28.1 and *AH* 2.28.3, where he declares the concept of increase to be characteristic to the creature in contrast to the one who creates.[23] So, human beings are 'inferior to and more recent than the Word of God and his Spirit' because they are incomplete, imperfect, or perpetually increasing, whereas the Word of God and his Spirit are complete, or perfect. Therefore, for Irenaeus one of the keys to distinguishing the divine and human, the Creator from the creature, lies in whether that nature is complete, perfect, or incomplete and perpetually increasing.

We may gain still further insight into the difference between the perfect Word and Spirit and the 'inferior' and 'more recent' human beings. Irenaeus only speaks of two categories of being: that which is perfect and that which is perpetually increasing. The Creator, God the Father, is perfect; the created—human beings—are perpetually increasing. As we just saw, for the contrast between both the Word and Spirit and human beings to hold, the Word and Spirit must also be perfect. Therefore, the Word and Spirit must not be classed among the created but rather with the Creator to whom Irenaeus refers at the beginning of the above selection. In comparison to the perfection of the Word

[22] A search conducted in the Library of Latin Texts for all the forms of *perfect** in *AH* produced 164 results. Of those hits, 111 uses of a form of *perfect** have no extant Greek fragment of *AH* for us to compare; ten uses have no extant Greek fragment of *AH*, but they do occur in quotations of the NT or LXX. Of these, nine translate a form of τελε* and one translates a different word. Of the 43 occurences for which we have a Greek fragment for comparison, 39 translate a form of τελε*, leaving a form of *perfect** to translate a different word four times. Therefore, of the 53 occurences of a form of *perfect** in *AH* that we can compare to a text, 49 translate a form of τελε*, and only five translate a different word. Moreover, τελείου is the basis for *perfecto* in *AH* 4.38.1 which parallels the present discussion: 'those which were created by him, insofar as they have a beginning they would be necessarily inferior to that one who created them. Indeed, it is impossible for uncreated things to be those which are recently created. Moreover, because they are not uncreated, for this reason they fall short of the perfect (*perfecto* / τελείου).' This data reveals that a form of *perfect** translates a form of τελε* the vast majority of times, supporting my contention with regard to *perfectae* in 2.28.2.

[23] Behr (2000: 40) argues that only that which is created visible, sensible, and temporal is subject to change, while that which is 'created invisible and intelligible, the spiritual beings who are eternal and thereby neither subject nor able to change, at least within the course of human temporality'.

and Spirit, then, human beings are 'inferior', since a creature experiences perpetual increase, and 'more recent,' since they are in fact created.[24] Therefore, the contrast between beings characterized by perfection and beings characterized by increase involves the concept of creativity. Perfect beings create; increasing beings are created. Creative activity distinguishes the perfect from the increasing, God from humanity.[25]

2.2.1.2 The Distinction of the Word and Spirit

The logic that distinguishes the Word and Spirit from humanity does not permit distinction between the Word and Spirit themselves. Still, Irenaeus' statements throughout *AH* 2 indicate that he may have a distinction in mind. Here and elsewhere in *Against Heresies*, he affirms the generation of the Word,[26] though he also declares that the limited nature of human language and experience prevent human beings from describing this production.[27] The most succinct expression of these points occurs in *AH* 2.28.6:

> If anyone, therefore, says to us, 'How then has the Son been produced by the Father?' we reply to that person that this production, or generation, or declaration, or revelation, or whatever name by which one may call his indescribable emergence, no one knows . . . except only the Father who begets and the Son who was begotten.[28]

[24] Cf. *AH* 2.25.3.

[25] Behr does not take this passage into consideration, which results in this inaccurate determination: 'For Irenaeus the distinction between God and created reality is not to be conceptualized in terms of an opposition between two distinct substances, existing in parallel and therefore commensurate with each other. Rather, for Irenaeus the distinction is primarily thought of in terms of their relationship to each other: "In this God differs from man, that God creates and man is made" (*AH* 4.11.2)' (Behr, *Way to Nicaea*, 2001: 125). Behr is correct to state that Irenaeus distinguishes between God and humanity by means of their relationship to creative activity. However, as we have seen in *AH* 2.28.1–3 the distinction is indeed 'conceptualized in terms of an opposition between two distinct substances' (to use Behr's language). That which is perfect is the Creator; that which is perpetually increasing is created. Though the Creator-creature relationship is at the forefront of Irenaeus' thought, the Creator and creature are not defined by that relationship alone, for certain qualities of 'being' follow from one's identity as the Creator or creature. According to Irenaeus, therefore, we may also say that by definition a creature is that which increases, and the Creator is that which is perfect.

[26] See, for example, *AH* 3.11.8, 3.19.2. Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 285) and Fantino (1994: 375–6) have pointed out that Irenaeus' terminological usage is consistent with the Scriptures. When he speaks of the divine generation of the Word, he uses γενεά (Isa. 53:8), and when he speaks of the human generation of the Word he uses γέννησις (Matt. 1:18). *AH* 3.11.8 is an excellent example of this consistency.

[27] *AH* 2.13.8 and 2.25.3 contain emanation or emission language; for the limitation of human experience see *AH* 2.13.8 and *AH* 2.28.4.

[28] *AH* 2.28.6: *Si quis itaque nobis dixerit: Quomodo ergo Filius prolatus a Patre est? dicimus ei quia prolationem istam, siue generationem, siue nuncupationem, siue adapertionem, aut quolibet quis nomine vocaverit generationem eius inenarrabilem exsistentem, nemo nouit . . . nisi solus qui generavit Pater et qui natus est Filius.*

This statement builds upon *AH* 2.13.8, where he contends that the analogy of human speech fails to describe the production of the divine Word because there is no 'beginning and principle of production'[29] in the generation of the eternal Word of God. In fact, God 'has in himself nothing more ancient than another, nor later or earlier than another, but persists as wholly equal and similar and one, one can no longer conceive of such an emission of this [kind] of order.'[30] There is no room for any notion of temporality, or sequencing made possible by temporality, in our conception of the production of the Word. Therefore, any analogy involving the production of human speech fails to describe the production of the Word of God. Humanity cannot conceive of timeless production, negating all human analogy.[31] This does not deny the production of the Word, just our ability to conceptualize it and speak of it.

On the other hand, Irenaeus never posits an explanation in *AH* 2 for the manner in which the Spirit coexists with God. In fact, no explicit statement may be found in any of his extant writings. The very absence of an account for the production of the Spirit indicates that Irenaeus does not conceive of the Spirit's coexistence in the same fashion as the Word's; otherwise it would have been simple for him to provide a similar statement. That he does not do so—that he does not even appear to recognize the benefit of or need for such an account—indicates a different understanding, an understanding that differentiates the Word from the Spirit, though one we cannot identify.[32]

2.2.2 The Creator God as Spirit

This study of Irenaeus' theology of the Holy Spirit focuses, of course, on his conception of the identity and activity of the Spirit as the third member of the Godhead. Yet, the peculiar ambiguity of the terms *spiritus* and πνεῦμα is that they can refer to either who God is (the Holy Spirit, distinct from the Father and the Son) or what God is (Spirit, that—the immaterial divine stuff—which is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). Since Irenaeus recognizes and appropriates the two different referents of this terminology at different points in his work, we must evaluate each use of the terms *spiritus* or πνεῦμα to determine their referent.

Such a determination can be rather easy, as for instance when the term occurs in a dyad with the Son, but it can also be rather difficult when a

[29] *prolationis initium . . . et genesim.*
[30] *AH* 2.13.8.
[31] In addition to the passages mentioned, *AH* 2.25.3 discusses the human limits with respect to knowledge as well.
[32] For more on this topic and a possible explanation for Irenaeus' approach, see p. 130 n. 94.

particular context or strain of reasoning provides no certain direction. These latter situations are complicated by the fact that Irenaeus uses no particular grammatical or terminological construction to differentiate the two possible referents. The immediate context of the term and the placement of the discussion into his larger theological account, then, become central to recognizing his meaning.

This section exists within this study not just to draw attention to both meanings of 'spirit' in Irenaeus' thought, though it functions to do so. Nor does this section exist just to warn the reader to be cautious when determining the meaning of any given passage, though I hope it functions to do that as well. No; the main purpose of this section is to show that the identification of what God is, that God is Spirit, is fundamental to Irenaeus' theological construct.

His most elaborate defense of God being Spirit occurs in *AH* 2.30. Here, the affirmation is essential to his argument that one God created and rules over all things, material and spiritual. Irenaeus desires to counter the Gnostic doctrine that attributes material creation to an animal Demiurge, while tracing the production of spiritual substance back to a spiritual source (*see*, for example: *AH* 2.17.3–8, 2.29.3, 2.30.6). Chapter 30 ends (in *AH* 2.30.9) with repeated affirmations that creative activity belongs to only one God, which in the context of his argument means that one Creator God is responsible for the production of spiritual (*spiritale*), animal (*animale*), and material (*materiale*) substances (as detailed in *AH* 2.29.3).[33] The first step in his argument toward this end is to counter the Gnostic idea that assigns the creation of different substances to different beings. To accomplish this task, Irenaeus challenges the Gnostic characterization of the Demiurge as animal in nature by declaring that those who 'declare to be animal' the one

> who has made his angels spirits, and is clothed with light as with a cloak, and holds the circle of the earth as if in his hand, by whom its inhabitants have been regarded as if they are grasshoppers, and [who is] the Creator and God of all spiritual substance, . . . [those who say this] reveal indisputably and truly their own insanity.[34]

Irenaeus does not here construct an argument, the outcome of which permits him to characterize the Demiurge ('that God who made and adorned the heavens, and the earth, and the seas, and all that are in them')[35] as spiritual. Rather, he approaches these descriptions as beyond question, and as such they

[33] This does not exclude the agency of God's Word and Wisdom in creation, to which Irenaeus twice refers in *AH* 2.30.9. For more on Irenaeus' Wisdom language in *AH* 2.30.9 and elsewhere, *see* the 'Spirit as Wisdom' section in chapter 5.

[34] *AH* 2.30.1.

[35] Ibid.

demonstrate that the Creator is not animal.[36] An argument, however, is not long in coming. In the remaining sections of this chapter, *AH* 2.30.2–9, Irenaeus sets out to support his contention that the Creator is spiritual. Of these sections, the last four, in which he proves from the Scriptures 'that all things which have been mentioned, visible and invisible, have been made by one God,'[37] contain the heart of his argument.

At the end of *AH* 2.30.6, Irenaeus prepares the way for his argument from Scripture by stating, 'if these (invisible beings, namely, Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Powers, etc.) were made by the Creator—as they certainly were made [by him]—and [if] they are spiritual (*spiritalia*) and holy: then he is not animal (*animalis*), that one who created the spiritual (*spiritalia*).' Since the one who creates spiritual things must be spiritual, then it follows that the one who creates both material and spiritual things must be spiritual also. His task, then, is to offer Scriptural evidence that the Creator who is responsible for the production of material things also created spiritual things. For he would thus counter the Gnostic claim that different beings created the different substances.

In *AH* 2.30.6 Irenaeus classifies 'the heaven and the whole world that is situated below it' as material things (*materialia*). In *AH* 2.30.7–8, he uses Paul's account of his ascent to the third heaven (2 Cor. 12) to affirm 'that there are spiritual creatures in the (material) heavens.'[38] The last few sentences of *AH* 2.30.7 contain Irenaeus' account of what Paul witnessed in his ascent:[39]

> but, therefore, up to that point it is permitted even without the body to observe spiritual mysteries, which are the works of God who made the heavens and the earth, and formed man and placed him in paradise . . .[40]

Here he provides otherwise unspecified content for Paul's experience: Paul witnessed the works of God, which Irenaeus describes as 'spiritual mysteries' (*sacramenta spiritalia*). By stating that Paul witnessed 'spiritual mysteries', Irenaeus can assert that the same God who produced these *sacramenta spiritalia* or *operationes* also produced 'the heavens and the earth, and formed man and placed him in paradise'—the material works which served as the

[36] Irenaeus counters the Gnostic understanding of creation by arguing against the idea that any transcendent beings exist beyond the Creator of the world (the Demiurge), and then by correcting the Gnostic concept of the Demiurge, so that it accords with the traditional catholic understanding of the Creator God.

[37] *AH* 2.30.6, ANF translation.

[38] *AH* 2.30.7, ANF translation.

[39] 2 Cor. 12:4 refers to hearing alone, not sight; Irenaeus, however, describes the ascent as involving both senses.

[40] *AH* 2.30.7: *sed ideo usque illuc permittatur etiam sine corpore sacramenta perspicere spiritalia, quae sunt Dei operationes qui fecit caelos et terram et plasmavit hominem et posuit in paradiso, | speculatores fieri eos qui similiter ut Apostolus valde sint perfecti in dilectione Dei.*

setting for the observation of the spiritual works. He expands upon these thoughts in the next section:

> And so this one (God) also made the spiritual (pl.) of which, as far as the third heaven, the Apostle was made a spectator, and [heard] indescribable words which it is not permitted for a human being to speak, since they are spiritual; and this he himself exhibits to the worthy just as he wills:[41] for paradise is his. And truly he is the Spirit of God, not in fact an animal Demiurge, otherwise he never would have brought about the spiritual (pl.). If, on the other hand, he is animal, let them tell us by whom the spiritual (pl.) are made.[42]

Irenaeus interprets Paul's testimony as evidence that the God who produced material things also produces spiritual things. The apostle saw spiritual mysteries or operations and heard spiritual words which Paul could not have witnessed had the Creator been animal, for an animal being could not have produced spiritual mysteries or spiritual words.[43] In this passage, *Spiritus Dei* ('Spirit of God') should not be understood to refer to the Holy Spirit, but rather to mean 'the Spirit who is God' along the lines of John 4:24.[44] This is the only interpretation of *Spiritus Dei* that fits Irenaeus' argument. The Creator who produces spiritual works and spiritual words must be a spiritual being himself; he cannot possess an animal nature and produce spiritual things. Therefore, Paul's testimony of his experience of spiritual things in the third heaven supports Irenaeus' contention that the God who created 'the heavens and the earth, and formed man and placed him in paradise' is a spiritual being, is the Spirit of God, the divine Spirit. The identification of God's being as Spirit, then, enables Irenaeus to affirm that one God created all things, both spiritual and material.

[41] The translator of the ANF finds this phrase 'a very ambiguous expression,' but it can be understood as a simple reference back to *AH* 2.30.7 where Irenaeus declares, 'they are made spectators who, similar to the Apostle, are intensely perfect in the love of God.' Those who are 'worthy' in *AH* 2.30.8 must be those who are 'intensely perfect in the love of God' in *AH* 2.30.7. To these people, God exhibits the spiritual mysteries and they are made spectators.

[42] *AH* 2.30.8: *Et spiritalia itaque hic fecit quorum usque ad tertium caelum speculator factus est Apostolus, et inenarrabiles sermones quos non licet homini loqui, quoniam sint spiritales, et ipse hic praestat dignis, quemadmodum vult: huius enim est paradisus. Et vere est Spiritus Dei, sed non animalis Demiurgus, alioquin numquam spiritalia perfecisset. Si autem animalis hic, per quem facta sunt spiritalia referant nobis.*

[43] Irenaeus twice states (once each in *AH* 2.30.7 and *AH* 2.30.8) that human beings are not permitted (*licet*) to speak spiritual words. The stricture on the speaking of spiritual words probably derives from the fact that human speech involves a material mechanism, but the material cannot produce the spiritual—so by definition, a human being cannot utter spiritual words.

[44] Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 332, 317 n. 2).

Chapter Conclusion

Justin Martyr's approach to the Spirit serves as an example of the rudimentary understanding of the Spirit in the middle of the second century. Lacking a firm understanding of the distinct activity and identity of the Spirit, Christianity possessed a theology of the Spirit in only the most elementary respect. The first detailed theology of the Holy Spirit, however, began to take form as Irenaeus sketched out his thoughts on the Spirit in the first two Books of *AH*.

Even in his earliest thought on the Spirit, Irenaeus defines the Spirit as possessing the perfect nature of the Creator and as having a role in creation. Nevertheless, we will see in the next two chapters that the difference between the pneumatology in *AH* 1 and 2 and in *AH* 3 is dramatic and startling. In the third Book of *Against Heresies* Irenaeus exhibits a multi-faceted and insightful conception of the identity and activity of the Holy Spirit that progresses far beyond his predecessors and contemporaries alike, and even his own thought in *AH* 1 and 2. Indeed, the pneumatological account in *AH* 3 supersedes that of *AH* 1 and 2 by so large a degree that it may be best to regard his reasoning in the first two Books as the most advanced theology of the Spirit of the previous generation, and to regard the reasoning we find in *AH* 3 as the beginning of the most complex expression of Jewish-Christian pneumatology to be constructed.

3

Pneumatological Expansion

The limited references to the Spirit found in the first two Books of *Against Heresies* give way to the argument of *AH* 3 in which the theology of the Spirit plays an integral role. In addition to being integral to his argument, Irenaeus' account of the Spirit in Book 3 is multifaceted. Some aspects of the pneumatology we find here will play a considerable role in the pneumatological themes addressed later in this study. Some are important, even foundational to Irenaeus' broader theology and polemic, but are relatively less important to his pneumatology itself.

These latter, less-important features of his theology of the Spirit in *AH* 3 still warrant our brief consideration since they are evidence of the dramatic pneumatological expansion that occurs in this Book. This expansion ought to be highlighted inasmuch as one purpose of this study is to elucidate the manner in which Irenaeus' thought on the Spirit develops throughout his writing. That being said, the fact that some aspects of this amplification in his thought will continue to play a central role throughout the course of his pneumatology, while some do not, has led me to divide my analysis of his theology in *AH* 3 in order to provide an easy way for the reader to differentiate between the two categories.

This present chapter will examine those features of his theology of the Spirit in *AH* 3 that are less relevant to his later pneumatological development and our particular examination of it. The next chapter will then focus on those features of his account that will continue to appear in one form or another over the course of his pneumatological development and throughout this study.

3.1 PENTECOST

AH 3.6.4 contains a prayer whose opening address to the one Creator God is composed in terms designed to oppose Gnosticism and Marcionism. The second half of the prayer declares the means by which human beings may know the Creator: 'grant, by our Lord Jesus Christ, the governing power of the

Holy Spirit; give to every one who reads this writing to know you, that you are God alone, to be strengthened in you, and to depart from every heretical, and godless, and impious doctrine.' A question exists as to whether the original text read *dominationem* ('governing power') or *donationem* ('gift') of the Holy Spirit.[1] While Irenaeus never again uses the expression 'governing power of the Holy Spirit,' the phrase 'gift of the Holy Spirit' occurs in the New Testament, other writers of the time, and elsewhere in Irenaeus himself. The suggestion then follows that *donationem* is original to this passage.[2]

Strictly speaking, it is true that Irenaeus never uses *dominationem Spiritus sancti* elsewhere.[3] Yet in the early chapters of *AH* 3, Irenaeus establishes that the starting point for his argument in this Book is the role of the Spirit in the dissemination and preservation of the gospel message in the apostolic church. In this way, we can understand him to say that the Spirit possesses 'governing power' over the dissemination and preservation of the gospel message. Indeed, we could even summarize the work of the Spirit in this regard as securing the gospel message from 'every heretical, and godless, and impious doctrine.'

I would like to suggest, then, that *dominationem* is correct and should be preserved, for while Irenaeus does not ascribe the term to the Spirit elsewhere, the term depicts the role Irenaeus ascribes to the Spirit in the chapters preceding *AH* 3.6. We turn to this discussion of the Spirit in the early chapters of Book 3, where the story of Pentecost is the occasion for Irenaeus' attribution of this particular role to the Spirit in relation to the gospel message.

Among the defenders of the church catholic in the second century, Irenaeus alone incorporated Pentecost in a significant manner.[4] It is a distinguishing feature of his thought. Moreover, its presence in *AH* 3.1.1 suggests the Lucan writings had an influence upon the first chapters of Book 3 that has gone unnoticed. Three additional factors support this recognition of Lucan influence; their identification gives us insight into the picture of the church and the Spirit that Irenaeus adopts. First, in *AH* 3.pref, Irenaeus quotes Luke 10:16, 'He who hears you, hears me; and he who despises you, despises me, and him that sent me.' With this quotation, Irenaeus introduces his argument that the message of the apostles, the apostolic tradition, is the true tradition, the message of Christ.

[1] Grabe changed *dominationem* to *donationem*, and the editors of the SC have followed suit.

[2] So argues Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 257).

[3] See, however, Irenaeus' reference to *Spiritu principali* ('the governing Spirit') of Ps. 51.12 in *AH* 3.17.2.

[4] Pentecost does not make an appearance in the works treated by Gregory (2003). Soon after Irenaeus, Tertullian (*On Baptism*, 1999: 19) considers Pentecost to be among the particularly appropriate times for baptism because of its association with Christ's resurrection appearances.

Second, the words *Dominus omnium dedit apostolis suis potestatem Evangelii* ('the Lord of all gave to his apostles the power of the Gospel') precede the quotation of Luke 10:16. It seems best to understand *potestatem Evangelii* as referring to the power given by Jesus to his Apostles in order for them to spread the message of the Gospel. Irenaeus' reference in the next section to the bestowal of power on the apostles at Pentecost suggests that 'the power of the Gospel' here may also be linked to the reception of the Spirit. If such is the case, then Irenaeus could be alluding to Acts 1:8, 'you will receive power (δύναμιν) when the Holy Spirit comes upon you,[5] and you will be my witnesses . . . '[6]

The fact that Irenaeus says the power is given by Jesus while Acts connects the power with the reception of the Spirit can be explained by noting that Luke proclaims the Spirit to be given by the glorified Christ. In this way the power received by the apostles would originate with Jesus as well. The possibility that Irenaeus is working from Acts 1:8 is made even more likely by the fact that both Irenaeus and Acts associate the reception of the power with the apostolic proclamation that Jesus is the Son of God.[7] Thus, the power received upon the reception of the Holy Spirit is the 'power of the gospel' because it enables the witness of the Apostles.

The third factor that shows Lucan influence upon Irenaeus in the early chapters of *AH* 3 is the theological significance that Irenaeus attaches to the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost. In the following paragraphs we will see that Irenaeus views the Spirit as the source of the oral and written message of the Apostles. Moreover, he maintains that the mission of the Church is guided, directed, and empowered by the now-present Spirit. Both of these positions correspond to the theological significance that Luke attaches to the work of the Spirit among the apostles in the first days of the Church.[8] Irenaeus will begin with the work of the Spirit in the story of Acts, and just as Marsh can say the story of Acts 'is the story of the Gospel all over again,'[9] so we can say that for Irenaeus, the story of the early Church (post-Acts) is the story of Acts all over again.

[5] For the close link that Luke establishes between the Spirit and the concept of power, *see*: Lampe (1957: here 171, 193); Marsh, *ITQ* 45 (1978: 101–16, here 104–6); McPolin, *ITQ* 45 (1978: 117–31, here 117, 120–3).

[6] *Potestatem Evangelii* could be an allusion to Rom. 1:16, 'I am not ashamed of the gospel, it is the power (δύναμις) of God for salvation.' I do not think this is the case for several reasons: (1) in *AH* 3, the power is the 'power of the Gospel,' whereas in Rom. 1 the power is the 'power of God;' (2) the power in *AH* 3 is given by Jesus to his apostles, but in Rom. 1 the power is not given and the apostles do not appear; and (3) in *AH* 3, the power involves the proclamation that Jesus is the Son of God, but in Rom. 1 the power reveals that righteousness comes from faith.

[7] *AH* 3.pref: 'the Lord of all gave to his apostles the power of the Gospel, through whom we have known the truth, that is, the doctrine of the Son of God'; Acts 2:22–36.

[8] For Luke's conception of the activity of the Spirit in the early church, *see* Lampe (1957: 196); Marsh, *ITQ* 45 (1978: 104–5); McPolin, *ITQ* 45 (1978: 121, 127–8); and Lake (1979: 108).

[9] Marsh, *ITQ* 45 (1978: 104).

Irenaeus considers Pentecost to be the foundational moment in the possession and transmission of doctrinal truth for the Church. It is the moment in which the original purveyors of the tradition were invested with the power and gifts of the Spirit.[10] As such, it is the basis for the apostolic mission and kerygma. Since the truth for which Irenaeus argues rests on the veracity of the apostolic kerygma, the need to establish the reliability of the doctrines proclaimed by the apostles assumes first place on his agenda.[11] His solution is to base the authenticity—and therefore, the trustworthiness and efficacy of the apostolic kerygma—on the Spirit's activity at Pentecost:[12]

> For after our Lord rose from the dead, and [the apostles] were clothed with power from on high when the Holy Spirit came upon them, were filled from all [his power], and had perfect knowledge;[13] they went out to the ends of the earth, preaching the good things which were [sent] from God to us, and announcing the peace of heaven for human beings—who indeed all possess, equally and individually, the Gospel of God.[14]

As soon as he establishes that the oral communication of the gospel message by the apostles occurred after and as a result of the activity of the Spirit, Irenaeus moves to link the production of the written gospel accounts with Pentecost as well. He refers to gospels communicated by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John—emphasizing the written nature of transmission each time.[15] Each of these Gospel accounts emanates from apostles who received the power and gifts of the Spirit at Pentecost: this is the reason why he identifies the accounts of Mark and Luke as containing the gospels preached by Peter and Paul, respectively.[16] Irenaeus does not, in this regard, distinguish between the oral proclamation and the written testimony—both have as their origin apostles

[10] Cf. de Andia (1986: 230).

[11] *AH* 3.1.1 reveals why it is so important for Irenaeus to establish the accuracy of the apostolic message: 'we know by no others the plan of our salvation, than by those through whom the Gospel has come to us . . . handed down to us in the scriptures, to be the support and pillar of our faith.'

[12] Grant (1993: 12) suggests that the underlying motivation for Justin's insistence on 'the one prophetic Spirit' was to counter 'the Gnostic notion that various planetary deities had inspired various Old Testament prophets . . . that the Old Testament was interpolated'. Irenaeus is taking a similar approach by using the activity of the Spirit at Pentecost as the basis for the message of the Church.

[13] Cf. *AH* 4.33.7–8 where the Spirit is the source of our 'knowledge of truth' in 4.33.7 and 'true knowledge' is the doctrine of the apostles in 4.33.8.

[14] *AH* 3.1.1; 3.12.1 also refers to Pentecost and its fulfillment of Joel 2:28; in 3.12.5 the disciples were perfected by the Spirit after the assumption of the Lord.

[15] Matthew *scripturam edidit Euangelii*; Mark *per scripta nobis tradidit*; Luke *in libro condidit*; John *edidit Euangelium*.

[16] Paul's inclusion in this category would seem to be based on the account of Acts 9:1–18, which concludes with his filling with the Holy Spirit (v. 17).

who received the power and gifts of the Spirit at Pentecost.[17] All the apostles communicated one message containing 'perfect knowledge' by both word of mouth and hand, a message guaranteed by the descent and empowerment of the Spirit at Pentecost.

The importance of founding the unity and authority of the oral and written traditions on the work of the Spirit crystallizes in *AH* 3.2.1.[18] Here Irenaeus reveals that his opponents, working from 1 Cor. 2:6, posit the superiority of the oral tradition over the written. The truth of the tradition was not related by written word, but viva voce. Having already undercut this heretical enterprise by basing the transmission of every message of the gospel on the work of the same Spirit, Irenaeus proceeds to further erode any basis for an alternative tradition by means of the notion of apostolic succession. At the end of *AH* 3.1.2 he summarizes the essential truths communicated in the oral and written gospel by the apostles: 'there is one God, Maker of heaven and earth, who has been announced by the law and the prophets; and one Christ, the Son of God.'[19] Those who oppose these truths do so at the risk of their own peril: despising Christ and the Father, a person stands condemned, 'resisting and opposing one's own salvation, as all heretics do.'[20] Nevertheless, adversaries to the tradition existed. And their tendency to deny the authority and accuracy of Scripture lead him to affirm that the truths originating with the apostles were preserved among the presbyters, to whom the apostles committed the care of the churches.[21]

> Since the apostles, just as the rich in a bank, abundantly bestowed in [the church] all things that have to do with the truth, so that every person who is willing may take from her the drink of life. For [the church] is the entrance to life; but all the rest are thieves and robbers.[22]

The apostolic tradition, the common interpretation of Scripture by churches possessing an apostolic foundation, rests secure in the Church. It does so

[17] That being said, he does offer certain particulars with regard to the work of the Spirit in the process of writing the gospel accounts. For instance, the Spirit's foreknowledge permitted the guidance of the composition of Scripture in order to forestall heretical interpretations (*AH* 3.16.2 and 3.21.9); and the impetus of the Spirit lies partially behind Paul's transposition of word order (*AH* 3.7.2).

[18] Irenaeus has already stated in *AH* 3.1.1 that his opponents contended that the apostles preached prior to their possession of 'perfect knowledge.' Such a stance rendered acceptable their modification, or 'correction,' of the apostolic writings and the gospel accounts in particular. Irenaeus' reference to the reception of 'perfect knowledge' by the apostles at Pentecost (the only gift he chooses to identify) is a direct response to these opponents.

[19] *AH* 3.1.2; Irenaeus repeats these first principles of the gospel in *AH* 3.11.7.

[20] *AH* 3.1.2.

[21] *AH* 3.2.2; see also *AH* 3.3.1, where any hidden mysteries would have been delivered by the apostles to their successors; and *AH* 3.4.1, where doctrinal disputes should be settled by the most ancient churches with whom the apostles conversed.

[22] *AH* 3.4.1; cf. *AH* 3.5.1.

because of the continuity of tradition preserved by the chain of leadership existing in these apostolic churches, but continuity of tradition is worthless if the tradition preserved is not authoritative. Thus, the notion of apostolic succession depends upon the reception and empowerment of the Spirit at Pentecost: the moment at which both the content of the tradition and the impetus to share that tradition originated. Therefore, the Church possesses the truth of the gospel message because of the work of the Spirit, and the work of the Spirit alone guarantees the truth of the gospel.[23]

As mentioned earlier in this section, Irenaeus' thought on this matter corresponds to that of Luke, especially that of the book of Acts. According to F.F. Bruce, the book of Acts 'describes the gospel as making its way through the world under the constant direction of the Holy Spirit.'[24] Or perhaps we should say, under the 'governing power' of the Holy Spirit.

3.2 THE 'PILLAR AND SUPPORT' OF THE CHURCH

In *AH* 3.1.1 Irenaeus refers to the Scriptures as the 'support and pillar of our faith.' By *AH* 3.11.8, the metaphor has expanded to include the Spirit:

> the 'pillar and support'[25] of the church is the Gospel and the Spirit of life; it is fitting that she would have four pillars, which from every side are breathing out incorruptibility and are vivifying human beings.[26] According to which it is evident that the Word . . . has given to us a quadriform Gospel which is held together[27] by one Spirit.[28]

The addition reflects Irenaeus' appreciation of the intrinsic role of the Spirit in establishing and transmitting the gospel tradition, as we have discussed. Yet, this passage does not just rely upon the role of the Spirit as discussed earlier in *AH* 3, but rather leads to further insight into his thought on the matter. As when he turned to pneumatology to refute the abuse of Scripture earlier in this Book,

[23] Cf. Clement of Rome's declaration that divisions and schisms should not exist for 'do we not have one God and one Christ and one Spirit of grace, a Spirit that was poured out upon us?' *Epistle to the Corinthians* 46.6 (1946).

[24] Bruce, *Interpretation* 27 (1973: 166–83, here 183).

[25] *Στῦλος δὲ καὶ στήριγμα*; *columna autem et firmamentum.*

[26] *Πνέοντας τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ ἀναζωπυροῦντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*; *flantes incorruptibilitatem et vivificantes homines.*

[27] '*Ενὶ δὲ Πνεύματι συνεχόμενον*; *uno Spiritu continetur.*

[28] Both passages use *firmamentum* and *columna*. The metaphor 'pillar and ground' comes from 1 Tim. 3:15 which describes the Church as the 'pillar and foundation of the truth'. De Andia (1986: 210) says that in *AH* 3.11.8 'pillar and support' refer to the Gospels and the Spirit, respectively. Fabbri, *CyF* 12/45 (1956: 7–42, here 27–8) attempts to connect 'pillar and support' with the Spirit's identification as the Unction of Christ.

in *AH* 3.11.8 Irenaeus is combating those who deviate from right doctrine by altering or ignoring portions of the Gospels.[29] This acknowledgement of doctrinal errors comes right after an elucidation of the apostolic tradition taken mainly from the Gospels. The acknowledgement and his pneumatological response reflect his understanding that a counter-explanation from the Gospels is not enough to prevent errant readings. Rather an external logic is necessary to control the interpretation of Scripture. For Irenaeus, that logic always rests on the theology of the Spirit. In the beginning of *AH* 3, both the notion of apostolic succession and the affirmation of 'perfect knowledge' to the authors of Scripture depend on the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost. We will see here that the four Gospels, and their respective messages, enjoy a harmonious relationship with each other because of the work of the Spirit.

Two statements in the passage quoted above draw our attention. First, the pillars breathe out incorruptibility and vivify human beings. Second, the pillars are 'held together by one Spirit.' This selection and its surrounding context offer little insight into the first statement. What is clear is that the pillars, the Gospels, are 'from every side . . . breathing out incorruptibility' and 'vivifying human beings' because of their connection with the Spirit.

Two observations substantiate this connection. The first is that the Spirit is identified as 'the Spirit of life,' a title that corresponds to the ideas of incorruptibility and vivification. The second is that Irenaeus' affirmation that the pillars are 'breathing out incorruptibility' and 'vivifying human beings' is the basis for the conclusion ('it is evident') that the Church has received a 'quadriform Gospel . . . held together by one Spirit.' Such a conclusion is only 'evident' if the breathing out of incorruptibility and the vivification of human beings are due to the Spirit. Beyond this minimal understanding, Irenaeus is here silent.[30]

On the other hand, Irenaeus does provide insight at this time into his statement that the pillars are 'held together by one Spirit' (*uno Spiritu continentur*). In *AH* 3.11.9 he offers one last comment with regard to the quadriform nature of the Gospels:

> But that these alone are true and sure, and that beyond what was said beforehand, neither more nor fewer Gospels can be conceived, we have made clear by so many and so great [arguments]. And since God made all things ordered (*composita*) and suited (*apta*) (to each other), it was also necessary for the outward form (*speciem*) of the Gospel to be well ordered and well joined together (*bene compositam et bene compaginatam esse*).

[29] As he explains with reference to particular controversies in *AH* 3.11.7.

[30] Irenaeus resumes the theme of the life-giving activity of the Spirit in *AH* 3.24.1, a passage I will discuss in the next chapter. He reserves his main treatment of the life-giving work of the Spirit for Book 5: I too will reserve my main discussion of this aspect of his pneumatology for my comments on that Book in the sixth chapter of this study.

In this last comment he provides the most insight into what he means by *uno Spiritu continentur*. We have seen that according to Irenaeus the veracity, reliability, and numerical perfection of the Gospel accounts depend upon the activity of the Spirit. It makes sense then to see the agency of the Spirit in his present statement, despite the absence of an explicit reference.

Additional support for this determination comes from the particular aspect of creative activity that Irenaeus uses to support the fourfold aspect of the Gospel. While it will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, when we consider Irenaeus' identification of the Spirit as Wisdom,[31] I will mention the conclusion of that examination now since it bears on our current question. Irenaeus' goal in referring to the wisdom of God in creation and in identifying the Spirit as Wisdom is to affirm the harmony of creation and, thereby, to confirm that creation is a meaningful whole. This determination comes primarily from a detailed analysis of *AH* 2, and especially *AH* 2.25.1–2, which means that Irenaeus had arrived at this understanding by the time he wrote *AH* 3.11.8–9. An example of the type of language he uses to express the agency of the Spirit as Wisdom in rendering creation harmonious occurs in *AH* 2.30.9, 'This one alone is discovered to be God . . . [who] has fitted and arranged (*aptavit et disposuit*) all things by his Wisdom.' The presence of the verb *aptare* stands out, for it also occurs in the above selection from *AH* 3.11.9.

In *AH* 3.11.8–9 Irenaeus intends to convey, with regard to the Spirit's agency in producing a quadriform Gospel, the same idea that he intends to convey with regard to the Spirit's agency in creation. Just as a diverse creation is made into one harmonious and meaningful whole by the activity of the Spirit, so are the multiple and diverse aspects of the Gospel 'held together by one Spirit.' According to Irenaeus, the Spirit effects the harmony of the Gospels and their very harmony renders them meaningful. If his opponents fail to preserve the harmony of the Gospels, they will fail to grasp their meaning.

3.3 THE WINGED SPIRIT

Three times in the course of *AH* 3.11.8 Irenaeus associates the Spirit with wings:

> 'the fourth (living creature) was like a flying eagle,' indicating the gift[32] of the Spirit flying over the Church.
>
> Mark, on the other hand, commences with the prophetic Spirit coming from on high to human beings, saying, 'The beginning of the Gospel as it is written in

[31] See pp. 126–46.

[32] Greek *τὴν δόσιν*, Latin *gratia*: *gratia* is best understood as translating *δόσις* along the lines of 'the free gift' of the Spirit to the Church, rather than 'the grace' of the Spirit.

> Isaiah the prophet,' showing the winged [33] image of the Gospel; and because of this he made a compendious and hurried announcement, for such is the prophetic character.
>
> And also the Word of God himself, indeed that one who was before Moses, used to speak with the patriarchs according to [his] divinity and glory; to those, however, under the law, he used to provide a sacerdotal and ministerial function.[34] Since then he was made a human being for us, [and] he sent the gift of the celestial Spirit over all the earth, protecting us with his wings.[35]

The association of the Spirit with a bird is not unusual. The most prominent associations occur in the creation account of Gen. 1 and the Gospel accounts of Jesus' baptism.[36] Less common are references to the Spirit as an eagle (as opposed to a dove), as well as references to the wings of the Spirit.[37] Nevertheless, a significant antecedent exists that associates the Spirit and wings, *Odes of Solomon* 28.1–8:[38]

(1) As the wings of doves over their nestlings,
and the mouths of their nestlings toward their mouths,
so also are the wings of the Spirit over my heart.

(2) My heart continually refreshes itself and leaps for joy,
like the babe who leaps for joy in his mother's womb.

(3) I trusted, consequently I was at rest;
because trustful is he in whom I trusted.

(4) He has greatly blessed me,
and my head is with him.

(5) And the dagger shall not divide me from him,
nor the sword.

(6) Because I am ready before destruction comes,
and have been placed in his incorruptible arms (or, wing).

[33] Following SC 210 (1974: 285).

[34] Following SC 210 (1974: 285).

[35] This third selection follows immediately after the second; I have separated them for convenience of reference.

[36] Gen. 1:2; Matt. 3:16, Mark 3:10, Luke 3:22, and John 1:32. The Talmud (b. Hag 15a) likens the brooding of the Spirit over the waters at creation to the fluttering of a dove. The Dead Sea Scrolls' 4Q521 Fr. 2, 2.5 reapplies Gen. 1:2 eschatologically—'over the poor his (the Lord's) spirit will hover and he will renew the faithful with his power' (Vermes 2004: 412).

[37] In fact, I am unaware of another explicit reference to the Spirit as an eagle. That being said, Scripture does not lack references to eagles, and while an explicit connection with the Spirit is absent, a few verses suggest similar activities as those attributed to the Spirit in *AH* 3.11.8. For instance, in Deut. 32:11 the Lord protects his people 'as an eagle stirs up its nest, and hovers over its young; as it spreads its wings, takes them up, and bears them aloft on its pinions' (NRSV); cf. Exod. 19.4. The wings of God provide divine protection in Ruth 2:12, Ps. 17:8, 36:7, 57:1, 61:4, 63:7, and 91:4.

[38] I take the *Odes* to be dated in the second century; for a list of literature on dating the *Odes,* see Harvey, *SVTQ* 37 (1993: 111–39, here 122 n. 49).

(7) And immortal life embraced me,
and kissed me.
(8) And from that (life) is the Spirit which is within me.
And it cannot die because it is life.[39]

Verses 2 through 8 flow out of the similes in verse 1 which compare the 'wings of the Spirit' over the heart of the Odist to the 'wings of doves over their nestlings' and the mouths of doves feeding their nestlings. Our attention focuses on verses 2, 3, and 6 which list effects of the wings of the Spirit that develop out of the similes offered in the first verse. The continually refreshing heart in verse 2 stems from the nourishing aspect of the wings of the Spirit described by 'the mouths of their nestlings toward their mouths.' The trust that leads to rest in verse 3 and the preparedness for destruction in verse 6 reflect the protective aspect of the wings illustrated by 'the wings of doves over their nestlings.' Thus, in these verses the Odist associates two main concepts with the wings of the Spirit: nourishment and protection. Of these two, the idea of protection also belongs to Irenaeus' association of the Spirit and wings imagery.

Two features of the first reference in *AH* 3.11.8, 'the gift of the Spirit flying over the Church,' capture our attention: the idea of the Spirit as a gift and the notion of the Spirit as flying. The description of the Spirit as flying reminds us of Gen. 1:2 where the Spirit hovered over the waters in the creation account, suggesting perhaps that Irenaeus intends to speak of the creative activity of the Spirit within the Church. Such activity could correspond to the Spirit's title of 'Spirit of life' and his work of 'breathing out incorruptibility' and 'vivifying human beings' mentioned earlier in *AH* 3.11.8, indicating the creation of new life, eternal life, within believers.[40] Yet, the phrase 'the gift of the Spirit' moves us away from interpreting the 'Spirit flying' as a reference to the Spirit's creative agency, since it reflects a different Scriptural theme: the giving of the Spirit by Christ, for instance in John 14:16 or Acts 1:4–5, 2:33.[41]

The reference to the wings of the Spirit in the third selection from *AH* 3.11.8 serves as a guide through this interpretive maze. Irenaeus writes, 'Since then,

[39] 'Odes of Solomon,' in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, vol 2 (1985). All quotations of the *Odes* are Charlesworth's translation.

[40] This would correspond to later statements by Irenaeus: e.g., *AH* 3.24.1, 4.21.3, 5.1.3, 5.7.2, 5.9.2–4, 5.12.2, 5.15.1.

[41] McPolin points out (ITQ 45 1978: 118–19) that Luke expresses a similar idea to that of John 14:16 when he refers to the Spirit as the promise of the Father in Acts 1:4–5 and 2.33. The fulfillment of Joel's prophecy at Pentecost is the context for the reception of the Promise. Prior to McPolin, Bruce noted that John and Luke/Acts possess similar perspectives on the giving of the Spirit after Christ's glorification (Bruce, *Interpretation* 27 1973: 166–7). As for influence, the strong connection of the Spirit with Pentecost in *AH* 3 combined with the use of the noun 'gift' (δωρεὰν) for the Spirit in Acts 2:38 (in contrast with the verbal 'will give' [δώσει] in John 14:16) may grant a slight edge to the passages in Acts. The fact that in *AH* 3.12.2 Irenaeus quotes an otherwise unknown variant of Acts 2:33 that adds a reference to the Spirit as the 'gift' (*donationem*) makes his reliance (in these chapters) on Luke as certain as possible.

he was made a human being for us, [and] he sent the gift of the celestial Spirit over all the earth, protecting us with his wings.' Here the sending of the Spirit by the incarnate Son is the dominant theme. Moreover, this selection further clarifies the first by providing content for the image of the Spirit flying with its wings over the Church ('protecting us'): Irenaeus associates this imagery with the idea of protection. Reading the first selection through the lens of the third finds support in the fact that Irenaeus intends the first selection to interpret the phrase 'the fourth living creature like a flying eagle' from Rev. 4:7.[42] The very idea of an eagle evokes the notion of protection.[43] The association of the Spirit with protection fits easily within the first chapters of *AH* 3 and *AH* 3.11.7–9 in particular. As we have seen, the Spirit ensures or protects the gospel tradition, and therefore the Church, from heretical interpretations. The references to the protection of the Spirit's wings in *AH* 3.11.8, however, do not require such specificity. So though the connection exists, we should not limit our interpretation to that particular kind of protection of the Church.

The second reference, associating the prophetic Spirit with the 'the winged image of the Gospel,' conveys a different image from the first and the third. The Gospel of Mark commences with quotations from Mal. 3:1 and Isa. 40:3, which the author groups together as 'written in the prophet Isaiah.' It seems that the quotation from prophecy which introduces this Gospel combined with the association of Mark with the eagle of Rev. 4:7 (that Irenaeus interprets as pointing to 'the gift of the Spirit flying over the Church') is enough to lead him to describe the prophetic activity of the Spirit as the 'winged image of the Gospel.'[44] In so doing, Irenaeus drops the concept of protection from the wings imagery. This move illustrates, as did *Ode* 28, that the association of the Spirit and wings can bear multiple meanings.

A fourth reference to wings occurs in *AH* 3.11.8. I have refrained from mentioning it until the clearer statements had been considered, because it does not include an explicit reference to the Spirit. Following the reference to the wings of the Spirit that occurs in the third selection, Irenaeus refers to four principal covenants given to the human race. The first three covenants, the Adamic, Noahic, and Mosaic, pave the way for the fourth,

> which renovates human beings and recapitulates in itself all things, by means of the Gospel raising and flying human beings to the celestial kingdom.[45]

[42] The order: lion, calf, human, eagle aligns with Rev. 4:6–8 (Ezek. 1:10 has the order: human, lion, ox, eagle). The governing paradigm, however, for Irenaeus' discussion of the living creatures in *AH* 3.11.8 comes from Ezek. 1:10. There the creatures have four faces, while Rev. 4 only speaks of four creatures.

[43] See p. 54 n. 37.

[44] His description of the announcement of Mark as 'hurried' probably reflects the idea of speed attached to the concept of wings.

[45] *AH* 3.11.8: *quartum, vero quod renovat hominem et recapitulat in se omnia, quod est per Euangelium, elevans et pennigerans homines in caeleste regnum.*

Irenaeus could be saying that the fourth covenant raises and bears men into the heavenly kingdom upon its own wings; such a figure for the Gospel is understandable. Nevertheless, the fact that several aspects of this selection parallel ideas found earlier in *AH* 3.11.8 strongly suggests that he intends this statement to serve as a summary, itself a recapitulation.

Irenaeus' statement that 'four principal covenants' (*τέσσαρες . . . καθολικαὶ διαθῆκαι*) were given to humanity returns the reader to the opening discussion of *AH* 3.11.8, where the 'four principal winds' (*τέσσαρα καθολικὰ πνεύματα*) substantiate the numerical perfection of the four Gospels.[46] At the beginning of *AH* 3.11.8, Irenaeus describes the Gospels as 'breathing out incorruptibility' and 'vivifying human beings' because of their connection with the Spirit. If we understand 'raising and flying' in the last selection from the end of *AH* 3.11.8 as an allusion to the activity of the Spirit ('raising' would approximate 'breathing out incorruptibility' and 'vivifying human beings'), then we can recognize a similar statement at the end of this section as we saw at the beginning. The fourth covenant 'renovates human beings . . . by means of the Gospel' which is able to raise and fly 'human beings to the celestial kingdom' because of its connection with the Spirit.

This reading is further encouraged by similar statements elsewhere that connect the Spirit with the idea of flying human beings to heaven.[47] *Ode* 36.1–2 reads:

> I rested on the Spirit of the Lord,
> and she raised me up to heaven;
>
> And caused me to stand on my feet in the Lord's high place,
> before his perfection and his glory,
> where I continued praising (him) by the composition of his odes.

Tatian remarks in *Oration to the Greeks* 13.2, 'if [the soul] lives alone it inclines down towards matter and dies with the flesh, but if it gains union with the divine spirit it is not unaided, but mounts to the realms above where the spirit leads it; for the spirit's home is above, but the soul's birth is below.'[48] And again in *Or* 20.1, 'The soul's wings are the perfect spirit, but the soul cast it away because of sin, fluttered like a nestling and fell to the ground, and once removed from heavenly company yearned for association with inferiors.' Finally, in *AH* 3.24.1, which will be considered later in the next chapter,

[46] The translator uses *principales* for *καθολικὰ* with regard to the winds. The second quotation, however, lacks a corresponding Latin adjective for *καθολικαὶ*. One must assume that it was mistakenly neglected in the earliest of translations since none of the Latin manuscripts testifies to its presence, only the Greek fragment fortunately retained.

[47] *See* SC 210 (1974: 286–87) where the discussion mentions the Scriptural origins of this idea, and points the reader to the Armenian version of *AH* 5.9.1.

[48] Tatian (1982). All quotations of Tatian's *Oration* are Whittaker's translation.

Irenaeus says, 'this is the Holy Spirit, the earnest of incorruption and the confirmation of our faith and the ladder of ascent to God.' It would not be untoward, therefore, to deduce that 'flying' at the end of *AH* 3.11.8 refers to the Spirit who elevates and bears humanity to heaven. Thus, Irenaeus commences and concludes *AH* 3.11.8 by affirming the renewal of humanity by means of the Gospel through the agency of the Spirit.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter constitutes the beginning of our consideration of Irenaeus' pneumatology in *AH* 3. Though brief, these pages permit the reader to begin to grasp the development in his pneumatology that occurred between *AH* 1 and 2 and *AH* 3. At least, for now, the reader should recognize a striking difference between the two accounts. As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the next chapter represents the second half of our examination of Irenaeus' account of the Spirit in Book 3.

4

The Emergence and Development of Foundational Themes

The growth in Irenaeus' account of the Spirit, which we began to document in the last chapter, continues to be our attention here. This chapter, however, examines aspects of his theology of the Spirit in *AH* 3 that will continue to appear in one form or another over the course of his pneumatological development and throughout this study. Some lines of thought will be developed themselves over the course of his writing. Some lines of thought are foundational for, or interconnected to, later features of his pneumatology.

4.1 THE UNCTION OF CHRIST

Irenaeus' understanding of the descent of the Spirit on Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan has garnered a great deal of attention.[1] At issue is the way in which the Holy Spirit, if indeed the descending Spirit should be regarded as the Holy Spirit rather than an impersonal Spirit or power of God, relates to the humanity and divinity of Jesus. Two questions have received considerable attention in the past. First, were both Jesus' humanity and divinity anointed by the Spirit, or solely his humanity? Second, what was the effect of the anointing by the Spirit? The answer to this second question largely depends on whether Irenaeus understood Jesus to be anointed by the Holy Spirit or by an impersonal Spirit or power of God. The number of answers offered to these questions in the last fifty years almost equals the number of authors that have presented them.

[1] Houssiau (1955: 173–86); Fabbri, *CyF* 12/14 (1956: 7–42); Aeby (1958: 58–67); Orbe (1961: 501–41); Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 248–52); Orbe, *Greg* 65 (1984: 5–52); de Andia (1986: 185–223); Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 666–77); Vigne (1992: 78–81); Fantino (1994: 378–81); Orbe, *Greg* 76 (1995: 663–99); McDonnell (1996: 57–60, 116–23) Smith, *TS* 58.4 (1997: 618–42).

Given such an extensive history of research, it might be surprising to find central aspects of Irenaeus' discussion of the Spirit's relationship with Jesus overlooked, yet this is the case. To my knowledge, no study has given adequate weight to Irenaeus' statement that the Spirit became accustomed to the human race by means of the humanity of the Incarnate Word (*AH* 3.17.1). Nor has any study explained the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit (*AH* 3.9.3) while taking into consideration the subsequent glorification of that very humanity by the same Spirit. As a result, the discussions of the anointing by the Spirit, a key theme in Irenaeus' theology, have been incomplete.

My answers to the two questions central to this discussion will form the structure of this section. First, I will argue that Irenaeus considered only Jesus' humanity to be anointed by the Spirit. Second, I will contend that the effect of the anointing by the Spirit was a non-qualitative empowerment of Jesus' humanity for the fulfillment of the Christological mission.[2] During the course of this answer to the second question, I will show that Irenaeus believed the anointing Spirit was the Holy Spirit, rather than an impersonal Spirit or power of God.

The aspects of Irenaeus' thought that have been overlooked in the past, figure for the most part into our analysis of the effect of the anointing by the Spirit and the identification of that Spirit. The correctives they offer, however, also affect the way in which we understand what happened to Jesus' humanity at the Incarnation and his glorification. While Jesus' humanity experienced no qualitative change at the time of his anointing in the Jordan, it did undergo one qualitative change before, and one after, that anointing. His humanity received the quality of incorruption in full at the time of, and as a result of, its union with the Word in the Incarnation. The second qualitative change occurred at his glorification, when the Holy Spirit rendered the incorruptibility proper to his own flesh communicable to the rest of the human race. It was at this moment that Jesus' humanity became the saving principle for other human beings. Thus, while this section is principally concerned with articulating Irenaeus' understanding of Jesus' anointing by the Holy Spirit, a proper understanding of that anointing both conditions, and is conditioned by, proper understandings of the Incarnation and his glorification.

Our consideration of the Incarnation and Jesus' glorification will take place at the end of this essay in the third and final part of this section. We will begin by considering whether Jesus' humanity and divinity received an anointing by the Spirit, or just his humanity alone.

[2] 'Christological mission' refers to the sending of the Son by the Father and the attendant events of Jesus' life, as well as their salvific significance as described by Scripture and perceived by the Church. I will later use 'Messianic mission' to refer to Jesus' awareness or consciousness of himself as Messiah and of the salvific significance of his actions.

4.1.1 The Anointing of Jesus' Humanity by the Spirit

The passage of primary importance to determining whether Jesus' humanity alone or also his divinity was anointed by the Spirit is the passage of primary importance to this topic as a whole. It is also the first place that Irenaeus discusses Jesus' anointing by the Spirit at the Jordan. In *AH* 3.9.3 Irenaeus is responding to the Gnostic claim that Matt. 3:16 speaks of the descent of the aeon Christ upon the man Jesus, he writes:

> For Christ did not descend at that time upon Jesus, nor was Christ one and Jesus another; but the Word of God, who is the Savior of all and the Lord of heaven and earth, who is Jesus, as we have shown earlier, who also assumed flesh and was anointed with the Spirit by the Father,[3] [and] was made Jesus Christ. As Isaiah says, 'A stem will come forth from the root of Jesse, and a flower will rise from his root. And the Spirit of God will rest on him: the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and piety, and the spirit of the fear of God will fill Him. He will not judge according to appearance, nor convict according to report; but He will dispense justice to the humble, and convict the renowned of the earth' [Isa. 11:1–4a]. And again Isaiah, pointing out beforehand his unction and the reason why he was anointed, says himself, 'The Spirit of God is upon me, because he has anointed me: he has sent me to preach the Gospel to the lowly, to heal the broken in heart, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and sight to the blind; to announce the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance; to comfort all that mourn' [Isa. 61.1–2]. For as far as the Word of God was man from the root of Jesse and son of Abraham, insofar as this, the Spirit of God rested on him and he was anointed to preach the Gospel to the humble. But insofar as he was God, he did not judge according to appearance, nor did he convict according to report: for 'He had no need that anyone should present to him testimony about human beings, since he himself knew what was in human beings' [John 2:25]. Moreover, he called all the people who are mourning, and giving forgiveness to those who had been led into captivity by [their] sins, he released them from [their] chains, about whom Solomon says, 'And each one is bound by the ropes of his own sins' [Prov. 5:22]. Therefore, the Spirit of God descended on Him, [the Spirit] of him who by the prophets had promised that he will anoint him, in order that we, receiving from the abundance of his anointing, might be saved.[4]

We will return to this text later in our discussion, for now I would like to show that it establishes the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit. Irenaeus recites two texts from Isaiah to support his interpretation of Jesus' anointing by the Spirit: first, Isa. 11:1–4a, then, Isa. 61:1–2. He uses Isa. 11:1–4a to demonstrate that the Spirit descended on Jesus, who as the Incarnate Word is both human and divine. He uses Isa. 61:1–2 to establish the reason for Jesus'

[3] *Qui et adsumpsit carnem et unctus est a Patre Spiritu.* [4] *AH* 3.9.3.

anointing by the Spirit. We will address Isa. 61:1–2 and Irenaeus' comments on that text in the next section. Isa. 11:1–4a, on the other hand, is central to our present discussion.

As soon as Irenaeus finishes quoting the two passages from Isaiah, he provides a commentary on them that reveals their importance to his discussion. He first interprets Isa. 11:1–3a, writing, 'For as far as the Word of God was man from the root of Jesse and son of Abraham, insofar as this, the Spirit of God rested on him and he was anointed to preach the Gospel to the humble.' According to Irenaeus, the Spirit of God anointed or rested upon Jesus only as far as he was human ('man from the root of Jesse and son of Abraham'). Only after he speaks of the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit does he then turn to speak of his divinity. The construction *secundum autem quod*, 'but insofar as,' alerts the reader to this change of subject matter: 'But insofar as he was God, he did not judge according to appearance, nor did he convict according to report: for "He had no need that anyone should present to him testimony about human beings, since he himself knew what was in human beings" [John 2:25].'

The grammatical construction of the passage reveals that Irenaeus has in mind a contrast: the Spirit anointed Jesus insofar as he was human, but not insofar as he was divine.[5] The comments included by Irenaeus indicate the Spirit anointed Jesus' humanity but not his divinity because of the differing capabilities of each, or from the opposite point of view, the need proper to each.[6] As God, Jesus does not judge on the basis of one's status or reputation, for it is proper to him to know the heart, 'what was in human beings.'[7] This insight that inherently belongs to Jesus because of his divinity illustrates that he did not need the Spirit's anointing insofar as he was divine. In contrast, insofar as he was human, Jesus needed the Spirit to rest upon him, anointing him 'to preach the gospel to the humble.' We can summarize, then, that according to *AH* 3.9.3, Jesus needed the anointing of the Spirit to empower[8] his humanity so that he could fulfill the Messianic mission, but he did not need a similar empowerment with respect to his divinity.[9] Therefore, his humanity was anointed, but his divinity was not.

[5] By neglecting to consider *autem* D. Smith understands Irenaeus to say 'insofar as' rather than 'but insofar as,' which leads him to view this passage as a comparison rather than as a contrast. As a result, Smith ascribes the faculty of judgment to both Jesus' humanity (following the anointing) and to his divinity. He explains this as an early example of *communicatio idiomatum*: the anointing of the Spirit, made possible by the union of Jesus' humanity with the Word, bestowed the attribute of just judgment which affected both Jesus' humanity and his divinity (Smith, *TS* 58.4 1997: 628).

[6] Irenaeus' approach betrays a certain lack of development when it comes to his understanding of the integrity of Jesus' person.

[7] Cf. *Prf* 60, where Irenaeus interprets Isa. 11:3–4 this way.

[8] I will explain what I mean by 'empower' later in section 4.1.2.2.

[9] The fact that Irenaeus' argument contrasts the capability of his humanity with that of his divinity presumes that Jesus possesses a particular capacity inasmuch as he is human and

Both Enrique Fabbri and Antonio Orbe argue from other passages that Irenaeus envisions an additional anointing, one on the Word. Fabbri argued first from *Prf* 49 and 53 that the eternal generation of the Son should be considered the first of three anointings,[10] but Orbe's later argument for a transcendental anointing of the Word based on *Prf* 47 and 53 has been the most influential.[11]

Orbe contends that of the passages in Irenaeus that speak of Jesus' anointing by the Spirit, *Prf* 47 deserves interpretive priority over the rest because it alone makes it clear that the Father anointed the Son insofar as he is God.[12] Assigning interpretive priority to *Prf* 47 permits him to state that the anointing of the Spirit substantiated by Isa. 61:1 in *AH* 3.9.3 cannot be the same anointing supported by Ps. 44:8 in *Prf* 47. For Irenaeus makes explicit in *AH* 3.9.3 that Isa. 61:1 refers to an anointing by the Spirit of Jesus insofar as he is human. As a result, Orbe determines that Ps. 44:8 and Isa. 61:1 are proof–texts that establish, in order, the anointing of the Son insofar as he is God and the anointing of Jesus insofar as he is human—that is both a transcendental and an historical anointing.[13]

Having established that Irenaeus has in mind two anointings of the Spirit, and having established proof-texts for each anointing, Orbe applies this interpretive framework to *Prf* 53:

> And His name is twofold: in the Hebrew language 'Messiah' [means] 'Christ', and [. . .]'Jesus', 'Saviour'; and both of these names are the names of deeds

another inasmuch as he is divine. This association of different capacities with Jesus' divinity and humanity goes against J. Behr's statement, 'Irenaeus refuses to distinguish between two beings or two elements in one and the same Jesus Christ (one part human and visible, the other part divine and invisible), preferring instead to think in terms of two states of the same Word: the invisible, incomprehensible Word, becoming visible and comprehensible' (Behr, *Way to Nicaea*, (2001: 132 cf. 125): 'There are not two "parts," as it were, to Jesus Christ, one of which was passible and visible, the other impassible and invisible.'). Furthermore, finding both the human and divine in Irenaeus' conception of Jesus calls into question the link Behr finds between Irenaeus on the one hand, and Zephyrinus and Callistus on the other. Behr, *Way to Nicaea* (2001: 145) quotes von Harnack to support his argument, 'Indeed, as Harnack pointed out (using his categories), "Monarchians of all shades had a common interest in opposition to Logos Christology: *they represented the conception of the Person of Christ founded on the history of salvation, as against one based on the history of his nature*" [von Harnack (1958, vol. 3: 62)]. Inasmuch as this was indeed their intention, Zephyrinus and Callistus stood within the tradition represented by Irenaeus' (the emphasis is von Harnack's).

[10] Fabbri, *CyF* 12/45 (1956: 31–2, 35).

[11] The arguments in support of this reading are by Vigne (1992: 80–1), de Andia (1986: 191–2; her reference to *Prf* 9 in this context is difficult to understand given the explicit reference to the anointing of his humanity: 'that is [on] the Word in his human advent. De Andia stands alone in her appropriation of this text to this end), and McDonnell (1996: 58, 119) follow those of Orbe. So it will be sufficient for this part of my argument to discuss the work of Orbe alone.

[12] Orbe (1961: 502, 506).

[13] Orbe (1961: 508–10).

> accomplished. For He is named 'Christ,' since through Him the Father anointed and adorned all things, and [because], <in> His advent as man, He was anointed by the Spirit of God His Father, as He Himself says of Himself, by Isaias, 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He has anointed me, to bring good tidings to the poor' [Isa. 61:1, Luke 4:18].

He contends that this passage speaks of two anointings. One active: insofar as he is God, the Word anointed all things. One passive: insofar as he was human, the Incarnate Word was anointed.

Orbe approaches *Prf* 53 having already determined that Irenaeus' thought involves two anointings of the Spirit, and he is working from the principle that the end or purpose of an unction defines its nature. These presuppositions enable him to conclude that the active anointing of all things by the Word cannot flow from the passive anointing of the Word as human, rather the passage presumes two additional anointings. The first additional anointing is passive: the Father by means of the Spirit anointed the preincarnate Word, so that the Word could anoint and adorn all things. The second additional anointing is active: the Incarnate Word, insofar as he is human, anoints all human beings who believe in him by means of the Spirit received from the Father at the Jordan.[14] Thus, Orbe arrives at a fourfold anointing of the Spirit that includes the anointing of the preincarnate Word and of the Incarnate Word.

In developing this understanding of Irenaeus, Orbe fails to engage the work of Albert Houssiau beyond an occasional notation for reference. Houssiau's conclusion is opposite to that of Orbe: Irenaeus speaks of one anointing by the Spirit, upon the humanity of the Incarnate Word. Houssiau argues from *AH* 3.9.3 and *AH* 3.17.1–4 that the incarnation is the precondition for the Spirit's descent on Christ because the descent of the Spirit was the first realization of the charismatic effusion in the human race.[15] Orbe's failure to interact with Houssiau is unfortunate, since the later critique of Rousseau showed Orbe's interpretation of *Prf* 47 to be mistaken.

Rousseau undermined the foundation of Orbe's position by demonstrating that Irenaeus does not use Ps. 44:8 to refer to the preincarnate Word but to the Incarnate Word in *AH* 4.33.11, and in particular, in *Prf* 47 where the psalm occurs in a series of Old Testament prophecies announcing the human coming of the Son. Irenaeus is saying that the anointed one is the Incarnate Son who is God, not that the anointed one is the Son as God.[16] The limited possibilities

[14] Orbe (1961: 515–16); for the principle that the end of an unction defines its nature, see pp. 510–11.

[15] Houssiau (1955: 175–7, 179). The reader should note, however, that even Houssiau considered Irenaeus' discussions on the anointing by the Spirit in *AH* 3.6.1 and *Prf* 47 to be somewhat unclear (p. 181).

[16] Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 248–52). See also, Fantino (1994: 379–80).

for translating the Armenian text do not include an anointing of the Son as God. Such a reading of *Prf* 47 would be a 'flagrant misinterpretation.'[17] Rousseau concludes by reaffirming Houssiau's evaluation: the anointing by the Spirit concerned Jesus' humanity alone.[18]

Despite the clear and convincing statements by Rousseau, Orbe's argument has continued to be persuasive. It appears, then, that Orbe's contentions need further deconstruction. Toward this end, I will offer two comments that concern Orbe's discussion of *AH* 3.9.3 and *Prf* 53. First, Orbe argues that by differentiating between the divine and human in Jesus in *AH* 3.9.3[19] Irenaeus intends to say that the Incarnate Word acted or could act as God or as a man. He could even have received some missions that pertained to his divinity and some that pertained to his humanity.[20]

Orbe's reading is incorrect: Irenaeus' goal in *AH* 3.9.3 is to safeguard the unity of Jesus Christ.[21] Jesus is the Word made man who became the Christ at the descent of the Spirit. Jesus was not a mere man who received supernatural qualities at the descent of the aeon Christ. Orbe's contention that the Incarnate Word could act as either God or man suggests that Irenaeus is making a counterproductive argument: being able to act as either God or man would jeopardize the very unity of the Incarnate Word, which is the point of the passage.

Irenaeus does not differentiate between the two natures of Jesus in order to say that he could act as either God or as a man. Instead, he differentiates between the two natures in order to explain why the Spirit needed to descend on the Incarnate Word. He is aware that his opponents could ask him why Jesus needed to receive the Spirit at all if Jesus was already divine as the Son-made-man.[22] His answer is that the Incarnate Word, insofar as he was God, did not need to be anointed by the Spirit, but insofar as he was human Jesus needed the Spirit to fulfill his mission. This passage, then, does not leave room

[17] Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 252): 'un contresens flagrant.'

[18] Rousseau does not take into consideration the comparison that follows and seems to be the particular context for Ps. 44:7–8 in *Prf* 47. Irenaeus says, 'the Son receives . . . the oil of anointing above his fellows.' He defines the 'oil of anointing' as the Spirit, and 'his fellows' as the prophets, the righteous, the apostles, his disciples—all who participate in his kingdom. The comparison makes no sense if Irenaeus is comparing other human beings to the Son insofar as he is God, for two reasons: (1) the most natural meaning of the phrase 'his fellows' is the shared identity of the Son as human and his disciples as other human beings; and (2) it would be pointless to argue that the Son is 'above' human beings if we are speaking of the Son insofar as he is divine.

[19] *AH* 3.9.3: 'as far as the Word of God was man . . . insofar as this, the Spirit of God rested on him and he was anointed to preach the Gospel to the lowly. But insofar as he was God, he did not judge according to glory, nor did he convict according to speech: for "He had no need that anyone should present to him testimony about human beings, since he himself knew what was in human beings" [John 2:25].'

[20] Orbe (1961: 609).

[21] Houssiau (1955: 177, 185).

[22] Trypho asks Justin a version of this question in *Dial* 87.2.

for two anointings of the Spirit for two different purposes, one as God and one as man.

Second Orbe sets up his argument for a transcendental anointing in *Prf* 53 by extracting from *AH* 3.9.3 the interpretive principle that the end or purpose of an unction defines its nature. According to this logic, the Spirit anointed the Incarnate Word, insofar as he was human, because that anointing leads to the anointing of other human beings, that is, to their salvation. In the same way, the Word would not have received an anointing intended for the entire created universe in his humanity, but in a transcendental way that corresponds to its ultimate end.[23]

Orbe's logic, however, is flawed. He assumes that Irenaeus distinguishes between the created status of humanity and the created status of the rest of creation, so that the transcendental anointing can have as its object the Son himself (which would correlate to the status of the created universe), rather than the Son's created humanity (which would correlate to the status of created humanity). Yet in this regard the main point in Irenaeus' theology is to differentiate between that which is created and the Uncreated who creates, and not to differentiate between different orders of creation.[24] In this respect, the universe is just as created as humanity, which leaves no room to distinguish between the two. Therefore, Orbe's interpretive principle is in fact self-defeating. To apply his logic to Irenaeus' theology of creation would result in the Incarnate Word experiencing one anointing, of his created humanity, by means of which the rest of humanity and the whole created order is anointed. We only have grounds, then, to speak of an anointing of Jesus' humanity.

4.1.2 The Effect of the Anointing by the Spirit

The scope of the second question, as to what effect the anointing of the Spirit had upon the humanity and/or divinity of Jesus, has been limited by the foregoing discussion. We should speak of one anointing of Jesus, insofar as he was human, not two anointings; the second being on the Word as God. There is universal agreement that the purpose of the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit was to prepare or enable him to fulfill the Christological mission.[25] The question at hand, then, revolves around whether the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit had a qualitative effect upon his

[23] Orbe (1961: 510–11).

[24] e.g. *AH* 2.28.1–2 and 4.11.2. This is not to say that he does not acknowledge different orders of creation, cf. Fantino (1986: 86).

[25] Houssiau (1955: 176–7, 179); Fabbri, *CyFl* 12/14 (1956: 23–4); Orbe (1961: 510); Orbe, 65 (1984: 41, 43); de Andia (1986: 191–2); Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 667, 669); Vigne (1992: 79); Fantino (1994: 380); Orbe, *Greg* 76 (1995: 673); McDonnell (1996: 119–20); Smith, *TS* 58.4 (1997: 619).

humanity by which his humanity received divine attributes. Central to this determination is whether Irenaeus regards the anointing Spirit as the Holy Spirit, or an impersonal Spirit or power of God.

4.1.2.1 The Anointing Spirit is the Holy Spirit

Both Fabbri and Orbe believe that an impersonal Spirit or power of God anointed Jesus. Fabbri says the Spirit, who is the 'divine life,' gave supernatural life to Jesus' humanity, making his humanity the efficient cause and exemplar of all vivifying and sanctifying works.[26] Orbe goes into more detail. He contends that the anointing Spirit is the power or dynamic quality of the Spirit of God that descended upon Christ's humanity, sanctified it, and then, gave it the physical principle of divine life.[27] As 'the saving thing'[28] in Christ, this power of the Spirit is the principle of divine operations common to the 'persons' of the Godhead, the salvific power that caused the flesh of Jesus to become the physical principle of salvation that is able to work salvation in himself and others.[29] Thus, the anointing of the Spirit introduced a 'true newness'[30] into Jesus when he was christened in his human nature by the salvific instrument (the Spirit of God, the salvific power) that he then passes to others at Pentecost.[31] Daniel Smith utilizes Orbe's conclusions to argue that 'by virtue of the incarnational union' the anointing represents a *communicatio idiomatum*.[32] This makes the baptism at the Jordan 'a key filial moment in the life of Jesus, an important step in the progressive deification of the human nature of Christ.'[33]

[26] Fabbri *CyF* 12/45 (1956): for the Spirit as the divine life see esp. p. 18, p. 30 n. 64; for the effect of the anointing on Jesus' humanity, *see* pp. 9, 21.

[27] Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 676). See also, Orbe (1961: 541). Two points need to be made. Orbe's reference to 'divine life' is misleading. Irenaeus conceives of two modalities of the one human, physical life: temporal and eternal. For a discussion of Irenaeus' conception of temporal and eternal life, *see* chapter 6 of this study, esp. p. 149, p. 149 n. 5, and pp. 166–73. For what Orbe means by 'physical principle' see n. 29.

[28] 'lo saludable;' ibid. 677, vol. 2.

[29] Ibid. See also, Orbe, *Greg*, 65 (1984: 41). Orbe argues from the basis of *AH* 3.10.3 and 3.12.7; the following pages contain a counter-interpretation of these passages.

Orbe refers to both the 'physical principle of divine life' and the 'physical principle of salvation.' He uses the term 'physical' to emphasize Irenaeus' concern with the salvation of the flesh (human material), in contrast to the Gnostics (who were concerned with the Spirit) and the Platonizing ecclesiastics (who were concerned with the soul). The 'physical principle of divine life' and the 'physical principle of salvation' are related to each other. The first is the power of the Spirit of God (the anointing Spirit itself) that his flesh received for the salvation of humanity (including Jesus' own flesh). The 'physical principle of salvation,' then, is the ability to dynamically work salvation that the flesh of Jesus possesses once it has received the 'physical principle of divine life' (*i.e.*, once it has been anointed by the Spirit). (Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 676–7)).

[30] 'verdadera novedad;' Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 673).

[31] Ibid. vol. 2: 675. *See also*, Orbe, *Greg* 65 (1984: 43).

[32] Smith, *TS* 58.4 (1997: 634, 640).

[33] Ibid. p. 640.

Fabbri and Orbe derive their understanding of the anointing Spirit as the power, dynamic quality, or (principle of) divine life from *AH* 3.12.7;[34] Orbe also works from *AH* 3.10.3, which we will address after our consideration of *AH* 3.12.7. For both, the quotation of Acts 10:38 in *AH* 3.12.7 supports their contention that Irenaeus ascribes an impersonal character to the Spirit received by Jesus at his baptism. That passage reads: '. . . Jesus of Nazareth, how God anointed him with the Holy Spirit and with power;[35] who went around doing good, and healing all who were oppressed by the devil; because God was with him.' The quotation is open to interpretation. Fabbri and Orbe understand it as identifying the power of God with the Holy Spirit.

They neglect, however, to take into consideration the clarifying summary of this passage that Irenaeus offers later in *AH* 3.12.7: 'he also has testified to them that Jesus Christ was the Son of God . . . and not only this, but he also has testified that Jesus was himself the Son of God, who also, having been anointed with the Holy Spirit, is called Jesus Christ.' In this description of the incidents recounted in Acts 10, Irenaeus does not indicate that he considers *virtute* to define or in any way modify *Spiritu sancto*. Indeed, he does not even include the words 'and with power' when he reiterates the story of Acts 10. Therefore, nothing in the quotation of Acts 10:38, or in Irenaeus' own summary of that text, suggests he understands *Spiritu sancto* and *virtute* in apposition with each other, nor as being received by Jesus as divine qualities during his baptism at the Jordan. According to *AH* 3.12.7, then, it is the Holy Spirit who anointed Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan.

This determination agrees with Houssiau's analysis of the different meanings the Book of Acts and Irenaeus assign to the name 'Jesus Christ.' Houssiau wrote, 'For the Book of Acts, "Jesus" designates the man from Nazareth, whereas "Christ" signifies the power and the divine dignity. For Irenaeus, on the contrary, "Jesus" designates the divine person, that is the Word, whereas the name "Christ" is attributed to Jesus because of the humanity that he has assumed. "Jesus becomes Jesus-Christ" simply means that "the Word becomes flesh".'[36] Irenaeus' ascription of the title 'Christ' to Jesus, following his anointing by the Spirit, does not correspond to the reception of divine qualities, but in fact affirms Jesus' humanity.

Orbe also refers to Irenaeus' discussion in *AH* 3.10.3 to substantiate his interpretation of the Spirit. Irenaeus writes:

> But the knowledge of salvation was the knowledge of the Son of God, who both is called and is in truth, Salvation (*Salus*), and Savior (*Salvator*), and Salutary (*Salutare*) . . . But Salutary (*Salutare*), thus: 'God has made known his Salvation

[34] Both Fabbri and Orbe utilize *AH* 3.12.7 as a proof text. Fabbri (CyF 12/45 1956: 27 n. 54) says only that Jesus' humanity was clothed with the Spirit and power at the shores of the Jordan. Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 677) simply offers a quote.

[35] *AH* 3.12.7: *Iesum a Nazareth, quemadmodum unxit eum Deus Spiritu sancto et virtute.*

[36] Houssiau (1955: 185).

> (*Salutarem*) in the sight of the Gentiles' [Ps. 98:2].[37] For he is indeed Savior (*Salvator*), since he is the Son and Word of God; but Salutary (*Salutare*), because [He is] Spirit: for he says, 'The Spirit of our face, Christ the Lord' [Lam. 4:20]. But Salvation (*Salus*), since he is flesh: for 'The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us' [John 1:14].[38]

Three titles apply to the Son, each of which contributes to our understanding of redemption. The third title, *Salutare*, is of particular interest to this present study for it involves the relationship between the Son and Spirit with regard to salvation. Several generations of scholars have focused on Irenaeus' use of Lam. 4:20 in connection with this title: 'but Salutary, because [He is] Spirit: for he says, "The Spirit of our face, Christ the Lord" [Lam. 4:20].' J. Armitage Robinson first suggested that *Salutare* refers to the Son as 'saving principle.'[39] Adelin Rousseau proposed that it refers to the common divinity, the Spirit, of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.[40] Orbe would have us believe that it refers to the 'salvific instrument' in Christ's flesh.[41]

If we were to base our determination on this portion of Irenaeus' discussion alone, it seems to me that *Salutare* would be best understood as a reference to the common divinity Jesus possesses: the Spirit shared by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.[42] Still, it is difficult to understand what Irenaeus would mean by saying that Jesus is *Salutare* because he is God, since just before this statement he said that Jesus is Savior (*Salvator*) because he is the Son and Word of God. The two statements seem to overlap each other considerably—to be almost tautological. Nevertheless, Irenaeus could be saying that as God, Jesus has saving power or is saving (is *Salutare*), and as Son or Word of God, he is the particular subsistence of that saving power (is the *Salvatore*).

[37] *AH* 3.10.3: *Salutare autem sic: 'Notum fecit Deus Salutarem suum in conspectu gentium.'*

[38] *AH* 3.10.3. The reader of the ANF translation should note that the division between *AH* 3.10.2 and *AH* 3.10.3 occurs at different places in the ANF and the SC; my references follow the SC.

[39] Robinson (1970: 63). Followed by a host of others, he interprets Irenaeus' use of Lam. 4:20 here as saying, 'Christ was Spirit of God, and Christ's body was made by his Spirit. This is as much as saying that the Word of God was the agent of his own incarnation.' That Irenaeus does not intend this particular use of Lam. 4:20 to describe the process by which the Word is incarnated is evident from (1) the fact that Irenaeus discusses the incarnation under the title *Salus*, not *Salutare*; and (2) my upcoming argument, which will show the verse to support Irenaeus' explanation for the Spirit's role in bringing Salvation to humanity. Robinson's reasoning may be overly influenced by the presence of Lam. 4:20 in *Prf* 71, and perhaps Justin's 1 *Apol* 32–33 remains in the back of his mind as well. I do not, then, consider this to be a statement of Spirit-Christology; for my discussion of Spirit-Christology in Irenaeus, see chapter 7, pp. 182–93.

[40] Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 272).

[41] Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 674–5).

[42] For a statement such as this, see *Prf* 71 in which Lam. 4:20 is again quoted. As note 39 indicates, however, I do not believe Lam. 4:20 is used in this way in *AH* 3.10.3. On Irenaeus' use of 'Spirit' to refer to the spiritual nature of God, and esp. its Stoic roots, see Barnes (2009: esp. 68–70).

The Son or Word is God who is Spirit, who effects salvation, or something of the like.

At least three points lead us away from such an interpretation. First, in such an argument, we would expect Irenaeus to discuss Jesus first as God and then as the subsistence of God, the Word or Son of God, but Irenaeus would be doing the opposite. Second, Irenaeus consistently connects the basis of the salvation of others with Jesus' humanity, as in fact he does in the next sentence of this passage ('Salvation since he is flesh'), but here he would be connecting it with his divinity. The third point comes from an early portion of the passage that is always overlooked.

We cannot understand what Irenaeus means by 'Salutary, because [He is] Spirit' without taking into consideration his first step in substantiating the title *Salutare*. Prior to his connection of *Salutare* to Lam. 4:20, Irenaeus writes: 'But Salutary (*Salutare*), thus: "God has made known his Salvation (*Salutarem*) in the sight of the Gentiles" [Ps. 98:2].'[43] Irenaeus defines *Salutare* as the making known of God's Salvation. He defines Salvation as the Word Incarnate, as seen in the last sentence in the above selection: 'But Salvation, since he is flesh.' In his first definition of *Salutare*, then, Irenaeus gives us the information we need to understand what he means when he says a few sentences later the Son of God is 'Salutary, because [He is] Spirit.' Jesus is *Salutare* because he has been made known to human beings as their Salvation. Irenaeus uses Lam. 4:20 to connect the Spirit with the title *Salutare* because it is by means of the Holy Spirit as the Unction of Christ that Jesus is made known to or brought to the rest of the human race.

Neither *AH* 3.10.3 nor *AH* 3.12.7, then, can be used to identify the Spirit that descended on Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan as an impersonal Spirit or power of God.[44] Rather, both passages refer to the particular association of the Holy Spirit with the Incarnate Word that began when the Father anointed Jesus with the Spirit at his baptism.[45] The most fundamental discussion of this

[43] *AH* 3.10.3: *Salutare autem sic: 'Notum fecit Deus Salutarem suum in conspectu gentium.'*

[44] Insofar as Heine (*JTS* 49 1998: 56–91, here 69–71) has ascertained Callistus' approach to the baptismal account, Irenaeus' Trinitarian interpretation distinguishes him from the theological milieu of Callistus. Irenaeus would also differ from the opinions of the Theodotians (which Heine describes on p. 71), because his deprecation of the notion that Christ descended upon the human Jesus would apply to the Theodotians just as it does to his present adversaries.

[45] Cf. *AH* 3.18.3: 'For in the name of Christ is implied, who anoints, the one who has been anointed, and the unction itself with which that one has been anointed. And indeed the Father anoints, the Son to be sure has been anointed, with the Spirit who is the Unction (*in Spiritu qui est unctio*). As the Word says through Isaiah, "The Spirit of God is upon me, because he has anointed me" [Isa. 61:1], signifying both the anointing Father, the anointed Son, and the Unction, which is the Spirit.'

Fabbri (12/45 1956: 30–1) interprets *AH* 3.18.3 as revealing a double anointing of Jesus, the first at his Incarnation and the second at his baptism. He misunderstands Irenaeus' appeal to the name of 'Christ': it does not indicate that he conceives of an anointing at the Incarnation. The point of the passage is that the Incarnate Son suffered the crucifixion. He appeals to the name 'Christ' because the three-fold referent inherent to that title proves, according to Irenaeus,

association of the Holy Spirit with Jesus occurs toward the end of *AH* 3.9.3. Two points emerge from this passage. First, the anointing of Jesus by the Spirit resulted in a non-qualitative empowerment of his humanity for the fulfillment of the Christological mission. Second, Jesus' anointing by the Spirit is the basis for the reception of Salvation by the rest of the human race, for Salvation comes to others by means of the Spirit as the Unction of Christ.

4.1.2.2 The Non-Qualitative Empowerment of Jesus' Humanity

Instead of receiving a qualitative empowerment by means of an anointing by an impersonal Spirit or the power of the Spirit of God, Jesus experienced a non-qualitative empowerment of his humanity by means of an anointing by the Holy Spirit. The appropriation of Isa. 11:1–4 and 61.1–2 by Irenaeus shows that these passages are the context for his thinking about the anointing by the Spirit. Since there is no evidence to the contrary, we may presume that Irenaeus' understanding of anointing corresponds to the accounts he finds in the Old Testament.[46] In those accounts the descent of the Spirit onto Israelites empowered them to perform a mission or fulfill an office given to an individual by God.[47] The period of empowerment lasted as long as the purpose for the empowerment existed. It was not permanent by nature, as the occasional departure of the Spirit from an anointed-one reveals.[48] Since the powers given to the anointed-one ceased at the departure of the Spirit upon the completion of the mission or the removal from office, we can infer that the descent of the Spirit did not involve a qualitative change of the anointed-one.

In the case of the anointing of Jesus, then, the Spirit empowered his humanity so that the Incarnate Word could fulfill the Messianic mission: 'he

that the Son was truly present in the flesh at the time of his anointing at the Jordan (the Incarnate Son was anointed by the Father with the Spirit). This same Incarnate Son, who was anointed and received the title 'Christ,' is the one who died on the cross (against the claim that the 'Christ' departed Jesus prior to his passion).

In addition to Fabbri and Orbe, a non-Trinitarian reading of Jesus' anointing with the Spirit by the Father is supported by von Harnack (1958, vol. 2: 267 n.2) who says, 'the personality of the Spirit vanishes [in 3.18.3]'; and Smith (*TS* 58.4 1997: 624), who does not consider the Spirit to be distinct in identity but to be the Spirit or power of the Father (or to be the divinity of the Son in 'the case of conception').

A Trinitarian reading is supported by Aeby (1958: 60–1), Rousseau (SC 210 1974: 248), Jaschke (1976: 214–15), de Andia (1986: 189–90), Vigne (1992: 79–80), Fantino (1994: 380), and McDonnell (1996: 118–19).

[46] Indeed, he speaks of Isaiah as 'pointing out beforehand his (Jesus') unction and the reason why he was anointed . . . ' (*AH* 3.9.3).

[47] See S. Tengström, 'רוּחַ,' 13 (2004: 390–4). That Irenaeus understands the descent of the Spirit as missional is evident from the connection he makes between the descent of the Spirit and the Christological mission in the passage above: 'the Spirit of God rested on him and he was anointed to preach . . . '.

[48] e.g. the departure of the Spirit of the Lord from Saul after Samuel anointed David as Saul's successor in 1 Sam. 16:13–14.

was anointed to preach the Gospel to the lowly . . . he called all the people who are mourning, and giving forgiveness to those who had been led into captivity by [their] sins, he released them from [their] chains.'[49] The empowerment of Jesus' humanity never ends, not because it involves a qualitative change, but because the very purpose of the Word's incarnation is to fulfill the Messianic mission. That is to say, the Spirit never departs his humanity because the Messianic mission is its *raison d'être*.

A passage that occurs a little later in Book 3 confirms that the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit resulted in a non-qualitative empowerment of his humanity. Those who argue that Jesus' humanity was invested with divine attributes by means of the Spirit's anointing undervalue or neglect the accustomization of the Spirit that occurred during Jesus' life. Irenaeus speaks of this accustomization in *AH* 3.17.1:

> And again, giving to the disciples the power of regeneration into God, he said to them, 'Go, teach all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit' [Matt. 28:19]. This (Spirit), indeed, he promised by the prophets to pour out in the last times on [his] servants and maid servants so that they might prophesy; and for this reason [the Spirit] descended on the Son of God made the Son of Man, with him becoming accustomed (*cum ipso adsuescens*) to dwell in the human race, to rest in human beings, and to dwell in the formation of God, working the will of the Father in them and renewing them from oldness into the newness of Christ.

The beginning of *AH* 3.17.1 parallels *AH* 3.9.3. As Irenaeus himself observes, he once again deploys Isa. 61:1–2 to combat the notion that the aeon Christ, rather than the Holy Spirit, descended upon Jesus at his baptism. This text, however, provides an added detail: Irenaeus believes that the Spirit became accustomed (*adsuesco*) to dwell, rest, and work among human beings as Christ's Unction.

Irenaeus considers the anointing of Jesus to involve not only the Spirit acting on Jesus but also the Spirit as acted upon. He does not say here that the Spirit created an environment within the humanity of Jesus suitable to his presence and work. Instead, he says the Spirit himself had to become accustomed to dwelling, resting, and working in the human environment.

The need for the Holy Spirit to become accustomed to 'working the will of the Father' in human beings and to 'renewing them from oldness into the newness of Christ' entails the presupposition that the Spirit was not prepared to perform and so could not have performed such works prior to the period of accustomization.[50] As a result, the Spirit could not have renewed Christ's own

[49] *AH* 3.9.3.

[50] De Andia states that the anointing of the Spirit on Jesus has the same effect as the anointing of the apostles because of accustomization (1986: 206). According to my understanding, accustomization signals the Spirit could not have had the same effect on Jesus prior to being accustomed as it had on the apostles once the accustomization had been accomplished.

humanity 'from oldness into the newness,' a qualitative change, at the time of the anointing at the Jordan. The Spirit acquired the capability to perform this work in humanity by anointing and remaining with the humanity of the Incarnate Word.[51] As a result, the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Holy Spirit could only have involved a non-qualitative empowerment.

4.1.2.3 The Unction of Christ is the Medium of Salvation

The anointing of Jesus' humanity with the Holy Spirit makes it possible for human beings to receive the redemption that results from the completion of his mission. Irenaeus writes:

> Therefore, the Spirit of God descended on Him, [the Spirit] of him who by the prophets had promised that he will anoint him, in order that we, receiving from the abundance of his anointing, might be saved.[52]

We have already seen that the anointing by the Spirit enabled the fulfillment of the Christological mission. We learn here that the salvation worked by Jesus Christ comes to human beings by their participation in the Unction of Jesus—the believer experiences salvation by 'receiving from the abundance of his anointing.' That is to say, the Spirit with whom the Father anointed the Incarnate Word then, as the Unction of Christ, anoints each individual believer, an anointing which results in the salvation of that person.[53] When we combine this passage with *AH* 3.10.3, Irenaeus' conception of the believer's anointing with the Unction of Christ becomes clearer. *AH* 3.9.3 establishes that each believer receives the Holy Spirit as the Unction of Christ. *AH* 3.10.3 explains that this reception involves bringing or making known Jesus—Salvation—to the believer. Therefore, the Spirit as the Unction of Christ is the medium by which believers receive Jesus, their Salvation.

4.1.3 Jesus' Anointing within the Context of his Incarnation and Glorification

Now that we have arrived at a new understanding of Irenaeus' conception of Jesus' anointing with the Holy Spirit, it will be helpful to place what happened

[51] Aeby (1958: 61) describes this accustomization of the Spirit as 'a comparable apprenticeship to that of the Son of God in the old theophanies'.

[52] *AH* 3.9.3: this selection may be read in context at the beginning of this section.

[53] *AH* 3.17.2 indicates that the anointing of the believer by the Spirit occurs at the time of that individual's baptism. Contrary to the dominant scholarly consensus, I believe that Irenaeus' discussion in *AH* 3.17.2 makes best sense when read in light of a two-rite baptismal ceremony.

at this moment in his life in context with what happened to his humanity at other key moments. Indeed, while I have argued that Jesus' humanity did not undergo a qualitative empowerment at the time of his anointing, we should recognize that it experienced qualitative changes at both his incarnation and glorification. Considering together his incarnation, anointing, and glorification will not only confirm my reading of Jesus' anointing, it will also shed further light upon it, and it will add to our understanding of Irenaeus' vision of Jesus' life as a whole.

4.1.3.1 The Reception of Incorruptibility at his Incarnation

De Andia has shown that according to Irenaeus, Jesus' humanity received the quality of incorruption at the time of its union with the Word in the Incarnation. She writes, 'in the mystery of the incarnation, it is the divinity, united to the humanity, which procures incorruptibility.'[54] In this I agree, but she further contends that the humanity of Jesus progressed in incorruptibility throughout his life. From the time of his incarnation to his baptism in the Jordan, his incorruptibility was the result of the union of the Word with his flesh, and from the time of his baptism to his exaltation in glory it is the Spirit who transformed his flesh rendering it incorruptible in glory.[55]

The involvement of the Spirit in the creation of Jesus' humanity, in its resurrection, and in its glorification, is beyond doubt. De Andia, however, can provide no clear passage to support her position that the Spirit transformed Jesus' humanity during the course of his life—between its creation and resurrection.[56] In fact, Irenaeus never states that Jesus' humanity received any divine quality or attribute at any point prior to his death other than when the Word united with his humanity. For this reason we should understand him to mean that Jesus' humanity received the divine quality or attribute of incorruptibility in full at the time of his incarnation. As Irenaeus writes in *AH* 3.19.1:

> For it was for this end that the Word of God was made man, and He who was the Son of God became the Son of man, that man, having been taken into the Word, and receiving the adoption, might become the son of God. For by no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been

[54] De Andia (1986: 185); this is a summary statement of the preceding chapter, see esp. pp. 157–78 where she analyzes the key passages of *AH* 3.18.7 and *AH* 3.19.1.

[55] Ibid. 185.

[56] Her main discussion occurs in *Homo Vivens*, (de Andia 1986: 189–201). On p. 185, she quotes *AH* 2.20.3: 'but our Lord Christ has suffered a strong and unyielding passion; not only was he himself not in danger of being corrupted, but he even established corrupt humanity by his own strength, and recalled it to incorruptibility.' Here, it is better to understand Irenaeus as saying that the effect or outcome of Jesus' passion (when completed) was the establishment of humanity in incorruptibility, rather than to say that incorruptibility was achieved during the course of the passion.

> united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless, first, incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive the adoption of sons?[57]

The full reception of incorruptibility by Jesus' humanity occurred by means of its union with the Word at the time of the Incarnation.[58] This means that there is no need to postulate a qualitative effect for the anointing of the Spirit at the Jordan in order to explain the incorruptibility or sanctification possessed by Jesus' humanity.

4.1.3.2 The Reception of Communicability at his Glorification

The first qualitative change of Jesus' humanity occurred at his Incarnation when its union with the Word rendered it incorruptible. The second qualitative change of his humanity occurred at his glorification or spiritualization, when the Spirit rendered his already incorruptible humanity the saving principle for the rest of the human race.

I have argued Orbe was wrong to believe that the anointing by the Spirit at the Jordan had a qualitative effect on the humanity of Jesus: giving to it the physical principle of divine life (making him *Salutare*), by which salvation comes to other human beings.[59] Orbe's argument was based upon the understanding that the effect of the union of the Word with Jesus' humanity was incommunicable, whereas the effect of the union of the Spirit with Jesus' humanity is communicable.[60] By stating that the anointing of Jesus' humanity by the Spirit gave to it the physical principle of divine life, Orbe was trying to explain how the salvation accomplished by Jesus and experienced by his own humanity comes to other human beings. He was wrong to state that this occurred at the anointing at the Jordan, and he was wrong to hold that the anointing Spirit itself was the physical principle of divine life. Orbe was not wrong, however, to suggest that Irenaeus locates the saving principle in the humanity of the Incarnate Word, nor to associate the Spirit (though I am here speaking of the Holy Spirit) with the establishment of that saving principle.

Irenaeus describes the glorification of Jesus' flesh with the following words:

[57] ANF translation; cf. *AH* 3.18.7.

[58] De Andia (1986: 177) has shown that for Irenaeus 'filial adoption is nothing other than the participation in incorruptibility'. We may say, then, that the filial adoption or deification of Jesus' humanity was completed at the time of the Incarnation.

[59] Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 674–6); based on his reading of *AH* 3.10.3.

[60] Orbe (1987, vol. 2: 670).

> . . . in order that on the flesh of our Lord might come the paternal light, and from his brilliant flesh might come to us, and so humanity might come to incorruptibility, having been enveloped by the paternal light.[61]

De Andia refers to this selection when she argues that the bringing of incorruptibility to the human race by the Spirit occurs after the flesh of Christ has been glorified because the incorruptibility the Holy Spirit brings to humanity is proper to the glorified flesh of Christ.[62] I agree with her evaluation. However, Irenaeus does not indicate that the transformation of Christ's flesh progressed throughout his life and culminated at his glorification.

We should, then, deduce that Irenaeus assigns the qualitative changes of Jesus' humanity to two instants in time. First, the Incarnation, at which time the unification of humanity with the Word granted to Jesus' humanity the divine quality of incorruptibility (e.g. *AH* 3.19.1). Second, the glorification or spiritualization of Jesus' incorruptible flesh,[63] at which time the Spirit produced the second qualitative change rendering it the saving principle for other human beings.

Since the incorruptibility belonging to Christ's humanity was only communicated after his glorification, we may infer that the incorruptibility possessed by his flesh prior to its glorification, the incorruptibility proper to its union with the Word, was incommunicable. The glorification/spiritualization of his flesh, then, rendered the incorruptibility proper to his own flesh communicable to the rest of the human race. Since this communicability follows the spiritualization of his incorruptible flesh by the Holy Spirit (*AH* 5.7.2),[64] it should be considered the result of that spiritualization or glorification. His glorification, then, occurred in order to bring Salvation, the glorified Incarnate Word, to human beings (*AH* 3.9.3 and *AH* 3.10.3). Therefore, the defining characteristic of the glorified flesh of Jesus in contrast to the anointed flesh of Jesus is the communicability of the incorruptibility that belongs to the union of the Word and its humanity.

It is not a coincidence that the moment at which Jesus' incorruptibility became communicable, his glorification, was the moment that the Christological mission was accomplished. The Spirit's accustomization to humanity that

[61] *AH* 4.20.2. For the involvement of the Spirit in the glorification of Jesus' humanity, see *AH* 5.6.2–5.8.1, where Irenaeus argues from 1 Cor. 6:14 and Rom. 8:11 that the resurrection and glorification of the body of Jesus and the bodies of other human beings occur by the same instrumentality of the Spirit.

[62] De Andia (1986: 199; see also 186, 206). For the significance of the resurrection as the source of filial adoption for the believer, see (1986: 185–201, esp. 186, 201). See in Irenaeus, *AH* 3.16.3.

[63] For the glorification of Jesus' flesh, see the end of *AH* 5.6.2 and the beginning of *AH* 5.7.1.

[64] *AH* 5.7.2: 'For these are animal bodies . . . which rising by means of the Spirit become spiritual bodies, so that by the Spirit they may have life ever-lasting.' This statement refers to the resurrection and glorification of the bodies of believers, but in *AH* 5.6.2 and *AH* 5.7.1 Irenaeus quotes 1 Cor. 6:14 and Rom. 8:11 to establish that the resurrection and glorification of Jesus' body and the bodies of believers occur in the same way.

took place by means of the Incarnation was completed at the moment of Christ's glorification, and it was then that Jesus sent the Spirit bearing the incorruptibility of his flesh to other human beings.[65] The moment at which his incorruptibility was communicable was the same moment at which the Holy Spirit became able to communicate that incorruptibility, Jesus' glorification.[66]

Section Conclusion

According to Irenaeus, then, Jesus experienced one anointing by the Spirit, an anointing of his humanity that occurred at his baptism in the Jordan. Moreover, the Spirit who descended upon Jesus was the Holy Spirit, not an impersonal Spirit or the power of the Spirit of God. This anointing with the Holy Spirit resulted in a non-qualitative empowerment of Jesus' humanity, so that he could fulfill the Messianic mission.

The Holy Spirit's identity as the Unction of Christ allowed him to become accustomed to working and dwelling in the human race. The ability of the Spirit to bring Salvation to the rest of the human race is contingent upon this period of accustomization. After the completion of his accustomization, after Jesus' glorification, the Spirit as the Unction of Christ became the uniquely capable agent who mediates the presence of Christ to believers. This mediation of the Spirit as the Unction involves bringing to humanity the requisite knowledge for redemption, the knowledge of the Incarnate Word, who is 'Salvation, since he is flesh.'

Irenaeus, then, envisioned a Christological mission that rested on a co-dependent relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit. Moreover, that relationship involves a specific sequence of events. The anointing of the Incarnate Word by the Holy Spirit made possible the fulfillment of the Messianic mission and the accustomization of the Spirit to humanity. The Messianic mission culminated in the glorification of Christ by the Holy Spirit, at which time the incorruptibility that was the exclusive possession of Jesus' humanity was rendered communicable and the Holy Spirit became eligible to bring the incorruptibility of the glorified Christ to believers. The glorified Christ then sent the Spirit to those who believe in him. It is at this sending that the anointing of Christ, the Spirit as the Unction, was poured out to the rest of humanity, anointing believers and bringing to them their Salvation.

[65] As de Andia writes, 'the knowledge or the gnosis of the Son, and, in him, that of the Father, is the source of eternal life. It is "the knowledge of the Son of God which is incorruptibility" [*AH* 4.15.2]' (1986: 184).

[66] *Contra* Orbe's statement that Irenaeus never explains why the Spirit is not given to other human beings after Jesus' baptism at the Jordan, but rather after his ascension (1961: 528).

4.2 THE UNCTION OF THE CHURCH

In our consideration of the Spirit as the Unction of Christ, we cannot lose sight of the fact that Irenaeus addresses this topic in order to explain how the activity of the Spirit at Pentecost, and beyond, fulfills the promise of Joel 2:28 to pour out the Spirit 'in the last times.'[67] The anointing of the Son-made-man with the Spirit served as the precondition and conduit for the transmission of the Spirit to other human beings for their salvation and edification. When Christ's time walking upon the earth came to an end, the Spirit, who had become accustomed to dwell and work among humanity, continued a new form of that work as the newly promised gift of the Savior. In *AH* 3.17.1 the Spirit who anointed Christ, and the Spirit who worked in Peter to testify to the Lord's identity (the quotation of Matt. 10.20), is the same Spirit behind the 'power of regeneration into God' given to the disciples, so that they could fulfill the Great Commission.[68] Expounding upon this latter stage of the Spirit's activity, the activity that follows his sending by Christ, is Irenaeus' chief concern in *AH* 3.17.2–3.

The majority of *AH* 3.17.2 and the whole of *AH* 3.17.3 describe how the Spirit, the Unction of Christ, adapts believers to God: 'For this reason also the Lord promised to send the Paraclete, who would adapt us to God (*qui nos aptaret Deo*).' These two sections contain two themes with regard to the work of the Spirit in the Church: the establishment of unity and the establishment of productivity.[69] He opens his account with two analogies that illustrate these topics:

> For just as from dry wheat one lump of dough cannot be made without water, nor one loaf of bread, so neither can we many be made one in Christ Jesus without the water which is from heaven.[70] And just as dry ground, if it does not receive moisture does not bear fruit, likewise even we, who are at first a dry tree may never bear the fruit of life without the willing rain from above.[71]

Irenaeus expands upon the analogy of the dry wheat in the remaining sentences of *AH* 3.17.2; he addresses the analogy of the dry tree in *AH* 3.17.3.

[67] *AH* 3.17.1. De Andia's division of the passages that refer to the Spirit as water of life into two categories (first, a Christological context in which Christ gives the Spirit; second, a Pentecostal context) suggests Irenaeus never uses this particular metaphor of the Spirit to connect the giving of the Spirit by Christ and the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost (de Andia 1986: 212). Yet, this is the very framework of *AH* 3.17.

[68] *AH* 3.17.1; quoted in the previous section. For the Lucan idea of the Spirit as the power given by Jesus Christ at Pentecost in order to fulfill the mission of the Church, see Lampe (1957:193–94).

[69] De Andia also recognizes the Spirit as the source of unification and production in this passage (1986: 210–13).

[70] For the scriptural background for understanding the Spirit as the water from heaven, see de Andia (1986: 212 n. 41).

[71] *AH* 3.17.2.

4.2.1 The Analogy of the Dry Wheat

His discussion of the first analogy begins immediately after the above quotation with the following sentence: *Corpora enim nostra per lavacrum illam quae est ad incorruptionem unitatem acceperunt, animae autem per Spiritum* ('For our bodies have received unity by means of that laver which leads to incorruptibility, but our souls by means of the Spirit.'). The suggestion that the body receives some sort of unity by means of baptism poses an interpretive problem. Irenaeus never makes a similar statement elsewhere, which means that our present version of this passage could be the result of a translation error. Instead of 'unity which leads to incorruptibility,' Irenaeus could have written, 'union with incorruptibility.'[72] This latter wording could find support in a similar statement in *AH* 3.19.1: 'Indeed, in no other way could we receive incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immortality.'

Two main problems exist with regard to this emendation. First, it disregards the careful construction of the sentence. It would require *quae* to refer to *unitatem* when its placement in the sentence, in addition to the presence of *illam*, suggests that Irenaeus intends for it to refer to *lavacrum*. 'That baptism' is the one 'which leads to incorruptibility.' Irenaeus is saying that the unity occurs by the laver '*which leads to* incorruptibility'—incorruptibility is not received at the time of the laver, or by means of the laver; rather baptism conducts the neophyte toward incorruptibility.[73] Second, the suggestion forces an awkward reading upon the analogy of dry wheat that Irenaeus means for this sentence to explain. The natural reading of the analogy involves the unification of many elements into one body by means of the Spirit (the water from heaven), referring to the unification of individual believers into the one body of Christ by the work of the Spirit.[74]

Irenaeus is saying, then, that the unity a believer receives as a part of the body of Christ follows the reception of incorruptibility granted by the Spirit, which itself follows the washing of baptism. In order to secure this reading, we need to answer three questions. First, why does Irenaeus link the body to baptism, but not the soul? Second, given that baptism 'leads to' incorruptibility and does not produce incorruptibility itself, when and how does the neophyte receive incorruptibility? Third, how does the Spirit unite individual believers into the one body of Christ?

[72] Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 329).

[73] The reception of the Spirit in the baptismal ceremony is a precondition for the ultimate reception of incorruptibility that occurs following the vision of God (*AH* 4.20.5) and could be understood in that sense as leading to incorruptibility. This, however, does not explain the differentiation between body and soul that forms the context of this statement.

[74] De Andia (1986: 210–11, 213).

The explanation for why Irenaeus links the body to baptism but not to the soul lies in the use of the word *lavacrum*.[75] Outside of our present passage *lavacrum* occurs twice in *Against Heresies*, both in a single passage in *AH* 5.15.3. In that passage, Irenaeus recounts the story of the blind man who was healed when he washed off the paste of clay and spittle with which Jesus had anointed his eyes. Twice during the telling of this story, Ireneus refers to the 'laver of regeneration' (*lavacro regenerationis*; *lavacrum regenerationem*) as the means by which the body was restored. Irenaeus uses the story of the blind man to illustrate the salvation of the flesh and to prefigure the future resurrection of the body from the dead—two themes that play a prominent role in this portion of *AH* 5, which focuses on the redemption of the body. The washing in water healed the body by restoring its sight, thus tying the use of *lavacrum* to the restoration of the body in particular. This particular use of *lavacrum*, then, suggests that the washing of baptism in *AH* 3.17.2 refers to the purification of the body alone, and not to the purification of the soul.

Irenaeus does not seem to be alone in this type of reasoning. Hippolytus says the third cup the neophyte drinks after baptism contains water 'as a sign of the washing, so that the inner person, which is made up of the soul, should receive the same as the body.'[76] The idea seems to be that the soul, which dwells inside the body, can only be cleansed by water that enters inside the body and not by the baptismal water that touches the exterior of the body alone. By separating the soul from the washing of baptism, Irenaeus may be working with the same idea as Hippolytus: the baptismal water affects the outside of the person, the body, and not the inner person, the soul. Instead of saying that the soul is washed by means of internal water, Irenaeus says that the soul is cleansed *per Spiritum*, 'by means of the Spirit.'[77] So according to Irenaeus, 'both are necessary, since both contribute towards the life of God.'[78] The body of the catechumen must be cleansed by water and the soul by the Spirit.[79]

[75] A Library of Latin Texts search shows that *baptism** occurs 32 times in *Against Heresies*, but in none of those occurrences does Irenaeus discuss the baptismal liturgy as he does here. The majority (19) of the references refer to Jesus' baptism at the Jordan.

[76] Hippolytus, *Apostolic Tradition* 21.29 (2001). Unless otherwise noted, all quotations of the *Apostolic Tradition* are taken from this text.

[77] De Andia is correct to point out (1986: 221) that in *AH* 5.6.1 Irenaeus states that the soul experiences a direct union with the Spirit, but the body experiences an indirect union with the Spirit through the soul. Yet, I do not believe that Irenaeus intends to make this point in this passage, nor do I believe that this passage indicates that the soul receives the Spirit in the washing of baptism. A separate point: while the parallel is not exact, a certain similarity of logic exists between Irenaeus' understanding here and his argument in *AH* 2.30, esp. *AH* 2.30.8, that only the Spiritual can produce the Spiritual. We should also note that his discussion of baptism in *Prf* 41 ('cleansing their souls and bodies by the baptism of water and the Holy Spirit') is ambiguous.

[78] *AH* 3.17.2; ANF translation.

[79] Both writers seem far from Tertullian's understanding that the Spirit empowers the baptismal waters to sanctify both the spirit and the flesh of the catechumen (*Bapt.* 4.4 [1999]).

The second question. We can explain how and when the catechumen receives incorruptibility, since baptism only 'leads to' incorruptibility, by recognizing the baptismal liturgy that Irenaeus has in mind. The liturgy that best fits his comments is one that involves two rites. In the first, baptism cleanses the catechumen's sins, thus paving the way for the second, the post-baptismal reception of the Spirit,[80] whether by an imposition of hands or by an anointing with chrism.[81]

Origen, Hippolytus, and Tertullian were all familiar with two-rite liturgies.[82] Hippolytus records a liturgy that involved both baptism and a post-baptismal anointing: '"Lord God, you have made them (the neophytes) worthy to deserve the remission of sins through the laver of regeneration: make them worthy to be

[80] Both Benoît (1953: esp. 204–5, 224) and Lampe (1951: 193) have argued that no post-baptismal rite existed for the bestowal of the Spirit during the second century, or at least no important rite. Lampe does state that a variety of practices emerged at the beginning of the third century, which is not far from the date of *AH* 3 (pp. 196–7). And after arguing otherwise, Benoît also acknowledges the possibility that a two-rite baptismal liturgy existed during Irenaeus' time (pp. 207–8). Marsh *ITQ 40* (1973: 126) has already challenged their conclusions with regard to baptismal practice during the second century by pointing out the weakness of arguments from silence. Benoît (1953: 204) says that Irenaeus would have opposed the Gnostic understanding of anointing if he had been familiar with such a practice in the church.

With regard to Irenaeus in particular, Benoît makes two positive arguments (1953: 203). First, the proximity of the metaphors of 'water from heaven' for the Spirit and of 'washing' for baptism indicate the Spirit is given in baptism (the 'water' in the 'washing'), but this is a logical *non sequitur*. Second, he affirms Barthoulot's translation and note (PO12.5 1917: 760 n.1) that *Prf* 7 states that the neophytes bear the Spirit when they have been taken up from the baptismal waters (p. 207). But J. Smith has already pointed out (1952: 144 n. 45), that the grammatical construction is just a doublet that cannot bear Barthoulot's rendering, nor sustain Benoît's argument.

De Andia follows Benoît in saying the Spirit is given in baptism in *AH* 3.17.2 (1986: 219–21) but her final comments (p. 221) acknowledge that Benoît's explanation does not account for Irenaeus' different approach to the body and soul. In her own study of baptism, de Andia cites *Prf* 3 and 57 in addition to *AH* 3.17.2. She argues that the first part of *Prf* 57 refers to baptism (pp. 215–21). However, it is also the case that the second half of *Prf* 57 says the Spirit is received by drinking. As a result, this text can be seen to agree with a two-rite baptismal ceremony. Irenaeus refers to baptism twice in *Prf* 3. He first writes 'we have received baptism for the remission of sins,' and then, 'this baptism is the seal of eternal life and rebirth unto God.' Since the first reference was likely to be a part of the baptismal liturgy that Irenaeus knew (Kelly 1960: 77): it confirms that he understood baptism to entail the forgiveness of sins alone, which agrees with the two-rite baptismal ceremony. The description of 'baptism for the remission of sins' in the second reference as the 'seal of eternal life and rebirth' would then point to baptism as the earnest or promise of future eternal life and rebirth. Such a meaning occurs in the so-called *Second Epistle* of Clement 7.6 and 8.6, where the seal must be kept preserved or undefiled to receive incorruptibility. In *AH* 5.8.1 Irenaeus quotes Eph. 1:13 to say the Spirit is the seal or earnest of our future inheritance. Therefore, the incorruptibility that de Andia sees as occurring as a result of baptism alone is the effect of both rites of baptism.

[81] Since the context of Irenaeus' one reference to the imposition of hands in *AH* 4.38.3 has nothing to do with baptism, it should not influence our understanding of the baptismal practices of the day. Moreover, because the concept of anointing plays a central role in *AH* 3, I suspect that anointing is the post-baptismal rite Irenaeus has in mind.

[82] Origen: e.g. *PA* 1.3.2, 7; *Comm. Rom.* 5.8.3; *Hom. Ezek.* 7.4. Hippolytus and Tertullian are discussed in my argument above.

filled with the Holy Spirit" . . . after this, pouring the sanctified oil from his hand and putting it on his head he shall say: "I anoint you with holy oil in God the Father Almighty and Christ Jesus and the Holy Spirit".'[83] Tertullian records a liturgy that involved both baptism and a post-baptismal imposition of hands: 'Not that in the waters we obtain the Holy Spirit; but in the water, under (the witness of) the angel, we are cleansed, and prepared for the Holy Spirit;' and 'In the next place the hand is laid on us, invoking and inviting the Holy Spirit through benediction . . . Then, over our cleansed and blessed bodies willingly descends from the Father that Holiest Spirit.'[84] In the two-rite baptismal liturgy, the Spirit cleanses the catechumen of sin through the washing of baptism, which prepares the neophyte for the reception of the Spirit by means of the post-baptismal rite. Incorruptibility then follows from the reception of the Holy Spirit who unites the believer to Christ. Therefore, the two-rite liturgy explains Irenaeus' careful statement that the laver of baptism 'leads to' incorruptibility; it does not itself render the catechumen incorruptible.

As for the third question, the Spirit's identity as the Unction of Christ explains how individual believers are united into the one body of Christ. As we discussed in the last section, as the Unction that overflows to human beings, the Spirit brings Salvation, Jesus Christ, to those who believe. The story of the Samaritan woman (John 4) may seem a little out of place in *AH* 3.17.2, since it has nothing to do with baptism. Until, that is, one recognizes that Irenaeus highlights her reception of the living water, which John 8:39 declares to be the Spirit.

The placement of the story of the Samaritan woman after his allusion to the baptismal rites drives home the point that it is the Spirit who unifies. Without the activity and presence of the Spirit in the two rites of the baptismal liturgy, no believer could become united to Christ and become incorruptible.[85] The Spirit uses the two rites of the baptismal liturgy to join the flesh and soul of an individual to incorruptibility, to 'the Son of God who was made the Son of Man,' as he says in *AH* 3.19.1.[86] When individuals are 'united to incorruptibility and immortality,'[87] united by the Spirit through baptism to the

[83] Hippolytus, *Apostolic Tradition* 21.20–2 (2001).

[84] Tertullian, *On Baptism* 6.1 and 8.1 (1999). Tertullian's liturgy also includes an anointing after baptism and before the imposition of hands (*Bapt*. 7). The purpose of baptism is not to give the Spirit, because that occurs at the imposition of hands. It rather seems to be to free the recipient from the bondage of sinfulness (baptism cleansed the catechumen from sin). Tertullian also offers an etymological explanation for the anointing, which is similar to that offered by Theophilus, *Autol* 1.12.

[85] Cf. de Andia (1986: 223).

[86] Irenaeus' use of a text from John in his argument that the Spirit unites the believer to Christ may indicate that he is in tune with John's pneumatology. McPolin observes that in John the Spirit is 'the personal link for the believer with the Incarnate and glorifed Jesus. He renders effective the presence of the glorified Lord for the believer and leads him into communion with Jesus' (McPolin, *ITQ* 45 1978: 126).

[87] *AH* 3.19.1.

Incarnate Son, then 'can we many be made one in Christ Jesus,' as the analogy of dry wheat affirms. The Spirit unites the bodies and souls of the individual with the incorruptible and immortal One, and in the process unites each of those individuals into the one body of Christ. It is for this purpose of making a myriad into one that Jesus gave the Spirit to his followers. As Irenaeus writes at the end of *AH* 3.17.2, 'Which (the living water/Spirit) the Lord, receiving as a gift from the Father, likewise himself bestowed on those who are partakers of himself, sending the Holy Spirit on all the earth.'

4.2.2 The Analogy of the Dry Tree

AH 3.17.3 develops the second analogy we found in *AH* 3.17.2: 'And just as dry ground, if it does not receive moisture does not bear fruit, likewise even we, who are at first a dry tree may never bear the fruit of life without the willing rain from above.' Irenaeus expands upon the water metaphor in this analogy in order to discuss the Spirit. Both the lack of dew on Gideon's fleece and Isaiah's prophecy that no rain will fall on Judah indicate that the people of Israel 'should no longer have the Holy Spirit from God.'[88] He turns to Isa. 11:2 to state that God has conferred upon the Church the 'Spirit of God, who descended upon the Lord,' the 'dew [that] comes on the whole earth,' the 'Paraclete from heaven.'[89] He then makes a simple declaration illustrated by several allusions to Scripture:

> This is why the dew of God is necessary for us, so that we may not be consumed with fire, nor be rendered unfruitful, and so that [where] we have an accuser there we also may have the Paraclete [1 John 2:1], the Lord commending to the Holy Spirit his own human being[90] who had fallen among bandits [Luke 10:35], to whom he himself showed mercy and bound his wounds, giving two royal denaria; so that, receiving by the Spirit the image and inscription [Matt. 22:20, etc.] of the Father and the Son, we may bear fruit, the denarius which was entrusted to us having been multiplied and remitting it to the Lord [Matt. 25, Luke 19].[91]

[88] *AH* 3.17.3. The reader will recall that Justin made a similar statement in *Dial* 87. After quoting Isa. 11:1–3 Justin argues that the Spirit has ceased to work among the Israelites and now as Christ works among his followers. Irenaeus' discussion, though, does not incorporate Spirit-Christology.

[89] Cf. *Ode* 36.6–7 where the Spirit anoints Christ, who then emits a cloud of dew from his mouth. With regard to Irenaeus' use of the name 'dew' for the Spirit, Orbe notes Prov. 3:20: 'and the clouds drop down the dew' Orbe, *Greg* 76 (1995: 678 n. 34). Irenaeus understands Prov. 3: 19–20 to refer to the Spirit in *AH* 4.20.3.

[90] *Suum hominem*, a singular form which I take as a collective reference to human beings as the creation of the Word; see also *AH* 3.24.1: *hominem suum*.

[91] *AH* 3.17.3.

The Spirit does three things as the dew of God.[92] First, he keeps the believer from judgment ('not be consumed by fire'), which could well refer to the unification of humanity to incorruptibility that the Spirit works through baptism in *AH* 3.17.2. Second, he keeps the believer from unfruitfulness, which refers to the second analogy and is the ultimate point of this selection. Third, he functions as an advocate for the believer, which builds upon Irenaeus' references in *AH* 3.17.2–3 to the Spirit of Christ as the Paraclete.[93] Having here summarized his teaching on the activity of the Spirit in *AH* 3.17.1–3, Irenaeus then proceeds to make the same points in the familiar language of Scripture:

> . . . the Lord commending to the Holy Spirit his own human being[94] who had fallen among bandits, to whom he himself showed mercy and bound his wounds, giving two royal denaria [Luke 10]; so that, receiving by the Spirit the image and inscription of the Father and the Son [Matt. 22:20, etc.], we may bear fruit, the denarius which was entrusted to us having been multiplied and remitting it to the Lord [Matt. 25, Luke 19].[95]

His decision to cast his teaching in scriptural allusions must emanate from the idea that the words of Scripture grant validity and support to his reasoning—regardless of whether those words are used in a manner that agrees with their original contextual meaning. Readers who attempt to understand Irenaeus' combination of these scriptural allusions by means of the original meaning of the allusions will find themselves in utter confusion. The statements are only intelligible as words of Scripture used with a new meaning for a new purpose.

At first blush, such a blatant disregard for the original contextual meaning of Scripture does not seem to agree with a thinker who has already affirmed the interpretive principle: 'parables ought not to be adapted to ambiguous expressions.'[96] But when we combine this interpretive principle with his declaration that 'parables are able to receive many interpretations,'[97] we come to an understanding that makes sense of his approach in *AH* 3.17.3. Irenaeus believes that the three points he has taught with regard to the Spirit are themselves unambiguous; after all he has supported them with references

[92] The connection between the Spirit and dew extends beyond Irenaeus. In Clement of Alexandria's *Quis Dives Salvetur* 34.1 dew belongs to the Spirit just as power to the Father and blood to the Son: 'knowing not what a "treasure in an earthen vessel" we bear, protected as it is by the power of God the Father, and the blood of God the Son, and the dew (δρόσῳ) of the Holy Spirit' (ANF 2 1897).

[93] Jesus is the paraclete for the believer in 1 John 2:1, but since Irenaeus states that the Spirit is the Paraclete and since 1 John does not mention an accuser as does Irenaeus, it seems that Irenaeus is just expounding upon the meaning of 'paraclete.'

[94] *Suum hominem*, a singular form which I take as a collective reference to human beings as the creation of the Word, *see* also *AH* 3.24.1: *hominem suum*.

[95] *AH* 3.17.3.

[96] *AH* 2.27.1; ANF translation.

[97] *AH* 2.27.3.

to Scripture. Therefore, he can appropriate parables to express these truths, even if they did not express those truths in their scriptural context.

Irenaeus, then, divorces three parables from their original contexts to create the following narrative. By using the parable of the good Samaritan in Luke 10 ('the Lord commending to the Holy Spirit his own human being who had fallen among bandits, to whom he himself showed mercy and bound his wounds, giving two royal denaria'), Irenaeus is saying Jesus sent the Spirit to fallen humanity, the Incarnate Son's own creation whom he has healed, and for whom he has provided. By using the parable about paying taxes to Caesar in Matt. 22:20, Luke 20:24 and Mark 12:16 ('So that, receiving by the Spirit the image and inscription of the Father and the Son'), Irenaeus is saying Jesus provides for those he has healed by sending the Spirit as his Unction to bring to believers the riches of salvation belonging to the Father and Son.[98] And by using the parable of the Talents/Ten Minas in Matt. 25 and Luke 19 ('[so that] we may bear fruit, the denarius which was entrusted to us having been multiplied and remitting it to the Lord'), Irenaeus is saying the salvation brought to believers by the Spirit ought to result in the production of good works for the Lord.[99]

Section Conclusion

Thus, Irenaeus utilizes two analogies in *AH* 3.17.2–3 to explain two effects of the anointing of the Church by the Spirit, the Unction of Christ. According to the analogy of the dry wheat, the Spirit unites human beings to incorruptibility through the two rites of baptism, and in the process unites individual believers into the one body of Christ. According to the second analogy, the Spirit renders Christians productive, as dry trees that receive water are able to bring forth fruit. In both of these ideas, Irenaeus thinks of the Spirit as the one who brings the Incarnate Word and his saving work to fallen humanity.[100] The Spirit, as the Unction of Christ, is the mediator without whom the redemptive work of the Incarnation remains unrealized for the rest of the human race.

[98] Cf. Fantino, who reads the reference to the 'image and inscription' in *AH* 3.17.3 together with *AH* 4.36.7 and *Prf* 7 to determine, 'Baptism provides for us the denarius which bears the image and inscription of the Father, that is to say, the knowledge of the Son . . . Salvation is then in this denarius mentioned by our text, a denarius which corresponds to the gift of the Holy Spirit' (Fantino 1986: 101).

[99] The thieves represent the devil and the innkeeper the Spirit according to Orbe, *Greg* 76 (1995: 680).

Irenaeus' use of parables having to do with currency may have had a particular relevance for readers in Lyons. M.S. Enslin has pointed out that Augustus had established at Lyons the imperial mint, which remained the sole source of silver and gold coinage during his reign. Enslin, *HTR* 40 (1947: 137–65, here 156).

[100] In a similar way, Ignatius pictures the Holy Spirit as the cable linking Christ's redemptive work to human beings in his striking illustration in *Ep. Eph.* 9.1, 'You consider yourselves stones of the Father's temple, prepared for the edifice of God the Father, to be taken aloft by the hoisting engine of Jesus Christ, that is, the Cross, while the Holy Spirit serves you as a rope; your faith is your spiritual windlass and your love the road which leads up to God.' (ACW1 1946).

4.3 THE LIFE-GIVING GIFT

The last section of this chapter showed that the Spirit, as the Unction of Christ given to the Church, works to establish unity and productivity among believers. In *AH* 3.24.1 Irenaeus revisits the idea that the Spirit was presented to the Church now, however, as the gift that brings to life those who receive it.

> For it is to the church that this gift of God[101] has been entrusted (*creditum est*), just as breath [was entrusted] to the one who was molded (*aspiratio plasmationi*), so that all the participating (*percipientia*) members may be made alive (*vivificentur*); and by it communion with Christ has been deposited, this is the Holy Spirit, the earnest of incorruption and the confirmation of our faith and the ladder of ascent to God.[102]

As in *AH* 3.17.2, where the Spirit unites the believer to Christ through the baptismal rites, in *AH* 3.24.1 the reception of the gift of the Spirit deposits within the believer communion with Christ.[103] After affirming this role of the Spirit in uniting an individual to Christ, Irenaeus then speaks to the activity of the Spirit beyond the initial deposit. The Spirit is the earnest of incorruption, the confirmation of our faith, and the ladder of ascent to God. Each step of the Christian life involves the presence and activity of the Spirit in the believer. From the first to the last, one's salvation depends upon the reception of the Spirit sent by Christ. *AH* 3.24.1, however, offers even more details about the reception of the Spirit.

Irenaeus' affirmation early in *AH* 3.24.1 that 'the preaching of the Church is everywhere consistent, and continues in an even course, and receives testimony from the prophets, the apostles, and all the disciples'[104] recalls his earlier remarks attributing the preservation and unity of the gospel message to the work of the Spirit.[105] This preaching of the Church leads to faith, which has an effect by means of the agency of the Spirit: 'and which (one's faith) always, by means of the Spirit of God, as if in an excellent vase there is a precious deposit, is rejuvenating, and causes to rejuvenate the vase that contains it.'[106] While the role of faith in the rejuvenation of the believer may rouse the curiosity of the reader, Irenaeus focuses upon the agency of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit who

[101] I follow Rousseau (SC 210 1974: 390–3) in understanding the 'gift of God' as the Spirit and not 'faith'. Acts 2:38 or the variant form of Acts 2.33 found in *AH* 3.12.2 could be the text he has in mind for the identification of the Spirit as the gift given to the Church. Irenaeus' reference to the Spirit as the 'gift of God' points to the Spirit's identity as the Unction of Christ—the one whom Jesus received from his Father at his baptism and has sent to the Church after his ascension (*AH* 3.17.2).

[102] *AH* 3.24.1.

[103] Cf. 3.10.3 where the Spirit brings Salvation, the Incarnate Word, to humanity.

[104] ANF translation.

[105] See chapter 3, pp. 46–53.

[106] *AH* 3.24.1.

maintains the preaching of the Church and renders one's faith effective is the gift of God who makes alive those who receive it. Faith 'is rejuvenating' and is that 'which causes to rejuvenate,' but only as a result of the agency of the Spirit (*semper a Spiritu Dei*).

The Spirit restricts its work to the Church: to those to whom the 'gift of God has been entrusted,' that is, to 'all the participating members.' *Omnia membra percipientia*, 'all the participating members,' is an intriguing turn of phrase. The basic idea Irenaeus intends to convey is straightforward: all those who receive the gift of the Spirit are made alive. The language found later in *AH* 3.24.1, however, suggests we should regard 'all the participating members' as sacramental. Note his use of *participant* and its cognate *participes* in the following selections:[107]

> For, 'in the church,' it is said, 'God has placed apostles, prophets, teachers,' and all the rest of the Spirit's works; those are not partakers (*non sunt participes*), who do not agree (*non concurrunt*) with the church, but cheat themselves of life by their evil opinions and most wicked activity.[108] For where the church is, there is the Spirit of God;[109] and where the Spirit of God is, there is the church and every grace: indeed, the Spirit is truth.[110]
>
> Therefore, those who do not partake of him (*qui non participant eum*) are neither nourished into life from the breasts of the mother, nor do they receive the clearest fountain proceeding from the body of Christ[111] . . . (these people are)

[107] The second selection follows right after the first in *AH* 3.24.1. I have separated them for ease of reference.

[108] *AH* 3.24.1: *operationem Spiritus, cuius non sunt participes omnes qui non concurrunt ad Ecclesiam, sed semetipsos fraudant a vita.*

[109] De Andia sees here a connection between Irenaeus' ecclesiology and Christology: the Church is the place of the Spirit, insofar as it is the Body of Christ, the source of the Spirit for the Church (1986: 232).

[110] 'Spirit is truth' probably comes from the Gospel of John's references to the 'Spirit of truth.' De Andia (1986: 232–3) does not doubt Irenaeus' dependence on John, and also notes the role this affirmation plays in Irenaeus' own theology. For relevant references in John, see McPolin, *ITQ* 45 (1978: 118–19, 127).

[111] De Andia asserts that the 'clearest fountain' flowing out of Christ is the Spirit, the living water (1986: 197, 234–5). She misses, though, the general sacramental character of *AH* 3.24.1 (she does mention the connection with regard to 'clearest fountain' in particular). I am unable to say with certainty what Irenaeus meant by 'nourished into life from the breasts of the mother, nor do they receive the clearest fountain proceeding from the body of Christ.' I think a better suggestion, however, is that Irenaeus has in mind two of the cups served to neophytes in the Eucharistic meal of the baptismal service. Both Justin (1 *Apol* 65) and Hippolytus (*Apostolic Tradition* 21.27, Dix 1992: 23) refer to the liturgy of this rite. Though it is difficult to see how Justin's account would accord with Irenaeus' statements, the account of Hippolytus is similar. Hippolytus states that the neophyte drinks from three cups: (1) a mixture of wine and water; (2) a mixture of milk and honey; (3) water. According to Hippolytus, the cup of milk and honey corresponds to Christ's flesh 'through which those who believe are nourished just like little children,' an idea that accords well with Irenaeus' 'nourished into life' (on the use of milk and honey in the post-baptismal rite, see McGowan (1999: 107–15)). The mixture of wine and water, which Hippolytus says is 'on account of the likeness of the blood which was shed for all who have put their faith in him,' agrees with Irenaeus if we understand 'clearest fountain proceeding from

> fleeing the faith of the church lest they be converted, rejecting, in truth, the Spirit so that they may not be instructed.

The reader may recall from the last section of this chapter an important precedent for the use of *participes* and *participant*. In *AH* 3.17.2 we find the same terminology when Irenaeus states that the individuals whom the Spirit unites to Christ and to the Church through the baptismal rites are those 'who are partakers of [Christ]' (*qui ex ipso participantur*). The presence of the same language here suggests that he is again thinking of the role of the sacraments in the life of the Church. Moreover, the use of *concurrunt* in the first selection above encourages this idea: 'those are not partakers (*non sunt participes*), who do not agree (*non concurrunt*) with the church, but cheat themselves of life by their evil opinions and most wicked activity.'

My translation of *concurro* as 'agree' reflects the content of the following clause. Those who possess 'evil opinions' and engage in 'most wicked activity' do not 'agree' with the Church—especially when the identifying mark of that Church is the Spirit who is truth. Nevertheless, translating *concurro* as 'agree' fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the first clause which precedes it ('those are not partakers').

The solution to this apparent dilemma comes by recognizing the careful selection of the term *concurro*, a word which bears both the meanings 'to agree' and 'to join together.'[112] When reading *concurro* in light of the preceding clause, the latter meaning makes the most sense. Those who 'are not partakers' do not 'join together' with the Church—the same idea that we found in *AH* 3.17.2. Therefore, *concurro* communicates that those who are not partakers are not joined to the Church because their opinions and actions do not agree with the Spirit who characterizes the Church—one of the fundamental ideas of *AH* 3.24.1.

We have seen that Irenaeus links the concept of 'partaking' to the concept of being united to, or joined with, the Church. However, what exactly a person does, or does not, partake of is not specified in the first selection. Such is not the case in the second selection where there is no question that the word 'him' (*eum*) in the phrase 'who do not partake of him' (*qui non participant eum*) refers to the Spirit.[113] Irenaeus' use of *participes* and *participant* is similar, then, to his use of *participantur* in *AH* 3.17.2. Yet, a notable difference

the body of Christ' as referring to the wound incurred by the soldier's spear which caused the release of both blood and water [John 19:34] (the mixed cup is the blood of Christ in *AH* 4.33.2). The referent for 'mother' must also remain unclear, though de Andia's suggestion that the referent is Christ agrees with the sacramental context wherein the cup of milk and honey represents the flesh of Christ (1986: 234).

[112] The differing translations of the ANF and SC bear out this fact. Rousseau's suggested retroversion, *συντρέχω*, also bears both of these meanings, SC 211, (1974).

[113] It does not matter whether it is the 'Spirit of God' or the 'Spirit [who] is truth.'

exists: in *AH* 3.17.2 believers partake in Christ, while in *AH* 3.24.1 believers partake in the Spirit. It would be rash to say that this change indicates that the discussions in *AH* 3.17.2 and *AH* 3.24.1 do not agree with each other. Irenaeus is saying that while the Spirit unites believers to Christ through the rites of baptism (*AH* 3.17.1), the Spirit also unites believers to himself in the rites of baptism (*AH* 3.24.1).[114] The Spirit does not just unite people to Christ, the Spirit unites people to himself as he unites them to Christ.[115]

We may now return to the phrase *omnia membra percipientia*, 'all the participating members,' with which we began this discussion. Irenaeus wrote, 'For it is to the church that this gift of God has been entrusted . . . so that all the participating (*percipientia*) members may be made alive (*vivificentur*); and by it communion with Christ has been deposited, this is the Holy Spirit.' The Spirit is the gift of God entrusted to the Church, so that each person who participates in, or receives, the Spirit may be brought to life. The *percipientia membra* live because the Spirit they receive in the sacraments is the Spirit as the Unction of Christ, the Spirit who communicates the incorruptibility belonging to the humanity of Christ, the Salvation of the human race.[116]

4.4 THE CREATIVE AGENCY OF THE SPIRIT

The philosophical acumen of Irenaeus has been the subject of discussion at least since Hermann Diels stated that the references to philosophers in *AH* 2.14.2–6 came from the doxographical handbook of Pseudo-Plutarch.[117] Regard for Irenaeus' philosophical ability reached its nadir when Gustave Bardy declared that Irenaeus is not a philosopher. According to Bardy, '[Irenaeus] does not combat profane wisdom; he is content to disdain it.'[118] Both Robert M. Grant and André Benoît followed Diels in affirming Irenaeus' use of Aetius

[114] I specify baptism here since Irenaeus has not yet discussed the role of the Spirit with regard to the Eucharist; for that see *AH* 4.18.5.

[115] Benoît (1953: 201–3) finds in *AH* 3.17.2 an implicit discussion of the reception of the Spirit in baptism and states that baptism has the same result as the gift of the Spirit. This last point is *apropos* to *AH* 3.24.1 where Irenaeus first refers to the gift of the Spirit and then utilizes sacramental language to further discuss the reception of the Spirit. I agree with Benoît's conclusions, but would alter his statements to reflect a two-rite baptismal liturgy that reflects my argument with regard to *AH* 3.17.2.

[116] It is important to remember throughout the course of this discussion that the Spirit sent by Christ is the Spirit with whom Jesus was anointed. So when the anointing of Christ overflows to his followers, those human beings experience a union with the Spirit similar to the union Jesus' humanity first experienced with the Spirit. As Houssiau (1955: 175–7, 179) has argued, the descent of the Spirit on Jesus' humanity is the first realization of the charismatic effusion in the human race.

[117] Diels (1879: 171–2).

[118] Bardy (1928: 36).

as edited by Ps-Plutarch, but while Benoît's ultimate judgment agreed with Bardy's opinion, Grant was more positive.[119]

In direct opposition to Bardy, Grant demonstrated Irenaeus' rhetorical orientation, concluding: 'in rhetoric as in Christianity he was an apt and intelligent pupil.'[120] According to Grant, Irenaeus' interest was more rhetorical than philosophical. Nevertheless, he still wondered at the ease with which Irenaeus dismissed 'insoluble difficulties in science,' ultimately determining that though this approach was much like the Stoics, Irenaeus tended toward skepticism. William R. Schoedel picked up on this attitude as well and proceeded to show Irenaeus' ability and willingness to adopt Empiric method in his argumentation.[121]

If we combine Grant's conclusions with Schoedel's determination that Irenaeus' indebtedness to Empiricism extends beyond doxographical knowledge,[122] we arrive at a picture of Irenaeus as aware of general philosophical positions, as trained in rhetorical arts, and able to utilize well certain philosophical methods in his argumentation.[123] Christopher Stead's summary is well balanced, '[Irenaeus] has, I suspect, more philosophical talent than is easy to detect in his surviving work . . . But when philosophical methods are used, they are ably handled, and one regrets the disappearance of other works known to Eusebius, especially the treatise arguing that God is not the author of evil.'[124]

It should come as no surprise, then, to find Irenaeus appropriating philosophical polemic to his advantage in *AH* 3.24.2 to 3.25.5.[125] In *AH* 3.24.2 he

[119] Grant, *HTR* 42 (1949, 41–51, here 43); Benoît (1960: 65–7). In fact Grant and Benoît are arguing over the validity of Bardy's judgment: Grant quotes it in opposition on p. 51; Benoît quotes it in support on p. 73.

[120] Grant, *HTR* 42 (1949: 51).

[121] Schoedel, *JTS* 35 (1984, 31–49). Galen's *On Medical Experience* is Schoedel's primary source of comparison for Empiricism. In an earlier study Schoedel concluded, 'Irenaeus had some acquaintance with rhetoric and less with the higher discipline of philosophy' (Schoedel, *VC* 13 1959: 22–32, here 32).

[122] Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 49). See also, Jacobsen, *SP* 36 (2001: 256–61).

[123] This goes against Benoît's assertion (1960: 67) that Irenaeus has a 'singulièrement négative' opinion of philosophy and philosophers—especially since Schoedel works from *AH* 2, which is the basis for Benoît's conclusion.

[124] Stead (1994: 90). Despite the progress of scholarship on this issue, there is a persistent tendency to disparage Irenaeus' philosophical ability. For example, according to E. Pagels, 'we need to remember that Irenaeus was not a philosophically inclined theoretician debating theology with academic and ecclesiastical colleagues so much as a young man thrust into leadership' (Pagels, *VC* 56 2002: 339–71, here 348).

[125] When confronted with Irenaeus' constructive use of philosophy in this passage, Benoît's negative evaluation of Irenaeus' approach to philosophy in *AH* 2 leads him to the absurd suggestion that due to a delay in writing *AH* 3, Irenaeus forgot he had condemned 'en bloc' all the philosophers in *AH* 2.14 (Benoît 1960: 71). His argument that Irenaeus' opinion of philosophy changed between *AH* 2 and 3 because he read different doxographical sections, on the origins of the world when he wrote Book 2, and then on providence when he wrote Book 3, overlooks the dependence of philosophical argumentation for providence on a particular understanding of the origin of the world. It is far better to understand Irenaeus' approach in *AH* 2.14.2–6 as an *ad hominem* argument. D.B. Reynders, *RTAM* 7 (1935: 9) has shown he is comfortable using versions of this rhetorical device.

first utilizes philosophical polemic when he derides the Gnostic position that the immanence inherent in creative activity excludes the Creator from being the highest God. Irenaeus labels this stance as the Epicurean conception of a God who exercises no providence: 'they have discovered namely the God of Epicurus, who furnishes nothing either for himself or others; that is, one who exercises no providence at all.'[126]

Attacking the Epicureans for their non-teleological conception of cosmology was a standard tactic in the philosophical battles of the day. The arguments of both Stoic and Middle Platonic protagonists featured this approach.[127] It is a question then of whether Irenaeus is appropriating either Stoic or Middle Platonic reasoning. The answer comes by means of his quotations of Plato's *Laws* 4.715E and *Timaeus* 29E in *AH* 3.25.5, which indicate he has turned to Middle Platonism rather than Stoicism as an aid to his present purposes.[128] This reliance on Middle Platonic thought might provide the logical basis for an aspect of his argument in *AH* 3.24.2 that he leaves unexplained.

The Gnostic doctrine that the Creator cannot be the highest God—since human beings know of the Demiurge—presupposes the complete transcendence and the attendant inaccessibility to human knowledge of the highest God. Against this logic, Irenaeus argues in *AH* 3.24.2 that though the greatness (*magnitudo*) or substance (*substantia*) of God cannot be known, God can be known 'by means of his love and infinite kindness.' This 'love and infinite kindness,' his providence, is evident in his creative activity:

> Wherefore also the light which is from God does not illumine them (Irenaeus' opponents), because they have dishonored and despised God, holding him of small

[126] *AH* 3.24.2. For examples of Epicurean cosmology without teleology, see Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* (*De rerum natura*) 4.823–57, 5.156–234; Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* (*De natura deorum*) 1.18–23, 1.52–3. All of these are conveniently listed in Long and Sedley vol. 1 (1987: 58–61).

[127] While commenting on Philo, J. Dillon notes, 'every Platonist wished to maintain the doctrine of God's Providence. Without that, one would fall into Epicurean atheism . . . ' (Dillon 1977, 1996: 168). For an example from Stoicism, see Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* (*De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos*) 1075E, where he quotes the Stoic, Balbus.

[128] While Irenaeus seems to approach *AH* 3.24.2 through *AH* 3.25.5 from a Middle Platonic perspective, he does not provide enough detail for us to settle on a particular source. The character of his references in *AH* 3.24.2–25.1 may be explained by reliance upon a doxography since they could come from a general awareness of philosophical polemic. The quotations of Plato in *AH* 3.25.5, though, could suggest more extensive access to certain texts. Moreover, given Schoedel's demonstration that Irenaeus had more than a general acquaintance with Empiricism, one cannot rule out, despite Benoît's insistence otherwise (1960: 70), that he had access to copies of *Timaeus* and *Laws* at some point in time. Then again, such a conclusion has no scholarly support and is not necessary, as he could also have obtained these quotations from a text collection used during his rhetorical training. In fact, the possibility that he used a *testimonium* gains considerable support from the use of slightly different versions of both passages in a similar context by Atticus (Frag. 3, 798D; Atticus, (1977: 46–7). This is also the opinion of van Unnik, *VC* 30 (1976: 201–13, here 208). In any case, we are left to explain his argument without the aid of knowing the particular text from which he works.

> account, because, by means of his love and infinite kindness, he has come within reach of human knowledge. Knowledge, however, not with regard to his greatness, or with regard to his substance[129]—for no one has measured or handled it—but after this sort: that we may know that he who made, and formed, and breathed in them the breath of life, and nourishes us by creation, establishing by his Word and binding together [by his] Wisdom all things, this is [he] who is the only true God.[130]

Irenaeus is arguing that it is possible to know God in truth if not in fullness. God expressed certain aspects of his character when he 'made, and formed, and breathed in them (Irenaeus' opponents) the breath of life, and nourishes us by creation.' In other words, those human beings who consider the creative activity of God will 'have perceived the providence of God'[131] and therefore will have grasped a certain understanding of God himself. At the same time, human knowledge of God is restricted to the perception of his providence garnered through his creation. Created beings cannot know God with regard to his greatness or his substance.[132]

Elsewhere, Irenaeus attributes the limitation of human knowledge of divine things to the created status of a human being.[133] The epistemological limitation inherent to a created being lies in the background of this discussion as well, but that idea is not the basis for his reasoning here and he makes no explicit reference to it. Instead, his argument rests on the accessibility of God to human beings: 'by means of his love and infinite kindness he has come within reach of human knowledge.'[134] Yet in this discussion, Irenaeus is careful to keep 'God,' that is the Father,[135] at a remove from creation. When Irenaeus writes, 'establishing by his Word and binding together [by his] Wisdom all things' he is summarizing the preceding examples of creative

[129] *AH* 3.24.2: *agnitionem autem non secundum magnitudinem nec secundum substantiam*.

[130] *AH* 3.24.2: *sciremus quoniam qui fecit et plasmavit et insufflationem vitae insufflavit in eis et per conditionem nutrit nos, Verbo suo confirmans et Sapientia compingens omnia, hic est qui est solus verus Deus*. G.L. Prestige has remarked that Wisdom in *Verbo suo confirmans et Sapientia compingens omnia* occupies the same position as Spirit in Athenagoras, *Emb.* 6.2, *ὑφ' οὗ λόγῳ δεδημιούργηται καὶ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ πνεύματι συνέχεται τὰ πάντα* (Prestige 1969: 91). Dependence, however, remains unclear since the passage in Irenaeus does not bear other marks of Athenagoras' influence.

[131] *AH* 3.25.1: *sensibilitatem perceptam de providentia Dei*. *See* SC 210 (1974: 393–4) for Rousseau's suggestion for the original and translation.

[132] *AH* 3.24.2.

[133] See for instance, *AH* 2.28.1–3, 6; I discuss these passages in chapter 2, pp. 38–41.

[134] *AH* 3.24.2: *in agnitionem venit hominibus*.

[135] The references to 'God' in *AH* 3.24.2 and *AH* 3.25.1 refer to the Father. Irenaeus identifies 'God' as the 'Father' in *AH* 3.25.7 at the end of this discussion: 'I may succeed in persuading them to abandon such error, and to cease from blaspheming their Creator, who is both God alone, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ' (ANF translation). It is not unusual for Irenaeus to identify the members of the godhead as God, Word, and Wisdom.

activity by which he says we may know the 'love and infinite kindness' of the Father: 'he who made, and formed, and breathed in them the breath of life, and nourishes us by creation.' It is the same as saying that the 'love and infinite kindness,' the providence, of the Father may be seen in the establishment of creation by his Word and in its binding together by his Wisdom. The 'love and infinite kindness' of the Father comes 'within reach of human knowledge' by means of the creative agency of his Word and Wisdom. Human beings, then, may know the 'love and infinite kindness' of God because they are the basis for the creative activity accomplished by his agents, the Word and Wisdom.

From the opposite perspective, the creative agency of the Word and Wisdom also accounts for the restriction of human knowledge, so that creatures can know God neither 'according to his greatness nor according to his substance.' Because the Father creates by means of the Word and Wisdom, they serve as intermediary agents between the Father and creation. In this capacity, the Word and Wisdom function as filters which permit and restrict the knowledge of certain aspects of God, the Father.[136]

Therefore, according to Irenaeus the ability to know is proportional to the degree to which the object of knowledge is transcendent or immanent to creation. Since the Father creates through the agency of the Word and Wisdom, he is not entirely immanent but neither is he wholly transcendent as the Gnostics contend. Thus, God cannot be known in fullness but he can be known insofar as his 'love and infinite kindness' are evident in creation.

In this passage, the intermediary agency of the Word and Wisdom in creation is the logical basis for the epistemological limitation of human beings.[137] Insofar as Irenaeus can affirm that as the agents of creation the Word and Wisdom are present to creatures and that, as the agents of creation, they mark the limit to which the knowledge of the transcendent God is available to creatures, then his conception of their identity and agency is similar to certain Middle Platonic accounts of the Logos.[138]

Irenaeus' thought in this passage bears certain affinities to strains of logic found in Philo. Dillon has observed that Philo's monotheism leads him to substitute a distinction between God and his Logos for the contrast between a first and second God.[139] And Stead has observed that in Philo, 'The Logos acts as the mediator, undertaking tasks for which the Almighty is ultimately

[136] De Andia (1986: 166) makes a similar statement, though built upon *AH* 4.4.2 and 4.38.2.

[137] Perhaps this idea explains Irenaeus' intriguing comment in *AH* 4.4.2, 'Well spake he, who said that the unmeasurable Father was himself subjected to measure in the Son; for the Son is the measure of the Father, since he also comprehends him' (ANF translation).

[138] For a concise statement of the Middle Platonic conception of the Logos, see Dillon, (1996: 45–6); he later contrasts Stoic and Middle Platonic positions when he writes of Atticus, whose *floruit* he dates to AD 176–80 (p. 252).

[139] Dillon (1996: 46).

responsible, but which could impair his transcendent holiness.'[140] We could even find a certain similarity to the later thought of Eusebius of Caesarea in *Proof of the Gospel* 4.6.4. Stead, again, offers an apropos comment on that passage: 'The Logos might therefore be described as the permanent agent of God's self-limitation and condescension.'[141]

It seems reasonable, then, to suggest that the logical basis for the limitation of human knowledge that we find in this passage is due to a Middle Platonic influence on Irenaeus' thought. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the logic we find in this passage reveals a certain appropriation of Middle Platonic reasoning by Irenaeus to bolster his polemic against the Gnostics. Though he is not dependent upon the Middle Platonic notion of the Logos, his understanding of the manner in which the Word and Wisdom interact with the world as the creative agents of the Father agrees with the Middle Platonic notion of the instrumentality of the Logos well enough for him to be comfortable utilizing the philosophical polemic to his advantage.[142]

Thus, several signs point toward a reliance on Middle Platonism by Irenaeus as he wrote *AH* 3.24.2 through *AH* 3.25.5. He does not just ridicule the Gnostics as reasoning like Epicureans, but turns to opposing philosophical positions to bolster his contention that the 'love and infinite kindness' of a providential Creator God are evident in his creation. Indeed, he points out that certain pagans 'having been moved by [God's] providence, even if only slightly, were nevertheless convinced that they should call the Maker of this universe the Father, who exercises providence over all things, and disposes the affairs of our world.'[143] The Middle Platonic tenor of this passage culminates in quotations from Plato's *Laws* 4.715E and *Timaeus* 29E, as Irenaeus' decisive blow to his Epicurean-Gnostic opponents. According to Irenaeus, these two texts prove 'that the Maker and Framer of the universe is good . . . establishing the goodness of God, as the beginning and cause of the creation of the world.'[144] We can see, then, that the 'love and infinite kindness' of God that Irenaeus says we can know because they are the basis for creation parallels his

[140] Stead (1994: 150). Of course, there is no suggestion in this passage or anywhere else in Irenaeus that the Father employs the Word and Wisdom as his agents of creation to preserve his holiness. Irenaeus does not adopt philosophical concepts entirely but rather adapts them for the purposes of his argument.

[141] Ibid. 156. According to Eusebius, the Logos has this role because it alone can endure the Father's radiance and can transmit it to human beings in a mild and beneficent form. Stead connects this idea to the Stoic idea of two kinds of fire, but it could very well be a reflection upon the brilliance of God mentioned in Ezk. 1:27.

[142] Irenaeus' conception of the Word and Spirit are biblical in origin as is evident from his ubiquitous references to Scripture. Moreover, in a manner wholly different from Middle Platonic doctrine, Irenaeus' attribution of creative activity to the Word and Spirit is perhaps his strongest and clearest statement of their equal divinity with the Father. For example, see my discussion of *AH* 4.20.1–3 in chapter 5, pp. 121–2.

[143] *AH* 3.25.1.

[144] *AH* 3.25.5; ANF translation.

understanding of *Tim* 29E that goodness is the 'beginning and cause of the creation of the world.' An idea that Plato connected from the start with the providential desire for a good creation: 'For God desired that, so far as possible, all things should be good and nothing evil.'[145]

I will conclude this section by placing Irenaeus' present use of the Spirit as Creator tradition in context with his previous and future statements. First, to this point Irenaeus had used the Spirit as Creator tradition to affirm that God needs no help to create. This passage adds an additional dimension to that message. Here he uses the tradition to affirm that creation is the work of a God that is both transcendent and immanent. Both of these ideas remain attached to the tradition in *AH* 4 where Irenaeus makes the most references to the creative activity of the Spirit. For instance, as we will see, he uses the identification of the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God to affirm the self-sufficiency of the Creator. The very image of creation by means of one's hands, however, includes the idea of transcendence and immanence. Second, we should note that Irenaeus continues to lack scriptural support for his Spirit as Creator theology. In my comments on *AH* 1.22.1 I pointed out that early in his work Irenaeus used Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) to support the creative activity of the Word alone, and that his utilization of Ps. 33:6 to support the creative activity of both the Word and the Spirit does not occur until *Prf* 5.[146] In the next chapter, however, we will see that by the time he composes *AH* 4, Irenaeus has at last found a passage from Scripture that he can deploy to support the creative activity of the Spirit.

Chapter Conclusion

Against Heresies 3 reveals a multi-faceted theology of the Holy Spirit that is integral to Irenaeus' broader theological argument and polemic. Some features of his account of the Spirit in Book 3 are more central to the development of his pneumatology than others. What stands out above all is the expansion of his account to include many new themes. The unity, authority, and meaning of the gospel tradition depend upon the work of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit anoints Jesus' humanity and plays an integral role in the success of the Christological mission and the bringing of redemption to human beings. The Spirit as the Unction of Christ renders the followers of Christ united and productive; while the Spirit as the gift of God brings to life the members of the Church. The creative agency of the Spirit, as well as the Word, substantiates and delimits the human ability to know the Father—a new corollary of the Spirit as Creator tradition.

[145] *Tim*. 30A, quoted from Plato IX (1925: repr. 1991).

[146] See chapter 2, pp. 32–4, the Excursus that follows this chapter discusses his use of Ps. 33:6 in *Prf* 5.

The pneumatology of *AH* 3 is surprising when compared to the theology of the Spirit in *AH* 2. It is astounding when compared to that of Justin only a generation earlier. Even at the midpoint of his work, Irenaeus' account of the Spirit has so surpassed the apologists of the second century that it belongs to a class of its own. Yet, he is far from finished. Rather than continuing to discuss each aspect of Irenaeus' pneumatological development, however, I will restrict the focus of the next chapter of this study to two ideas for which Irenaeus is well known: his identification of the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God and his identification of the Spirit as Wisdom.

Prior to that examination, though, we will discuss Irenaeus' reception of Theophilus' correspondence *To Autolycus*. In the following Excursus I will argue that the influence of *Autol* on Irenaeus' thought first appears toward the end of *AH* 3, which suggests that he acquired the correspondence during the course of his work on that Book. This discussion will lead into chapter 5, which focuses heavily on the influence of Theophilus on Irenaeus' pneumatology.

Excursus
Irenaeus' Reception of Theophilus' *To Autolycus*

> For it is to the church that this gift of God has been entrusted *(creditum est),* just as breath [was entrusted] to the one who was molded *(aspiratio plasmationi),* so that all the participating *(percipientia)* members may be made alive.
>
> *AH* 3.24.1

The analogy Irenaeus uses in this selection to ascribe life-giving agency to the Spirit reveals more than the additional details about his understanding of the Spirit's work discussed in chapter 4: it reflects the initial influence of Theophilus of Antioch's correspondence *To Autolycus* on Irenaeus' pneumatology. The question as to whether Irenaeus depended upon Theophilus of Antioch has claimed the attention of scholars for over a century.[1] Recent comments

[1] In 1894 Klebba regarded Theophilus as Irenaeus' 'Lehrmeister' (Klebba 1894: 42–3 and 66–7). Robinson found in *Autol* 'much that reminds us' of Irenaeus, and suggested that an even closer unity would have existed between Irenaeus' work and Theophilus' 'more distinctively Christian teaching' (St. Irenaeus, 1920: 60). K. Müller, to the contrary, declared that Irenaeus did not know Theophilus (1924: 219); but that very year von Harnack's attention was drawn to the same passages as Klebba, and he concluded against Müller that a literary connection must exist (von Harnack 1924; 1985: 318 n. 3). The debate began in earnest with Loofs, who argued (1930: 72) that much of Irenaeus' *Against Heresies* consists of quotations taken from Theophilus' lost work *Against Marcion* (he also finds (1930: 67–70) a number of parallels between Irenaeus and *Autol*). Hitchcock found Loofs' methodology lacking, and in the process followed Müller (Hitchcock, *JTS* 38 1937: 130). Grant (*HTR* 40 1947: 227–56, here 228) contended that a comparison of the probable dates of composition indicates that Irenaeus 'may well have known the first two books Ad Autolycum'. Even so, he says, the 'striking differences' between the two authors suggest that *Autol* 1 and 2 'are not likely to have formed the core of [Irenaeus'] own work' (ibid. 229, 228). Kretschmar, on the other hand, saw 'very striking parallels' between Irenaeus and *Autol*: he concluded that Irenaeus knew more of Theophilus than these letters alone, but determined that it is unhelpful to speculate about those possible sources (Kretschmar 1956: 34–6). Lastly Wingren, who regarded Müller's and Hitchcock's dismissal of Theophilus as an 'exaggeration', nevertheless decided 'investigating Irenaeus' relationship to the earlier writers

illustrate a movement toward acknowledging that Irenaeus had access to the letters *Autol.*[2] Continuing in this trend, I contend that we can, to a reasonable degree of probability, determine that Irenaeus relied upon Theophilus' correspondence *Autol.* This excursus will treat an aspect of Irenaeus' pneumatology that demonstrates this dependence, with the additional intention of establishing that Irenaeus acquired the first and second letters of *Autol* by the time he penned *AH* 3.22.4 through *AH* 3.24.1[3] where we find several parallels with Theophilus' correspondence. In order to establish when Irenaeus began to utilize *Autol*, however, we must first determine when he had not yet begun to employ ideas from the earlier work. The manner in which he handles Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) in *AH* 3.8.3, in comparison to the manner in which he deploys this verse later,[4] will form the basis for my argument that Irenaeus was not relying upon *Autol* in *AH* 3.8.3. It is *AH* 3.8.3, then, that will serve as the latest point at which we can say that Irenaeus does not seem to possess a copy of *Autol.*[5]

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PS. 33:6 (32:6 LXX)

Irenaeus quotes Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) three times. In *AH* 1.22.1 and *AH* 3.8.3 the verse is essentially quoted in full.[6] In *Prf* 5, however, he produces a variant quotation that leaves out τοῦ στόματος:[7]

> In this way, then, it is demonstrated [that there is] One God, [the] Father, uncreated, invisible, Creator of all, above whom there is no other God, and after whom there is no other God. And as God is verbal, therefore He made created things by the Word; and God is Spirit, so that He adorned all things by the

of the primitive church . . . is a problem of little account' (Wingren, 1959: xvii and xx; against the 'exaggeration,' he notes Klebba's argument (p. xvii n. 14).

[2] Grant (1997: 1, see also, 40, 45); Behr (2000: 51, 110). Discussions of the influence of Theophilus upon Irenaeus frequent the recent work of M.C. Steenberg, who writes, 'I am convinced the question of that influence can be more strongly declared in the positive' (Steenberg 2008: 10 n. 23).

[3] In chapter 5, I will argue that we can trace Irenaeus' dependence on Theophilus to *AH* 3.21.10—a little earlier than the previously observed parallels that factor into this excursus.

[4] *Prf* 5.

[5] An earlier parallel exists between *AH* 2.10.4 and *Autol* 2.4, where both writers argue for the superiority of God's creative activity in comparison to that of a human artist. However, the broader conception of God's creativity exhibited by both texts differs to such an extent that Irenaeus' reliance upon *Autol* is highly unlikely. See Fantino, *RSPhTh* 76.3 (1992: 421–2, here 425); (1994: 278, see also 278 n. 36); and May (1994: esp. 169–73).

[6] The verse is quoted exactly in *AH* 1.22.1: *Verbo enim Domini caeli firmati sunt, et Spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum.* In *AH* 3.8.3, Irenaeus interjects in the beginning of the verse: the Latin is quoted verbatim from *caeli*. It is interesting that manuscripts C and S omit *oris* in *AH* 3.8.3.

[7] Behr's note (1997: 103 n. 19) as to the irregularity of these texts is inaccurate.

> Spirit, as the prophet also says, 'By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all their power by His Spirit' [Ps. 33:6]. Thus, since the Word 'establishes,' that is, works bodily and confers existence, while the Spirit arranges and forms the various 'powers,' so rightly is the Son called Word and the Spirit the Wisdom of God.

The obvious question is: why the change? Part of the answer lies in the function of the text within the arguments of each passage. In *AH* 1.22.1 Irenaeus cites Ps. 33:6 in order to support the creative agency of Father and Word. Only later in the passage does he note the Spirit's involvement. In a similar fashion, in *AH* 3.8.3 Ps. 33:6 occurs in conjunction with John 1:3 and Ps. 33:9 (32:9 LXX) to support the creative agency of the Word. Irenaeus even says that the whole of Ps. 33:6 refers to the creative role of the Word.

The variant quotation of Ps. 33:6 in *Prf* 5, on the other hand, occurs in the midst of a different argument. Irenaeus advances the Spirit as Creator tradition by providing for the first time a basis for differentiating between the creative work of the Word and Spirit. They represent different aspects of God's being.[8] It is now, therefore, to Irenaeus' advantage to offer a quotation of Ps. 33:6 that delineates the creative activity of both Word and Spirit. The result of eliminating τοῦ στόματος is that the second half of Ps. 33:6 loses the ambiguity attached to the term πνεῦμα. It is no longer appropriate to read the verse as 'all the power of them by the Breath of his mouth;' it is now best read as 'all the power of them by his Spirit.'

Now that we have established how the altered quotation functions in his argument, we can consider the reason for the change in his thought. In *Autol* 1.7, Theophilus uses the same variant quotation of Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) to the same end—the establishment of the mutual creative agency of the Word and Wisdom, who is the Spirit. He writes:

> Who is the physician? God, who heals and makes alive through the Word and Wisdom. God made all things through his Word and Wisdom: for 'by his Word the heavens were made, and all their power by his Spirit'.

I suggest that, in contrast to the earlier passages in *Against Heresies*, by the time of the writing of *Prf* 5 Irenaeus had access to the correspondence *Autol* and follows both the argument and the variant form of Ps. 33:6 found therein. So while he first used Ps. 33:6 to support the creative activity of the Word alone, his use of the variant form in *Prf* 5 supports the creative activity of both the Word and Spirit. This latter usage is his most developed and mature interpretation of the verse.

[8] *Prf* 5: 'And as God is verbal, therefore he made created things by the Word; and God is Spirit, so that he adorned all things by the Spirit.' As I said in the Introduction to this study, such developments in Irenaeus' thought lead me to date his writing of the *Proof* after *AH* 3.

His reference *en passant* to the Spirit's creative role in *AH* 1.22.1 now becomes relevant to this discussion. It would seem that while Irenaeus had textual support in *AH* 1.22.1 for the creative role of the Word, he did not possess similar support for the creative role of the Spirit in the early stages of his writing.[9] Therefore, while he is aware of a traditional attribution of creative agency to the Spirit, as can be seen in *AH* 1.22.1 and *AH* 2.30.8–9, it plays no significant role in his teaching until he has the necessary textual support, which he discovers in *Autol*. Thus, Irenaeus' use of Ps. 33:6 in a similar fashion to Theophilus suggests that he relied upon *Autol* when he wrote *Prf* 5, while his use of Ps. 33:6 in a dissimilar fashion to Theophilus in *AH* 3.8.3 suggests that he did not make use of *Autol* when he constructed that portion of his work.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF *AH* 3.24.1

AH 3.24.1 seems to contain the earliest pneumatological dependence of Irenaeus on Theophilus. Prior to discussing that passage, however, it is important to mention the three previously established parallels with *Autol* that occur in the chapters immediately preceding *AH* 3.24.[10] In *AH* 3.22.4, Irenaeus states Adam and Eve were created as children,[11] and in *AH* 3.23.5, he indicates that disobedience caused the Fall[12]—both ideas found in *Autol* 2.25.[13] Next, in *AH* 3.23.6 he ascribes a remedial value to death, a notion seen in *Autol* 2.26.[14] This sudden flurry of common ideas is likely the result of Irenaeus' initial contact with the work of Theophilus. That being said, we turn once again to *AH* 3.24.1:

> For it is to the church that this gift of God[15] has been entrusted (*creditum est*), just as breath [was entrusted] to the one who was molded (*aspiratio plasmationi*), so that all the participating (*percipientia*) members may be made alive (*vivificentur*); and by it communion with Christ has been deposited, this is the Holy Spirit, the earnest of incorruption and the confirmation of our faith and the ladder of ascent to God.

The analogy between the giving of the Spirit to the Church and the giving of the breath to Adam entails the Spirit as Creator motif, which suggests a connection

[9] For this argument see chapter 2, esp. 32–5.
[10] In chapter 5, I will argue that an earlier parallel occurs in *AH* 3.21.10.
[11] Cf. *AH* 3.23.5, *Prf* 12 and 14.
[12] Von Harnack (1985: 318 n. 3).
[13] Klebba (1894: 42–3); Behr (1997: 104 n. 39).
[14] Klebba (1894: 65–6); Behr (2000: 51).
[15] As stated above, I follow Rousseau (SC 210 1974: 390–3) in holding that the 'gift of God' should be understood as the Spirit and not 'faith'.

with Theophilus, as is evident from the earlier discussion of Ps. 33:6. The fact that this point of agreement follows on the heels of other doctrinal parallels would be enough to regard reliance here as highly probable. Yet, the contrast between the roles of the Spirit and breath in this passage and Irenaeus' later explanation of the particular roles of the Spirit and breath in *AH* 5, makes his reliance upon Theophilus here almost certain.

AH 5.12.2 should be considered the *locus classicus* for Irenaeus' differentiation between the breath of life, which he states is the soul, and the Spirit. A brief discussion of the chapters leading up to that pericope will set the stage. *AH* 5.1.3 first suggests the difference between animation by means of the breath of life (the soul) and vivification by means of the Spirit. The ones who remain in the animated state of being (*in animali*) alone are in fact dead, while those who also enter into the spiritual state (*in spiritali*) may be vivified (*vivificemur*).[16] In *AH* 5.7.1 he explains further when he links the presence of the soul to the possession of breath and animation, while the Spirit 'is itself the life of those who receive it.'[17] The repeated statements in *AH* 5.9.2–4 and *AH* 5.11.1 that life comes through the Spirit lead us to *AH* 5.12.2, where the first sentence encapsulates the section: 'The breath of life, which makes man animated,[18] is one thing, and the vivifying Spirit, which makes him spiritual, is another.'[19] By this point in Book 5 the language of animation and vivification ought to be considered technical: that which vivifies is the Spirit, and that which animates is the soul.[20] Moreover, that the vivification of the Spirit involves the bestowal of eternal life, i.e. incorruptibility or immortality, is further established when Irenaeus argues from Isa. 42:5 'the breath has been given in common to each person on the earth, but the Spirit exclusively to these who trample under earthly desires.'

We now return to *AH* 3.24.1, which contains the one clear contradiction to the pairing of the Spirit with vivification and the breath/soul with animation that we found in Book 5.[21] As we have seen, in contrast to his

[16] The references to animal and spiritual states of being reflect only the presence or absence of the Holy Spirit in an individual. The presence of the Spirit does not involve the reception of a 'spiritual life' different in kind from the physical life possessed by all human beings. For a discussion of the two modalities, temporal and eternal, of the one life, see chapter 6, esp. 149, 149 n. 5, 166–73.

[17] *Et ipse vita est eorum qui percipiunt illum.*

[18] *Ψυχικὸν ἀπεργαζομένη τὸν ἄνθρωπον*; *animalem efficit hominem.*

[19] *Πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν . . . πνευματικὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελοῦν*; *Spiritus vivificans . . . spiritalem eum efficit.*

[20] Cf. Behr (2000: 105–8). Note that, while we distinguish the two, we should not too rigidly separate animation from vivification, for Irenaeus holds that both ultimately come from the same source—the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit.

[21] *Prf* 11 may seem to offer a contradiction, but when seen in light of *AH* 2.33.3–4 and *AH* 2.34.4, it becomes apparent that the 'making alive' by the 'breath of life' to which Irenaeus refers

later articulation, in *AH* 3.24.1 the analogy declares that both the Breath and the Spirit vivify. An explanation for this divergence can be found in *Autol* 1.7 and 2.13, which reveal that Theophilus speaks of both the Breath and the Spirit as giving life to creation. In *Autol* 1.7 he writes:

> This is my God, the Lord of all . . . who founded the earth upon the waters, and gave a Spirit (πνεῦμα) to nourish it; whose (οὗ) Breath (πνοὴ) gives life (ζωογονει) to the whole; who, if He withdraws the Spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) present to it, the whole will come to an end.

And *Autol* 2.13 reads:

> And [by] the Spirit (πνεῦμα) which is borne above the waters, [he means that] which God gave for vivifying (ζωογόνησιν) the creation, just as [he gave] life (ψυχην) to man, the fine mixing with the fine.

A comparison of these selections highlights the common use of ζωογονέω: in *Autol* 1.7 with regard to the Breath, and with regard to the Spirit in *Autol* 2.13. Yet, it is not even necessary to compare these passages; for *Autol* 1.7 alone reveals that he understands both the Breath and the Spirit as having the same role. When Theophilus states the Breath gives life to the whole and the withdrawal of the Spirit causes the whole to come to an end, one reality is being expressed—life comes to creation from God. Since he is speaking of one reality, it makes sense for that one reality to be caused by one agent. Thus, not only are both the Spirit and the Breath responsible for the giving of life to creation, but, we ought to understand the Spirit and the Breath to be identical in this context. Though Irenaeus refrains from identifying the Spirit and the Breath, it remains highly probable that the analogy in *AH* 3.24.1, wherein the Spirit makes alive the Church just as the Breath makes alive the first man, reveals the influence of *To Autolycus*. Reliance on Theophilus in *AH* 3.24.1, then, explains the inconsistent nature of this passage when compared to the rest of Irenaeus' thought on the activity of the Breath and the Holy Spirit.

Excursus Conclusion

In Theophilus, then, we have a source that uses the same variant quotation of Ps. 33:6 to the same end as Irenaeus, and a source in which both the Spirit and the Breath give life to creation. That being said, we may assert that Irenaeus' varying approach to Ps. 33:6 can be explained by the point in time at which he acquired copies of *Autol*, and that the sudden flurry of corresponding ideas in *AH* 3.22.4, 3.23.6, and 3.24.1 suggests his initial utilization of Theophilus' writings. Therefore, this excursus suggests Irenaeus acquired a copy of the

in *Prf* 11 is not an effect of the soul itself, but rather an effect of the life which makes the soul itself alive, and which the participating soul may then share with the body.

letters after the composition of *AH* 3.8.3 and prior to the composition of *AH* 3.22–4.[22] Furthermore, the analogy contained in *AH* 3.24.1 bears the first marks of Theophilus' influence upon Irenaeus' pneumatology, albeit an influence on Irenaeus' thought that does not last.

[22] *AH* 3.22–24 can be dated between AD 180 and AD 189: from the writing of Theodotian the Ephesian (*AH* 3.21.1) to the death of Eleutherius (*AH* 3.3.3).

5

His Hand and Wisdom

The previous two chapters of this study revealed that Irenaeus' move toward a more positive theology in his third Book of *Against Heresies* included the development of a pneumatology containing manifold elements and themes. The remaining chapters of this study will focus on fewer aspects of Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit, but each theme I address is distinctive and central to his thought. My intent is to provide the reader with a solid grasp of his pneumatology and its development, without discussing every feature.

This chapter contains two essays that focus on the largest identifiable influence and the single most important aspect of Irenaeus' account of the Spirit: Theophilus' *To Autolycus* and the Spirit as Creator tradition. Both Theophilus' influence and Irenaeus' ascription of creative activity to the Spirit are most evident in *AH* 4. The Spirit as Creator tradition appears in two main ways in this Book: the identification of the Spirit as one of the Hands of God and the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom. Each identification is the topic of one of the essays in this chapter. The influence of Theophilus factors into each analysis. I will argue that we should recognize *Autol* as the source of the Hands imagery in Irenaeus and I will argue that Theophilus should not be regarded as the source of Irenaeus' identification of the Spirit as Wisdom.

5.1 THE HANDS OF GOD

Irenaeus' doctrine of the two Hands of God, which he identifies as the Son and Spirit or Word and Wisdom,[1] has played a frequent part in studies of his theology since Friedrich Loofs suggested the motif belonged to a tradition

[1] *AH* 4.pref.4, 4.7.4 (Arm.), 4.20.1, 5.1.3, 5.5.1, 5.6.1, 5.28.4, and *Prf* 11. Irenaeus also refers to the hand of God in *AH* 4.39.2 and 'his hands' in *AH* 4.39.3. *AH* 4.39.2–3 bears many similarities to the passages discussed in this chapter, but it seems to me that the hands language we find there is anthropomorphic and does not entail an allusion to the Son and Spirit (whom he never mentions). Therefore, that passage will not factor into this study.

from Asia Minor developed by Irenaeus.[2] Rather than following Loofs' theory with regard to an unknown Asiatic source, J. Armitage Robinson stressed the similarity between Irenaeus' statements and a passage in *Autol* 2.18 in which Theophilus declares that the making of man was alone worthy of God's Hands, his Word and Wisdom. According to Robinson, 'we almost seem to be listening to Irenaeus' when we read this passage of Theophilus. He then suggested that Irenaeus' frequent declarations that the Word and Wisdom are the Son and Spirit, the Hands of God, might be an attempt to compensate for the occasional lack of distinction between the Word and Wisdom in Theophilus.[3]

Jules Lebreton offered a third hypothesis with regard to Irenaeus' source when he suggested that Irenaeus' theology of the Hands is the result of his direct development of the numerous references in the Old Testament to the hand or hands of God.[4] Michel René Barnes, though, in the most recent study to discuss Irenaeus' Hands motif, points out that while Gen. 1:26 is often the occasion for Irenaeus' deployment of Hands imagery, he never uses a text from Scripture to support his use of Hands language itself.[5] As a result, past arguments for Irenaeus' development of this imagery from Scripture alone become tenuous at best. We are then left with the hypotheses endorsed by Loofs and Robinson. It is not necessary to consider them mutually exclusive, however, for enough evidence exists to affirm both that Hands language belongs to a tradition from Asia Minor and that Theophilus' correspondence *Autol* is the primary source of this tradition for Irenaeus.

The tradition of Hands imagery is best characterized as Jewish. The numerous passages in the Hebrew Scriptures that contain references to the hand or hands of God, which can be found in the studies on Irenaeus mentioned above, could alone serve as a sufficient basis for this assertion. Yet it is not necessary to be content with just those passages. Barnes has drawn attention to the 'strong exegetical interest in God as potter and man as taken from a lump of clay in the Jewish writings *The Wisdom of Sirach* and *Fourth*

[2] Loofs (1968 [orig. 1889]: 107, 114). The later, posthumous publication of Loofs' *Theophilus von Antiochien* assigns the presence of the Hands tradition in Irenaeus to source 1QT (1930: 34–41), which he then identifies as Theophilus' lost work *Adv. Marcionem*. He makes this attribution despite the fact that he also considered several parallels to exist between Theophilus' *Autol* and Irenaeus (1930: 67–70). In preparation for the following discussion, the reader should also note that Loofs assigned Irenaeus' reference to the Word alone as the Hand of God in *AH* 3.21.10 to a different Asiatic source, 1QA (1930: 247–8). As the following study will show, I do not believe Loofs needed to attribute the presence of the Hands tradition in Irenaeus to a source that is no longer extant, nor is it necessary to posit separate sources to explain Irenaeus' references to the Hand (sg.) of God and his references to the Hands (pl.) of God.

[3] St Irenaeus, tr. J.A. Robinson (1920: 59); *see* p. 51–60 for his full discussion of the Hands.

[4] Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 580–1). Since Lebreton, other studies have also declared the Scriptures to be Irenaeus' source: Lawson (1948: 124, 136–7) and Mambrino, *NRT* 79 (1957: 355–70, here 357).

[5] Barnes (2009: 103).

Esdras 3:4–5, not to mention Paul, Romans 9:21ff.'[6] As will be mentioned again later, *4 Ezra* 8.7–8 seems to connect the hands of God with the *in utero* formation of each person. Hands imagery also finds a place in the thought of Philo, who says that 'divine hands' made Adam.[7] In addition, Abot de-R. Nathan, who wrote after the second century, affirmed man to be the only work of both of God's hands in a statement similar to that of Theophilus in *Autol* 2.18: 'How do we know that Adam was made by the two hands of God? Because it says, "The hands have formed me" (Ps. 119:73).'[8] Hands language, then, appears in a broad variety of Jewish works that were written both before and after the late second century writings of Theophilus and Irenaeus.

The identification of the Hands tradition as Jewish may well explain how it came to have a place in Theophilus' thought. For while I am unaware of a convincing argument for a specific source that accounts for Theophilus' incorporation of the Hands tradition,[9] his general indebtedness to Jewish thought is clear.[10] This position gains further support when one takes into consideration the heavy influence of Judaism on Christianity in Antioch itself. A predilection for Jewish traditions would not have been unusual for a Bishop of Antioch.[11]

Whatever particular source Theophilus depended upon, his location in Antioch also suggests one that came from Asia Minor. Additional support for a tradition from Asia Minor may be found in Robinson's observation that hands imagery is also found in the *Clementine Homilies*,[12] whose date is unclear but whose provenance seems to be in the East, perhaps even Syria.[13] Both *Sirach* and *4 Ezra*, which contain the Hands motif or similar language, further substantiate the presence and receptivity of the tradition in the East, and their subsequent translation into Syriac shows a continuing presence in Asia Minor.[14] All this being said, the presence of the Hands tradition in Asia

[6] Barnes (2009: 102–3).

[7] ('On the Creation of the World': 148). On Philo's use of hands language, see D.T. Runia's brief note in *Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey* (1993: 112 n. 99).

[8] Grant, *HTR* 40 (1947: 227–56; here p. 237).

[9] Runia's criticism has placed José Pablo Martín's suggestion of the possibility of Philo on hold (1993: 112–16). Before Martín, Hitchcock argued that both Theophilus and Irenaeus depended separately upon Philo for the Hands tradition ('Loofs' Theory of Theophilus of Antioch,' *ITS* 38 (1937: 130–9, esp. 131–4).

[10] In so saying, I do not intend to discount the possibility of an intermediate Christian source that may have already incorporated the Jewish tradition. Rather, my goal is to affirm that aspects of Theophilus' writings reveal an affinity to Jewish thought, which indicates that he is not opposed to incorporating a Jewish tradition—whether he received it directly or indirectly. For the similarities to Jewish thought in Theophilus, see among others: Kretschmar (1956: esp. 36–9, 57–9); Grant, *HTR* 43 (1950: 179–96) and (1988: 157–60, 165–8); and Schoedel (1993).

[11] See, for example, Daniélou, (1964: 356 and *passim*); Grant, *RSR* 60 (1972: 97–108); Hartin, *Scriptura* 36 (1991: 38–50). For details on the Jewish community, itself, in Antioch see Kraeling, *JBL* 51 (1932: 130–60).

[12] St Irenaeus, tr. J.A. Robinson, (1920: 53 n. 1).

[13] See Kelley (2006: 11–15).

[14] Of course, this is not to suggest that Theophilus read these works, nor read them in Syriac.

Minor does not preclude its existence elsewhere, as is evident from its presence in the *First Epistle of Clement* 33.4, but neither do I desire to make such an argument. I am content, at this point, to show that the possibility of a source from Asia Minor is not without foundation and that it is also possible that Theophilus' source was Jewish.

The existence of a tradition from Asia Minor does not rule out the dependence of Irenaeus upon Theophilus for the Hands tradition. In fact, I believe that sufficient evidence exists to conclude that Irenaeus' acquisition of *Autol* led to his depiction of the Word and Wisdom, Son and Spirit, as the Hands of God. My contention rests upon three observations. First, the location, or timing, of Irenaeus' first application of hands imagery to either the Son or the Spirit. Second, the particular details surrounding that first incorporation of hands imagery. And third, the point at which Irenaeus links *plasma* language with hands language. I believe these observations will not only show Irenaeus acquired the Hands tradition from Theophilus, but will also address why he does not refer to the two Hands of God until *AH* 4—a fact scholars have noted with interest since Robinson drew attention to it.[15]

5.1.1 The Source of the Hands Motif

Irenaeus does not refer to both the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God until *AH* 4.pref.4, but he does refer to the Word alone as the Hand of God once in the first three Books of his work, at *AH* 3.21.10. He writes, 'the protoplast (*protoplastus*) himself Adam, from untilled and as yet virgin soil ("for God had not yet sent rain, and man had not tilled the ground" [Gen. 2:5]), received substance (*habuit substantium*) and was formed (*plasmatus*) by the Hand of God, that is, by the Word of God.'[16] This is the first identification of the Word as a Hand of God. Prior to this passage, a form of *manus* occurs 38 times in *AH*,[17] none of which clearly identifies the Word as a Hand of God. Nevertheless, two passages that occur after *AH* 3.8.3, the last point at which we have good reason to believe that Irenaeus had not yet encountered *Autol*,[18] and prior to this selection from *AH* 3.21.10, merit our consideration.

In *AH* 3.10.4,[19] the first passage, Irenaeus quotes Ps. 95:4-5 (94:4–5 LXX) to establish that the one who made man is the One Creator God: 'In his hand (*manu*) are the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are his. For the sea is his, and he himself has made it; and his hands (*manus*) have formed

[15] St Irenaeus, tr. J.A. Robinson (1920: 51).
[16] We will examine this passage in detail later.
[17] According to a Library of Latin Texts search.
[18] For this argument, see the Excursus prior to this chapter.
[19] *AH* 3.10.3 in the ANF edition.

(*formaverunt*) the dry land.' The use of hands language in this verse could be understood to indicate the creative activity of the Son and Spirit if it occurred after Irenaeus had identified the Word as a Hand of God in *AH* 3.21.10—or even better, if it occurred after he had identified both the Word and Wisdom as the Hands of God in *AH* 4, since hands language occurs in both the singular and plural in these verses (as it does in the LXX). But it occurs well before Irenaeus makes these connections, and moreover, Irenaeus' interpretation of these verses refers only to the activity of the One Creator God and never to the creative agency of the Son or Spirit. Thus, the use of Ps. 95:4–5 in this passage should not be considered a reference to the Hands of God tradition.

The second passage, found in *AH* 3.16.4, is worth a more detailed examination, not only because of what Irenaeus says there but also because of the connection Jean Mambrino found between this passage and Justin's *Dial.* If Mambrino was correct to say that Irenaeus depends on Justin for his discussion in *AH* 3.16.4, and if he was correct that Irenaeus first identifies the Word as a Hand of God in that passage, then Justin rather than Theophilus is the source behind Irenaeus' initial appropriation of the Hands tradition.
Irenaeus wrote:

> Now these are the works of Christ. He therefore was Himself Christ . . . whom the Magi, when they had seen, adored, and offered their gifts [to Him], as I have already stated, and prostrated themselves to the eternal King, departed by another way, not now returning by the way of the Assyrians. 'For before the child shall have knowledge to cry, father or mother, He shall receive the power of Damascus, and the spoils of Samaria, against the king of the Assyrians' [Isa. 8:4]; declaring, in a mysterious manner indeed, but emphatically, that the Lord did fight with a hidden hand (*absconsa manu*) against Amalek [Exod. 17:16 (LXX)].[20]

Mambrino is interested in Irenaeus' use of the Septuagint's version of Exod. 17:16, and its interpolated 'hidden hand' with which the Lord fights, to support his interpretation of Isa. 8:4 as a prophetic reference to the reception of the gifts of the Magi by the infant Jesus. He tentatively suggests that the bizarre connection of Exod. 17:16 (LXX) with Isa. 8:4 is due to Irenaeus' reliance upon Justin, who both uses Exod. 17:16 (LXX) in *Dial* 49.8 and links Isa. 8:4 to the reception of the gifts of the Magi in *Dial* 77.2–3.

I do not agree with Mambrino's assertion that Justin's interpretation of 'hidden hand' (κρυφίᾳ χειρὶ) in *Dial* 49.8 as the 'hidden power of God' (κρυφία δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ) indicates Irenaeus first thought of the Hands tradition as an 'intime et éminemment spirituelle' relationship between the Hand and its possessor,[21] because Irenaeus himself gives no indication of such an understanding in *AH* 3.16.4. Neither do I agree with his judgment that Justin relates

[20] *AH* 3.16.4, ANF translation. [21] Mambrino (1957: 356).

both the Assyrians and Amalek by giving to them 'le symbole des ennemis de Dieu,'[22] because I do not at all see Justin doing that except in the most general of terms. As a result, Mambrino's argument for Irenaeus' reliance upon Justin is less than convincing, because he fails to explain how two separate statements by Justin can explain Irenaeus' unconventional use of Exod. 17:16 to support his interpretation of Isa. 8:4. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that Mambrino is correct insofar as dependence upon these two passages in Justin's *Dial* does explain Irenaeus' combination of these verses.

The connection that Mambrino misses lies in the fact that both Irenaeus and Justin are using the same verses to the same end. In 3.16.4 Irenaeus is providing illustrations from Scripture which confirm that Jesus was not just 'the receptacle of Christ'[23] but that he is the Word who 'became incarnate for our salvation.'[24] In *Dial* 49.8 Justin is completing his argument against Trypho's assertion that 'they who assert that [Jesus] was of human origin, and was chosen to be anointed and became the Christ, propose a doctrine much more credible than yours.'[25] *Dial* 77.2–3 occurs in a series of quotations from Scripture intended to show that the God who appeared in the Old Testament 'could also be born man of a virgin.'[26] Therefore, in connecting Exod. 17:16 (LXX) with Isa. 8:4 to support the Incarnation of the Word over against the notion that the aeon Christ descended onto the man Jesus, Irenaeus has selected two texts that Justin used to demonstrate that Jesus Christ was the God who became man and not simply the man Jesus who received the hidden power of God at a later point in time.

One could still object that a text collection intended to explain the Incarnation could account for the presence of both texts in Irenaeus and Justin. An additional parallel, however, minimizes the likelihood of this possibility. In *AH* 3.21.7, as in *AH* 3.16.4, Irenaeus offers textual support for recognizing a passage in Isaiah as referring to the advent of the Son of God, this time Isa. 7:14. According to Irenaeus, the account in Dan. 2:34 of the rock cut out without the operation (*non operantibus*) of human hands prefigures the conception of Jesus without the operation (*non operante*) of Joseph. He concludes by saying, 'So, we should understand that his human advent (resulted) not from the will of man, but from the will of God.' In *Dial* 76.1, which is in the same series of quotations as *Dial* 77.2–3, Justin writes that when Daniel 'calls Christ "a Stone cut out without hands"' he is saying figuratively 'he would become man and appear as such, but that he would not be born of a human seed.' He then concludes, 'for, to affirm that he was cut

[22] Mambrino (1957: 356).
[23] *AH* 3.16.1.
[24] *AH* 3.16.2.
[25] *Dial* 49.1; St. Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho* (2003).
[26] *Dial* 75.4; Falls' translation.

out without hands signifies that he was not a product of human activity (ἔργον), but of the will of God, the Father of all, who brought him forth.'[27]

Once again, the presence of Dan. 2:34 in both authors could be attributed to a common text collection, but the identical interpretations provided by Justin and Irenaeus negate this possibility. According to both writers, Dan. 2:34 is significant because it shows that the birth of Jesus is the result of an other-than-human ἔργον or *opus*, which occurs as the result of the will of God. Therefore, as Mambrino suspected with regard to *AH* 3.16.4, Irenaeus was utilizing Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* as a source for his arguments, at least with regard to the advent of the Son of God, during the period in which he wrote *AH* 3.16.4 and *AH* 3.21.7.

Having shown that Mambrino was correct to assert Irenaeus' reliance on Justin, despite the inadequacy of his argument, it is necessary to determine if he was also correct to consider *AH* 3.16.4 the first instance in which Irenaeus identified the Word as a Hand of God. This is of particular significance for my contention that Irenaeus identified the Word and Wisdom as Hands of God as a result of his contact with *Autol*. If the Hands motif occurs in *AH* 3.16.4, then Justin might be his first source for the tradition. That the 'hidden hand' with which the Lord fights does not, however, refer to the Incarnate Word is evident from the consistent referent of the title 'Lord' in this passage. Irenaeus uses the term 'Lord' before and after the case with which we are concerned. Both times the title refers to Jesus himself: beforehand he says John leapt in Elizabeth's womb when he recognized that Mary was pregnant with the Lord;[28] afterward he introduces the quotation of Luke 24:25 with 'the Lord also said to his disciples after the resurrection.'[29]

So, then, when Irenaeus states, 'the Lord did fight with a hidden hand against Amelek,' the contextual use of the term 'Lord' suggests he is not referring to the Father but to the Incarnate Word. This reading is confirmed by the fact that he introduces this particular section with the statement, 'Now these are the works of Christ.' This conclusion receives further support from Irenaeus' later use of the Hands tradition. In every case Irenaeus identifies the Hands as the Word and Wisdom, or Son and Spirit, and never as the Incarnate Word, the Son-made-man, or Jesus Christ.[30] Therefore, the 'hidden hand' refers to the activity of Christ himself.[31] It is the

[27] Here, the quotations of *Dial* 76.1 are from Falls' translation.
[28] *AH* 3.16.4.
[29] *AH* 3.16.5.
[30] Note, however, that by emphasizing the continuity of creative activity between the invisible Word, who is the Hand of God that originally formed Adam and continues to form human beings in the womb, and the visible Word, who as Jesus formed the eyes or vision of the blind man, Irenaeus identifies Jesus as the incarnate Word in *AH* 5.15.2–16.2.
[31] The chronological problem to Irenaeus' argument is obvious, for he is saying that the Incarnate Word fought against Amalek prior to the Incarnation. Irenaeus himself seems to acknowledge this conundrum when he writes that Isaiah declares this 'in a mysterious manner indeed.'

'hidden hand' of Christ that fought against Amalek. Christ is not the 'hidden hand' fighting on behalf of the Father. As a result, this is not the first appropriation of the Hands tradition by Irenaeus.

Irenaeus' first utilization of Hands imagery is not, in fact, nebulous—as would be the case if it had occurred in *AH* 3.16.4. In *AH* 3.21.10 we read:

> And just as the protoplast (*protoplastus*) himself Adam, from untilled and as yet virgin soil ('for God had not yet sent rain, and man had not tilled the ground' [Gen. 2:5]), received substance (*habuit substantium*) and was formed (*plasmatus*) by the Hand of God, that is, by the Word of God, for 'all things were made by Him' [John 1:3], and 'the Lord took dust from the earth and formed (*plasmavit*) man' [Gen. 2:7]; so did He who is the Word, recapitulating Adam in Himself, rightly receive a birth (*exsistens*), enabling Him to gather up Adam [into Himself], from Mary, who was as yet a virgin.[32]

Irenaeus' identification of the Word as the Hand of God could not be more straightforward: the Word is the Hand of God that formed Adam from the dust of the earth, a formation that corresponds to the virgin birth of the Incarnate Word.

The present question, then, is whether we can determine if Irenaeus is depending upon Theophilus in this statement. First, it is helpful to point out that while we have shown that Irenaeus had been working from Justin's *Dial* right before these words appear, Justin's writings evince no familiarity with the tradition that identified the Word and Wisdom, or Son and Spirit, as Hands. Even the aforementioned discussion in *Dial* 49.8 does not identify the 'hidden hand' with Christ, but rather places the 'hidden hand' in parallel with the 'hidden power of God' in the crucified Christ. Irenaeus' association of the 'hidden hand' with the activity of Christ in *AH* 3.16.4 approximates this association in Justin. Second, it is beneficial to recognize that the identification of the Word as a Hand of God in *AH* 3.21.10 occurs just before the other parallels to *Autol* identified earlier,[33] which is enough to lead us to suspect a connection but not enough to lead us to suggest one. A comparison, though, of *AH* 3.16.4 with selections from *Autol* 2.18–19 will provide the necessary evidence to suggest, and even make probable, Irenaeus' reliance on Theophilus. We turn then to *Autol* 2.18:

> For when God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness,' he first discloses the worth of man. For God having made all things by the Word, and having reckoned them all mere bye-works, reckons the creation of man to be the

[32] My translation with reference to the ANF.

[33] As discussed in the Excursus before this chapter, the other parallels are found in *AH* 3.22.4, *AH* 3.23.5, *AH* 3.23.6, and *AH* 3.24.1. They correspond, in order, to *Autol* 2.25, 2.25, 2.26, and 1.7 and 2.13.

> only work worthy of his own Hands. Moreover, God is found, as if needing help, to say, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.' But to no one else than to his own Word and to his own Wisdom did He say,'Let us Make.'[34]

Opinion has varied with regard to whether *Autol* 2.18 can be considered the basis for the Hands tradition in Irenaeus. According to Robinson, Theophilus almost says the Word and Wisdom are the Hands of God, but 'has stopped short of saying it'—though as mentioned above, this does not keep him from declaring, 'we almost seem to be listening to Irenaeus.'[35] In contrast, John Lawson stated, 'there does not appear to be any direct evidence that Theophilus spoke of the Logos as "the Hand of God".'[36]

It is difficult for me to see how Lawson could make such a rigid statement, given *Autol* 2.18. While Theophilus may have 'stopped short' of an explicit identification of the Word and Wisdom as the Hands of God, unless an implicit identification of the Hands with the Word and Wisdom exists, the reader is left to wonder to what or to whom does 'the Hands of God' refer, since Theophilus makes it clear that only God's Word and Wisdom were involved in the creation of Adam.[37] The natural reading of this passage is to understand Theophilus as affirming the creative activity of the Hands of God with regard to Adam. He then uses that tradition to interpret Gen. 1:26 as recording the conversation that occurred between the Father and his Word and Wisdom, his Hands, prior to Adam's creation.

Irenaeus' approach to the Hands tradition mirrors that of Theophilus. Besides the basic identification of the Word as a Hand of God that occurs in both passages, three particular parallels between *AH* 3.21.10 and *Autol* 2.18–19 increase the probability that Irenaeus depended upon this passage in Theophilus for his initial identification of the Word as Hand of God. First, both authors use John 1:3 to support the creation of man by the Word: Theophilus wrote, 'God having made all things by the Word;' while Irenaeus quotes the text. The second parallel goes beyond *Autol* 2.18 to *Autol* 2.19, where Theophilus elaborates upon the creation of man: it is more conclusive because of the distinctive language involved. Irenaeus quotes Gen. 2:5 to state that Adam was formed 'from untilled and as yet virgin soil,' a characterization of Adam's substance that he uses to connect him with Jesus, whose substance came from a virgin as well. His ultimate point is that both the flesh of Adam and the humanity of Jesus, as the second Adam, were formed by God himself. A quotation of Gen. 2:5 also occurs in *Autol* 2.19, and Theophilus'

[34] My translation with reference to the ANF.
[35] St Irenaeus, tr. J.A. Robinson (1920: 59).
[36] Lawson (1948: 137).
[37] Robinson wrote, 'though [Irenaeus] does not explicitly identify Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, his language certainly implies that this was his meaning', St Irenaeus, (1920: 54).

interpretation of that quotation also emphasizes that the earth remained untilled and that God himself produced that which came from the earth.[38]

The third parallel lies in their shared conception of the creation of man as a distinctive physical act. Recognition of this correlation in their thought begins with the realization that *Autol* 2.18 contains a double entendre, a twofold meaning that Irenaeus recognized and then used to develop a significant aspect of his own theological language. Theophilus wrote, 'For God having made all things by the Word (λόγῳ), and having reckoned them all mere bye-works, reckons the creation of man to be the only work worthy of his own Hands.' Here, λόγος carries two different meanings when considered in light of the first and the second halves of the sentence. The allusion to John 1:3, 'having made all things,' requires that we understand λόγος to refer to the second member of the Trinity, the Word. The use of Hands imagery in the second half of the sentence, however, suggests that Theophilus intends to draw a contrast between creation by means of the spoken word and creation by means of hands.

The emphasis that Theophilus places in *Autol* 2.19 on the creation of God by means of his command ('but the earth produced all things spontaneously by the command of God') confirms that he intended the double entendre in *Autol* 2.18. When we add this statement in *Autol* 2.19 to the quotations of Gen. 1:26 and the discussion of 'let us create' that follows the sentence in *Autol* 2.18 with which we are now concerned, it becomes evident that the second of the two meanings is the focus of Theophilus' thought. In fact, the first meaning serves to set up the contrast Theophilus desires to make by means of the second.

Therefore, though it is there, the contrast is not so much between the Word acting alone and the Word acting in cooperation with Wisdom, especially since Theophilus has already established the creative agency of the Spirit with regard to the world as a whole in *Autol* 1.7. It centers instead on the notion of physicality attached to the terms 'word' and 'hands.' Theophilus establishes the 'worth of man' by contrasting the creation of 'all things' by speaking with the creation of man by speaking and touching—creation by *fiat* versus creation by *fiat* plus manipulation. It is this suggestion, that the notion of physicality marks the creation of man, which finds a parallel in Irenaeus.

Irenaeus expresses the physicality of the creation of man by means of *plasma* language. John Behr has commented upon the advantages of using

[38] Theophilus differs from Irenaeus by stating that production occurs by means of God's command. *Autol* 2.19: 'By this He signifies to us, that the whole earth . . . had no need that man should till it; but the earth produced all things spontaneously by the command of God, that man might not be wearied by tilling it' (ANF translation). Theophilus' approach to Gen. 2:5 is not identical to Irenaeus', but neither does it need to be. In fact, it is better to think of Irenaeus as utilizing the work of Theophilus as a sourcebook for his own theology—he adopts and adapts ideas that are conducive to his own thought. Irenaeus dropped the reference to the command of God because, as we will see later in this chapter with respect to *plasma* language, he desired to further emphasize the physical nature of the creative act of the Hands.

the term *plasma* to express the creation of man—it emphasizes 'the immediacy of the fashioning of man by God: it is quite literally, a "hands-on-affair";' and it emphasizes 'the materiality of man, the fact that man is made from the earth, from mud.'[39] Irenaeus uses *plasma* language to refer to the creation of man from the earliest chapters of *AH*.[40] However, the terminology does not contain both emphases to which Behr refers until Irenaeus unites *plasma* language with Hands imagery in *AH* 3.21.10. Once Irenaeus has joined *plasma* language to the Hands motif, then his use of that language includes the 'immediacy of the fashioning of man' by virtue of the inference drawn from the picture of molding or forming something by means of one's hands.[41] Up to that point, *plasma* language just refers to the materiality of man and its origin, his formation from dust by God.[42] With the exception of *AH* 1.3.6, the first use

[39] Behr, *Against Heresies* (2000: 38).

[40] From *AH* 1.5.3 on, to be exact. The presence of this language from the beginning of the work until the very end should probably be attributed to his ongoing polemic with the Gnostics, who devalued the physical aspect of humanity. G. Joppich makes this point in the midst of a brief discussion of *plasma* language (1965: 49–51). Two good examples of the use of *plasma* language in this polemic can be found in *AH* 4.pref.4, '[the heretics] come to this at last, they blaspheme the Creator, and disallow the salvation of God's formation (*plasmatis*), which the flesh truly is;' and *AH* 5.15.4, 'The Valentinians lose their case when they say that man was not fashioned (*plasmatum*) out of this earth, but from a fluid and diffused substance (*materia*)' (ANF translations, both).

[41] *Plasma* language is found in every passage in *Against Heresies* that refers to both Hands of God: *AH* 4.pref.4, 4.20.1, 5.1.3, 5.5.1, 5.6.1, 5.28.4; and it also occurs in *AH* 3.21.10, 5.15.2-4, and 5.16.1, which refer to the Word alone as the Hand of God. Moreover, Robinson found the equivalent of *plasma* or *plasmatio* to occur in the Armenian of *Prf* 11 (St Irenaeus, 1920: 80 n. 2). Mambrino (NRT 79 1957: 358) also noticed the connection between *plasma* language and hands imagery.

The consistent presence and use of *plasma* language in these passages delineates the particular creative activity of the Son and Spirit that Irenaeus intends to highlight by using the Hands metaphor. When Irenaeus refers to the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God, he emphasizes their role in the formation of the physical substance of earth into the flesh of Adam. If we include the references to the Word as a Hand (sg.) of God (I will argue for this inclusion later in this section), then the Hands tradition also refers to their subsequent activity among the rest of the human race, whose materiality stems from that original formation. Thus, Beuzart (1908: 42) and MacKenzie (2002: 101) are correct to draw a particular connection between the Hands motif and the creation of human beings. However, I disagree with the position maintained by some scholars that Hands language applies to all facets of the creative activity of the Son and Spirit, for instance Lawson (1948: 17–18) and Steenberg (2008: 104 n. 11). This undue expansion of the significance of the Hands motif is often connected to or derived from a reading that considers the identification of the Son and Spirit as Hands to hold the principal place in Irenaeus' conception of the Trinitarian relations and to be his principal expression of the immanence of God to creation e.g. Lawson (1948: 122); Steenberg (2008: 81).

[42] e.g. Adam is formed from the soil in *AH* 1.9.3 and *AH* 3.18.7; in *AH* 2.7.2 the line *Non enim possibile est, cum sint utrique spiritaliter emissi, neque plasmati neque compositi* involves a contrast between spiritual emission on the one hand, and physical formation and composition on the other; and in 3.16.6, Jesus is 'man (*homo*), the formation (*plasmatio*) of God . . . the invisible being made visible.' More examples occur in Books 4 and 5: in *AH* 4.41.4, the Father 'gave salvation to his formation (*plasmati*), which is the substance of the flesh (*carnis substantia*)'; reading together *AH* 5.1.3, 5.5.1, and 5.6.1 shows *plasma* to refer to the physical aspect of Adam, the flesh, and to its formation by God's Hands; and in *AH* 5.14.2, flesh consists of 'a transmission (*successio*) of that thing formed (*plamationis*) originally from the dust' (ANF translation).

of the term, and *AH* 3.6.3, where the term occurs in a quotation of Isa. 44:9–10, *plasma* language in *Against Heresies* refers to the creative activity by which man comes into existence, to man as the result of that particular creative activity, or to the One who creates.[43]

Since Irenaeus uses *plasma* language prior to the point at which I believe he came into contact with Theophilus, the question arises as to why he chose this particular terminology. There is the possibility that its presence just reflects Irenaeus' reading of Scripture. A familiarity with the scriptural use of *plasma* language is already evident by its third usage. In *AH* 1.9.3 he states, 'the flesh . . . is that formation (*plasmatio*) of Adam from dust which was made by God in the beginning'—a clear reference to Gen. 2:7.[44] Here Gen. 2:7 is the occasion for his use of *plasma* language, but Irenaeus does not reason from a text of Scripture to explain his use of *plasma* language until *AH* 3.21.10, where he states 'the Lord took dust from the earth and formed (*plasmavit*) man' [Gen. 2:7], in order to justify the formation of Adam by God's Hand, the Word.

In contrast to earlier passages, Gen. 2:7 is used once in *AH* 4 (4.20.1) and once in *AH* 5 (5.15.2) to support the formation of man by one or both of God's Hands. Of these passages, *AH* 5.15.2 provides the clearest example of the reliance of his *plasma* language on Gen. 2:7: 'Now the work (*opera*) of God is the forming (*plasmatio*) of man. For, as the Scripture says, He made [man] by this kind of work (*operationem*): "And the Lord took clay from the earth, and formed (*plasmavit*) man" [Gen. 2:7].'[45] It is clear from this passage that *plasma* language describes the particular work of God by which he created the first human being. Yet, while the original creation of a human being from the earth is the primary referent of this language,[46] Irenaeus does not restrict *plasma* language to the formation of Adam alone. In the very next section, *AH* 5.15.3, he writes, 'Now, that the Word of God forms (*plasmat*) us in the womb, he says to Jeremiah, "Before I formed (*plasmarem*) you in the womb, I knew you . . . ".'[47] Thus, from *AH* 3.21.10 on, Irenaeus refers to both Gen. 2:7 and

[43] *AH* 1.3.6 refers to the formation of the universe, which Rousseau understands to refer to the formation of the aeons: *plasmate universorum*; τοῦ πλάσματος πάντων. *AH* 3.6.3 refers to those who form an idol to be a god: *Confunditur omnes qui plasmant Deum et sculpunt inutilia*; Isa. 44:10 (LXX): οἱ πλάσσοντες θεὸν. Beyond these two instances, *plasma* language occurs as described above in 133 passages in *AH* (according to a Library of Latin Texts search). NB: both exceptions, in *AH* 1.3.6 and *AH* 3.6.3, occur prior to *AH* 3.21.10 where *plasma* language is connected with Hands language.

[44] Cf. *AH* 3.18.7, where he speaks of the formation of Adam from the virgin soil.

[45] *AH* 5.15.2.

[46] e.g. *AH* 5.14.2: *Caro enim vere primae plasmationis e limo factae successio*: 'For flesh has been truly made [to consist in] a transmission of that thing molded originally from dust' (ANF translation).

[47] Once, in *AH* 5.15.4, Irenaeus uses *plasma* language to depict healing as an act of creation in order to identify the Incarnate Word as the creative Hand of God and the revealer of the Father: 'For, from the earth out of which the Lord formed (*formavit*) eyes for that man, from the same earth it is evident that man was also fashioned (*plasmatus*) at the beginning. For it were

Jer. 1:5[48] as support for the specific referent of *plasma* terminology to be the creation of human beings.[49]

The familiarity with the septuagintal usage of *plasma* language that we see prior to *AH* 3.21.10 is not the same as the direct scriptural support for *plasma* language that we see several times following *AH* 3.21.10. If his theological appropriation of the terminology was based on Scripture alone, then we should see Irenaeus use Scripture to support his terminology far earlier than the later chapters of *AH* 3. So it seems most probable that sources other than the direct study of Scripture explain his early use of *plasma* language.

With this in mind, an interesting quotation of Justin's 'book against Marcion' that occurs early in *AH* 4 might shed light on his use of *plasma* language prior to *AH* 3.21.10:

> Justin does well say, 'I would not have believed the Lord Himself, if He had announced any other than He who is our framer, maker, and nourisher. But because the only-begotten Son came to us from the one God, who both made (*fecit*) this world and formed (*plasmavit*) us, and contains and administers all things, summing up (*recapitulans*) His own handiwork (*plasma*) in Himself, my faith towards Him is steadfast, and my love to the Father immoveable, God bestowing both upon us.'[50]

incompatible that the eyes should indeed be formed (*plasmatum esse*) from one source and the rest of the body from another; as neither would it be compatible that one fashioned (*plasmasse*) the body, and another the eyes' (ANF translation).

[48] Irenaeus may also use Gen. 2:8 to support the formation of Adam in *AH* 5.5.1, but it is less clear since the main purpose of the quotation is to affirm the placement of Adam in Eden. Later, in *AH* 5.21.1, Gal. 4:4 provides the occasion, though not support, for him to refer to the creation of Eve by means of *plasma* language, 'And because of this the Lord acknowledges himself to the be the Son of man, recapitulating in himself that original man out of whom the molding of the woman had been brought about (*est plasmatio facta est*).' The quotation of Gal. 4:4 does not itself refer to the formation of Eve, but rather to the derivation of Jesus' flesh from Eve, so it cannot be said to support *plasma* language, but is rather the occasion for Irenaeus' use of it.

[49] NB: Irenaeus does use other terms to refer to the creation of human beings, but other than the two exceptions referred to earlier, *plasma* language always refers to some aspect of the creation of human beings.

[50] *AH* 4.6.2; ANF translation. J.A. Robinson has argued that this quotation does not belong to Justin in its entirety. He attributes to Irenaeus all but the one sentence of Justin quoted by Eusebius (*EH* 4.18.9, though in Greek of course): *ipsi quoque domino non credidissem alterum deum annuntianti praeter fabricatorem* (Robinson, *JTS* 31 1930: 374–8). His argument, however, remains unconvincing for several reasons, chief among which is that he fails to observe that the context in which the quotation appears in *Ecclesiastical History* undermines the starting point and end of his own case.

Robinson desires to prove that Eusebius 'was right in citing as Justin's words no more than he did . . . (because the rest is) the amplification and the comment of Irenaeus himself' (p. 378). Yet, the shortness of the quotations in Eusebius is better explained by his goal to encourage his audience to read Justin's works. Two passages in Irenaeus aid Eusebius in this endeavor. In both of them, Irenaeus expresses his approval of Justin's thought: (1) 4.6.2, *Et bene Justinus . . . ait*; and (2) 5.26.2, *Bene Justinus dixit*. A simple explanation, then, exists for why Eusebius quotes only a portion of the entire quotation of Justin in 4.6.2: he excerpts the sentence in which Irenaeus endorsed Justin's writings; he is not interested in quoting the whole passage, because it does not

Though this quotation occurs after *AH* 3.21.10, I am not aware of a reason to think that Irenaeus did not have this particular work prior to its use here. Moreover, the possibility of his possession of this source prior to *AH* 3.21.10 finds support in his utilization of Justin's *Dial* in *AH* 3 prior to *AH* 3.21.10 and in his promise in *AH* 3.12.12 to write his own work against Marcion, which would have been aided by Justin's 'book against Marcion.' We have reason then to think that Irenaeus had, or at least would have wanted to have, Justin's anti-Marcionite treatise on hand, in addition to his *Dial*, before he acquired the writings of Theophilus. This hypothesis would well explain the following facts: (1) Irenaeus uses *plasma* language from the beginning of *Against Heresies*; (2) Irenaeus does not provide scriptural support for *plasma* language until *AH* 3.21.10; and (3) *plasma* language and Hands imagery are not linked until *AH* 3.21.10.

The excerpt from *Against Marcion* reveals that Justin used *plasma* language to speak of the activity by which man comes into existence (*plasmavit*) and to speak of man as the result of that particular creative activity (*plasma*)—two of the three ways that Irenaeus uses *plasma* language. The third way that Irenaeus uses *plasma* language, to indicate the One who creates, could also come from Justin—which would not be difficult to imagine given the other two uses—or it could be the result of Irenaeus' own thought. As I have already mentioned, while Justin uses *plasma* language, the Hands tradition does not occur in any of his extant works.

Therefore, in Justin we seem to have a source that used *plasma* language as does Irenaeus prior to *AH* 3.21.10, and a source that does not connect *plasma* language with Hands imagery, as Irenaeus does not prior to *AH* 3.21.10. This suggests that Irenaeus' use of *plasma* terminology may be derived from Justin. Taking this language from Justin, rather than from a personal reading of Scripture, would also explain why Irenaeus does not provide scriptural

further his own argument. This understanding is supported by the observation that Eusebius' quotation from *AH* 5.26.2 is also just an excerpt of Irenaeus' longer quotation of Justin (there can be no doubt that the original quotation from Justin extends at least one phrase farther to include *quoniam et in parabolis et allegoriis a prophetis de eo sit dictum*).

Absent the starting point and end of his argument, Robinson's contention is no longer compelling. Eusebius does not quote what he does because he knows that portion alone belongs to Justin, but because he needs only those words to support his argument. Moreover, the similarities Robinson finds between the language in this quotation and that in other passages of Irenaeus does not have to mean the language in *AH* 4.6.2 is original to Irenaeus. The similarities can also be explained by thinking of the quotation as containing language with which Irenaeus agrees, and which he utilizes and develops.

Finally, the many examples that Robinson culls from Irenaeus still corroborate his intention to oppose Loofs' characterization of Irenaeus as a '"smaller man" than we had hitherto thought him' (p. 375). The ideas in *AH* 4.6.2 are integral to Irenaeus' thought, which itself possesses an intellectual unity. Viewing Justin as a source of some of Irenaeus' ideas does not diminish the fact that Irenaeus adopted and adapted them to his own purpose.

support for *plasma* language until *AH* 3.21.10—where we see the influence of Theophilus.

The plausibility of the suggestion that Irenaeus supports *plasma* language with a particular verse because of his reception of *Autol* depends on finding a passage in Theophilus' work wherein the use of *plasma* language is supported by the same particular verse. Just such a passage occurs at the end of *Autol* 2.19, the same portion of *Autol* that I have already argued is linked to Irenaeus' thought in *AH* 3.21.10. Theophilus wrote:

> But that the creation of man might be made plain, so that there should not seem to be an insoluble problem existing among men, God had said, 'Let us make man;' and since his creation was not yet plainly related, Scripture teaches us, saying: . . . 'and God formed (ἔπλασεν) man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul' [Gen. 2:7]. From which also the soul is called immortal by the majority of people. And after the formation (τό πλάσαι) of man, God chose for him a region among the places of the East . . . [51]

This passage follows soon after Theophilus' comments in *Autol* 2.18. So his reference to Gen. 1:26 entails his previous discussion of the formation of Adam by God's own Hands, the Word and Wisdom, to whom God says 'Let us make'—the discussion which relieved the 'insoluble problem.' He then turns to Gen. 2:6–7 to provide the particulars with regard to the creation of humanity that Gen. 1:26 left out.

We can see that he draws two points from Gen. 2:7. First, the second part of the verse reveals why the soul is considered immortal. Second, the first part of the verse relates the formation of man.[52] According to Theophilus, then, Gen. 2:7 affirms the formation of man, τό πλάσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, and when combined with Gen. 1:26, that formation occurs by means of the Hands of God. Theophilus uses the same verses to unite *plasma* language and Hands imagery in *Autol* 2.18–19 that Irenaeus does in *AH* 3.21.10. Therefore, reliance upon Theophilus' correspondence *Autol* by Irenaeus at the time that he wrote *AH* 3.21.10 explains why *plasma* language and Hands imagery become united in his work at that particular moment.

The one seemingly significant difference between *AH* 3.21.10 and *Autol* 2.18–19 is that Irenaeus speaks of the Word alone as being the Hand of God, rather than of the Word and Wisdom as being the Hands of God. Yet, a simple explanation accounts for this variation. In *AH* 3.21.10 Irenaeus desires to demonstrate the connection between Adam and the humanity of the Incarnate

[51] *Autol* 2.19; my translation with reference to the ANF.

[52] His mention of 'a region among the places of the East' prepares the way for Gen. 2:8, which he quotes at the beginning of the next section, *Autol* 2.20. Gen. 2:8 is also quoted by Irenaeus, as I noted above.

Word—a reference to the creative activity of the Spirit would have been superfluous and would have weakened the connection. We may then conclude that Theophilus is Irenaeus' source for Hands imagery and for his particular use of *plasma* language after *AH* 3.21.10, including its support by the above-mentioned passages of Scripture. Moreover, it is possible that reliance on Justin accounts for his use of *plasma* language prior to *AH* 3.21.10.

Up to this point, I have considered Irenaeus' use of the Hands of God motif in an effort to recognize the source from which he worked. In the second half of this analysis, I will show how Irenaeus utilized the Hands tradition to support his theological and polemical goals. To do so, I will break from my habit of dividing my discussion of Irenaeus' theology by Book, which has enabled me to convey to the reader the development of his pneumatology over the course of his writing. That being said, Hands imagery plays slightly different roles in Books 4 and 5, so I have structured the second half of this examination to bring out these differing purposes for which Irenaeus appropriates the tradition. I will begin by further addressing an issue that to this point I have just mentioned in passing.

5.1.2 The Theological and Polemical Utility of the Hands Motif

I stated earlier that recognizing Irenaeus' dependence upon Theophilus for Hands imagery explains why he does not refer to the two Hands of God until *AH* 4. If we understand Irenaeus' identification of the Word as the Hand of God in *AH* 3.21.10 as the result of his contact with *Autol*, where both the Word and Wisdom are identified as the Hands of God, then it is proper to say that this reference in *AH* 3.21.10 is the first appearance of the Hands tradition, despite the fact that the Word alone is characterized as a Hand of God. As previously discussed, the identification of the Spirit as a Hand of God would have been superfluous, and perhaps even detrimental, to the argument in *AH* 3.21.10. His characterization of both the Son and Holy Spirit as the Hands of God in *AH* 4.pref.4 should not, then, be considered the first moment at which Irenaeus utilizes the tradition. Rather, it should be regarded as the first moment after his contact with *Autol* at which he makes use of the traditional identification of both the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God.

In *AH* 4.pref.4 Irenaeus combats the Gnostic denigration of the salvation of flesh by contending that flesh, a part of the human being, was not made by a deficient Demiurge, but by the one Creator God who formed flesh by means of his Hands:

> In fact man is a mixture of soul and flesh,[53] who was formed (*formatus est*) according to the likeness of God and was molded (*plasmatus est*) by his Hands, that is by the Son and the Spirit, to whom he also said, 'Let us make man' [Gen. 1:26].

Human flesh can be saved because its initial creation, as a constituent part of the human being, was by the one Creator God. Its original formation, then, was not itself deficient. Indeed, Adam was made after the likeness of God. In a manner similar to Theophilus in *Autol* 2.18, Irenaeus secures this contention by appropriating the Hands tradition to interpret the 'Let us make' of Gen. 1:26 in a way that attributes creative activity to the one God. The 'let us' refers to God's own Hands, the Son and Spirit.[54] Once he has established that God alone creates, nothing inhibits him from ascribing to humanity the likeness of that one Creator God.

Prior to interpreting the communication in Gen. 1:26 as occurring between God and his Hands, that is between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—the one Creator God—the statement in the verse could have been explained as communication between the highest God and a lower creative Demiurge. This explanation would generate the possibility of ascribing to humanity the likeness of the creative Demiurge and not the highest God. Once the original 'likeness' of creation to the highest God is in jeopardy, so is the 'likeness' achieved by means of salvation.

The salvation of the flesh, which Irenaeus considers to be humanity's defining characteristic because of the Gnostic polemic, is guaranteed by the 'likeness' of the original formation to its Creator God—a 'likeness' that Irenaeus secures by using the Hands tradition to interpret Gen. 1:26 as referring to the creative

[53] There is a question as to whether the original text included the reference to 'flesh,' which occurs in the Latin but not the Armenian. Fantino has pointed out (1986: 118–21) that in either case (1) the emphasis of the passage is on the formation of the flesh, and (2) ὁμοίωσις is the Greek original for 'likeness'. Thus, the presence or absence of *carnis* does not change our reading of the passage. NB: I do not agree with Fantino's identification of ὁμοίωσις with the Spirit itself: for my interpretation of the 'likeness' of God see pp. 173–81 in chapter 6.

[54] In *Dial* 62.1–4, Justin supports the distinction of the Word from the Father by means of the 'us' in Gen. 1:26: 'God spoke with one endowed with reason and numerically different from himself' (*Dial* 62.2; Falls' tr.). He then denounces the idea that 'us' is explained by God speaking to angels (62.3) and goes on to identify the Word as Wisdom (62.4). Irenaeus does not use Gen. 1:26 to affirm the creative activity of the Word or Spirit prior to *AH* 4.pref.4, despite the fact that their agency in creation is central to his argument that the one God alone creates (which includes arguments against angelic involvement in creation: *AH* 1.22.1, *AH* 2.2.1–5, etc.). Since we have established that Irenaeus was working from Justin's *Dial* while writing *AH* 3, we can presume that he was familiar with his predecessor's use of Gen. 1:26 but chose not to use the text himself. We can make sense of this by surmising that Irenaeus does not appropriate Gen. 1:26 earlier in his work because he disagrees with Justin's identification of the Word to whom God spoke as Wisdom. On the other hand, the text appears in *AH* 4.pref.4, soon after he receives *Autol*, because Theophilus provides an explanation of the 'us' that suits Irenaeus' identification of the Spirit as Wisdom.

activity of the One God. Moreover, using the Hands motif to support his argument for the One Creator God locates the creative activity attributed to the Spirit as a Hand of God within the broader Spirit as Creator tradition that Irenaeus has already used in *AH* 1.22.1, 2.30.9, and 3.24.2 to support his argument for creation by the One God alone.

This use of Hands imagery to support his argument for the One Creator God distinguishes its use in *AH* 4 from its use in *AH* 5. As in *AH* 4.pref.4, Irenaeus uses the Hands motif in *AH* 4.20.1 to affirm the One God who creates, this time in explicit opposition to several different heresies that ascribe complete transcendence to the Father and reserve creative activity for a lower being or beings.[55]

> And it is this one of whom Scripture said, 'And God formed (*plasmavit*) man, taking dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life' [Gen. 2:7]. Therefore, angels did not make (*facerunt*) us, nor did they form (*plasmaverunt*) us, nor, indeed, were angels able to make an image of God, nor anyone else besides the true God, nor a Power far removed from the Father of all things. For God did not need these [beings] to do (*ad faciendum*) what he had himself beforehand determined to do (*fieri*), as if he himself did not have his Hands. For always present with him were the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit, by whom and in whom, he made all things freely and of his own will, to whom he also speaks, when he says, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness' [Gen. 1:26].

Two points draw our immediate attention. First, Gen. 2:7 is now added to the argument in order to affirm the formation of human beings by the One Creator God, who continues to be defined as the Father and his Hands by means of Gen. 1:26. Second, having discredited the possibility of the Gnostic concept of creation by a god, the Demiurge, lower than the Pleroma (*AH* 4.19.3), Irenaeus broadens his argument in *AH* 4.20.1 to oppose three other heresies distinguished by their doctrines of creation. It is not permissible to attribute creative activity to the 'angels . . . , nor anyone else besides the true God, nor a Power far removed from the Father of all things.'[56]

Against these systems, Irenaeus asserts that there is One God who creates: the Father by means of his Hands. In contrast to the angels, another God, or a

[55] Scholars often highlight that Irenaeus uses the Hands motif to establish the immediacy or direct action of God in creation, that is to say, that God himself creates human beings without utilizing a lower demiurge, angels, aeons or any other less- or non-divine intermediary. For instance, Lawson (1948: 124–5, 127, 131); Lebreton, (1928 vol. 2: 576–82, esp. 579); Mambrino, *NRT* 79 (1957: 360, 369).

[56] C.E. Hill (2006: 25) has pointed out that Irenaeus argues against 'heresies of three distinct types, defined by their doctrines of creation'. We can recognize those heresies here, though they occur in a different order than the standard arrangement highlighted by Hill. Irenaeus attributes a doctrine of creation by angels to Simon, Menander, Saturninus, Basilides, and Carpocrates (*AH* 1.23.2, 5; 1.24.1, 4; 1.25.1); he attributes a doctrine of creation by 'some other God' (here: 'anyone else besides the true God') to Cerdo and Marcion (*AH* 1.27.1, 2); and he attributes a doctrine of creation by a Power far removed from and ignorant of God to Cerinthus (*AH* 1.26.1).

certain Power, as God's Hands, the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit, were always present with God. This is the case, not because they existed alongside the Father as opposing deities (as in a dualist system), nor because they are connected to the highest God by a chain of being,[57] but because, as the Hands of God, they themselves are members of the One Creator God.[58]

As a Hand of God, the Spirit participated in the creation of human beings. This affirmation reveals the theological importance of the Spirit as Creator tradition since Irenaeus restricts creative activity to God alone: as one who creates, the Spirit is God.[59] Moreover, as one of the two Hands of God, the Spirit is distinct from and equal to the Son, both of whom must be equal to the Father with regard to their divinity, or else a gradation of divine being would exist within the Godhead. Irenaeus' conception of divinity has no room for such a subordinationist understanding of the Godhead, for it would bring his position uncomfortably close to the celestial chain of being advocated by some of his opponents.[60]

The presence of Hands language in the original text of *AH* 4.7.4 is disputed—it is not present in the Latin, but is present in the Armenian.[61] It is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer to this dispute without recovering the original

[57] Barnes (*NV* 7 2009: 76–8) provides an excellent discussion of Irenaeus' argument against a 'spatial' understanding of the Godhead in which the interval between beings is the ontological basis for the inferiority of each descending order in the celestial hierarchy. For more on 'topological' theology in Gnosticism and early Jewish and Christian theologies, see Schoedel (1972: 88–108, esp. 99–103, which focus on Irenaeus).

[58] According to Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 579), Irenaeus likes to call the Word and Spirit the Hands of God 'without doubt to better mark the unity of the creator God'.

[59] Irenaeus' simple declaration in *AH* 5.15.2 drives home this point, 'Now the work (*opera*) of God is the forming (*plasmatio*) of man.' Cf. Barnes, who argues against inaccurate interpretations of the Hands expressions that ascribe sanctifying rather than creative activity to the Spirit (Barnes, *NV* 7 2009: 104).

[60] This is not to say that there is no room in Irenaeus' thought for a hierarchy within the Godhead that serves to differentiate the Three, as I mentioned in chapter 2. Indeed, it seems to me that the terminology Irenaeus uses lends itself to such an approach. His most frequent title for the Father is 'God,' while the Son and Spirit are 'his Hands.' In this I agree with Stead's judgment: 'Irenaeus apparently wished to associate the Son and Spirit more closely with the Father, picturesquely describing them as "the two hands of God" (*AH* 5.6.1, etc.). Are these "hands" supposed to be coequal? Possibly; this idea would come more easily to Irenaeus, in that he identified the Spirit, not the Logos, with Wisdom; and he does not allude to the conventional view that the right hand must be superior. But his image hardly suggests the later view that *all three* Persons are coequal' (1994: 157; author's emphasis). NB: the second century usage of hierarchical language to differentiate the Three (e.g. Athenagoras, *Emb* 10.5, where rank (τάξις) distinguishes the Three) differs from the later theological logic that ascribes differing degrees of divinity to the Father, Son, and Spirit—subordinationist accounts.

[61] The Armenian has 'his Hands' (իւր ձեռք) instead of 'his likeness' (*figuratio sua*). Several scholars have argued for the accuracy of the Latin over against the Armenian, for instance: Robinson, *JTS* 32 (1931: 153–66, 370–93, here 156–7); Froidevaux, *ROC* 3rd series, vol 8 (1931–2: 441–3). To the contrary, Rousseau has argued for the accuracy of the Armenian text, SC 100.1, (1965: 212–19). As stated above, in my opinion a conclusive argument has not yet been made. See the following note for an additional possibility.

Greek. That being said, the agreement of the argument in this passage with those of *AH* 4.pref.4 and *AH* 4.20.1, which contain the other references to the Hands tradition in Book 4, makes the original presence of that language here possible, though by no means certain or even probable.

Once again, Irenaeus is arguing for creation by the One God to the exclusion of angelic instrumentality. God has no need for angelic participation because his Offspring and his Similitude, the Son and Holy Spirit, the Word and Wisdom, 'minister to him in all respects.' To suggest that God needs angelic aid while ministered to by the Son and Spirit, 'whom all the angels serve and to whom they are subject,' makes little sense. Though not stated outright, the similar arguments elsewhere in *AH 4* suggest that the creative activity of the Son and Spirit should be read into his comments in *AH* 4.7.4. Furthermore, just as the comparison of the angels and other Powers to the Son and Spirit revealed the divine status of the Son and Spirit in *AH* 4.20.1, the elevation of the Son and Spirit above the angels in this passage points toward the same understanding. Irenaeus does not class the Son and Spirit among the angels or Powers. In *AH* 4.7.4 they are at least superior beings, and when combined with *AH* 4.20.1 we see they are superior beings because they are divine, members of the One God who creates.[62]

In *AH* 4 Irenaeus uses the Hands motif primarily to support the creative activity of the One God which ensures the salvation of the flesh; in *AH* 5 he uses the Hands motif primarily to support the salvation of the flesh which is guaranteed by the creative activity of the One God.[63] The somewhat different emphases of the two Books lead to the somewhat different appropriations of the Hands tradition. They are very much, though, two sides of the same coin.

[62] The titles 'Offspring' and 'Similitude' that the Latin text gives to the Son and Spirit are interesting. Barnes (*NV* 7 2009: 93–6) has observed that Irenaeus lacks a way to speak of the 'generation' of the Spirit, a point I made in chapter 2. If the title 'Similitude' is original (see the previous note), one cannot help wondering if Irenaeus was trying to develop something in this line by means of this title. If he was, it does not seem to go any farther than this statement. Irenaeus never explains how the title 'Similitude' defines the relationship of the Spirit to the Father or Son (the Spirit does bring the similitude [*similitudinem*] of God to human beings in *AH* 5.6.1, for instance), as he will later use the idea of generation ('offspring') to define the relationship of the Son to the Father in *Prf* 47 (on this see Barnes (*NV* 7 2009: 8), who discusses the generation of the Son in *Prf* 47 and points out the heightened importance of this concept and title for the Son in *Prf* as compared to *AH*). Given the later debates with the Homoians, it is likely that such a theology for the Spirit would have proven controversial. In fact, such a controversy could have prompted the Armenian translator to replace 'his Similitude' (*figuratio sua*) with 'his Hands' (իւր ձեռն).

[63] Irenaeus' use of the Hands motif in his *Proof* comes closest to its use in *AH* 4. In *Prf* 11, he uses Hands imagery to affirm the creative activity of the one Creator God. The purpose of the discussion in *Prf* 11 is found in *Prf* 8: God is the 'Lord of all by whom all things exist and from whom all things are nourished.'

His approach to Hands imagery in *AH* 5 is clear from its first use in *AH* 5.1.3, where he writes:

> the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having been united with the ancient substance of the formation (*plasmationis*) of Adam rendered (*effecit*) man living (*viventem*) and perfect (*perfectum*) . . . so that in the spiritual we may all be made alive (*vivicemur*). For at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God, to whom the Father speaking, said, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness' [Gen. 1:26]. And on account of this, in the last times, not by the will of the flesh, nor by the will of man [John 1:13], but by the good pleasure of the Father, his Hands have rendered man living (*vivum perfecerunt hominem*), in order that Adam might be made (*fiat*) after the image and likeness of God.

According to Irenaeus' reasoning, the person who is animated by the breath of life participates in natural life, but spiritual vivification follows the reception of the Spirit.[64] The vivification of the whole person, in particular the salvation of the flesh, is at the heart of his debate with the Gnostics, who deprecate the material nature of man and deny the possibility of its salvation. His argument in *AH* 5.1.3 is presaged by the concluding statement in *AH* 5.1.2: 'vain is the argument of the Valentinians who argue against Jesus' 'truly possessing flesh and blood . . . in order that they may exclude the flesh from salvation, and cast aside what God has fashioned.'[65] Here he connects the salvation of the flesh with the creative activity by which it was formed.

Irenaeus moves in *AH* 5.1.3 from this initial connection of salvation of the flesh with its original creation to substantiate the very possibility of the flesh's salvation by the fact of its creation. To be specific: because the Word and the Spirit, as the Hands of God, made the first person in the image and likeness of God,[66] so are they able to form a living person in the last times after the image and likeness of God by being united with the ancient substance of Adam's formation.[67] Moreover, the phrase 'for at no time did Adam (meaning: the human race) escape the Hands of God' hints at the providential authority of the creative Hands over the salvation of their creation that he elaborates upon in *AH* 5.5.1:

> For by means of those Hands by which they (Elijah and Enoch) were formed (*plasmati sunt*) in the beginning, they received assumption and translation. For in

[64] The Spirit's role in Irenaeus' anthropology and soteriology will be discussed in detail in the next chapter of this study.

[65] ANF translation.

[66] His most detailed discussion of the original creative activity of the Hands occurs in *Prf* 11.

[67] An almost identical statement occurs in *AH* 5.28.4: 'And because of this in every time, man, having been formed (*plasmatus*) in the beginning by the Hands of God, that is by the Son and by the Spirit, is made after the image and likeness of God.' This statement, however, does not highlight the role of the Incarnation as does the one in *AH* 5.1.3.

> Adam the Hands of God were accustomed to set in order, to rule, and to sustain[68] his own formation (*plasma*), and to bring it and place it where they wish.

The vivification of human beings, which the 'assumption and translation' of a person would assume, is guaranteed by the authority of the Hands over their creation. That Irenaeus conceives of this authority as extending throughout every moment of the creature's existence is seen in *AH* 5.15.1–4, where the Incarnate Word restored sight to the blind man 'in order to make clear the Hand of God, that which in the beginning had formed (*plasmavit*) man.'[69] Therefore, in the fifth Book of *Against Heresies*, the authority over their creation that follows from the creative activity of the Hands guarantees the salvation of the flesh, and thus of the whole human person.

Section Conclusion

Several important points flow out of this section. First, while a source in Asia Minor may account for the presence of the Hands motif in Theophilus, *Autol* itself seems to be the source for the appearance of the Hands tradition in Irenaeus. Second, Irenaeus' utilization of works by Justin can account for his use of *plasma* language prior to *AH* 3.21.10. Third, the timing of Irenaeus' reception of Theophilus' correspondence *Autol* explains why Irenaeus unites *plasma* language with Hands imagery in *AH* 3.21.10. Fourth, as with Theophilus, in Irenaeus *plasma* language entails an emphasis on the physical manipulation of the substance of the earth in order to form Adam. Fifth, Irenaeus uses the Hands motif in *AH* 4 primarily to support the creative activity of the One God which ensures the salvation of the flesh; whereas (sixth) in *AH* 5 he uses the Hands motif primarily to support the salvation of the flesh which is guaranteed by the creative activity of the One God. The somewhat different emphases of the two books lead to the somewhat different appropriations of the Hands tradition; they are very much, though, two sides of the same coin.

These last two points in particular, which demonstrate the theological and polemical appropriation of the Hands tradition, show that Irenaeus adapted the ideas he received from an earlier, less-developed tradition to fit his own

[68] *Coaptare et tenere et baiulare*; ῥυθμίζειν καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ βαστάζειν.

[69] *AH* 5.15.2. Barnes' statement, 'the language of "made by God's Two Hands" is used to describe the creation or formation of Adam and only that specific act of creation' (*NV* 7 2009: 102) is accurate with regard to the use of 'Hands' in the plural. I have argued above, however, that as far as Irenaeus is concerned, we should include the references to the Word as the Hand (sg.) of God within the Hands tradition. This being the case, we can say that Irenaeus connects the *in utero* creation of each individual person to the Hands tradition as well, for that creative activity is attributed to the Word as the Hand of God in *AH* 5.15.3 on the basis of Jer. 1:5 (cf. 4 Ezra 8.7–8). Irenaeus also connects instances of miraculous preservation of the flesh (e.g. Elijah; Ananias, Azarias, and Misaël) to the work of the Son as a Hand of God in *AH* 5.5.2.

theological goals. He did not just reiterate what came before him. Rather, he approached Theophilus' work as a sourcebook that he adopted and adapted to his own ends.

5.2 THE SPIRIT AS WISDOM

The creative activity Irenaeus ascribes to the Spirit in *AH* 4 is not limited to the association of the Spirit with the Hands motif. In fact, if we desire to categorize Irenaeus' pneumatology, the creative activity ascribed to the Spirit as one of the Hands of God would fall under the broader heading of the Spirit as Creator. Under this heading too, we would place his identification of the Spirit as Wisdom, which is most prominent in Book 4.

Irenaeus' identification of the Spirit with the figure of Wisdom in sapiential literature has perplexed scholars, especially those who consider the title 'Wisdom' to be firmly affixed to the Son by this point in time.[70] The very fact that both Theophilus and Irenaeus identify the Spirit as Wisdom, however, indicates it is inaccurate to consider the title to be already so closely linked to the Son that we should expect its exclusive identification with him.[71] The better question is, rather, why do Theophilus and Irenaeus make the connection they do when passages in Scripture and in Justin join the title to the Son?[72] It would seem that the most likely answer lies in a traditional association of spirit and wisdom language that finds a place in both Theophilus and Irenaeus.[73]

The scholarly consensus has assigned to this traditional association of Spirit and Wisdom a Jewish character and an Oriental provenance, possibly Syria or Palestine.[74] The strength of this determination of provenance comes largely from Kretschmar's study of wisdom language in works that precede Irenaeus.[75] He concluded that Irenaeus' immediate source for the God-Word-Wisdom triad is Theophilus. In his mind, Theophilus occupied the pivotal place in the application of old Israelite Wisdom traditions to the Christian Holy Spirit and in the dissemination of this new Wisdom tradition in both the

[70] The comments of Prestige (1969: 91) represent this perspective: 'The identification (by Theophilus and Irenaeus) of the Spirit and the Wisdom failed to secure acceptance; already the title of Wisdom had come to be too closely connected with the Son'.

[71] Unlike Irenaeus, Theophilus is not consistent in his identification: he also identifies the Word as Wisdom, e.g. *Autol* 2.10.

[72] As Lebreton states (1928 vol. 2: 568).

[73] To my knowledge, the best study remains that of Kretschmar (1956: 36–61).

[74] e.g. Lebreton (1928 vol. 2: 569–70); Kretschmar (1956: esp. 57–9); Orbe (1966: 520); Jaschke (1976: 258). This assignment of provenance agrees with my conclusions with regard to the Hands of God tradition that Irenaeus also utilizes.

[75] Kretschmar (1956: 36–61).

East and West.[76] On the other hand, Lebreton, Rousseau, Jaschke, and Fantino point to the Sapiential literature as Irenaeus' immediate source.[77]

I agree that Theophilus influenced Irenaeus' identification of Wisdom with the Spirit. Indeed, I believe his fingerprints are all over *AH* 4.20.3ff.[78] Yet, Irenaeus first utilized the God-Word-Wisdom triad in *AH* 2.30.9, well in advance of the first signs of Theophilus' influence upon his thought. I also agree that Irenaeus utilized Sapiential literature,[79] again in *AH* 4.20.3 especially, but he never reasons from these passages of Scripture in support of the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom.[80] Moreover, he quotes the passages from Proverbs in *AH* 4.20.3 long after he first refers to the dyad, Word and Wisdom, in *AH* 2.30.9 and *AH* 3.24.2, and after he makes the explicit identification of Wisdom and Spirit in *AH* 4.7.4. For these reasons, while it is difficult to believe that Irenaeus was not long aware of Sapiential passages that would support his initial identification of Wisdom and the Spirit, he gives no indication that he identifies the two because of this literature.

The fact of the matter is that Irenaeus does not give us enough information to determine what particular source may have encouraged his identification of the Holy Spirit as Wisdom. Because we are unable to draw definitive conclusions from Irenaeus himself, I will follow the conclusions Kretschmar gained from his analysis of preceding traditions, insofar as they point to an oriental Jewish tradition that associates wisdom and spirit language. Yet, since

[76] Kretschmar (1956: 58–60). Robinson illustrates Irenaeus' connection of the Spirit and Wisdom by referring to Theophilus, but refrains from labeling Theophilus as Irenaeus' source (1920: 53–60).

[77] Lebreton (1928 vol. 2: 569); Rousseau, SC 211 (1974: 393, 477 n. 2); Jaschke (*Der Heilige Geist*, 1976: 264); Fantino (1994: 291); Fantino also states that the identification of spirit with wisdom comes out of Jewish speculation which passes into Jewish-Christianity—Irenaeus' identification is in line with this tradition.

[78] In this opinion Robinson precedes me, 'the next sentences of Theophilus give in summary form much which is said with great fullness by Irenaeus, touching the vision of God and the resurrection of the flesh as well as of the soul' (Robinson 1920: 55; he is speaking of Theophilus' use of Ps. 33.6 and Prov. 3.19–20 in *Autol* 1.7 with reference to *Prf* 5 and *AH* 4.20.3–4, as his note shows). An extended analysis of *AH* 4.20.3ff and its relationship to Theophilus will have to await a future study.

[79] Rousseau suggests that Prov. 8:30 accounts for Irenaeus' description in *AH* 3.24.2 of Wisdom as 'binding together (*compingens*) all things', (SC 211 1974: 393), and according to Jaschke (*Der Heilige Geist*, 1976: 264), Irenaeus draws from Wisd. 1:7 when he says in *AH* 5.2.3 that the Spirit of God 'contains (*continet*) all things'. In fact, however, the most that can be said about these passages is that they utilize the same language that occurs in Proverbs and the Wisdom of Solomon. Insufficient parallels make suggestions of dependence tenuous.

[80] Only once does Irenaeus reason from a passage of Scripture to the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom: from Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) in *Prf* 5. This fact is less significant to this present discussion than it may seem, for three reasons: (1) the *Proof* (as I argued in the Introduction) was written after Irenaeus' initial identification of the Spirit as Wisdom in *AH* 2.30.9; (2) Ps. 33:6 refers to the Spirit not to Wisdom, so the identification had to be already in place in Irenaeus' mind for him to make use of the passage; and (3) Irenaeus relies upon his later reception of Theophilus for his application of Ps. 33:6 to the Spirit as Wisdom, as I argued in the Excursus following chapter 4.

Irenaeus identifies Wisdom and the Holy Spirit prior to his encounter with Theophilus' letters *To Autolycus*, Theophilus cannot be Irenaeus' initial source of the tradition.[81] It is better to say that Irenaeus' identification of the two comes from an oriental Jewish Tradition of which he was aware, a tradition that Theophilus probably used as well. His later contact with Theophilus, then, provided the hitherto-lacking textual basis and intellectual categories to further develop the Spirit-Wisdom identification that Irenaeus already held.[82]

A careful accounting of Irenaeus' wisdom language, in particular his association of wisdom language with the Spirit, is then needed. The remainder of this section will supply the reader with an account which takes into consideration the initial setting of the development of his wisdom language, the transition of wisdom from an attribute of God to its identification with the Holy Spirit, the context in which Irenaeus refers to the Spirit as Wisdom, and the activities—and especially the effect of those activities—that he ascribes to Wisdom. I will treat these points within two sub-sections: first, the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom; and second, the activity and the effect of Wisdom.

The division of this examination into two parts treating (1) the identification, and (2) the activity and the effect of Wisdom, while convenient, is to a certain degree false. Irenaeus identifies the Spirit as Wisdom seven times in *Against Heresies*, to which we can add two additional occasions in his *Proof*.[83] In every instance, with the possible exception of *Prf* 10,[84] the ascription of the title occurs when he is affirming the creative activity of the Spirit. A quotation from *Prf* 5 explains this pattern: 'Thus, since the Word "establishes," that is, works bodily and confers existence, while the Spirit arranges and forms the various "Powers," so rightly is the Son called Word and the Spirit the Wisdom of God.'[85] Here, it is clear that the Spirit is called 'the Wisdom of God' because of its role in creation: the arranging and forming of the powers, in this case. The particular connection of the title, Wisdom, with creative activity renders my division between identity, and activity and effect, somewhat false. The separation of these ideas is, nevertheless,

[81] Irenaeus' reference to the dyad, Word and Wisdom, in *AH* 2.30.9 bears no other similarity to the work of Theophilus than the reference itself.

[82] Chief among these examples would be Irenaeus' incorporation of the Hands of God, which Theophilus identifies as the Word and Wisdom, Prov. 3:19–20 in *AH* 4.20.3, and Ps. 33:6 which is the one passage from Scripture that Irenaeus uses to justify his identification of the Spirit as Wisdom (*Prf* 5). I have shown in the Excursus and earlier in this chapter that Irenaeus takes both the Hands motif and his use of Ps. 33:6 from Theophilus.

[83] *AH* 2.30.9, 3.24.2, 4.7.4, 4.20.1, 4.20.2, 4.20.3, 4.20.4; *Prf* 5, 10. I do not consider the quotations of Isa. 11:1–3 in *AH* 3.9.3, 3.17.1, or *Prf* 9 as instances when the Spirit is identified as Wisdom. In each of those passages Irenaeus deploys the verse to discuss the activity of the 'Spirit' and not the activity of the Spirit as 'Wisdom.'

[84] Where the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Holy Spirit, glorify God at the beginning of a section that then transitions to a discussion of creation.

[85] Behr's translation.

an easy way to convey information. I beg the reader's indulgence for the occasional repetition of information that overlaps my partition.

5.2.1 The Identification of the Spirit as Wisdom

The Wisdom pneumatology of Irenaeus reaches its apogee in *AH* 4, where five of his nine references to the Spirit as Wisdom occur (two references occur before this Book and two after). Of the passages containing wisdom pneumatology in this Book, *AH* 4.20.1–4 stands above the rest. Here, Irenaeus identifies the Spirit as Wisdom to establish that creative activity belongs to one God alone. In the course of this argument he also establishes the eternality of the Spirit as one of the members of the Creator God.

As we saw in our discussion of the Hands of God, Irenaeus restricts creative activity to God alone by contending that God does not need 'outside' assistance. He writes in *AH* 4.20.1, 'For with Him were always present the Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and spontaneously, He made all things, to whom also He speaks, saying, "Let Us make man after Our image and likeness" [Gen. 1.26].'[86] The self-sufficiency that Irenaeus ascribes to God in this statement depends on two separate, but related points. First, God did not need assistance to create because his Word and Wisdom, Son and Spirit, were always with him. Second, God did not need assistance to create because he made all things by his Word and Wisdom, Son and Spirit. The next two sections, *AH* 4.20.2–3, contain Irenaeus' argument in support of these two points.

In the first half of *AH* 4.20.2, he details verses that support the creative activity of the Father.[87] In the second half of this section, Irenaeus moves to the involvement of the Son and Spirit: 'God who made (*fecit*) all things by [his] Word and adorned (*adornavit*) them by [his] Wisdom.' He supports the creative activity of the Son by affirming his sovereignty over the heavens and the earth, for sovereignty belongs to the Creator.[88] He then quickly supports the eternality of the Son by saying he has already demonstrated 'the Word, namely the Son, was always with the Father.'

Though his logic has required a similar understanding of the Spirit up to this point in his work,[89] he has not yet offered explicit comments on the eternality of the Spirit. That being the case, he devotes *AH* 4.20.3 to showing 'that Wisdom also, which is the Spirit, was present with Him, anterior to all

[86] ANF translation.
[87] He quotes *Mandate* 1.1 from the *Shepherd of Hermas* (which he considers to be Scripture), Mal. 2:10, Eph. 4:6, and Matt. 11:27.
[88] Cf. his ascription of providence to the Creator in *AH* 3.24.2–3.25.1; see chapter 4, pp. 91–3.
[89] See, for example, the perfection of the Spirit that I discuss in chapter 2, pp. 38–40.

creation.'[90] Irenaeus then famously establishes the eternality and creativity of the Spirit by appropriating three Wisdom passages from Proverbs: 3:19–20, 8:22–25, and 8:27–31.

Irenaeus explicitly states that the verses from Proverbs serve to substantiate the eternality of the Spirit/Wisdom: 'Wisdom also, which is the Spirit, was present with [the Father], anterior to all creation, He declares by Solomon.'[91] Despite the simplicity of his purpose and the clarity with which he states it, some commentators attempt to impute additional significance he never intends.[92] In particular, the quotation of Prov. 8:22 ('the Lord created me [*Dominus creavit me*]') should not be taken as revealing Irenaeus' understanding of, or even interest in, the generation of the Spirit.[93] In contrast to his comments on the generation of the Logos in *AH* 2, at no time does Irenaeus explain his conception of the production of the Spirit. In fact, he gives no indication that he considers it important to verbalize an account of the Spirit's production or that he even has an account that he could verbalize.[94]

The grammatical structure of *AH* 4.20.3 confirms the role the verses from Proverbs play in Irenaeus' argument. Between the quotations of the first and second groups of verses (Prov. 3:19–20 and Prov. 8:22–25) occur the words

[90] ANF translation.

[91] ANF translation.

[92] For instance, Orbe (1966: 697–8).

[93] As, for example, Orbe, when he says that these texts are sufficient to legitimate the Holy Spirit's personality, as they would serve others (e.g. Tertullian in *adv. Hermog.* and *adv. Prax.*) to demonstrate the procession of the Word from his personal immanence in God to his full personal subsistence. So, in this sense the true exegetical difficulty of the personality of the Spirit that exists for others, disappears for Theophilus and Irenaeus (Orbe 1961: 538–9). In addition, by comparing Irenaeus to Theophilus, Lebreton's comments are potentially misleading: 'the Spirit also derives its origin from the Father, but nowhere does he say it is generated by the Father; this reserve, certainly intentional, is all the more notable as this generation could seem suggested by certain passages of the sapiential books (he notes Prov. 8:25 in *AH* 4.20.3) that Irenaeus interprets of the Holy Spirit.' And then from the note to that statement, 'Saint Theophilus who, around the same date, also identifies Wisdom with the Spirit, is less reserved than Irenaeus and represents sometimes this Wisdom as generated by God' (Lebreton 1928, vol. 2: 562, 562 n. 3). Lebreton's statement that Irenaeus' approach to the generation of the Spirit is intentionally reserved in comparison to Theophilus' suggests that Irenaeus is unwilling or unable to give an account of the production of the Spirit. It is better to say that he is not at all interested in providing such an account.

[94] This should not be explained by suggesting that Irenaeus conceives of the Spirit as being in some way reducible (he intends for his comments in *AH* 4.20.3 to stand against this very possibility—the Spirit is as eternal as the Word). A curious passage in Theophilus may shed some light on Irenaeus' thinking. In *Autol* 2.10, we find, 'For the prophets were not when the world came into existence, but the Wisdom of God which was in him (ἐν αὐτῷ), and his holy Word which was always present with him (συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ)' (ANF tr. M. Dods). It is true, as Lebreton points out (1928, vol. 2: 562–3 n. 3), that earlier in this passage Theophilus refers to the emission (ἐξερευξάμενος) of Wisdom, but here the different terms seem to suggest that while his Wisdom and Word existed prior to creation, their status ('in' versus 'with') was different. Such an understanding could explain Irenaeus' lack of interest in the production of the Spirit, and contribute to the generation of the Spirit still being an open question in Origen's time (*PA* 1. pref.4). Along the same line, Barnes suggests that Irenaeus' failure to provide an aetiological model for the Holy Spirit weakens later pneumatology (*NV* 7, 2009: 105–6).

et rursus ('and again'), and between the quotations of the second and third groups (Prov. 8:22–5 and Prov. 8:27–31) we find *et iterum* ('and again'). These conjunctions create a series of quotations in which each individual quotation refers back to the purpose stated at the beginning of the passage, thereby limiting their signifance to the sole intent of the passage.[95] Therefore, Prov. 8:22–5 finds a place in this series because, as with the others, it confirms the eternality of the Spirit by establishing its existence as Wisdom prior to creation.[96]

Irenaeus does not take the time to argue for the creative activity of the Spirit as Wisdom. He presumes that the verses from Proverbs will speak to this point for themselves. The one theme that is common to the three selections from Proverbs is the existence of Wisdom prior to creation, which makes sense given Irenaeus' reason for appropriating these texts. A certain variation exists, however, in how the selections support this theme. In this variation lies the support for the creative activity of the Spirit as Wisdom. Proverbs 3:19–20 supports the eternality of the Spirit by establishing the role of Wisdom in creation. In order for Wisdom to have been involved in creation, so the logic goes, Wisdom would have had to exist prior to creation. Proverbs 8:22–5 and 8:27–31 support the eternality of the Spirit by establishing the presence of Wisdom with God prior to, and then at the time of, creation. The first selection speaks less directly to the Spirit's eternality but more directly to its creative activity; the reverse goes for the second and third selections. In the end, their combination permits Irenaeus to state at the beginning of *AH* 4.20.4, 'Therefore, [there is] one God, who by the Word and Wisdom made and adapted all things.'

If the pinnacle of Irenaeus' Wisdom pneumatology occurs in *AH* 4, the roots of his identification of the Spirit with Wisdom lie in *AH* 2. The polemic with Gnosticism is the initial setting for his development of wisdom language and for its first connection with his concept of creation. The first important moment in the formation of his idea of wisdom occurs in *AH* 2.17.7–8 where he reclaims the terminology from Gnostic usage.

Irenaeus demonstrates in *AH* 2.17 that the Valentinian theory of the production of aeons is faulty because spiritual production entails continuity in substance or nature.[97] As a result of this continuity, 'if it is impious to ascribe ignorance and passion to the Father of all,'[98] then 'those productions

[95] Therefore, Orbe's approach to *AH* 4.20.3, which garners different points from the different verses (1966: 697–8), is incorrect. Bacq is on the right track when he states, 'By this expression (γέννημα), he intends only to emphasize the absolute transcendence of the Son and the Spirit in relation to all the other beings which are the "work" (ποίημα) of God' (Bacq 1978: 168 n. 2).

[96] Fantino (1994: 350–2) is correct to say that by basing the eternality of the Spirit on its preexistence to creation, Irenaeus does not mean that the eternality of the Spirit, or the Son for that matter, is just relative to creation.

[97] *AH* 2.17.6: *eiusdem enim substantiae omnes inveniuntur cum Patre, tantum secundum magnitudinem, sed non secundum naturam differentes ab invicem.*

[98] *AH* 2.17.6, ANF translation.

which proceed from [the Logos] (which in turn proceeded from the Father), since they are of the same substance with himself, remain perfect, and impassible, and always similar to him who produced them.'[99] Of particular concern to Irenaeus in this discussion is to establish that 'it is not possible . . . that the Sophia of God, she who is within the Pleroma, coming from a production of this kind, should have fallen under the influence of passion, and conceived such ignorance.'[100] His primary interest in arriving at this conclusion is to undermine the Gnostic theory of creation, which views the ignorance of Wisdom as the key moment in the creation of matter. His secondary interest, however, is much more important for the construction of his own theological account—he is creating semantic space for the proper understanding of the figure of Wisdom.

This secondary interest is not explicit, but is evident from three statements he makes in the course of his argument and from the change in his usage of terminology that occurs at this point in his work. The first statement comes right before the height of his argument, at the end of *AH* 2.17.6: 'and while they ascribe the same impiety (ignorance and passion) to the very Sophia of God, how can they still call themselves religious men?'[101] This is effective polemic because characterizing the Wisdom of God as ignorant is not only impious, but also nonsensical. Beyond this polemical point, the question suggests that religious people should think pious thoughts with regard to the Wisdom of God.

This latter point indicates that Irenaeus desires to free the figure of Wisdom, in and of itself, from the errors of the Gnostic system. Such a desire only makes sense if he intends to reclaim Wisdom for his own theological system. The next two statements support this conclusion. In *AH* 2.17.8 Irenaeus compares the 'Sophia of God' to the 'Sapientia of Valentinus,'[102] thus differentiating the two rather than just showing the illogical nature of the concept of Sophia in the Gnostic system, which is all his argument requires. And in *AH* 2.18.1, he considers his reclamation project complete when he issues the ultimatum: 'Let them therefore no longer call this suffering aeon, Sophia, but let them make no mention of either her name or her sufferings.'

Irenaeus abides by his own dictate. Throughout the rest of his work he refers by name to the aeon, *Sophia,* just two times.[103] In addition, after *AH* 2.17.8 he never again uses the term *sapientia* to refer to the Valentinian

[99] *AH* 2.17.7.
[100] *AH* 2.17.8.
[101] ANF translation.
[102] By *Valentino Sapientia*, Irenaeus intends a double entendre: he is challenging both the figure of Wisdom in the Valentinian system, and the wisdom of the Valentinian system.
[103] In *AH* 4.33.3 and *AH* 4.35.4, in contrast to the 45 times the term appears from the beginning of *AH* through *AH* 2.18.1. The Latin translator retained and reserved *Sophia* to speak of the aeon.

Wisdom; he restricts its reference to wisdom as an attribute of God and to Wisdom as a name for the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it is clear that the argument found from *AH* 2.17.2 through *AH* 2.18.1 both undermines the Gnostic conception of Sophia, the pivotal figure in the Valentinian theory of creation, and creates a semantic space that he can fill with his concept of the figure of Wisdom, whom he identifies as the Holy Spirit.

It is important for me to be clear about my understanding of the relationship between the Gnostic figure of Wisdom and the figure of Wisdom in Irenaeus' thought. Two main similarities exist between the two conceptions of Wisdom. First, both associate Wisdom with the Holy Spirit (though what is meant by 'Holy Spirit' differs). Second, both assign a role to Wisdom in creation. Despite the similarities between the two systems, we should not say that Irenaeus has incorporated or modified the Gnostic concept of Sophia in order to produce his own idea of Wisdom. I believe two observations will suffice to substantiate my position. First, the 'cleansing' of the title Wisdom that occurs between *AH* 2.17.2 and *AH* 2.18.1 shows the disregard of Irenaeus for the Gnostic figure of Wisdom. He is only interested in the title, to which he will attach his own conception.[104] And second, in order to assert the dependence of Irenaeus on the Gnostic concept of Wisdom, one would have to demonstrate distinct parallels between the two systems that cannot be explained by parallels to any other system. This has not been done. In fact, the figure of Wisdom in sapiential literature and the figure of Wisdom in Theophilus bear many similarities, including the two mentioned earlier in this paragraph, to the figure of Wisdom in Irenaeus.[105]

The reclamation of Wisdom language from Gnostic usage, then, will enable Irenaeus to identify the Holy Spirit as Wisdom in *AH* 2.30.9. Before he does that, though, further interaction with his Gnostic opponents serves as the occasion for him to associate the attribute of God's wisdom with the harmony found in creation. In *AH* 2.25.1 we find him confronting the Gnostic proclivity for arithmology, but in so doing, he does not want to suggest that either the details of Scripture or the overall structure of the world are 'a meaningless and accidental thing.'[106] Against this notion, he responds, 'with great wisdom and diligence, all things have clearly been made by God, fitted and prepared (*apta et ornata*).'[107]

[104] In so saying I do not intend to discount the polemical advantage of taking over the terminology of one's opponents, but this polemical move does not necessarily involve the incorporation of the ideas of one's opponents.

[105] Robinson wrote long ago, 'The identification of the Spirit with Wisdom was made after a fashion by some of the "Gnostics," but not in a way that is likely to have influenced Irenaeus' Robinson (1920: 53).

[106] *AH* 2.25.1; the passage reads, 'Is it a meaningless and accidental thing, that the positions of names, and the election of apostles, and the working of the Lord, and the arrangement of created things, are what they are?—we answer them: Certainly not' (ANF translation).

[107] *AH* 2.25.1

In *AH* 2.25.2 he then borrows the illustration of the harmony of the lyre from Greco-Roman philosophy and culture to show that while 'various and numerous (*varia et multa*) are those things that have been made, they are indeed well fitted and adapted (*bene aptata et bene consonantia*) to the whole creation.' We can see that this is true because 'the sound of the lyre, by means of the interval that separates each one from the others, produces one harmonious melody, [but] consists of many and opposite (*multis et contrariis*) sounds.'[108] Moreover, just as the creation of the lyre by a single artist demonstrates 'the justice, goodness, and munificence belonging to the whole work and [thing of] wisdom,'[109] so too can we believe that the various parts of creation and the harmonic whole that they form are due to the work of one Creator. Thus, the wise work of God is that which joins together the 'various and numerous' aspects of creation into a meaningful whole.[110]

The next reference to the wisdom of God in creation occurs in chapter thirty of *AH* 2, which is also where we see Irenaeus expand his wisdom language to include the idea of Wisdom as the Holy Spirit. In *AH* 2.30.3, he challenges Gnostic superiority by means of a series of questions concerning the creation of the world, two of which read:

> And who can enumerate one by one all the remaining things constituted by the power of God and governed by his wisdom? Or, [who can] search out the greatness of his wisdom by which God created?[111]

I will take into consideration Irenaeus' use of *gubernare* in the next section; what interests me at the present time is the analysis of Hans-Jochen Jaschke. Jaschke stated that the language of this passage suits Irenaeus' understanding of the Spirit as Wisdom, whose 'ordering rule' receives an 'impressive illustration' in creation, but here *sapientia* refers to a quality of God.[112]

Jaschke's observation is more pertinent to this moment in Irenaeus' development of his wisdom language than he himself seems to realize. As we will see in the next section, Irenaeus ascribes to the wisdom of God in creation the same effect that he ascribes to the activity of the Spirit as Wisdom. This correspondence enables his deft appropriation of the language he developed

[108] *AH* 2.25.2.
[109] *AH* 2.25.2.
[110] A more detailed discussion of Irenaeus' illustration of the lyre takes place in the next subsection.
[111] *AH* 2.30.3: *Et reliqua omnia quae per virtutem Dei sunt constituta et per sapientiam eius gubernantur quis poterit per singula enumerare, vel investigare magnitudinem sapientiae eius qui fecit Dei?* cf. Athenagoras, *The Resurrection of the Dead* 5.1, 'Such seem to me, first of all, not to perceive the power and wisdom of the one who made and governs (τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος καὶ διοικοῦντος) this universe.' Text from Athénagore, SC 379 (1992); my translation.
[112] Jaschke (*Der Heilige Geist*, 1976: 262, 263 n. 55).

with reference to the activity of the wisdom of God to the activity of the figure of Wisdom. Irenaeus' ascription of an 'ordering rule' to the wisdom of God in *AH* 2.30.3 agrees with and leads to the activity he attributes to Wisdom in *AH* 2.30.9. There, he writes:

> he (the Creator) himself, by himself, made freely and by his own power, and arranged and finished all things . . . This one alone is discovered to be God, who made all things, who alone is Omnipotent, and who alone is Father. Founding and making all things, visible and invisible, those detected by senses and those not, heavenly and earthly, by the Word of his power, and he has fitted and arranged all things by his Wisdom; and he contains all things, but can be contained by no one.[113]

And then:

> He is Father, he is God, he is the Founder, he is the Maker, he is the Artificer, who made them by himself, that is, by his Word and Wisdom—heaven and earth, and the seas, and all that are in them.[114]

Both of these passages continue the theme first pointed out in our discussion of *AH* 1.22.1 where Irenaeus mentions the Spirit's involvement in creation: creative activity is the exclusive domain of the One God and is effected by his agents, Word and Wisdom.[115] In the first passage, however, Irenaeus is far more descriptive of the specific activities of the Word and Wisdom. Though we cannot be certain, the first sentence of the first selection ('he himself, by himself, made freely and by his own power, and arranges, and finishes all things') may introduce and summarize the thoughts contained in the following sentences of that passage. This possibility rests on the similarity of language and structure that exists between this sentence and what follows: 'arranged and finished' (*disposuit et perfecit*) would approximate 'fitted and arranged' (*aptavit et disposuit*), while 'made all things . . . by his own

[113] *AH* 2.30.9: *ipse a semetipso fecit libere et ex sua potestate et disposuit et perfecit omnia . . . solus hic Deus invenitur, qui omnia fecit, solus Omnipotens et solus Pater, condens et faciens omnia, et visibilia et invisibilia et sensibilia et insensate et caelestia et terrena, Verbo virtutis suae, et omnia aptavit et disposuit Sapientia sua, et omnia capiens, solus autem a nemine capi potest.*

[114] *AH* 2.30.9: *hic Pater, hic Deus, hic Conditor, hic Factor, hic Fabricator, qui fecit ea per semetipsum, hoc est per Verbum et per Sapientiam suam, caelum et terram et maria et omnia quae in eis sunt.*

[115] Readers unfamiliar with second century theology might expect an affirmation of the creative agency of the Word and Wisdom to lead to a discussion on the unity of activity in the Godhead: it does not. Irenaeus simply insists that creative activity belongs to the one God, the Father, who works by means of his Word and Wisdom. Such an approach entails an elevated role of the Father with respect to the Word and Wisdom, a point I have already made in my comments on *AH* 1.22.1.

Power' would approximate 'founding and making all things . . . by the Word of his power.'[116]

Assuming the first sentence does function in this way, Irenaeus utilizes three verbs to convey the creative activity of Wisdom: *disponere* ('to arrange'), *perficere* ('to finish'), and *aptare* ('to fit'). The partial overlap and general semantic agreement of these terms with those ascribed to the wisdom of God in *AH* 2.25.1–2 (*apta, ornata, aptare, and consonare*) and *AH* 2.30.3 (*gubernare*) shows that in the expansion of his wisdom language, from wisdom as a quality or attribute of God to also include Wisdom as the third member of the Godhead, Irenaeus ascribes to Wisdom the activity originally used to characterize the wisdom of God in creation. Thus, Irenaeus' concept of the wisdom of God prepares the way for, and to a certain extent leads to, his idea of the Wisdom of God—his understanding of the Spirit as Wisdom.

Having charted the reclamation of wisdom language from Gnosticism, and the development of that language to include not only wisdom as an attribute of God, but also as a name of the Holy Spirit, it is left for us to offer a more detailed consideration of the activity and the effect that Irenaeus links to his concept of wisdom.

5.2.2 The Activity and Effect of Wisdom

Earlier in this examination I pointed out the difficulty in erecting an artificial partition between the identity of Wisdom, and its activity and effect, in the thought of Irenaeus: the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom is directly linked to the particular creative activity that Irenaeus connects to the concept of wisdom. To put it another way, Irenaeus refers to the Holy Spirit as Wisdom in order to attribute to the Spirit a particular role in creation. For this reason, it becomes crucial to recognize the specific activity and the effect of that activity that Irenaeus links to Wisdom, otherwise we will not understand the significance of the title.[117] This task is complicated by the number of terms used to convey the wise activity of God or the activity of the Wisdom of God.

Six different verbs along with three adjectival cognates are connected to the idea of wisdom in eight passages in *Against Heresies*: *adornare* ('to prepare, adorn;' *AH* 4.20.2)[118] and its cognate, *ornata* ('prepared, ornate;' *AH*

[116] By not referring to the two agents of creation in the first sentence, Irenaeus would be emphasizing the exclusivity of the creative act—the one God accomplishes creation, the ubiquitous theme in these passages.

[117] For a brief treatment of the verbs Irenaeus uses to describe the activity of Wisdom in creation see Jaschke (1976: 261–5).

[118] *AH* 4.20.2: *qui omnia Verbo fecit et Sapientia adornavit.*

2.25.1)[119]; *aptare* ('to adapt, fit;' *AH* 2.25.2, 2.30.9, 4.20.4)[120] and its cognate, *apta* ('adapted, suitable;' *AH* 2.25.1, 4.38.3)[121]; *compingere* ('to join, bind together;' *AH* 3.24.2)[122]; *consonare* ('to harmonize, agree;' *AH* 2.25.2)[123] and its cognate, *consonantia* ('harmony, agreement;' *AH* 4.38.3)[124]; *disponere* ('to dispose, order, arrange;' *AH* 2.30.9)[125]; and *gubernare* ('to govern, control, guide;' *AH* 2.30.3).[126] In addition to these terms, *Prf* 5 associates two verbs with the activity of Wisdom: յարդարել ('to arrange'), and կերպարանել ('to form'). Despite the number and variety of these terms, they are linked together by the effect on creation that Irenaeus associates with the concept of wisdom.

In *AH* 2.25.1–2 Irenaeus defines the particular type of activity in creation and the particular effect of that activity in creation that he connects from there forward to his concept of wisdom. He begins by confronting the Gnostic proclivity for arithmology, but as I stated earlier, in so doing, he does not want to suggest that either the details of Scripture or the overall structure of the world are 'a meaningless and accidental thing.'[127] Indeed:

> with great wisdom and diligence, all things have clearly been made by God, fitted and prepared (*apta et ornata*); and his Word has produced (*operatum est*) both things ancient and those belonging to the most recent times . . . For all things [originate] from one and the same God.[128]

The key to his response is located in the idea that 'with great wisdom and diligence' have 'all things . . . been made . . . fitted and prepared.' The wisdom

[119] *AH* 2.25.1: *cum magna sapientia et diligentia ad liquidam apta et ornata omnia a Deo facta sunt.*

[120] *AH* 2.25.2: *quia autem varia et multa sunt quae facta sunt, et ad omnem quidem facturam bene aptata et bene consonantia*; *AH* 2.30.9: *et omnia aptavit et disposuit Sapientia sua*; *AH* 4.20.4: *Unus igitur Deus, qui Verbo et Sapientia fecit et aptavit omnia.*

[121] See n. 119 for *AH* 2.25.1; *AH* 4.38.3: *circa Deum autem virtus simul et sapientia et bonitas ostenditur . . . sapientia vero in eo quod apta et consonantia quae sunt fecerit* (σοφία δὲ ἐν τῷ εὔρυθμα καὶ ἐμμελῆ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευα τὰ γεγονότα πεποιηκέναι—see p. 141 n. 138 on the Greek text).

[122] *AH* 3.24.2: *Verbo suo confirmans et Sapientia compingens omnia. Compingere* ('to bind together') may at first seem to stand apart from these other terms, but Rousseau's observation (SC 210, 1974: 393) that in *AH* 2.33.5, ἁρμονίαν is translated by the couplet *compago siue aptatio* shows that it fits into the group.

[123] See note 120 for *AH* 2.25.2.

[124] See note 121 for *AH* 4.38.3.

[125] *AH* 2.30.9: *et omnia aptavit et disposuit Sapientia sua.*

[126] *AH* 2.30.3: *et reliqua omnia quae per virtutem Dei sunt constituta et per sapientia eius gubernantur quis poterit per singula enumerare, vel investigare magnitudinem sapientiae eius qui fecit Dei?*

[127] *AH* 2.25.1. The passage reads, 'Is it a meaningless and accidental thing, that the positions of names, and the election of apostles, and the working of the Lord, and the arrangement of created things, are what they are?—we answer them: Certainly not' (ANF translation).

[128] *AH* 2.25.1; my translation with reference to the ANF.

and diligence of God result in each individual piece of creation being 'fitted and prepared' so that all the elements join together to form a meaningful whole. Irenaeus elaborates upon this idea in *AH* 2.25.2:

> But because various and numerous (*varia et multa*) are those things that have been made, they are indeed well fitted and adapted (*bene aptata et bene consonantia*) to the whole creation; but when considered individually, are mutually opposite and not harmonious (*invicem contraria et non convenientia*). Just as the sound of the lyre (*citharae*),[129] by means of the interval that separates (*distantiam*) each one from the others, produces one harmonious melody (*consonantem unam melodiam*), [but] consists of many and opposite (*multis et contrariis*) sounds.

The number and variety of created things, when considered individually, are 'mutually opposite and not harmonious.' Still, 'just as the sound of the lyre . . . consists of many and opposite sounds' and yet 'produces one harmonious melody' by means of their relation to each other, so too can the 'various and numerous' things of creation be recognized as 'well fitted and adapted to the whole creation.'

According to this logic, the characterization of the whole as *bene aptata et bene consonantia* ('well fitted and adapted') stands in distinction from the characterization of the individual pieces as *invicem contraria et non convenientia* ('mutually opposite and not harmonious'). To be more precise, the activity or activities conveyed by the verbs *aptare* and *consonare* produce 'one harmonious melody' (*consonantem unam melodiam*) out of 'mutually opposite and not harmonious' (*invicem contraria et non convenientia*) parts of creation. The key to comprehending how Irenaeus understands this activity and the effect produced by this activity lies in making sense of the state in which the 'various and numerous' parts of creation exist prior to being acted upon—that is, understanding what Irenaeus means by *invicem contraria et non convenientia*.

In *AH* 2 the term *contraria* plays a significant role in Irenaeus' argument against the Gnostic assertion that creation is an image of the aeons of the pleroma. In *AH* 2.7.3 he argues that created things do not correlate to the aeons of the pleroma as the Gnostics claim, for while the aeons of the pleroma are said to be of one nature (*unius naturae*), the numerous components of creation 'stand in opposition to each other (*contrariis subsistentia*), and mutually resist each other, and destroy one another.'[130] The contrast with the one nature of the pleroma suggests that the opposition which exists between the constituent parts of creation, and which causes them to conflict,

[129] *Citharae* can refer to a cithara, lyre, lute, guitar, or a stringed instrument in general. I take it to refer to a lyre here, given the similarity of Irenaeus' statement to Greek musical and cosmological theory that utilizes the imagery of a lyre.

[130] *AH* 2.7.3: *Quomodo igitur ea quae tam multa sunt conditionis et contrariis subsistentia et repugnantia invicem et interficientia alia alia*; see also, *AH* 2.7.4, *AH* 2.7.6, and *AH* 2.8.3.

is due to their differing natures. This inference finds its confirmation in *AH* 2.18.5, where Irenaeus offers the following principle with respect to substances:

> when that which is similar is [placed] in a similar thing it will not be dissolved into nothingness, nor will it be in danger of being destroyed, but it will rather persist and increase, just as fire in fire, and spirit in spirit, and water in water; on the other hand, those which are contrary to each other (*contraria a contrariis*) suffer and are changed and are destroyed.

The animal kingdom provides an illustration of this principle: 'Whatever animals are foreign and strange to each other, as well as of contrary nature (*contrariae naturae*), fall into danger (when they come together) and are destroyed (by each other).'[131] In addition to illustrating the conflict that befalls the combination of opposites, the use of *naturae* in parallel with the earlier use of *substantiae* in *AH* 2.18.5 reveals we can also understand *naturae* in *AH* 2.7.3 to be equivalent to *substantiae* in *AH* 2.18.5. Thus, according to Irenaeus, the constituent parts of creation possess an intrinsic opposition to each other that will result in their conflict and eventual destruction. In terms of *AH* 2.25.2, they are *invicem contraria*.

The individual pieces of creation are not only *invicem contraria*, but also *non convenientia*. Whereas *contraria* highlights the opposition of particular aspects of creation to each other, in *AH* 2.25.2 *non conveniens* stresses that the individual pieces do not fit together into or come together as a meaningful whole. In *Against Heresies*, the terms *convenire* and *conveniens* come to prominence in the chapter just prior to the one in which we are interested. In *AH* 2.24.1–5 Irenaeus uses this terminology nine times, nearly one-third of its total uses in *Against Heresies*.[132] Seven of those nine occurrences express that a particular piece of information does not 'fit into' or 'agree with' the Gnostic theory or interpretation that is intended to account for all the data and make sense of that individual datum.[133] For instance, in *AH* 2.24.1 Irenaeus declares the Gnostics pass over in silence the name *Soter* 'because it does not fit into their theory (*non convenit figmento eorum*), neither according to numerical value nor according to letters.' In the same way, the first occurrence in *AH* 2.24.5 reads, 'If, indeed, the year were divided into thirty parts, and the month into twelve, then a fitting (*conveniens*) type might be regarded as having been found for their fictitious system (*mendacio*).'[134]

[131] *AH* 2.18.5.

[132] A Library of Latin Texts search reveals that *convenire* and its cognates occur 31 times in *Against Heresies*.

[133] *AH* 2.24.1, the third instance in *AH* 2.24.2, both occurrences in *AH* 2.24.3, *AH* 2.24.4, and both in *AH* 2.25.5.

[134] ANF translation.

Therefore, when Irenaeus characterizes the individual pieces of creation as *invicem contraria et non convenientia* ('mutually opposite and not harmonious') he is stating that they possess an intrinsic opposition to each other and that they do not form a harmonious whole. It is, then, the wise activity of God that effects a meaningful or harmonious whole; an activity that results in all things being *apta et ornata omnia* in *AH* 2.25.1 and is expressed by *aptare* and *consonare* in *AH* 2.25.2. Or in line with the illustration from music in *AH* 2.25.2, the wise activity of God produces *consonantem unam melodiam* ('one harmonious melody').[135] Furthermore, I have observed that the creative activity Irenaeus ascribes to the Spirit as Wisdom develops out of his understanding of the wise activity of God in creation that he expresses here. This means that the harmonic effect of the wise activity of God in creation is also the effect of the creative activity of Wisdom.

The variety of verbs that Irenaeus uses to express the wise activity of God in creation or the creative activity of Wisdom is explained by Irenaeus' concern with the effect of that activity rather than with the activity itself. As I stated earlier, the initial motivation for ascribing a particular effect to the wisdom of God in creation was Irenaeus' desire to affirm that creation is not a 'meaningless and accidental thing.'[136] Creation has meaning because of the wise activity of God that renders the individual constituents of creation a harmonious whole. The purpose of *AH* 2.25.1–2 is to affirm the harmony of creation and to explain its existence by reference to the wisdom of God in creation. The different terms used to express the activity are just the means to connect the cause (the wisdom of God) to the effect (a harmonious creation). Irenaeus is not concerned about the particular words he uses to convey the activity that produces the effect. As a result, the significance of the verbs he uses does not lie in the particular verbs used, but rather in the common effect associated with the terms. Therefore, Irenaeus' goal in referring to the wisdom of God in creation and in identifying the Spirit as Wisdom is to affirm the harmony of creation, and thereby, to confirm that creation is a meaningful whole.[137] As he

[135] Irenaeus is arguing for the simultaneous characterization of the constituents of creation as *contraria* and *conveniens*. Harmony is the arrangement of contrary elements into a meaningful whole, *consonantem unam melodiam*. Just as the notes remain different though they are fitted together to form a harmonious melody, so too do the constituents of creation remain *contraria*—they are not changed, they are just arranged. If the opposite were true, and the harmonization of creation entailed the alteration from *contraria* to *similis*, then his preceding arguments against the Gnostics (e.g. *AH* 2.7.3, 2.7.4, 2.8.3), which depend on an opposition intrinsic to the different parts of creation, would fail.

[136] *AH* 2.25.1.

[137] The wisdom of God that renders the individual parts of creation into a harmonious whole—giving meaning to creation—stands in stark contrast to the Gnostics, who 'will not even be able to adapt (*adaptare*) [the variety] of any single part [of creation], either celestial, terrestrial, or aquatic, to the smallness of their Pleroma' (*AH* 2.7.3). Insofar as the language that expresses the creative activity of Wisdom was developed in response to Gnostic theory, we can say that the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom serves as a continuing means to oppose

states in 4.38.3, '[God's] wisdom (*sapientia*) [is shown] in his having made created things fitted (*apta*) and harmonious (*consonantia*).'[138]

Up to this point I have shown that the activity expressed by the verbs Irenaeus connects with his wisdom language ought to be understood in light of their effect—the rendering of a harmonious, and therefore meaningful, creation. It remains to explain how Irenaeus connects the concept of wisdom itself with the harmony in creation. While wisdom language is associated with the idea of harmony in the sapiential literature of Scripture,[139] Irenaeus himself never reasons from a text of Scripture to associate the two.[140] Instead, Greek philosophy and culture are the means by which he connects the harmonizing activity in creation with the idea of wisdom. In *AH* 2.25.2 he states:

> Just as the sound of the lyre (*citharae*), by means of the interval that separates (*distantiam*) each one from the others, produces one harmonious melody (*consonantem unam melodiam*), [but] consists of many and opposite (*multis et contrariis*) sounds. The lover of truth, therefore, should not be deceived by the interval that separates (*distantiam*) each one from the others, nor should it be supposed that one [comes] from one artist and maker, but another [comes] from another, nor that one fitted the treble, another the bass, and yet another the tenor [strings], but [he should believe] that one and the same [person prepared the whole], [so as to give] clear proof of the justice, goodness, and munificence belonging to the whole work and [thing of] wisdom.

Irenaeus illustrates his idea of a harmonious creation by reference to the lyre. The opposition of the notes and the harmony of the melody (*consonantem unam melodiam*) that belong to a lyre constructed by one artist illustrate how opposition and harmony can be present in the creation of one God.

Gnosticism. This is close to, but not quite the same as, Fantino's position that the critique of Gnosticism is a key motivation in Irenaeus' incorporation of the traditional identification of the Spirit as Wisdom (Fantino 1994: 291).

[138] The Greek from John of Damascus' *Sacred Parallels* is slightly different: *σοφία δὲ ἐν τῷ εὔρυθμα καὶ ἐμμελῆ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευα τὰ γεγονότα πεποιηκέναι* ('and wisdom in his having made created things ordered and harmonious and proportional').

[139] e.g. Prov. 8:30 (LXX), 'I (Wisdom) was beside him, arranging [all things] (*ἁρμόζουσα*), I was the one in whom he took delight; and daily I rejoiced in his presence at every moment.'

[140] This fact has not prevented the suggestion of Scripture as the basis for this connection; see for instance, Rousseau, SC 210, 393 (1974: 477 n. 2); and Bacq (1978: 168 n. 3). Though Irenaeus uses Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) in *Prf* 5 to support the activity of Wisdom (which we have shown produces harmony in creation), Irenaeus approaches Ps. 33:6 with this understanding already in place. Three observations show this to be true: (1) the idea of harmony does not appear in Ps. 33:6; (2) the verbs connected to this activity do not appear in Ps. 33:6; and (3) Ps. 33:6 does not refer to wisdom. Thus, Ps. 33:6 cannot be regarded as the basis for Irenaeus' association of the idea of harmony or of a particular type of activity with the concept of Wisdom. It is enlightening to contrast Irenaeus' approach to wisdom with his approach to the Word: passages in Scripture are the clear basis for his ascription of creative activity to the Word, see for instance, *AH* 2.2.4–5.

Moreover, he describes this work of creation, illustrated by the lyre, as a '[thing of] wisdom.' It is this image of the lyre, its harmony and its construction, that Irenaeus uses to support his assertion that the harmony in creation is the product of the wise activity of God in creation. His utilization of the lyre to establish this connection reveals his familiarity with Greek philosophy and culture: the idea of the harmony of the lyre occupies a central place in Greek musical theory, and often illustrates principles in Greek cosmology. As a result, it is a reference to Greek philosophy that undergirds Irenaeus' initial association of harmony with the concept of wisdom.

To be more specific, Irenaeus' reference to the harmony of the lyre in this passage suggests he was aware of the Greek concept of ἁρμονία ('harmony'). The most basic meaning of ἁρμονία is 'fitting together,' a meaning that extends back to Homer.[141] The concept of ἁρμονία as the principle of agreement or concord that joins together disparate elements in musical theory or cosmology has a long history descending from early Pythagorean reasoning.[142] In addition to having a long history, its importance to Platonic philosophy gave the principle of harmony a place in the curriculum of classical education, ensuring a wide audience for the concept and guaranteeing it a place in basic Greek thought.[143] Thus, Irenaeus' utilization of the concept of harmony in musical theory to explain his understanding of cosmology is a move common to the thinkers of his time.

The use of a lyre[144] to illustrate harmonic principles has a lengthy history itself,[145] and the particular use of a lyre to illustrate the harmonization of disparate elements in creation also belongs to a long-standing tradition.[146] Plato uses the image of a lyre in a well-known passage from his *Symposium*:

[141] The term is found in *Od.* 5.248, which describes the process of fitting together different parts in the construction of Odysseus' raft. See: Lippman (1964: 1–2, 3); Anderson (1966: 37); and Faulkner (1996: 30).

[142] This is not to say that the term itself originated with Pythagoras, but rather that the Pythagoreans developed its significance: 'The Pythagoreans gave [*harmonia*] new importance. In the ratios of music, they felt they had found an actual link between *harmonia* on the everyday level and the *harmonia* that helped create the universe and that bound it together' K. Ferguson (2008: 107).

[143] Faulkner includes among Plato's primary ideas about music that 'the universe is characterized by a quality of interrelatedness (*harmonia*) that is highly evident in music.' He then goes on to state that while 'Plato had his detractors . . . what is essential is that his ideas on music were widely disseminated and heeded in pagan antiquity, and were incorporated into the classical educational curriculum, the proto-quadrivium' Faulkner (1996: 46–7).

[144] The lyre, in and of itself, occupies a long-standing position in Greek music and culture. The earliest representation of the instrument is on a vase that dates to *c.*700 BC, and the attribution of its invention by Hermes can be found in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, which dates to the early sixth century BC at the latest (Landels, 1999: 61).

[145] For examples, see: Lippman (1964: 42, 87); Levin (1975: 41); Joost-Gaugier (2006: 106). Aratus of Soli (*Phaenomena* 5.268) refers to the constellation Lyra, about which Hippolytus of Rome says, 'It consists of seven strings, signifying by these seven strings the entire harmony and construction of the world as it is melodiously constituted' (*Ref.* 4.48.2; tr. J.H. MacMahon, *ANF* 5).

[146] 'Harmony does not necessarily involve either number or measurement. It means simply "fitting together," as manifested typically in carpentry in the joining of two pieces of wood, and

> . . . [that music is under the sole direction of the god of love] is, perhaps, what Heraclitus meant us to understand by that rather cryptic pronouncement, 'The one in conflict (διαφερόμενον) with itself is held together (συμφέρεσθαι), like the harmony (ἁρμονίαν) of the bow and of the lyre.' Of course it is absurd to speak of harmony as being in conflict, or as arising out of elements which are still conflicting, but perhaps he meant that the art of music was to create harmony by resolving the discord between the treble and the bass (ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος). There can certainly be no harmony of treble and bass while they are still in conflict, for harmony is concord (συμφωνία), and concord is a kind of sympathy (ὁμολογία), and sympathy between things which are in conflict is impossible so long as that conflict lasts. There is, on the other hand, a kind of discord that is not impossible to resolve, and here we may effect a harmony—as, for instance, we produce a rhythm by resolving the difference between fast and slow.[147]

As in Irenaeus, here we find references to the lyre, the treble and bass, and the creation of harmony out of discordant elements. A similar statement is found in a passage much closer in date to Irenaeus: Philo, *Cher* 109–112:

> . . . God has made none of these particular [created things] complete (τέλειον) in itself, so that it should have no need at all of another. Thus through the desire to obtain what it needs, it must perforce approach that which can supply its need, and this approach must be mutual and reciprocal. Thus through reciprocity (ἐπαλλάττοντα) and combination (ἐπιμιγνύμενα), even as a lyre is formed of unlike notes, God meant that they should come to fellowship (κοινωνίαν) and concord (συμφωνίαν) and form a single harmony (ἡρμοσμένης), and that a universal give and take should govern them, and lead up to the consummation of the whole world. So love draws lifeless to living, unreasoning to reasoning, trees to men, men to plants . . . heaven to earth, earth to heaven, air to water, and water to air. So natures intermediate yearn for each other and those at either extreme . . . Thus each, we may say, wants and needs each; all need all, that so this whole, of which each is a part, might be that perfect work worthy of its architect, this world.[148]

the basic prerequisite of the conception is thus the existence of two or more distinguishable entities somehow capable of mutual adjustment. From the beginning, the idea was connected with music. The process of fitting together is peculiarly applicable to spatial or simultaneous constituents, and Greek music was in essence purely melodic; but in the tuning of the lyre there existed a simultaneity that was possibly not just an example but the true model of the whole conception' (Lippman 1964: 1–2).

[147] *Symp*. 187A–B; trans. by M. Joyce in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters*, Bollingen Series, 71; (1961); Greek from *Plato*, 3: 166 (1925, repr. 1991).

[148] *Philo in Ten Volumes*, 2 (tr. F.H. Colson; Loeb Classical Library, 227; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927, repr. 1979). Runia notes Philo's fondness for the example of the harmony of the lyre: Philo of Alexandria (2001: 294).

Though certain differences exist between these selections and that of *AH* 2.25.2, including terminology and level of detail, their basic similarities are clear. Irenaeus' use of a lyre to illustrate the harmonization of disparate elements in creation fits easily within this tradition.

The possibility exists, moreover, that Irenaeus' choice of the harmony of the lyre to illustrate his concept of harmony may be due to more than just a philosophical commonplace. Though we cannot identify with certainty the specific source from which Irenaeus borrowed this traditional image of the lyre, two possibilities have more potential than the rest. The first is a classical education.[149] On various occasions Irenaeus betrays a training in rhetoric and an ability to utilize philosophical method, as I pointed out earlier in this study.[150] The most interesting possibility, however, is the availability to Irenaeus of a source containing writings of Heraclitus.

We have already seen that Plato (*Symp*. 187A) quoted from Heraclitus to introduce the harmony of the lyre as an illustration of bringing harmony out of discord. The same passage from Heraclitus reappears in Hippolytus of Rome, who wrote soon after Irenaeus.[151] In his *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.2 we find the quotation, '[People] do not understand how, what is diverse (διαφερόμενον) is in agreement (ὁμολογέει) with itself: a back-turning harmony (παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη) like that of the bow and lyre.'[152] Hippolytus' use of the illustration of the harmony of the lyre to make a different point[153] than does Irenaeus poses no real difficulty, given the originality of Hippolytus' appropriation of philosophical texts and Plato's earlier use of the same passage in a way that generally agrees with the approach of Irenaeus.[154] The presence of this quotation in Hippolytus is significant not because of the way he uses it, but rather because the numerous quotations of Heraclitus in *Ref* 9.9.1 through 9.10.8 show Hippolytus was working from a written source that contained the writings of Heraclitus.[155]

The availability of such a source to Christians close to the time at which Irenaeus wrote, and the willingness of the Christian Hippolytus to utilize that source, creates the possibility that Irenaeus could have taken his illustration of the lyre from the same passage of Heraclitus we find quoted in Plato and

[149] Either formal or informal.

[150] Chapter 4, pp. 89–95.

[151] C. Osborne (1987: 149) asserts that this quotation 'almost certainly refers to the same passage in Heraclitus (that is found in Plato's *Symp*. 187A)'.

[152] *Ref* 9.9.2: οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη, ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης; Greek from Hippolytus (1986); my translation.

[153] For Hippolytus' use of this quotation *see* Osborne's discussion of fragment B51 in C. Osborne (1987: 148–53).

[154] 'Hippolytus' handling of [Greek philosophical] material is sensitive rather than mindless and original rather than second-hand' (C. Osborne 1987: 14).

[155] Sixteen of the nineteen quotations that occur in these sections 'are not cited explicitly in any other extant text' (C. Osborne 1987: 132).

Hippolytus.[156] The likelihood of this possibility increases or decreases depending on the type of relationship one believes existed between the two theologians. Photius described Hippolytus as the disciple of Irenaeus (*μαθητὴς δὲ Εἰρηναίου*),[157] which could refer to interpersonal contact between the two, or it could mean that Hippolytus just depended upon the writings of Irenaeus.[158] However, in the same passage, Photius also states that the *Syntagma* composed by Hippolytus is based on lectures of Irenaeus (*ὁμιλοῦντος Εἰρηναίου*), which must refer to messages he heard Irenaeus deliver and not to Irenaeus' written works.[159] This last point suggests that Hippolytus and Irenaeus had personal contact in either Lyons or Rome, making the possibility of a shared source much more tenable.

Section Conclusion

In the end, due to lack of detail we remain in the realm of speculation.[160] Though several possibilities for Irenaeus' source exist, we are unable to ascertain the origin of his illustration of the lyre. On the other hand, this examination of Irenaeus' concept of wisdom has yielded several informative points. First, his identification of the Spirit as Wisdom is restricted to the context of the Spirit's role in creation. Second, the polemic with Gnosticism is the initial setting for the development of his wisdom language: both the reclamation of the figure of Wisdom and the connection of the harmony in creation with the wisdom of God occur in the midst of anti-Valentinian arguments. Third, the overlap and general semantic agreement of the verbs used to convey the wise activity of God in creation and the creative activity of Wisdom shows that Irenaeus' understanding of the Spirit as Wisdom develops, insofar as activity is concerned, from his concept of the wisdom of God in creation. Fourth, the purpose of referring to the wisdom of God in creation or

[156] The early Christian use of Heraclitus is not limited to Hippolytus; Clement of Alexandria was also familiar with the philosopher, see for instance *Stromateis* 6.17.2, which contains fragment 36. The significance of this observation to our present discussion is unclear, since Clement's access to sources was likely different than that of Hippolytus and Irenaeus.

[157] Photius, *Bibliotheca* (1959–77: 121). All Greek quotations of Photius are from Photius, *Bibliothèque* (1959–77).

[158] Hippolytus refers to the work of Irenaeus at *Ref* 6.42.1 and 6.55.2; his discussion of Marcus that occurs between these references exhibits a substantial dependence on the discussion of Marcus in Irenaeus' *Against Heresies*.

[159] As pointed out long ago by Döllinger (1876: 13–15, and esp. 259–60).

[160] For instance, both Platonic and Aristotelian traditions incorporate the principle of harmony into their cosmologies. The first defines the disparate elements that are harmonized by their numerical ratios and the second defines them by their magnitude or quantity (Faulkner 1996: 34, 47.). Irenaeus' own use of the term 'interval' (*distantia*), and his lack of reference to numerical ratios, suggest that his way of thinking is closer to the Aristotelian tradition we find in Aristoxenus, though the limited details he provides render this conclusion suspect at best. Landels discusses the definition of interval in Aristoxenus' *Elements of Harmonics* in his *Music in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Landels 1999: 87–8). For a more thorough discussion of these points, see Winnington-Ingram, *CQ* 26 (1932: 195–208).

the creative activity of Wisdom is to relate the harmony in creation, and its meaningfulness. Fifth, the variety of terms Irenaeus uses to convey or describe the wise activity of God in creation and the creative activity of Wisdom finds its explanation, and the significance of the terms themselves, in the harmonious effect of the activity to which they refer, rather than in the activity itself. Sixth, Irenaeus uses the Greek philosophical image of the harmony of the lyre to support his initial connection of the concept of wisdom with the production of harmony in creation.

Prior to concluding this section, I would like to make a brief observation on Irenaeus' conception of the roles of the Word and Wisdom in creation. The first and last places in which Irenaeus speaks of the Word and Wisdom and their respective roles in creation will be sufficient for my present purpose. Irenaeus writes in *AH* 2.30.9, 'Founding and making all things (*condens et faciens omnia*), visible and invisible, those detected by senses and those not, heavenly and earthly, by the Word of his power, and he has fitted and arranged all things (*omnia aptavit et disposuit*) by his Wisdom.' And when commenting on Ps. 33:6 in *Prf* 5, he writes, 'Thus, since the Word "establishes" (հաստատէ; *ἐστερεώθησαν*, Ps. 32:6 LXX), that is, works bodily and confers existence, while the Spirit arranges and forms (յարդարէ եւ կերպարանէ) the various "powers," so rightly is the Son called Word and the Spirit the Wisdom of God.' These passages illustrate that with regard to the activity of the Word and Wisdom of God, Irenaeus conceives of a two-stage creation in which the Word causes creation to come into existence (*condens et faciens* in *AH* 2.30.9; հաստատէ / *ἐστερεώθησαν* in *Prf* 5), while as we have seen, Wisdom acts (*aptavit et disposuit* in *AH* 2.30.9; յարդարէ եւ կերպարանէ in *Prf* 5) to render what is created a harmonious whole.[161] The activities of the Word and Wisdom in creation are, at least logically, sequential. Both are required for a complete and meaningful created order.

Chapter Conclusion

The importance of the identification of the Spirit as one of the Hands of God and as Wisdom to Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit cannot be overestimated. Each of these titles entails the creative activity of the Spirit, the divinity of the Spirit, and the distinction and equality of the Spirit in relation to the Son. The attribution of creative activity to the Holy Spirit is the most foundational and significant aspect of Irenaeus' pneumatology.[162]

[161] This characterization of the roles of the Word and Wisdom in creation holds for every occasion in which the dyad appears. Irenaeus, however, does not maintain the same precision or consistency when speaking of the Word alone, as for instance in *AH* 5.18.3: *Verbum Dei gubernans et disponans omnia*. Cf. Steenberg (2008: 70).

[162] *Contra* the usual reading of Irenaeus' theological account that stresses the sanctifying role of the Spirit, as for instance J. Daniélou writes: 'Another characteristic feature of the theology of Irenaeus is the place which he gives to the Spirit as sanctifier alongside the Word as revealer. Of

The identification of the Spirit as a Hand and as Wisdom reveals the Jewish character of Irenaeus' pneumatology. It also shows that he adapts and develops the traditions he adopts to his own purposes. In the case of his identification of the Spirit as Wisdom the adaptation of the tradition involves the use of Greek philosophical concepts. The utilization of these traditions by Irenaeus goes far toward showing his theology of the Spirit to be the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the period.

the three major works of God, creation is attributed particularly to the Father, revelation to the Son, and sanctification to the Spirit . . . It will be noted that the operation of the Spirit is already present at the creation, but that the emphasis as regards his role is placed on sanctification (commenting on 5.18.2, and 3.17.1–2)' (Daniélou 1973: 362).

6

The Salvific Spirit

'c'est cette communication de l'Esprit Saint qui est le salut de l'homme'

A. Rousseau[1]

As I indicated in the introduction to the previous chapter, the remaining chapters in this study will focus on a few distinctive or significant aspects of Irenaeus' pneumatology. In this vein, the present chapter, which has as its subject matter the fifth Book of *Against Heresies,* will study just one feature of his theology of the Spirit, for the first half of *AH* 5 has more to say about the life-giving activity of the Holy Spirit than any other portion of Irenaeus' work.[2] Scholarship often features, even in a significant way, Irenaeus' identification of the Spirit as the particular agent by whom life comes to human beings. Even so, a full and accurate statement of Irenaeus' conception of the life-giving activity of the Spirit had yet to be provided as recently as the year 2000, as is evident from the great deal of time John Behr spent in his study of that date on Irenaeus' conception of this aspect of the Spirit's activity.[3] This chapter will not attempt to detail in full Irenaeus' understanding of the life-giving activity of the Spirit, but I hope it will present an even more accurate account by building upon and amending previous scholarship, in particular the work of Behr just noted.

The sheer number of pages that have been devoted since the late nineteenth century to explaining Irenaeus' understanding of the presence of the Spirit to human beings, and its life-giving activity in human beings, suggests the work of Irenaeus in this regard either lacks the clarity that comes from sufficient detail or is very complex. In fact, both are true. Irenaeus does not provide the clear and detailed explanations that would enable an easy statement of his thought on this matter. And this aspect of his pneumatology entails intricate connections with his anthropology, soteriology, and broader conception of the divine economy.

[1] Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 234); referring to *AH* 5.6.1 and 5.9.1.

[2] In chapter 4, I first addressed Irenaeus' discussion of the role of the Spirit in salvation: the Spirit is Unction of Christ that overflows to believers and so brings the glorified Jesus Christ to human beings. The Spirit in this sense is the bearer of life, and so Irenaeus can refer to the life-giving agency of the Spirit later in *AH* 3.24.1.

[3] Behr (2000: esp. 86–115).

Several interconnected issues stand out. First is the question as to whether Irenaeus' anthropology is trichotomous or dichotomous. All agree that Irenaeus holds both the body and soul to be parts of the human being; the concern is to determine whether he also includes a human, created spirit, or even if the presence of the Holy Spirit is essential to the human being.[4] The second issue revolves around whether Irenaeus conceives of only one type of life, a biological or physical life that can be either temporal or eternal, or if Irenaeus thinks of a physical life given to the body by means of the soul and distinguished by kind from a supernatural life given to the animated body by means of the Holy Spirit.[5]

[4] According to Klebba's account (1894: 164), prior to his study the assumption was that Irenaeus possessed a trichotomous anthropology, as he illustrates with reference to Zöckler (1879: 115). Klebba presents a passionate argument for a dichotomous reading of Irenaeus, in which all human beings consist of a body and a soul, with the perfect person receiving the addition of the Holy Spirit: 'If, however, our substance is called a combination of soul and flesh by Irenaeus, which only receives the Spirit of God, in order to make human beings spiritual, then clearly the two-part division of human beings is taught, beside which the third only exists as an accident' (1894: 164; 164–6 esp. for his arg.). The dichotomous interpretation has been maintained by: Koch, *TSK* (1925: 183–215, here 206); Slomkowski (1928: 32–3, 45–6); Jenkins, *SP* 6 (1962: 91–5, here 94), insofar as the Spirit or spirit is not a part of the original 'make-up' of man which includes the body and breath of life; Orbe, *Greg* 48 (1967: 522–76, here 548–54), and (1969: 16–20), though Orbe offers (1969: 58–77) the odd reading of the power of God mixed with dust to form man in *Prf* 11 to be the Spirit of God in Gen. 1:2 as an *anima mundi*; Jaschke (1976: 296–7); Fantino (1986: 121, 124–5, 127, 130), where he says Gen. 2:7 is the basis for Irenaeus' anthropology; de Andia (1986: 74–5, 80–1, 85–7); and Fantino (1994: 216). D'Alès RSR (1924: 532) suggests that the human spirit is the gift of grace deposited in a person by the divine Spirit, which he supports, as Jaschke (1976: 297 n. 15) has pointed out, by reading Irenaeus in light of the scholastic paradigm *donum creatum* (the human spirit) and *causa increata* (the divine Spirit) (d'Alès, 1924: 525)–much of d'Alès' work is marred by reading Irenaeus through the lens of later theological approaches. M.A. Donovan suggests that there is a clear distinction between the human spirit and divine Spirit in *AH* 5.8.2, but the word she translates 'spirit' in 5.8.2 is in fact *anima* (Donovan, *TS* 49, 1988: 283–97, here 295). De Lubac (1990: 129–34) includes Irenaeus among those who develop a trichotomous anthropology from 1 Thess 5:23, but Rousseau (SC 406, 1995: 357–64) shows his discussion of Irenaeus to be incomplete and his conclusion incorrect. Wingren (1956: 153–4, 157–8) would prefer not to place Irenaeus' thought in either category, saying it is better to think of the Spirit as 'something which grows together with man,' than to think of it as 'divine and superhuman.' In his final analysis, though, Wingren opts for a trichotomous reading. Rousseau too refuses to categorize Irenaeus' thought. He contends, 'it is one thing to consider man from an abstract point-of-view, in his common nature with all humanity; it is another thing to consider man from a concrete point-of-view, in his existential comportment, in the drama of the option by which, in opening himself (or in closing himself) freely to the appeal of God, he receives (or refuses) the full realization of his being in view of which he has been created. From the first point-of-view, man is body and soul; from the second point-of-view, he is—or, at least, he is invited to be—infinitely more', (Rousseau, SC 406, 1995: 357–8). Behr's thought is also difficult to categorize: he affirms that the Spirit is not a part of the 'constitution' of human beings, and yet holds that the 'continual nourishing presence' of the Spirit renders the human being living (Behr 2000: esp. 97–100).

[5] The idea that a distinction can be drawn in Irenaeus' thought between two types of life, the supernatural and the physical/biological, was a commonplace that still persists in some authors: Klebba (1894: 33); Vernet (1923: 2394–535, here 2454–7); d'Alès, *RSR* 6 (1916: esp. 532); Bonwetsch (1925: 74); Jaschke (1976: 257 n. 29); Rousseau, *NRT* 99 (1977: 834–64, here 842–3, 854) and SC 293 (1982: 345–9, esp. 347); de Andia (1986: 79); Donovan, *TS* 49 (1988:

The third questions the compatibility of the two strains of thought Irenaeus exhibits with regard to the salvation of human beings: he says both that salvation involves the restoration of the likeness which was lost by Adam and Eve, and that salvation involves the continual growth or increase of the created human being toward the perfection of the uncreated God.[6] The fact that he associates the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit with both the restoration of the likeness and the achievement of human perfection, generates the fourth question as to whether the Holy Spirit was present in Adam and Eve prior to the Fall, and whether the likeness of God lost at the Fall refers to the presence of the Holy Spirit.[7] These questions do not form the structure of this chapter; rather they and their answers form its content.

Behr's work, mentioned above, is an insightful analysis helpful to all who seek to better understand each of these questions. Indeed, two points-of-view that he articulates render his study the new starting place for any consideration of these long-standing issues. First, and most essential, he observes that Irenaeus conceives of the divine economy as a movement from animation of the human being by the soul to vivification by the Holy Spirit. Second, to this observation he connects the idea that Irenaeus envisions only one kind of life—the physical life lived by the human being and received from the Holy Spirit. As a result, the temporal life belonging to the animated human being and the eternal life

289). These later statements occur despite the existence of a growing body of scholarship showing the inaccuracy of such a characterization of Irenaeus' thought. Wingren established that in Irenaeus' theology all life comes from God; moreover, 'the resurrection life is not an unnatural addition to what is truly human, but is the uncorrupted life of Creation' (Wingren 1959: esp. 14, 54 n36, 108; quotation from 120). Fantino observed that created life is already a gift from God, and that there is a strong relationship between the created life and the incorruptible life (1994: 319–21). Behr develops and clarifies the observations of Wingren and Fantino (Behr 2000: 56 n. 76, 92–7); his argument will receive detailed attention later in this chapter.

[6] Many have followed the conclusion of Wendt (1882: 21–6, 29) that these two strains of thought are incompatible. Wingren identified Wendt's argument on this topic as 'the source of all subsequent division of the theology of Irenaeus and his writings,' and proposed a harmonious reading of these two lines of thought (Wingren 1959: esp. 26–32, 50–4, 52 n. 33, 27 n. 78). Bacq's analysis of *AH* 4, and in particular his appendix devoted to 4.37–9, finally established the unity in Irenaeus' writing and the harmonious existence of these two ideas (Bacq 1978: esp. 363–88, *see* 364–9 for a discussion of past scholarship on this issue).

[7] Here we can divide scholarship into three general categories. First, those who affirm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit: Klebba (1894: esp. 33–4); Vernet (1923: 2454–5); d'Alès, *RSR* 6 (1916: 512–13); Jaschke (1976: 256–7); Fantino (1986: 115–17, 160–2); de Andia (1986: 71–2, 96–7); Fantino (1994: 217); Behr (2000: 115). Second, those who reject the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit: Von Harnack (1958, vol. 2: 269 n.1); Koch (1925: 206–8); Slomkowski (1928: 44–6). Third, those who attempt to find the middle ground and affirm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit insofar as either Adam and Eve had the potential to receive the fullness of the Spirit had they not been disobedient, and/or there is a sort of increase or growth in the Spirit: Bonwetsch (1925: 66–9, 74); Prümm, *Scholastik* 13 (1938: 206–24, here, 219); Wingren, who identifies the Spirit as the principle of life as well (1959: 54–5, 55 n. 37). Among those who affirm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit, Fantino identifies the presence of the Spirit with the likeness of God (1986: 115–17, 160–3).

belonging to the vivified human being differ only in strength, not in kind. Working from this evaluation, he posits that the Holy Spirit, as the source of this life, must have a continual nourishing presence in every human being throughout all time in order for a human being to be living. This continual nourishing presence of the Spirit in all people grants temporal life to each one, but this presence occurs in a new fashion for those believers in Christ who receive the Holy Spirit sent to them in the last times, and who receive eternal life.

In this chapter I will adopt both Behr's understanding of the divine economy as a movement from animation to vivification, and his determination that temporal life and eternal life differ in strength, not in kind. On the other hand, Behr goes too far in arguing for the nourishing presence of the Spirit in all human beings, regardless of the status of their relationship with God. I will argue that Irenaeus believes the presence of the Holy Spirit is limited to the followers of God, whether the pre-lapsarian Adam and Eve, the patriarchs and prophets between the Fall and the completion of the Christological mission, or the believers in Jesus for whom the Spirit was poured out. This position entails a reading that limits the constitution of the human being to the body and soul alone: temporal life comes to human beings by the instrumentality of the Spirit, not its presence. I will also contend that the likeness lost at the Fall and restored to human beings by Christ should be understood as eternal life. Lastly, I will show that Irenaeus understands the difference in strength between the two modalities of life, temporal and eternal, to be due to a dynamic of grace or power. According to this dynamic, each person who possesses temporal life has received from the Holy Spirit a minimal amount of grace/power, whereas those who possess eternal life have received an additional amount of grace/power. So eternal life is stronger than temporal life because the Spirit has (further) 'empowered' temporal life, causing it to modulate to eternal life.

We turn, then, to the first part of this analysis in which I will contend that Irenaeus always limits the presence of the Spirit to the followers of God. In so saying, I am disagreeing with Behr's notion of a continual nourishing presence of the Spirit in all people.

6.1 THE PRESENCE OF THE SPIRIT TO HUMANITY

One of the chief concerns of Behr's work is to show that both the indirect animation of all people by means of the breath of life and the direct vivification of the elect entail the presence of the Holy Spirit in those individuals.

> Those who have not received the Spirit through adoption possess only the breath of life. Not being adopted sons of God, they can receive only the Spirit in a manner pertaining to their created state, and so, apropos of Isaiah 57:16, Irenaeus

> describes this as created breath . . . Unlike those who were animated by the breath of life, created by the presence of the life-creating Spirit, the adopted sons of God receive the vivifying Spirit itself, 'communion with the Spirit.' Thus there are not two sources of life, independent from each other; only the Spirit is life-creating.[8]

Behr provides additional insight into his understanding when he states that the Holy Spirit is 'present with creation, and especially with man' at all times: 'not only in the protological time of Adam's pre-lapsarian existence, but also throughout the apostasy.'[9] To affirm the presence of the Spirit 'to the human race during the course of the apostasy,' Behr turns to a depiction of the divine economy at large: 'when looking at the economy . . . Irenaeus does, in fact, envisage the continual nourishing presence of the Spirit, which, nevertheless, was bestowed in a new manner in Christ at the end of time, and therefore, in its fullness, remains an eschatological reality, of which the adopted sons at present receive a pledge.'[10]

Acccording to Behr, the presence of the Spirit at all times is necessary, for 'although Irenaeus occasionally describes man as a "compound being," a "mixture" or "union" of flesh and soul, because the soul, and through it the body, must participate in life to be a living man, such descriptions (of man as just body and soul) are not sufficient definitions of the living man.'[11] Whether temporal or eternal, the human life is the result of the constant presence of the life-creating Spirit in human beings. Moreover, since Irenaeus only conceives of a life lived in the flesh, and since that life is always dependent upon the presence of the Holy Spirit, then neither the Spirit nor the gift of life itself can be reckoned as superadded.[12] Rather, the Holy Spirit 'is essential to Irenaeus's understanding of man, yet (it) is not a "part" of his constitution,' because (*AH* 5.6.1 reveals) 'the body and soul can be called "parts" of man in a way in which the Spirit cannot—for it is the Spirit, something other than man.'[13] So, while 'the Spirit is not a man, nor even a part of a man, [it] is itself given to man in such a manner that it can be legitimately described as his Spirit.'[14] Therefore, all living human beings are body and soul made alive, indirectly (in temporal life) or directly (in eternal life), by the presence of the Holy Spirit.

The central claim of this summary of Behr's reading of Irenaeus is that both temporal and eternal life depend on the presence of the Holy Spirit. This means the Holy Spirit is present to human beings despite the state of

[8] Behr (2000: 106, 107); discussing *AH* 5.12.1–2. Irenaeus identifies the 'breath of life' with the soul.
[9] Behr (2000: 97).
[10] Ibid. 97.
[11] Ibid. 98.
[12] Ibid. 96–105.
[13] Ibid. 99, 100.
[14] Ibid. 100.

their relationship to God. So, Behr can say the Spirit was and is present to human beings during and following Adam's apostasy, and people show themselves worthy for punishment 'in their body, soul, *and* Spirit.'[15]

In making this claim, Behr departs from the thought of Irenaeus. In this first section of this chapter I will show that Irenaeus only conceives of the presence of the Spirit with those who maintain a right relationship with God. Irenaeus does not envision a presence of the Holy Spirit to every person, a presence with all human beings in such a way that people show themselves worthy for punishment in their Spirit. Rather, those who are worthy of punishment do not possess the Spirit.[16]

Behr notes five passages to support the 'continual nourishing presence' of the 'life-creating Spirit' to all human beings: *AH* 4.33.1, 4.33.7, 4.33.15, 5.1.3, and 5.28.4. Yet, none of these passages refer to the presence of the Spirit in those that do not follow God; some passages do not refer to the presence of the Spirit at all. A brief look at each one will demonstrate this to be the case. In *AH* 4.33.1 Irenaeus states:

> Such a truly spiritual disciple, who receives the Spirit of God, who, from the beginning in all the dispensations of God, was present with human beings, and has announced the future, and has revealed the present, and explains the past . . .

At question is whether 'present with human beings' refers to the whole human race without distinction or to a select portion of humanity. The answer lies in the qualifying phrase, 'in all the dispensations of God,' which refers to the preceding section in which Irenaeus discusses the rationale for the giving of two different testaments, one to the Jews and one to the Church. In *AH* 4.32.2 Irenaeus states that the two testaments, which correspond to the different dispensations of God spoken of in *AH* 4.33.1, were 'appointed . . . for the advantage of human beings . . . who were coming to believe in God.' So, the context for his reference to the presence of the Spirit with mankind, 'from the beginning in all the dispensations of God,' is the giving of the Old and New Testaments for the aid of those who believe in God. This suggests that in *AH* 4.33.1 Irenaeus is not speaking of the presence of the Spirit with the whole human race, but only with 'those who were coming to believe in God.'

We find confirmation for this reading in the parallel between the revelatory activity of the Spirit in *AH* 4.33.1 and the content of the Scriptures in *AH* 4.32.2, a connection that ties the two passages together. The Spirit's revelatory

[15] For the latter statement, see Behr (2000: 101); author's emphasis.

[16] This is not to deny that the Spirit is the source of all life for all things, including and in particular for human beings, but rather to oppose Behr's understanding that the Spirit must in some way always be present in each human being in order to be the source of all life (Behr 2000: 97). The third section of this chapter will address this issue.

activity with regard to the future, present, and past in *AH* 4.33.1 corresponds in reverse order to the content of the Scriptures given to those coming to belief in *AH* 4.32.2: 'exhibiting a type of heavenly things' equals Irenaeus' past, 'foreshadowing the images of those things which exist in the Church' equals his present, and 'containing a prophecy of things to come' equals his future. Thus, in both passages Irenaeus is speaking of the activity of the Spirit among believers, which confirms that he also has in mind here the presence of the Spirit with believers alone.

AH 4.33.7 is difficult to interpret because of the differences between the Greek and Latin texts.[17] I will provide a translation of the first half of the selection and then provide the Greek and Latin for the second half, where the difficulty lies.

> For all things are plain to him (the 'spiritual disciple' from 4.33.1): [to him who has] a full faith in one God Almighty . . . and a firm belief in the Spirit of God, who gives the knowledge of the truth,
>
> *τὸ τὰς οἰκονομίας Πατρός τε καὶ Υἱοῦ σκηνοβατοῦν καθ' ἑκάστην γενεὰν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καθὼς βούλεται ὁ Πατὴρ.*
>
> *qui dispositiones Patris et Filii exposuit secundum quas aderat generi humano, quemadmodum vult Pater.*

For this passage to be helpful, Behr must follow the Latin and understand it to say something like: 'who sets forth the dispensations of the Father and the Son, according to which he (the Spirit) dwells in the human race (or, "he dwells in [each] generation of human beings"), as the Father wills.' The Greek text, on the other hand, does not indicate that it is the Spirit who dwells among human beings. We can translate the Greek as, 'in order that the economies of both the Father and Son may dwell, according to each generation, among human beings, as the Father wills.'

The main difference between the Latin and Greek texts is that the Latin text contains two verbs (*exponere* and *adesse*), while the Greek contains one (*σκηνοβατοῦν*). It seems to me that the presence of the two Latin verbs reflects the difficulty of interpreting the infinitive *σκηνοβατοῦν*, which literally means 'to dwell' but in this context means 'to make known.' When Irenaeus writes, 'in order that the economies of the Father and Son may dwell . . . among human beings,' he means, 'in order that the economies of the Father may be known . . . among human beings.' Each verb in the Latin text conveys one of these meanings: *exponere* brings out the contextual meaning ('to make known'), while *adesse* brings out the literal meaning ('to dwell'). The Latin translator recognized the

[17] The numerous textual additions and subtractions in the Armenian translation render it unhelpful (for instance, it entirely omits the reference to the Spirit). This state of the Armenian more than likely reflects the difficulty this passage poses for the translator and interpreter alike.

two meanings, but was unable to produce an adequate translation and so included verbs to cover both meanings. Nevertheless, only the contextual meaning is appropriate. Therefore, we should disregard *adesse,* which reflects the literal meaning of the Greek. As a result, we should not understand Irenaeus to be saying that the Spirit dwells among human beings. Instead, the Spirit gives the knowledge of the truth in order that the 'economies' of the Father and Son may dwell, that is, be made known, among human beings.

Yet, even if we were to follow the Latin text, the context of the passage suggests Irenaeus does not intend for his reader to think that the Spirit rests in the human race indiscriminately. The beginning of *AH* 4.33.7 contains a sharp divide between the spiritual disciples and those outside the Church who manufacture schisms within it. When read in light of *AH* 4.33.1, the difference between the two groups must be the reception of the Spirit by the former. Moreover, at the end of *AH* 4.33.9 Irenaeus says the Spirit rests on the Church, and the logic at the beginning of *AH* 4.33.10 entails the resting of the Spirit on a certain group of people, likely a reference back to the Church in *AH* 4.33.9. As a result, whichever text one follows, *AH* 4.33.7 should not be interpreted as stating that the Spirit dwells among the entire human race.

AH 4.33.15 continues the discussion that began in *AH* 4.33.1, and contains a similar statement as *AH* 4.33.7:

> he who is truly spiritual will interpret (prophecies) . . . always knowing the same God, and always acknowledging the same Word of God, even if he has been made known to us (just) now; and always acknowledging the same Spirit of God, even if he has been poured out on us in a new manner in the last times.[18]

This passage is straightforward. Irenaeus is not saying the Spirit is always present with the whole human race, but rather that the truly spiritual person will always acknowledge the same Spirit of God, just as that one always acknowledges the same Word and always knows the same God. His point is that regardless of the dispensation during which the truly spiritual individual lives, he or she will always know the same God,[19] in contrast for instance to those who claim that the prophets of the Old Testament were sent from another God.[20]

[18] I agree with Rousseau that the phrase following this one does not modify the pouring out of the Spirit (as the ANF translator takes it), but rather begins a new thought. This is evident from the presence of '*et*' at the beginning of the phrase, since '*et*' also begins the statements having to do with the Word and the Spirit.

[19] That the Spiritual disciple always acknowledges the same God correlates to Irenaeus' purpose in this section of *AH* 4, which, according to Bacq, is to establish the 'uniqueness of the Creator God' by showing that the 'Old Testament is a prophecy of the New' (1978: 28–30, *see* also, 217–26).

[20] The beginning of *AH* 4.34.1 reveals that Irenaeus has in mind the doctrine of the Marcionites in particular.

I have already discussed in chapter 5 the portion of *AH* 5.1.3 that concerns us, and since my comments there remain apropos, I will offer only brief comments at this time and refer the reader back to the previous discussion.[21] Irenaeus states in *AH* 5.1.3, 'For at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God (the Son and Spirit), to whom the Father speaking, said, "Let us make man after our image and likeness" [Gen. 1:26].' By 'at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God', Irenaeus does not intend to suggest the Son and Spirit were present with humanity at all times, rather he is referring to the providential authority of the creative Hands over the salvation of their creation. He elaborates upon this point in *AH* 5.5.1, which declares that the 'assumption and translation' of Enoch and Elijah, which entail their vivification, occurred by means of the same Hands that formed them in the beginning. He then states, 'For in Adam the Hands of God were accustomed to set in order, to rule, and to sustain his own formation, and to bring it and place it where they wish.' Thus, the point of these passages is that the authority of the Hands over their creation guarantees the vivification of human beings.

The final passage to which Behr refers is *AH* 5.28.4, wherein Irenaeus writes:

> And on account of this throughout all time, man, having been formed in the beginning by the Hands of God,[22] that is, by the Son and Spirit, is made after the image and likeness of God: the chaff, indeed, which is the apostasy, being cast away; but the grain, that is those who bring forth the fruit of faith to God, being gathered into the storehouse.

It seems to me that for this passage to be relevant to Behr's discussion, he must read it as saying that the Son and Spirit, the Hands of God, who molded man at the beginning also make man 'throughout all time . . . after the image and likeness of God.'[23] Two points stand against this reading. First, at most, this passage refers to the activity of the Son and Spirit directed toward, rather than their presence with, human beings 'throughout all time.' Second, the combination of a later phrase in *AH* 5.28.4 with a statement in *AH* 5.29.1 reveals that Irenaeus here associates God (the Father), and not the Son and Spirit, with the tribulation that separates the wheat from the chaff and causes human beings to be made after the image and likeness of God. In *AH* 5.28.4 Irenaeus says, 'And for this cause (*propterea*) tribulation is necessary for those who are saved (*salvantur*)' and in *AH* 5.29.1 he writes, 'In the previous books I have set forth the causes for which (*propter*) God permitted these things to be made, and have pointed out that all such have been created for the benefit of that human nature which is saved (*salvatur*).'[24] Despite the reference to the 'previous

[21] See chapter 5, pp. 123–4.

[22] *Πλασθεὶς ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ θεοῦ/plasmatus in initio homo per manus Dei.*

[23] This is, in fact, how Fantino (1986: 141) understands it.

[24] ANF translations, both.

books,' the similar language shows that *AH* 5.29.1 continues the discussion of *AH* 5.28.4, thereby identifying God (the Father) as the one who permitted tribulation for the salvation of human beings. The correct reading of this passage restricts the activity of the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God to the original formation of the human being; thus this passage does not indicate the presence of the Son and Spirit with human beings, nor even their activity toward human beings, 'throughout all time.'

Thus, of the five passages Behr notes to support his declaration of the 'continual nourishing presence of the Spirit' with the human race, two of the passages do not refer to the presence of the Spirit at all (*AH* 5.1.3, 5.28.4). One passage, *AH* 4.33.7, may be interpreted to refer to the presence of the Spirit in humanity if one prefers the testimony of the Latin text to the testimony of the Greek text. Yet, even if one follows the Latin here, the context indicates we should understand the presence of the Spirit to be restricted to the Church. The two passages that clearly refer to the presence of the Spirit with humanity, *AH* 4.33.1 and *AH* 4.33.15, concern only the activity and presence of the Spirit among believers. Therefore, none of these passages supports Behr's reading that the Spirit is present with all human beings despite the state of their relationship with God. Rather the opposite is the case: Irenaeus speaks of the presence of the Spirit with believers alone.

In addition to the passages that Behr appropriates to substantiate the 'continual nourishing presence of the Spirit' with the human race, he utilizes three passages to argue for 'the presence of the Holy Spirit in the human formation'[25]: *AH* 5.6.1, *AH* 2.33.5, and *AH* 5.18.2. Of these, however, only his readings of *AH* 2.33.5 and *AH* 5.18.2 result in the presence of the Spirit in all human beings regardless of their standing with God. So, for the time being, I will address just these two passages.

Behr turns to the opening sentences of *AH* 5.18.2 as the capstone for his argument, but for the convenience of my own argument, I will treat this passage first and address the other passages as we proceed. The passage at issue reads (I will give the first part of the sentence in English, and the second, debated, part in the Latin and the rest in Armenian):

> For the Father simultaneously bears the creation and his Word, and the Word borne by the Father gives the Spirit to all as the Father wills:
>
> *quibusdam quidem secundum conditionem, quod est conditionis,*[26] *quod est factum; quibusdam autem secundum adoptionem, quod est ex Deo, quod est generatio.*
>
> այնոցիկ, որ ըստ աչխարհիս են, զաչխարհ, որ է եղեալն, իսկ այնոցիկ, որ ըստ որդեզրութեանն են, զի Հաւրէն, որ է ձնունդն նորա:

[25] Behr (2000: 98).

[26] This phrase, *quod est conditionis*, is not present in two important manuscripts, Claromontanus and Vossianus.

Behr translates the second half as, 'to some, who are in a created state, which is made, he gives the Spirit pertaining to creation, to others, who are according to adoption, an engendering, he gives the Spirit of the Father.'[27] Rousseau, whose reading Behr opposes, translates it as, 'aux uns, en rapport avec leur création, il donne l'esprit appartenant à la création, esprit qui est une chose faite; aux autres, en rapport avec leur adoption, il donne l'Esprit provenant du Père, Esprit qui est Progéniture de celui-ci.'[28] At debate is whether we should understand *Spiritum* to refer to both a created 'spirit,' which Rousseau holds to be the soul or breath of life, and the Holy Spirit, or if we should understand *Spiritum* to refer only to the Holy Spirit who is present to human beings in two different ways.[29]

The strongest aspects of Rousseau's argument for *Spiritum* to have two different referents are the close similarity of this passage to a description of the soul and Spirit that Irenaeus offers in *AH* 5.12.2, and to a lesser degree his interpretation of *generatio* as expressing 'the divine and transcendent character of the origin of the Spirit' (and that alone)—a reading for which he finds a parallel in the description of the Word as *progenies* in *AH* 5.36.3.[30]

The strength of Behr's argument for the Holy Spirit as the one referent of *Spiritum*, though present to humanity in two different ways, lies in his observations that (1) Irenaeus does not elsewhere use *spiritus* to refer to the soul, despite Rousseau's reference to *AH* 5.6.1;[31] (2) Irenaeus seems to be speaking of only one Spirit given in two different ways;[32] and (3) nowhere else does Irenaeus apply the term *generatio* to the Spirit.[33]

A simple comparison of their arguments would favor Behr because the reliance of Rousseau's argument on comparisons to other passages is less persuasive than Behr's analysis of the grammatical structure and pattern of terminological usage. Yet, neither Rousseau nor Behr gives due attention to

[27] Behr (2000: 105).

[28] SC 153 (1969: 239, 41); 'to some, in connection with their creation, he gives the spirit belonging to creation, a spirit which is a created thing; to others, in connection with their adoption, he gives the Spirit coming from the Father, a Spirit who is the Offspring of that one.'

[29] Orbe understands this passage as referring to the Spirit as both (1) the natural spirit of cohesion of the world (i.e. the *anima mundi*) and (2) the Spirit of adoption given exclusively to men (*Teología de San Ireneo, Commentario al Libro V del 'Adversus Haereses'* [1985, 1987, 1988], 2: 213–18). The interpretation of the Spirit as the *anima mundi*, however, has no textual basis in Irenaeus.

[30] SC 152 (1969: 286–95). Rousseau also attempts to support his interpretation of *Spiritum* as referring to the soul by reference to '*spiritus hominis*' of *AH* 5.6.1, which he understands to mean the soul as well, but which I take to refer to the Holy Spirit. In addition, he understands *progenies* in *AH* 4.7.4 to refer to both the Son and Spirit, an identification with which I disagree.

[31] This is the case by the time of the composition of *AH* 5, though in *AH* 2.31.2 his description of the spirit departing from and returning to a person bears questioning. Cf. Behr's comment on this passage that attributes this particular use of 'spirit' to an earlier quotation of Luke 8:55 (Behr 2000: 99 n. 51).

[32] Behr (2000: 104).

[33] Ibid. 103.

the immediate context of the sentence being considered—a context that stands against Behr's analysis and supports that of Rousseau.

Right after the debated passage, Irenaeus explains the purpose for the sending of the Spirit by the Word:

> And thus 'one God the Father' is revealed, 'who is above all, and through all, and in us all' [Eph. 4:6]. Indeed, the Father is above all, and is himself the head of Christ; while the Word is through all, and is himself the head of the Church; moreover the Spirit is in us all, and is himself the living water [John 7:39], which the Lord grants to those who rightly believe in him, and love him, and know that there is 'one Father, who is above all, and through all, and in us all.'

This explanation contains no indication that Irenaeus conceived of two different modes of the sending of the one Spirit as Behr argues. Rather, he speaks of one sending alone. In addition, it is clear that the Spirit is only sent to the Church of which the Word is the head: the Spirit is that which is given to those who believe in and love the Lord, and recognize the status of the Father relative to creation.

The limitation of the Spirit to the members of the Church finds an additional subtle emphasis through Irenaeus' use of the word *nobis*, 'us.' In the middle of this selection, the Spirit is the living water who is 'in us all,' which refers back to the Church in which Irenaeus includes himself. This Spirit is the living water granted to the Church, those 'who rightly believe in him, love him, and know' the truth of Eph. 4:6. The text of Eph. 4:6, itself, reinforces the restriction of the Spirit to the Church, since the phrase that pertains to the Spirit reads *in omnibus nobis*, 'in us all.'[34]

As a result, the immediate context of the passage in question enjoins us to acknowledge that the first sentence of *AH* 5.18.2 refers to only one sending of the Spirit, to the Church alone. We are then left with a very confusing passage, because as far as I know Behr's three observations mentioned earlier are correct, and yet the elucidation that Irenaeus provides in the immediate context indicates that we should follow Rousseau's reading. It is clear, then, that we must follow Rousseau's reading, insofar as he affirms only one giving of the Spirit and that to the believers in Christ. Yet, our inability to understand how this passage harmonizes with the rest of Irenaeus' logic means we should not draw upon it to substantiate any particular reading of Irenaeus.

The conclusion generated so far by our analysis, that Irenaeus limits the presence of the Spirit to believers alone, calls into immediate question the

[34] I have rendered the quotations of Eph. 4:6 in this text according to the Armenian version which includes 'us' in both texts (in fact, the Armenian reads 'is in us all,' but the predicate construction seems to be an addition of the translator), whereas *nobis* does not appear in the Latin of the first text.

inference Behr draws from *AH* 2.33.5: 'that those who did not please God had "their" Spirit before their death.'[35] *AH* 2.33.5 reads:

> all those who have been enrolled for life will rise again, having their own body, and their own soul, and their own Spirit, in which they had pleased God. On the other hand, those who are worthy of punishment will depart into it, having themselves also their own soul and their own body, in which they withdrew from the goodness of God.[36]

Behr summarizes this passage as 'those who have pleased God in their body, soul, and Spirit will be raised in their body, soul, and Spirit.'[37] The corollary, however, that he draws from the post-resurrection possession of the body, soul, and Spirit by those who please God is difficult to sustain. He declares, 'the parallel dynamics of these texts, and the fact that it is *in* their body, soul, and Spirit that they have pleased God, demand that it is also in their body, soul, *and* Spirit that the others have shown themselves worthy of punishment.'[38] Though Behr does not say so here, such a reading of this passage supports his contention that the Spirit is present to Adam throughout his apostasy.

Yet, this text only 'demands' that the Spirit is present in an individual while that person engages in sinful activity if one assumes that the Spirit is present in all human beings—those who are adopted as children of God and those who are not.[39] I have, however, just shown that such an assumption is untenable because it lacks adequate textual support. Therefore, it is unnecessary to read 'Spirit' into the second sentence.

That being the case, an alternative interpretation emerges. We can just as well understand Irenaeus to differentiate here between that which constitutes the person resurrected to eternal life and that which constitutes the person who departs into eternal punishment. That is to say, those who are enrolled for life shall rise again having their body, soul, and Spirit, in which they pleased

[35] Behr (2000: 101).

[36] I have followed Rousseau in rendering *corpora*/*σώματα*, *animas*/*ψυχὰς*, and *Spiritus*/*Πνεύματα* in the singular. Rousseau explains the plural uses of *Spiritus*/*Πνεύματα* as conforming to Irenaeus' understanding of the Spirit as the third element of the perfect person: insofar as each person has his or her Spirit, then there are many Spirits (SC 293, 1982: 341).

[37] Behr (2000: 101).

[38] Ibid. 101; author's emphasis.

[39] The reader should note that Irenaeus does not entertain the possibility that the person who possesses the Spirit will continue to engage in activity worthy of punishment. The discussion in *AH* 5.8.2 is a good example of his thought: 'Those, then, who have the earnest of the Spirit and are not enslaved to the desires of the flesh, but are themselves subject to the Spirit and are living according to reason in all things, does the apostle rightly call "spiritual," because the Spirit of God dwells in them . . . But those who do indeed reject the counsel of the Spirit, on the other hand, are enslaved to pleasures [of the flesh] and live contrary to reason and without restraint plunge into their desires, [are those who] have no desire for the Spirit of God at all.' He does not imagine a middle state, in which a person possesses the Spirit and yet continues to engage in sinful activity.

God, while those who are worthy of punishment will endure it in their soul and body, 'in which they withdrew from the goodness of God.'[40] According to this reading, *AH* 2.33.5 contains a considered statement expressing the absence of the Spirit in those who do not please God and will not experience the resurrection to eternal life: the exact opposite of Behr's understanding.[41]

To this point, we have shown that the passages thought to establish that Irenaeus held the Spirit to be present to all human beings regardless of their relationship with God are inadequate to the task.[42] There are no grounds for saying that those 'who remain in their created state,' those who have not been adopted as sons of God, can receive 'the Spirit as the Spirit is present throughout creation.'[43] As a result, there is no basis to declare that it is the presence of the life-creating Spirit in every human being that creates the soul or breath of life which animates each person, that is, gives to them temporal life.[44]

On the other hand, several passages we have discussed indicate Irenaeus understood the Spirit to be present with believers throughout the divine economy. Prior to the Fall, Adam and Eve enjoyed unbroken communion with God. Irenaeus says the Word walked and talked with them in the Garden,[45] and in *AH* 3.23.5, he states that Adam had received 'a robe of sanctity' from the Spirit: 'this robe of sanctity which I (Adam) had from the Spirit (*eam quam habui ab Spiritu sanctitatis stolam*), I have lost by disobedience.'

The 'robe of sanctity' is often identified with the Holy Spirit, producing the reading that Adam and Eve possessed the Holy Spirit until their Fall.[46] Yet, Irenaeus does not make this identification himself. The grammatical construction of the sentence is straightforward: *stolam* is the direct object since it is in the accusative, whereas *ab Spiritu* modifies the verb since it is in the ablative. Since the context of the sentence contains no reason to take the extraordinary step of dismissing the significance of the grammatical structure in order to identify the

[40] According to this reading the parallel that exists between these two sentences consists in the common cause and effect, or condition and consequence, that governs the outcome of a person's life. The parallel, however, does not extend beyond this governing structure to that which is involved in the cause and effect, to the terms of each sentence: soul, body, and Spirit, or soul and body.

[41] The added benefit of this reading is that it regards the text as containing a careful statement by Irenaeus, rather than approaching it as containing a careless parallel that needs interpolation to be understood.

[42] I have not yet dealt with *AH* 5.6.1, but other than de Andia's misguided reading (1986: 71), all agree that the presence of the Spirit in that passage refers to believers alone.

[43] Behr (2000: 105).

[44] This conclusion agrees with Irenaeus' comment in *AH* 3.24.1: 'For where the church is, there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the church and every grace: indeed, the Spirit is truth.'

[45] *Prf* 12; Theophilus makes a similar statement in *Autol* 2.22.

[46] e.g. Klebba (1894: 33–4); Jaschke, *Der Heilige Geist* (1976: 256–7); de Andia (1986: 96–7); Fantino (1986: 160–2). The identification of the 'robe of sanctity' as the pre-lapsarian possession of the Holy Spirit is often combined with the restoration theme in Irenaeus in order to say that the presence of the Holy Spirit lost by Adam is regained following the work of Christ.

robe and the Spirit, we should understand Adam to be saying he had received from the Spirit a 'robe of sanctity.' Both Wingren and Behr have drawn the same conclusion and offer similar understandings of what the 'robe' represents. Wingren holds the 'robe of sanctity' to be the righteousness received by the Spirit,[47] and Behr states the 'robe' represents the holiness of God that Adam and Eve received from the Spirit and continued to possess until the Fall.[48]

Less often, the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit is affirmed by means of Irenaeus' statement in *Prf* 11 that God mixed 'his own power' with the earth in order to form Adam.[49] Yet, Behr has shown that the 'power' in *Prf* 11 should not be identified with the Holy Spirit either.[50] Rather than affirming the pre-lapsarian 'possession' or 'indwelling' of the Holy Spirit by Adam and Eve, a position that has no supporting texts in Irenaeus,[51] it is better to affirm the pre-lapsarian 'communion' of Adam and Eve with the Spirit, as illustrated by their reception of the 'garment of sanctity;' a communion they also shared with the Word, who walked and talked with them in Paradise.[52] Prior to their Fall, the relationship of Adam and Eve with God was undamaged and they enjoyed the benefits of that relationship: the holiness of the Spirit and personal interaction with the Word.[53]

As with the presence of the Spirit prior to the Fall, Irenaeus does not describe in detail his understanding of the presence of the Spirit following

[47] Wingren (1959: 31–2).

[48] Behr (2000: 112). Behr, of course, continues to hold that the Holy Spirit was present with Adam and Eve prior to the Fall, since the Spirit maintains a 'continual nourishing presence' with all people at all times (Ibid. 115).

[49] Fantino (1986: 156–7, 160); As noted earlier, Orbe understands this power to be the Spirit referred to in Gen. 1:2, which he regards as an *anima mundi* (Orbe 1969: 58–77).

[50] Behr (2000: 88–9). The identification of the power mixed with earth to form Adam in *Prf* 11 as the Spirit stems from Irenaeus' somewhat similar identification of the Spirit with the 'willing rain' of *AH* 3.17.2 (a passage I discussed in chapter 4, p. 78, 83–5). Rather than comparing *Prf* 11 with *AH* 3.17.2, Behr draws a better comparison with *AH* 5.3.1–3, where 'Irenaeus claims that the flesh which, at the beginning, was skillfully formed by God into its various parts, will by the same power of God be raised from the dead . . . the idea behind both *Dem* 11 and *AH* 5.3.1–3 seems to be that whatever is created receives, and so participates in, the art, the power, and the wisdom of the Creator' (88–9). To this determination, I will add that prior to his reference to power in *Prf* 11, Irenaeus refers to the Hands as the agents of the formation of Adam's physical aspect. The Spirit as one of the Hands, one of the agents of formation, must be regarded as distinct from that which he is forming.

[51] De Andia (1986: 101–3) offers a unique interpretation of *AH* 5.5.1 as saying that Adam possessed the Holy Spirit since Irenaeus states that paradise 'has been prepared for righteous men, such as have the Spirit'. Her argument would have more weight if Adam was the subject of Irenaeus' discussion. As it is however, Irenaeus introduces Adam to establish the providential authority of the Hands of God over the assumption and translation of Elijah and Enoch, and to introduce the topic of paradise. He is not talking about Adam's constitution in paradise, but the constitution of the righteous, who shall go to paradise.

[52] If one discounts his notion of the 'continual nourishing presence' of the Spirit, which I have shown to lack a textual basis, then Behr's comments on Irenaeus' protology (2000: 110–12) support the conclusion that Adam and Eve did not possess the Holy Spirit prior to their Fall.

[53] Cf. Steenberg's helpful description of Irenaeus' conception of the Fall as 'largely a misdirection of the course of [human] growth' (2008: 153–4; see also, 167–9).

the Fall and prior to the fulfillment of the Christological mission. He is far more interested in the activity of the Spirit following the Christological mission. Nevertheless, we can say Irenaeus maintains that the Spirit was present with the followers of God but not in the same way that the Spirit dwells in believers in Christ. The Spirit enabled the prophetic vision of God,[54] helped to establish faith through revelation of Scripture,[55] and enabled the recognition of the one God.[56] Two of the clearest statements of the Spirit's activity during this period occur in *Prf* 6 and *Prf* 56.

Prf 6 offers a concise summary of the Holy Spirit's activity prior to Christ, while distinguishing this activity from his later work after being sent by Christ: 'the Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied and the patriarchs learnt the things of God and the righteous were led in the path of righteousness, and who, in the last times, was poured out in a new fashion upon the human race renewing man, throughout the world, to God.' The key to differentiating the work of the Spirit after the Fall and prior to the redemptive work of Christ is Irenaeus' statement that, after being 'poured out in a new fashion,' the Spirit renews human beings—a declaration he never makes about the activity of the Spirit which took place prior to the completion of the Christological mission.[57]

Prf 56 offers additional insight into the significance of the presence of the Spirit prior to versus after Christ, 'For those who died before the manifestation of Christ there is hope, [when raised] at the judgment, to obtain salvation, whoever feared God and died in righteousness, and had the Spirit of God within them, such as the patriarchs, the prophets and the righteous.' Those who had 'the Spirit of God within them' prior to the coming of Christ have hope of salvation at the judgment. While positive, having hope for salvation is not at all equal to becoming 'spiritual even now' and already having 'part of the honor' that has been promised by God, both of which come about by the reception of the Spirit sent by Christ.[58]

According to Irenaeus, the effect of the presence of the Spirit in the righteous changes because of the historical moment of the Christological mission.[59] The

[54] *AH* 4.20.5, 8–10.

[55] *AH* 4.32.2–33.1.

[56] *AH* 4.33.15.

[57] I explain why this is the case in chapter 4—the Spirit had to become accustomed to humanity by means of the Incarnation, and only after the completion of Christ's redemptive work is the Spirit able to bring Jesus Christ, Salvation, to believers.

[58] *AH* 5.8.1: 'But we do now receive a certain portion of his (the Lord's) Spirit, [disposing us] towards perfection and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms "an earnest," that is, a part of the honor which has been promised to us by God . . . If, then, this earnest is dwelling in us, it renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality.'

[59] The descent of Christ in order to bring salvation to the dead is a good example of the dependence of salvation on the historical moment of the Christological mission: 'For this reason, too, He administered food to them in a recumbent posture, indicating that those who were lying in the earth were they to whom He came to impart life. As Jeremiah declares, "The holy Lord

completion of Christ's redemptive work enables the Spirit sent by Christ to renew human beings, that is, to restore eternal life to the fallen human race. Irenaeus is far more interested in this period of the Spirit's activity, and it is toward a discussion of this addition of the Spirit to the believer in Christ that we now move. The next section of this chapter will show that Irenaeus conceives of the human being as constituted by body and soul alone.

6.2 THE BIPARTITE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN BEING

The majority of the passages containing the clearest statements with regard to the composition of the human being occur in *AH* 5, so it is fitting that the first section of the book contains a pertinent passage. *AH* 5.1.1 reads, 'the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh.'[60] Irenaeus' description of the dynamic of redemption implies that the redemption of human beings is a matter of the soul and flesh alone: Jesus gave 'his soul for our souls, and his flesh for our flesh.' Since the redemptive work of Jesus covered the need of the whole human being, and since Irenaeus only refers to the giving of Jesus' soul and flesh for our soul and flesh, we can infer that the soul and flesh constitute the whole human being.[61] A similar statement occurs in *AH* 5.20.1, where the soul and body compose the 'complete man' (*totius hominis*) who awaits salvation:

> But the path of those belonging to the Church circumscribes the whole world . . . and gives unto us to see that the faith of all is one and the same, since all receive one and the same God the Father . . . and await the same salvation of the complete man (*totius hominis*), that is, of the soul and body.[62]

If we are correct to understand these passages as revealing that the salvation of the whole human being concerns the body and soul alone, reflecting thereby

remembered His dead Israel, who slept in the land of sepulture; and He descended to them to make known to them His salvation, that they might be saved"' (*AH* 4.22.1, ANF translation). See also, *AH* 4.27.2.

[60] ANF translation. Cf. Clement of Rome (1946: 49): 'Jesus Christ our Lord gave his blood for us by the will of God, his body for our bodies, his soul for our souls' (tr. Kleist; ACW 1).

[61] An earlier statement in *AH* 3.22.1 supports this conclusion. In arguing that Jesus is human as we are, he writes: 'But every one will allow that we are a body taken from the earth, and a soul receiving Spirit from God. This, therefore, the Word of God was made, recapitulating in himself his own formation' (my translation with reference to the ANF). Jaschke shows that this text refers to the Holy Spirit and not a human spirit (*Der Heilige Geist*, 1976: 298), an argument constructed against Orbe's reading of the passage (1969: 76–7).

[62] ANF translation.

the composition of the whole human being,[63] then we would expect to find the same understanding of the composition of the human being in Irenaeus' comments with regard to its creation and its future resurrection from the dead and consequent reconstitution. Just such a passage exists in *AH* 5.3.2:

> For if he does not vivify what is mortal and does not bring back the corruptible to incorruption, he is not a God of power. But that He is powerful in all these respects, we ought to perceive from our origin, inasmuch as God taking dust from the earth, formed man. And surely it is more difficult and incredible, from non-existent bones, and nerves, and veins, and the rest of man's organization to bring it about that all this should be, and to make man an animated and rational creature, than to reintegrate again that which had been created and then afterwards decomposed into earth, for the reasons already mentioned, having thus passed into those [elements] from which man, who had no previous existence, was formed.[64]

Irenaeus argues that the power exhibited by God in the original creation of the human being proves that the same God is able 'to reintegrate' a person at the time of the resurrection. For this logic to hold, that which is reintegrated must be the same as that which was first created. Though his description of creation focuses a bit more on the flesh with the statements, 'inasmuch as God taking dust from the earth, formed man' and 'non-existent bones, and nerves, and veins,' he also refers to the bestowal of the soul at the time of creation: 'and to make man an animated and rational creature.'[65] Thus, the human origin that reveals the power of God and guarantees the future resurrection and reconstitution of the same human being refers to the flesh that was formed from the dust and the bestowal of the soul on that which was formed.[66] So, the human being that was created and will be recreated, consists of the body and soul.[67]

[63] Behr dismisses passages that occur 'in the context of exhorting his readers to live righteously in both soul and body, or, alternatively, of defending the resurrection of both,' declaring they are 'not sufficient definitions of the living man' because both the soul and the body must participate in life to be living (2000: 98). There is, however, a difference in defining the constitution of the human being versus explaining how that which constitutes the human being comes to life. Unless, of course, one presumes, as Behr does, that the Spirit must be present in the human being for the reception of temporal life. Long ago, Klebba (1894: 164–6) used almost all of the passages I do here, plus many others, to affirm the bipartite composition of the human being as body and soul.

[64] ANF translation.

[65] On the soul making the human being animated and rational, see for instance *AH* 5.1.3: 'at the beginning of our formation, that breath of life which proceeded from God, having been united to what had been fashioned, animated the man and manifested him as an animal being endowed with reason (*animal rationabile*)' (my translation with reference to the ANF).

[66] Cf. *Prf* 42, 'for it is [also] by this Spirit that the resurrection comes to believers, the body receiving back again the soul and, together with it, is raised by the power of the Holy Spirit and is led into the Kingdom of God.'

[67] Klebba considered this argument settled in 1894 when he declared, 'Möchte doch nunmehr die Behauptung von einem Trichotomismus des hl. Irenaeus für immer aus den Büchern verschwinden!' (Klebba 1894: 166).

6.3 THE LIFE-GIVING ACTIVITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

We may now consider the activity of the Spirit in the giving of temporal and eternal life to human beings. In this section I will argue several points. First, all human beings receive temporal life by the instrumentality and not the presence of the Holy Spirit. Second, while the presence of the Spirit is the basis for its activity in believers, Irenaeus highlights the instrumentality of the Spirit in the giving of the power or grace that renders temporal life eternal. Third, Irenaeus conceives of one kind of life that modulates between temporal and eternal according to a power/grace dynamic. Fourth, the instrumentality, not the presence, of the Spirit guarantees the existence of one Source of life.

Prior to entering deeper into this discussion it will be helpful to locate the addition and attendant work of the Spirit in the timeline of redemption. We will take a moment, then, to consider Irenaeus' understanding of the divine economy. As I mentioned above, Behr has discerned that Irenaeus conceives of the divine economy as being 'a movement from animation to vivification.'[68] Thus, 'as Adam was animated by the breath of life, so (the resurrected) Christ was vivified by the Spirit, as also will be those who, as adopted sons in him, presently have the pledge of the Spirit.'[69] Adam and Eve enjoyed immortality as a result of their possession of the 'order and strength' of the breath of life:[70] as long as they remained obedient to the command of God, they preserved the strength and order of the breath of life, and kept the 'robe of sanctity' given to them by the Spirit. The Fall ruptured the relationship of Adam and Eve with God, including the communion they enjoyed with the Word and Spirit, and caused them to lose the immortality proper to the 'strength and order' of the soul.[71] As a result, the eternal life they enjoyed was reduced to temporal life, their likeness to God was lost, and as I have shown earlier, the presence of the Word and Spirit once experienced by all of humanity, since righteousness prevailed prior to the Fall, became the exclusive domain of those who possessed the proper relationship with God. Such was the state of the human race until the completion of the redemptive work of Christ, which is brought to humanity by his sending of the Holy Spirit.[72]

[68] Behr (2000: 86).

[69] Ibid. 9. As I have previously noted, Irenaeus identifies the breath of life with the soul (e.g. *AH* 5.7.1).

[70] Ibid. 107, 111–15. Koch, long ago, preceded Behr in recognizing that the immortality of Adam and Eve depended upon their maintenance of the 'order and strength' of the breath of life (1925: 206–8). Both base their positions on *Prf* 14–15: '[14] and while the breath remains in [its] order and strength, it is without comprehension or understanding of what is evil . . . [15] And He (God) placed certain limits upon him (Adam), so that, if he should keep the commandment he would remain always as he was, that is, immortal.'

[71] *Prf* 15; for their communion with the Word and Spirit, see *Prf* 12 and *AH* 3.23.5.

[72] For more on the sending of the Spirit by Christ and the consequent work of the Spirit, see my earlier comments on the Unction of Christ and the Unction of the Church in chapter 3.

As I have mentioned several times now, Behr argues that every human being enjoys 'the continual nourishing presence of the Spirit,' a presence of the Spirit that 'was bestowed (on those adopted as sons) in a new manner in Christ at the end of time.'[73] While Behr attempts to substantiate the presence of the Spirit to every human being throughout time by means of the texts already covered in this study, his assertion flows out of the following determination: 'if one holds that the life-creating Spirit was not present to the human race during the course of the apostasy, then one must also postulate a separate source of life, a breath of life, which is merely physical and has nothing to do with communion with God.'[74]

This determination is itself intended to sustain two valid and important readings of Irenaeus, each of which will factor into the following portion of this examination. First, Irenaeus conceives of just one type of life: a physical or biological life.[75] And second, Irenaeus conceives of just one source of life: the Spirit.[76] Despite the validity of these two readings, the determination itself is misguided because the affirmation of one source of life does not logically require the continual presence of God, namely, the Holy Spirit, but just the continual instrumentality of the Holy Spirit. And, I contend, this latter understanding best represents Irenaeus' thought.

Irenaeus' discussions with regard to both the bestowal of temporal life, which involves the creation of the breath of life, by the Spirit, and the bestowal of eternal life by the Spirit, bear out my contention that in his mind life depends upon the instrumentality, not the presence, of the Spirit. We will

[73] Behr (2000: 97).

[74] Ibid. 97. Steenberg (2008: 131–4) follows Behr (to whom he refers, p. 130 n. 103) in placing too strong an emphasis on the presence of the Spirit in his discussion of the animation of the soul.

[75] Behr (2000: esp. pp. 93–7). For instance, he writes: 'there is no suggestion (speaking of *AH* 5.3.3) that they (the temporal life all human beings enjoy and the eternal life which vivifies in the resurrection) are two different types of life: physical/biological and spiritual/the presence of the Spirit' (pp. 96–7). Behr first supports this position with a reading of *AH* 2.34.3–4 that interprets Irenaeus' references to 'life' in that passage to refer to physical or biological life, a life lived in the flesh, which has the potential to continue forever (pp. 92–6). This reading of *AH* 2.34.3–4 stands against that of Rousseau, *NRT* 99 (1977: 842–3, 854); SC 293 (1987: 345–9, esp. 347). While I follow Behr's reading of Irenaeus as referring to only one type of life, refusing a spiritual-physical division, I agree with Rousseau that the soul does not live by its own nature and that the condemned are not annihilated, the arguments which are the context for his statements about supernatural life, SC 293 (1982: 346); *NRT* 99 (1977: esp. p. 843, 847–8); Rousseau is arguing against Lassiat (1974: 165–6); and *NRT* 100 (1978: 399–417, esp. 405, 411–12). Behr offers a necessary clarification of Rousseau's reference to the 'natural immortality' of the soul, when he states that the endurance of the soul after death can occur without life, i.e. when not immortal, as it does with the condemned (2000: 95). According to Irenaeus, eternal life belongs only to the righteous who are united to God; those who experience eternal punishment do not possess 'life', because they are separated from God.

[76] Behr (2000: esp. 97, 105–8 where he works from *AH* 5.12.1-2). In making this argument, he seeks to stay true to Wingren's earlier work which demonstrated that all life flows from God and is communion with God. Behr notes Wingren (1989: 14, 54 n. 36, 108, 120).

consider first the role of the Spirit in the bestowal of temporal life, and then his role in the bestowal of eternal life. *AH* 5.12.2 contains his clearest comments on the creation by the Spirit of the breath of life, or soul, which is the means by which the Spirit gives temporal life to the human being. The passage is of particular significance to my reading because Behr utilizes it to affirm that there is one Source of life.[77] Hence, it is important to show that in this passage, the instrumentality of the Spirit alone, and not its presence, is the basis for the affirmation of one Source of life. *AH* 5.12.1–2 reads:

> Moreover, the first life (temporal life) has been expelled, because it had not been given by the Spirit but by the breath. For the breath of life, which makes man animated,[78] is one thing, and the vivifying Spirit, which makes him spiritual, is another.[79] And because of this Isaiah says, 'Thus says the Lord, who made heaven and established it, who founded the earth and the things which are in it, and gave breath to the people upon it, and Spirit to those walking upon it' [Isa. 42:5]. Saying, indeed, the breath has been given in common[80] to each person on the earth, but the Spirit exclusively[81] to these who trample under earthly desires. And because of which the same Isaiah, distinguishing the same things already mentioned, again says, 'for the Spirit shall go forth from me, and I have made every breath' [Isa. 57:16]. Indeed, he regards the Spirit as belonging in the rank of God,[82] which in the last times he has poured out on the human race by the adoption of sons, but the breath [he has given] in common to creatures, and proclaims it a thing made. Now what has been made is other than the one who has made it. Therefore, the breath is transitory, while the Spirit is eternal.

This selection from *AH* 5.12.1–2 contains several points I wish to bring forward, but beforehand, a note. By the fifth book of *Against Heresies* the language of animation and vivification ought to be considered technical:[83] that which vivifies is the Spirit, and that which animates is the breath of life or the soul. Animation refers to the bestowal of temporal life, while vivification refers to the bestowal of eternal life.[84] So, in the opening line of this pericope, the one

[77] Behr (2000: 105–8).

[78] *ψυχικὸν ἀπεργαζομένη τὸν ἄνθρωπον*; *animalem efficit hominem.*

[79] *Πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν . . . πνευματικὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελοῦν*; *Spiritus vivificans . . . spiritalem eum efficit.*

[80] *Κοινῶς*; *communiter.*

[81] *Ἰδίως*; *proprie.*

[82] *Τὸ μὲν Πνεῦμα ἰδίως ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τάξας*; *Spiritum quidem proprie in Deo deputans.*

[83] I briefly trace the language of animation and vivification present in *AH* 5 in the Excursus located after chapter 4 of this work.

[84] *AH* 5.3.3 contains Irenaeus' key discussion with regard to the terminology of 'temporal' and 'eternal' life; a portion of this passage is printed below. I prefer the terms 'temporal life' and 'eternal life' because they are easy to understand, and because they indicate that Irenaeus has in mind two modalities of the one life. A point of clarification with regard to my usage of this terminology is necessary: by 'eternal life' I am referring to immortality, incorruptibility, the eternal life that comes to those who please God and which they live with him; not included in this 'eternal life' is the continual existence experienced by the souls relegated to punishment. On this

who is animated possesses temporal life, while the one who is spiritual possesses eternal life. This discussion, then, concerns the different ways in which these two modalities of life come to a human being.

In the course of his explanation, Irenaeus makes three points relevant to this present study. First, the breath of life has been given 'to each person on the earth.' Second, in contrast to the breath of life, the Spirit has been given to a select group of people: those 'who trample under earthly desires,' those who have experienced the 'adoption of sons.' Third, the Spirit creates the breath of life: 'Now what has been made is other than the one who has made it. Therefore, the breath is transitory, while the Spirit is eternal.'

It is clear from these points that Irenaeus associates the temporal life of animation with the presence of the breath of life, and the eternal life of vivification with the presence of the Spirit. The only connection he makes in this passage between the Spirit and the existence of temporal life in each human being is the Spirit's creation of the breath of life. Insofar as the Spirit creates the breath of life, we can say that the Spirit is the ultimate source of temporal life,[85] as the breath is the immediate source of temporal life for the human being. The Spirit is not, then, the ultimate source of temporal life because of its presence in each animated person, but because of its activity in creating the breath. Irenaeus' careful restriction of the presence of the Spirit to those who experience the adoption of sons underscores this reading: while the Spirit creates the breath of life that is present in all people, the Spirit itself is only present to a select group of people.

While in *AH* 5.12.1–2 Irenaeus associates temporal life with the presence of the breath of life and eternal life with the presence of the Spirit, he does not detail the dynamic involved in the reception of either temporal or eternal life. We gain insight, however, into the process whereby eternal life follows from the reception of the Spirit from his discussion in *AH* 5.6.2 through *AH* 5.8.1:[86]

> (*AH* 5.6.2) . . . that our bodies are raised not from their own substance (*substantia*), but by the power (*virtute*) of God, he says to the Corinthians, 'Now the body is not for fornication, but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. And God has raised the Lord and will also raise us up by His own power (*virtutem*)' [1 Cor. 6:13–14].

type of continual existence, see Rousseau, *NRT* 99 (1977: 834–64) and SC 293 (1982: 346); and Behr (2000: 95).

[85] In *AH* 2.34.4 Irenaeus says the soul, the breath of life, itself partakes in life: 'But as the animal body is certainly not itself the soul, yet has fellowship with the soul as long as God pleases; so the soul herself is not life, but partakes in that life bestowed upon her by God' (ANF translation). I will soon argue that the bestowal of temporal life upon the soul belongs to the agency of the Holy Spirit.

[86] I treated aspects of this discussion with regard to the glorification of Jesus in chapter 4, pp. 68–70, 73, 75–7.

> (*AH* 5.7.2) He has taught, beyond all doubt, that neither of the soul nor of the Spirit is he speaking,[87] but of the bodies that are dead. For these are animal bodies (*corpora animalia*), that is, [bodies] which partake of a soul, which when they have lost, they die; then, rising by means of the Spirit, they become spiritual bodies (*corpora spiritalia*), so that by the Spirit they may have an ever-lasting life.
>
> (*AH* 5.8.1) But we do now receive a certain portion of his (the Lord's) Spirit, [disposing us] towards perfection and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms 'an earnest,' that is, a part of the honor which has been promised to us by God . . . If, then, this earnest is dwelling in us, it renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality [2 Cor. 5:4] . . . If therefore, at the present time, having the earnest, we cry out, 'Abba, Father,' what will happen when, on rising again, we will see him face to face; when all the members shall burst out into a continuous hymn of exultation, glorifying Him who raised them from the dead, and gave the gift of eternal life? For if the earnest, gathering man into itself, even now causes him to say, 'Abba, Father,' what will the complete grace of the Spirit (*universa Spiritus gratia*) effect, which will be given to human beings by God? It will render us like unto Him, and will accomplish the will of the Father; for it will make a human being after the image and likeness of God.

In *AH* 5.6.2 Irenaeus states the 'power of God' will raise the bodies of believers from the dead, just as his power resurrected Jesus. In *AH* 5.7.2 he clarifies that the resurrection, which will occur by the power of God in *AH* 5.6.2, will be the work of the Spirit.[88] In *AH* 5.8.1 he transitions from speaking of the future resurrection alone to include the effect of the reception of the Spirit during this present time. The Spirit renders believers 'spiritual even now' as the 'mortal is swallowed up by immortality.' This is not the simple result of the presence of the Spirit as the first sentence of *AH* 5.8.1 suggests, but rather, as Irenaeus explains, it is caused by the grace imparted to the believer by the Spirit who is present in that person. This is clear from the leading question he asks his readers: 'what will the complete grace of the Spirit effect, which will be given to human beings by God (at the resurrection)?'[89] The idea being that if a portion of the Spirit's grace results in the believer's adoption as a son of God ('even now causes him to say, "Abba, Father"'), which entails the swallowing up of mortality by immortality even now, then the complete grace of the Spirit will resurrect the dead to eternal life.[90]

[87] Referring to 1 Cor. 15:43–4.

[88] In fact, Irenaeus makes this point earlier in *AH* 5.7.1, when he quotes Rom. 8:11, 'But if the Spirit of him who raised Christ from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies' (ANF translation).

[89] *Contra* Daniélou and Jaschke. Daniélou (1975: 363) states that the grace the Father gives to the Son, and the Son pours out on the Church, is the Spirit. Jaschke says the Spirit and grace cannot be differentiated in Irenaeus (*Der Heilige Geist* 1976: 299, 299 n. 23).

[90] In *AH* 4.20.5, we see that the resurrection of the dead to eternal life involves granting to the resurrected believer 'immortality for eternal life.'

When we read all of these passages together, as is proper since they belong to the same lengthy discussion, we see that it is not the presence of the Spirit but the agency of the Spirit that is responsible for the resurrection to eternal life and for the present participation in eternal life experienced by the believer. Moreover, it is clear that the 'power' mentioned in *AH* 5.6.2 and the 'complete grace' spoken of in *AH* 5.8.1 refer to the same 'thing'—that which the Spirit gives to the believer in the process of vivification.

Even more clarification on this process comes from *AH* 5.3.3:

> But if this temporal life,[91] which is much weaker[92] than eternal life,[93] is nevertheless sufficiently able to vivify our mortal members, why should not eternal life, which is more effective,[94] vivify the flesh, which is already exercised and accustomed to bear the life?

In this crucial text we find what I have already mentioned with reference to Behr, that Irenaeus conceives of temporal life and eternal life as two modalities of the same life.[95] As such, there is only one type of life—the life lived by the human being. We should not, however, stop with the observation that Irenaeus has in mind two modalities of one life, for grasping what it is that causes life to modulate from temporal to eternal provides the thread that ties together all of the passages we have just been discussing.

Irenaeus declares that life is either 'much weaker,' that is temporal, or 'more effective,' that is eternal. The question as to what causes life to go from being 'much weaker' to being 'more effective' finds a ready answer in the passages from *AH* 5.6.2 through *AH* 5.8.1 which we have just discussed. We have seen that in those passages, Irenaeus says believers receive even now a portion of the grace (*gratia*) or power (*virtus*) that, when it comes in full at the time of the resurrection, produces eternal life. That is to say, the person who has temporal life, which is 'much weaker' according to *AH* 5.3.3, is given a certain amount of grace or power upon the reception of the Spirit that renders them 'spiritual even now.' That same person is then given the complete grace or power at the time of the resurrection, at which time he or she will experience eternal life, which is 'more effective' according to *AH* 5.3.3. It is, then, the degree of power or grace inhering in or sustaining one's life that determines whether that life is temporal or eternal.

[91] *Τὸ πρόσκαιρον ζνῆ*; *temporalis vita*.
[92] *Πολλῷ ἀσθενέστερον*; *multo infirmior*.
[93] *Τῆς αἰωνίας ζωῆς*; *aeterna vita*.
[94] *Τούτου δραστικωτέρα*; *tantum potens*.
[95] Behr offers a good discussion with regard to how the argument in this passage would fall apart if we understood Irenaeus to be referring to two different types of life (2000: 96–7). See also my discussion of the destruction that follows from the combination of contrary natures and the increase that follows from the combination of similar natures (chapter 5, pp. 138–40).

We can say, then, that Irenaeus conceives of the temporal and eternal modalities of life to be points on the 'line of life' which correspond to the degree of power or grace given to an individual. The temporal life possessed by all human beings corresponds to the minimal possession of power/grace, the eternal life experienced even now by believers corresponds to a life empowered/'engraced' more than temporal life but less than the eternal life experienced at the resurrection, and the eternal life at the resurrection entails the reception of the 'complete grace' or full empowerment.[96] Since Irenaeus states the Holy Spirit creates the breath of life (*AH* 5.12.2), and since the Holy Spirit bestows on the believer power/grace for eternal life in part now and in fullness at the resurrection (*AH* 5.6.2, 5.8.1), it seems reasonable to conclude the Spirit also bestows the degree of power/grace that results in the temporal life that comes through the reception of the breath of life.[97] Therefore, it is the instrumentality and not the presence of the Holy Spirit that guarantees the existence of only one Source of life, for the Spirit creates the breath of life and bestows the appropriate amounts of power or grace which correspond to temporal and eternal life.

Moreover, while this discussion has referred to the post-lapsarian modalities of life, it accords well with Irenaeus' description of the pre-lapsarian eternal life experienced by Adam and Eve as due to the continuance of the breath of life in its 'order and strength.'[98] It makes sense to understand the transition from the pre-lapsarian breath of life, characterized by 'order and strength' (eternal life), to the post-lapsarian breath of life, characterized by the loss of that 'order and strength' (temporal life), to have occurred according to the same dynamic that governs the transition from the post-lapsarian temporal life to eternal life. The Fall, then, entailed the loss of the degree of power/grace that had sustained the 'order and strength' of the breath of life. This is confirmed by a statement in *AH* 4.38.4, 'But since we (i.e. the human race as represented by Adam and Eve) could not bear the power (*potestatem*) of divinity, [God] says, "But you will

[96] We can represent this scheme according to the following line graph:



The line of Life

[97] In this way, we would read *AH* 2.34.4, noted above, as referring to the agency of the Spirit.
[98] *Prf* 14; see p. 166 n. 70 for the relevant quotation.

die like men."' Since the salvation made possible by Christ entails the immediate addition of a degree of power/grace and the eventual addition of the complete power/grace at the resurrection, we may characterize the divine economy as the means by which God restores the degree of power/grace necessary for eternal life that the human race lost by the Fall.[99]

6.4 PERFECTION, LIKENESS, ETERNALITY

Having identified the dynamic by which the life-giving activity of the Holy Spirit operates in the believer, I would like to finish this chapter by considering the terminology Irenaeus uses to describe the state of the believer who has received the Spirit and its concomitant gift of power/grace. Examining Irenaeus' description of the human being who possesses the Holy Spirit as 'perfect' or 'like unto God' will both give us additional insight into the effect of the presence of the Spirit in the believer, and insight into the ultimate state of the believer as 'perfect,' 'eternal,' 'like' God.[100] The most fundamental passage in this regard is *AH* 5.6.1; and as such, I will include a lengthy quotation:

> For by the Hands of the Father, that is, by the Son and the Holy Spirit, the human being, and not merely a part of the human being, was made in the likeness of God. Now the soul and Spirit can be a part of the human being, but by no means the human being; for the perfect (*perfectus*) human being is the commingling and union of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that flesh which was formed after the image of God. And because of this the apostle says, 'We speak wisdom among them that are perfect' [1 Cor. 2:6], calling 'perfect' those who have received the Spirit of God, and who through the Spirit speak in all languages, as even he himself used to speak, and just as we hear many brothers in

[99] In so saying, I do not mean to equate pre-lapsarian eternal life with eternal life in Christ. Such an equation would suggest that Irenaeus conceived of eternal life in Christ as returning believers to the *status quo ante*—the pre-lapsarian state of being. But such an understanding would not suit his conception of the divine economy as a progression from animation to vivification (Behr 2000: 95) provides two other reasons in addition to this one), nor would it suit his understanding of humanity as undergoing continual increase or growth (as I have already discussed in chapter 2 of this work). Rather, I am just arguing that according to Irenaeus, the addition or subtraction of power/grace is the dynamic by which life fluctuates between the modalities of temporal and eternal.

[100] J. Fantino has distinguished two senses of *similitudo* in Irenaeus' writing. First, when *similitudo* translates ὁμοιότης, it refers to the human free will which makes a person similar to his Creator, the Father; this likeness to God has remained unsullied by the Fall of Adam. Second, when *similitudo* translates ὁμοίωσις, Fantino believes it refers to the presence of the Holy Spirit, which in contrast to free will is lost at the time of the Fall (Fantino 1986: 110–18). My discussion in this section of the human being's likeness to God concerns this second sense, that which was lost and will be restored in full at the resurrection. It may be beneficial to point out that Irenaeus locates the image of God in the physical form of each human being (*AH* 2.7.6, 2.19.6, 5.12.4, *Prf* 11 and 22; *see* Fantino 1986: 87–9, 99–106).

> the Church, who have prophetic gifts, and who through the Spirit speak all kinds of languages, both making known the secrets of humanity for their benefit and exposing the mysteries of God. Who the apostle also calls 'spiritual,' being spiritual by partaking of the Spirit and not by a deprivation and removal of the flesh (and this stripping alone). For if any one take away the substance of flesh, that is, of the handiwork [of God], and understand that which is purely spiritual, such then would not be a spiritual man but would be the spirit of a man, or the Spirit of God. But when this Spirit commingled with the soul is united to the formation, because of the outpouring of the Spirit the human being is rendered spiritual and perfect (*perfectus*), and this is he who was made after the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit is lacking from the soul, such a one, remaining in fact animal and carnal, will be imperfect (*imperfectus*), possessing indeed the image in the formation, but certainly not receiving the likeness through the Spirit. Moreover, just as this one is imperfect (*imperfectus*), so too, if someone takes away the image and rejects the formation (*plasma*), one can no longer perceive a human being, but rather some part of a human being, as we have said, or even something other than a human being. For neither the formation of the flesh itself, by itself, is the perfect (*perfectus*) human being, but the body of a human being and a part of a human being; nor is the soul itself, by itself, a human being, but the soul of a human being and part of a human being; nor is the Spirit a human being, for it is called the Spirit and not a human being. But the commingling and union of all of these constitutes the perfect (*perfectum*) human being.

Here Irenaeus is discussing the reception of the Holy Spirit by believers following the sending of the Spirit by Jesus after his resurrection.[101] In the course of this discussion Irenaeus says several times that the person who possesses the Spirit is 'perfect.' Yet it appears that perfection is not determined by just the presence or absence of the Spirit, for the 'commingling and union of all of these (the body, soul, and Spirit) constitutes the perfect human being.'[102] This suggests that 'perfection' depends equally upon the possession of the body, soul, and Holy Spirit.

[101] This is clear from the reference to the 'outpouring of the Spirit' which Irenaeus ties to the sending of the Spirit by Jesus in *AH* 3.17.1–2, as I discussed in chapter 4. It is confirmed by the references in *AH* 5.6.1 to the possession of the Spirit at the time of 1 Corinthians, and the possession of the Spirit by members of the Church in Irenaeus' time: 'just as we hear many brothers in the Church . . .'.

[102] Behr (2000: 99–100) offers a good discussion of this passage insofar as he makes it clear that Irenaeus is speaking of the addition of the Holy Spirit and not a human spirit to the body and soul of the human being, 'the body and soul can be called "parts" of man in a way in which the Spirit cannot—for it is the Spirit, something other than man'. Yet, he errs when he says this passage discusses the 'eschatologically "perfect" man, made spiritual by the full bestowal of the Spirit in a manner newly made possible by Christ, and so made in the image and likeness of God.' For as the reader can see, this passage never speaks of differing degrees of the Spirit's presence, so that it is proper to speak of a 'full bestowal of the Spirit.' According to Irenaeus, the Spirit is either present rendering a person 'spiritual and perfect,' or the Spirit is not present, rendering a person 'imperfect.'

According to Irenaeus, the individual who possesses a soul and body is 'animal,' while the individual who possesses a soul, body, and Spirit is 'spiritual and perfect.' In this way, the believer possesses the Holy Spirit in a manner that is analogous to the possession of the body and soul.[103] Irenaeus uses both of the terms 'spiritual' and 'perfect' earlier in the pericope when he says the apostle terms '"perfect" those who have received the Spirit of God . . . just as we hear many brothers in the Church . . . whom the apostle also calls "spiritual," being spiritual by partaking of the Spirit and not by a deprivation and removal of the flesh (and this stripping alone).' Here we see that by defining the 'spiritual and perfect' person as one who has received the addition of the Spirit, Irenaeus is combating the Gnostic suggestion that a spiritual person is one who sheds the flesh and soul, becoming only Spirit.[104] It is this anti-Gnostic polemic, then, that leads him to emphasize the possession by the spiritual person of the body, soul, and Spirit, all three. The 'perfect' human being, then, is the one who possesses, in addition to the body and soul, the Holy Spirit.

The simple reception of the Holy Spirit, however, does not fully explain what Irenaeus means by the term 'perfect.' In *AH* 5.6.1 he identifies the perfect human being as 'he who was made after the image and likeness of God.'[105] Since Irenaeus associates the possession of the image of God with the physical formation of the human being, then Ireneaus is saying the 'likeness of God' comes to a human being by means of the reception of the Spirit.[106] That

[103] That the possession of the Spirit is not the same as the possession of the body and soul is clear from Irenaeus' identification of the body and soul as 'parts' of the human being, a term he does not apply to the Spirit: 'but the body of a human being and a part of a human being; nor is the soul itself, by itself, a human being, but the souls of a human being and part of a human being; nor is the Spirit a human being, for it is called the Spirit and not a human being.' Nevertheless, the believer does possess the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Irenaeus' quotation of 1 Thess. 5:23 ('Now may the God of peace sanctify you perfect (*perfectos*), and may your Spirit, and soul, and body be preserved whole without reproach to the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ'), in which he says 'your Spirit.' See Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 233): 'the Spirit of God who has been given to you and has thus become in some manner your own Spirit;' and also, SC 293 (1982: 339–40), where his comments are well stated, though they do not apply to *AH* 2.33.5, which is the occasion for them.

[104] See for instance, *AH* 2.29.1.

[105] In her attempt to affirm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit, de Andia reasons that if the spiritual and perfect person who possesses the Spirit is made in the image and likeness of God, then Adam, who was made in the image and likeness of God, must have possessed the Spirit (de Andia 1986: 71). In so doing, she fails to recognize that Adam and Eve were not created perfect, for human beings grow in perfection throughout the divine economy (as I will soon discuss). She cannot, then, reason backwards from Irenaeus' description of the spiritual and perfect person to Adam and Eve's original state of being.

[106] Here it is important to note that while the reception of the Spirit is the means by which the likeness of God is restored to human beings, the basis for this restoration is the person and work of Jesus Christ. On this latter point, *AH* 5.16.2 is instructive: 'When, however, the Word of God became flesh, he confirmed both of these (the original creation in the image and likeness): for he both showed forth the image truly, since He became himself what was his image; and he re-established the likeness in a sure manner, by assimilating (*συνεξομοιώσας*) the human being to the invisible Father through the Word made visible (*βλεπομένου*).'

the 'likeness' cannot be the simple possession of the Spirit is evident from the fact that Irenaeus never refers to the possession of the Spirit by Adam and Eve, just to their communion with the Holy Spirit.[107]

Returning to *AH* 5.8.1 grants additional insight into Irenaeus' understanding of 'perfection:'

> But we do now receive a certain portion of his (the Lord's) Spirit, [disposing us] towards perfection and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms 'an earnest,' that is, a part of the honor which has been promised to us by God . . . For if the earnest, gathering man into itself, even now causes him to say, 'Abba, Father,' what will the complete grace of the Spirit effect, which will be given to human beings by God? It will render us like unto him, and will accomplish the will of the Father; for it will make a human being after the image and likeness of God.

The possession of the Spirit by the believer, and the grace the Spirit bestows upon its reception, begins to accustom the believer 'to receive and bear God'—a process Irenaeus describes as '[disposing us] towards perfection' or 'preparing . . . for incorruption.' He gives more details about this period of accustomization in *AH* 5.8.2, where he writes:

> Those, then, who have the earnest of the Spirit and are not enslaved to the desires of the flesh, but are themselves subject to the Spirit and are living according to reason in all things, does the apostle rightly call 'spiritual,' because the Spirit of God dwells in them: indeed, incorporeal spirits will by no means be spiritual human beings,[108] but our substance, that is, the union of soul and flesh,[109] receiving (*assumens*) the Spirit of God, makes up the spiritual man (*spiritalem hominem perficit*[110]).

Here, the 'spiritual' person is not just an individual who has received the Spirit of God, for the reception of the Spirit entails the subjection of oneself to the Spirit, so that one is freed from the 'desires of the flesh' and walks 'according to reason.' In this way, believers conform to the character of God with whom they are united by means of the Spirit even now. So, with the future resurrection in mind, Irenaeus can say in *AH* 5.8.1 that believers are now being disposed 'towards perfection,' 'preparing . . . for incorruption,' or, as he says a little later in that passage, 'the mortal is swallowed up by immortality.' Each of

[107] As discussed earlier, pp. 161–2.

[108] As the Gnostics held, cf. *AH* 2.29.1.

[109] The ANF translator does the English readers of Irenaeus a disservice by rendering this phrase, *animae et carnis adunatio*, as 'the union of the flesh and spirit.' While Irenaeus clearly states the Spirit is received by the human substance, the soul and body, the ANF translation misleads readers into thinking spirit is a constituent part of the human substance.

[110] Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 244) suggests *ἀπετέλεσεν* as the original.

these phrases refers to the transformative effect of the grace of the Spirit in the life of the believer, which renders the believer spiritual or perfect in the present. In the same way Irenaeus can say at the end of *AH* 5.6.1 that 'the perfect (are those) who both have the Spirit of God remaining always in them, and have preserved their bodies and souls without blame.' Therefore, 'perfection' also refers to the process by which the believer conforms to the character of God at this present time by means of the presence of the Spirit and the concomitant reception of grace.

We have yet, though, to determine what Irenaeus means in *AH* 5.6.1 when he says the perfect person 'is he who was made after the image and likeness of God.' *AH* 5.8.1 makes a similar statement. There, Irenaeus describes the present moment in the believer's life as being disposed 'towards perfection,' the time in which the believer is 'being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God.' If believers are on the way toward perfection now, then at the end of this present period of the believer's life, at the resurrection, the believer arrives at the state of 'perfection' which coincides with the time at which the believer is now able 'to receive and bear God.' Both of these, the state of 'perfection' and the ability 'to receive and bear God,' correspond to the effect of the complete grace of the Spirit to which Irenaeus refers at the end of *AH* 5.8.1: 'It will render us like unto him, and will accomplish the will of the Father; for it will make a human being after the image and likeness of God.' Therefore, in another sense, the perfect person is the one who at the resurrection is able 'to receive and bear God' and the one who has been rendered 'like unto' God, that is, made 'after (both) the image and likeness of God.' Irenaeus makes a similar statement prior to this in *AH* 5.1.3:

> the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having been united with the ancient substance of the formation (*plasmationis*) of Adam rendered (*effecit*) man living (*viventem*) and perfect (*perfectum*), receptive (*capientem*) of the perfect Father, in order that as in the animal we all die, so in the spiritual we may all be made alive (*vivicemur*). For at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God, to whom the Father speaking, said, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness' [Gen. 1:26]. And on account of this, in the last times, not by the will of the flesh, nor by the will of man [John 1:13], but by the good pleasure of the Father, his Hands have rendered man living (*vivum perfecerunt hominem*), in order that Adam might be made (*fiat*) after the image and likeness of God.

This passage has, as its proper subject, the Incarnation. Yet, the perfection achieved by the humanity united to the Word in the Incarnation and anointed by the Spirit is both the basis for and the goal of the perfection of the believer.[111] Indeed, many of the themes we have encountered in this chapter occur in this passage. As we have seen, the reception of the Spirit (and, here, the

[111] We discussed Jesus' flesh as the saving principle for other human beings in chapter 4, esp. pp. 75–7.

Word) vivifies the human being, granting eternal life. As in *AH* 5.8.1, Irenaeus refers to the will of God as the impetus behind the restoration of the likeness to humanity. And as we have just been discussing, union with the Spirit (and Word) renders the human being perfect. Here, though, we find a crucial piece of information that Irenaeus does not mention in *AH* 5.8.1. *AH* 5.8.1 refers to the state of being at which the believer arrives after the period of accustomization, the state of being at which the believer is able 'to receive and bear God,' that is, the state of being in which the believer is 'like unto' God. According to *AH* 5.1.3, this state of being corresponds to the state of being of the Father: 'perfect.' The perfect human being is able to receive the perfect Father.

In order to understand this correlation, we must return for a moment to the discussion of *AH* 2.28.1–3 located in chapter 2 of this study. There, I observed that one of the keys to distinguishing the divine and human, the Creator from the creature, lies in whether that nature is complete, perfect, or incomplete, perpetually increasing. In comparison to the perfection of the Word and Spirit, human beings are inferior (*minores*) since creatures experience perpetual increase, and more recent (*novissimi*) since they are created. As I noted in chapter 2, the discussion of perfection in *AH* 2.28 has a parallel in *AH* 4.38.1; we now have the occasion for a closer examination of that passage along with *AH* 4.38.3. In 4.38, Irenaeus is explaining why God did not create human beings perfect from the start.[112] He writes:

> (*AH* 4.38.1) Those which were created by him, insofar as they have a beginning, they would be necessarily inferior to that one who created them. Indeed, it is impossible for uncreated things to be those which are recently created. Moreover, because they are not uncreated, for this reason they fall short of the perfect (τελείου/*perfecto*). Because as they are newer, so are they infantile, and as they are infantile, so are they unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline . . . (*AH* 4. 38.3) For insofar as they have been created, they are not uncreated; but insofar as they continue throughout a long course of ages, they will receive the power of the Uncreated, through the gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence to them by God . . . By this arrangement, therefore, and these rhythms, and this discipline/movement, the human being, created and formed, is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated God—the Father deciding and commanding, the Son

[112] Though I disagree with several aspects of his article, including the notion that two mutually incompatible theological systems exist within Irenaeus' writing, Brown does offer a succinct summary of the argument of *AH* 4.38, in *SJT* 28 (1975: 17–25, esp. 21–4). On the ideas of perfection and growth in Irenaeus, see Wingren (1959: 26–38). Wingren writes, 'When Irenaeus refrains from saying that the man whom God created was perfect . . . [there is] no suggestion that there was any weakness, want, or mortality in Adam' (p. 28). And, 'When he says that man lacks perfection he is simply giving expression to the fact that man is created, and therefore, he "grows," he "becomes," but he does not create like God' (pp. 28–9 n. 85).

> executing and forming, the Spirit nourishing and increasing, and the human being slowly making progress and ascending toward perfection (τὸ τέλειον), that is, drawing near to the uncreated One. For the Uncreated is perfect, and this one is God.[113]

As in *AH* 2.28.1–3, here perfection is tied to being uncreated. God is perfect because he is not created; human beings are not perfect because they are created. That is to say, God is perfect because he is eternal; human beings are not perfect because they have a beginning in time. Moreover, since human beings are created and, so to speak, younger than the Uncreated, they are 'unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline (τὴν τελείαν ἀγωγήν; *perfectam disciplinam*).' And yet, given the proper amount of time, which allows for the unfolding of the divine economy, including the redemptive work of Christ and the reception of the Spirit as discussed in *AH* 4.38.2, human beings 'will receive the power of the Uncreated, through the gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence' and will be 'rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated God,' once again tying together the reception of power and grace with eternal life and the restoration of the likeness of God. He concludes by characterizing this process as a gradual ascent[114] to the perfect, which, he is careful to say, does not result in human beings being as perfect as God, but rather results in their approximation to God, the uncreated One, the perfect One.

Believers then experience an unending ascent in which, as human beings, they grow increasingly more perfect, ever closer to the nature of God, but never arriving. Perfection or the state of being uncreated is, in the simplest of terms, eternality. Strictly speaking, the Creator alone, the one who has no beginning or end, is perfect or uncreated—eternal. As a result, human beings, as creatures, will never be as perfect/eternal as the Uncreated. Yet, human beings can by the power/grace of God, inasmuch as it is possible for a creature, become perfect, eternal. In so becoming, human beings are 'like' God, but just 'like' God, for the perfection or eternal life acquired by human beings is one that suits the creature, that which has a beginning and remains ever increasing.

When we combine *AH* 4.38.1 and 4.38.3 with *AH* 5.1.3, *AH* 5.6.1 and *AH* 5.8.1–2 it becomes clear that Irenaeus envisioned the life of the human being as having the potential to go from imperfection to perfection. We can speak of a growth in perfection that corresponds to the movement of the divine economy from animal to spiritual. No human beings, as creatures, are perfect at the time of their creation.[115] This includes Adam and Eve, who, nevertheless, prior to the Fall possessed a soul characterized by 'order and strength' which afforded them

[113] Cf. *AH* 2.34.2.
[114] Cf. *AH* 5.8.1: 'being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God.'
[115] *AH* 4.38.1.

eternal life as long as they remained obedient, maintaining this quality of the soul.[116]

As I argued earlier, it makes sense for us to understand the 'order and strength' of the soul as being due to the power/grace of the Spirit, but the Fall disrupted the communion of Adam and Eve with the Spirit, which resulted in the loss of the power/grace that sustained the 'order and strength' of their souls.[117] The post-lapsarian status of Adam and Eve as possessors of temporal life alone carried over into their progeny; so that following the Fall, all human beings possess just the minimal amount of power/grace, granted by the Spirit to the soul, that results in temporal life.[118]

Yet, some human beings, those who choose to believe in Christ, receive the Holy Spirit and the attendant increase in power/grace.[119] At the time of the reception of the Spirit, these human beings first qualify to be called 'perfect' or 'spiritual,' not because they are as perfect as they can be, but because they have an 'earnest' of their future perfection in their possession of the Holy Spirit[120] and because they are increasing in perfection.[121]

These human beings, who have received the Holy Spirit, will receive at the time of their resurrection the fullness of the Spirit's power/grace, which will result in the possession of perfection or eternal life inasmuch as it is possible for the creature. This final state of being of the believer entails the highest approximation of the human being to God. In possessing eternal existence or perfection as much as it is possible for the human being, the believer is made in the likeness of God.[122] In so becoming, the likeness, the eternal life that once belonged to the progenitors of the race prior to their Fall, is restored to human beings.[123] And yet, the fact that these human beings can now be termed 'perfect' indicates that this state of being is not a simple restoration to the original state. Increase has occurred. Perfection includes the restoration of eternal life, but the growth which has occurred in perfect discipline means that believers now approximate the perfection of God—a point never made

[116] *Prf* 14–15.
[117] *AH* 4.38.4, *Prf* 15.
[118] *AH* 5.8.1 and 5.3.3.
[119] *AH* 5.8.1.
[120] *AH* 5.6.1, 5.8.1.
[121] The accustomization of the believer to God which entails the increase in 'perfect discipline' (*AH* 4.38.1, *AH* 5.8.1), which itself involves subordination to the Spirit and freedom from lusts of the flesh, so that the body and soul are blameless (*AH* 5.6.1, *AH* 5.8.2).
[122] *AH* 4.38.3, 5.1.3, 5.8.1.
[123] De Andia (1986: 72) identifies the likeness with incorruptibility; Behr says, 'the truly living man is the glory of God, and this is the one who was fashioned in the image *and likeness* of God' (Behr 2000: 115; author's emphasis).

about Adam and Eve.[124] It is this perfect human being, the one who 'approximates the uncreated One,' that is able to receive the perfect God.[125]

Chapter Conclusion

Several conclusions have emerged from the sections of this chapter. First, Irenaeus understands the Holy Spirit to be present in believers only. Second, the human being is composed of body and soul alone. Third, the life-giving activity of the Spirit functions according to a dynamic of grace/power, whereby the reception of an additional amount of grace/power modulates life from temporal to eternal. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the source of all life because of its instrumentality, not its presence. Fourth, Irenaeus' idea of 'perfection' includes (a) the composition of an individual as body, soul, and Holy Spirit; (b) the period of growth or accustomization which begins upon the reception of the Holy Spirit by the believer; and (c) the final state of being, in which the human being approximates the uncreated One by possessing eternal existence, inasmuch as it is possible for a created being, and so, as eternal, is 'like' God.

We have also seen that the Holy Spirit becomes more closely united to believers over the course of the divine economy. This aligns with the movement of the economy from animation by the soul to vivification by the Spirit. Prior to the Fall, Adam and Eve enjoyed unbroken communion with God, including the Holy Spirit, as is seen in their reception of the robe of sanctity. After the Fall and prior to the coming of Christ, the patriarchs, prophets, and righteous ones, the followers of God, were growing accustomed to receiving and bearing God. They enjoyed the presence of the Holy Spirit in them—a presence which gave them hope for salvation. After the completion of the Christological mission, believers in Christ receive, in a new manner, the Holy Spirit sent to them by the resurrected Christ. They possess the Holy Spirit as the 'earnest' of their future inheritance, and thereby become even now spiritual, mortality being swallowed up by immortality, in anticipation of their future reception of the complete grace/power of the Spirit, which will render them like unto God, the possessors of eternal life.

In summary, prior to the Fall, the Spirit was present to—but not present or dwelling in—Adam and Eve. After the Fall, the Spirit was present in the righteous, but not in such a way that they can be said to have possessed the Spirit. After the redemptive work of Christ, the Spirit is present in and possessed by believers: as the Spirit of the believer, the Holy Spirit is an essential element in the composition of the perfect human being.

[124] In so saying, I have joined together the ideas of the restoration of humanity to the pre-Fall status and of the perfection of humanity beyond the state of the original creation. Brown, SJT 28 (1975: 17) incorrectly declares that each of these 'themes . . . generates a separate theological system, and that the two systems are mutually incompatible on a number of important issues'.

[125] *AH* 5.1.3.

7

Trinitarian Convictions, Trinitarian Logic

We began this study by examining Justin Martyr's theology of the Holy Spirit. Our analysis led to the determination that Justin's account often fails to distinguish the activity of the Holy Spirit from that of the Word, and twice fails to distinguish their identities. We saw that his failure to maintain the distinct identities of the Holy Spirit and the Word is linked to his incorporation of Spirit-Christology, the identification of the Holy Spirit with the pre-existent Christ, which obscurs the distinction between the Word and Spirit. Moreover, Justin founded his Spirit-Christology upon the classification of both the Word and Spirit as irreducible Powers, a certain category of angelic beings. An angelomorphic pneumatology and Christology, then, are the grounds for his Spirit-Christology. As a result, though his Trinitarian convictions are beyond doubt, the binitarian logic that pervades his thought jeopardizes his Trinitarianism because he fails to adequately distinguish both the activity and identities of the Word and Holy Spirit.

Previous scholars have on occasion found similar tendencies in Irenaeus. These scholars have argued that both Spirit-Christology, and angelomorphic pneumatology and Christology exist within Irenaeus' work. In this chapter I will show that Irenaeus does not appropriate Spirit-Christology in the strict sense (the identification of the pre-existent Christ as the Holy Spirit), nor does he utilize angelomorphic pneumatology or Christology. This will permit us to conclude that Irenaeus' logic is not susceptible to the binitarian tendencies that follow from the incorporation of these patterns of thought. His theological account is firmly Trinitarian.

7.1 SPIRIT-CHRISTOLOGY

In order for Spirit-Christology[1] to jeopardize the Trinitarian logic of his theology, Irenaeus must identify the Holy Spirit as the pre-existent Christ. That is to say, in his Christology, Irenaeus must identify the Holy Spirit with the Word/Son, or substitute the Holy Spirit for the Word/Son as that which is incarnated. It is not

[1] For a definition of Spirit-Christology, *see* p. 10 n. 2.

enough to show that Irenaeus describes the Word as Spirit or identifies the divinity of Jesus as Spirit, because the ambiguity of the term 'Spirit' means it is theologically accurate, though perhaps problematic in this particular context, to refer to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as Spirit. According to this usage, 'Spirit' refers to what God is, the immaterial divine 'stuff' that is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 'God is Spirit' according to John 4:24. A statement that refers to Jesus as composed of flesh and Spirit, using this idea of Spirit, is orthodox and poses no hindrance to Trinitarian logic.

In the past, though, some have decided that in a few passages Irenaeus does identify the Holy Spirit with the Word as the pre-existent Christ. This determination accords with their classification of his thought as binitarian, or at least as possessing a tension between binitarianism and Trinitarianism.[2] Such readings of Irenaeus are incorrect. In this section, I will show that the type of Spirit-Christology present in Irenaeus' work cannot be used to ascribe a binitarian orientation to Irenaeus' theological account. While Irenaeus refers to the divine component of Jesus Christ as Spirit, he does so in order to identify the common divine 'stuff' shared by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. That is to say, by labeling the divine component of Jesus as Spirit, he is simply stating that Jesus is divine. At no time does he identify the Holy Spirit as the pre-existent Christ, that which is incarnated, or as the Word/Son without reference to the Incarnation.[3]

I will divide my discussion of Irenaeus' Spirit-Christology into two parts. The first will treat passages that have been erroneously labeled as Spirit-Christological.[4] The second will consider passages that utilize Spirit language to refer to the divine element of Jesus.

7.1.1 Non-Spirit-Christological Passages

Two passages require our attention in this section: *AH* 4.31.2 and *Prf* 97.[5] Both make nearly identical statements about the reception of the Holy Spirit by

[2] Loofs, (1930: 346); Simonetti, *Aug* 12 (1972: 231).

[3] In this determination Hans-Jochen Jaschke, who argues against Loofs' Spirit-Christological reading, has preceded me (*Der Heilige Geist*, 1976: 226–30). Yet, Jaschke addresses only a few of the germane texts, and does not provide a detailed analysis of those he does address. Long ago, Hitchcock did provide a brief examination of many of the texts to which Loofs appeals (Hitchcock *ZNW* 36 1937: 35–60, here 35–8), but he does not refer to some of the texts which received more recent attention by Simonetti (*Aug* 12 1972: 214, 220–1). Simonetti, in fact, either overlooks or ignores Hitchcock and is himself overlooked or ignored by Jaschke.

[4] I will not take the time to address the passages that Loofs' alters, by subtraction or addition, in order to render them Spirit-Christological. For these passages, see Hitchcock, *ZNW* 36 (1937: 35–8).

[5] In addition to these passages, there has been a persistent tendency to view *AH* 5.1.3 as Spirit-Christological. Both Loofs (1930: 240 n. 1) and Simonetti, *Aug* 12 (1972: 214, 220–1) base their convictions on the sentence, 'the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having been united with the ancient substance of the formation of Adam rendered man living and perfect.' Loofs

believers in Christ, and both have been misunderstood to refer to the incarnation of the Spirit.[6] *AH* 4.31.2 reads:

> Moreover, by their (Lot's daughters') words it is signified that there is no other person who is able to confer the begetting of children on the older and younger synagogues than our father. Now the father of the human race is the Word of God, as Moses made clear by saying, 'Is not this one your father who has acquired you, and made you, and created you?' [Deut. 32:6 LXX]. At what time, then, did he pour out upon the human race the life-giving seed, that is, the Spirit of the remission of sins, by whom we are vivified? Was it not at that time when he was eating with human beings, and drinking wine upon the earth? For it is said, 'The Son of man came eating and drinking' [Matt. 11:19]; and when having laid down, he fell asleep, and took repose. As he says himself in David, 'I slept and took repose' [Ps. 3:6]. And because He used thus to act while He dwelt and lived among us, he said again, 'And my sleep became sweet to me' [Jer. 31:26]. Now, all [this] was signified by Lot, because the seed of the father of all, that is, the Spirit of God, by whom all things have been made, was commingled and united with flesh, that is, with his own formation, by which commingling and unity the two synagogues, that is, the two congregations, produce from their father living sons for the living God.[7]

With these words, Irenaeus provides an allegorical interpretation of the story in Genesis 19 of the impregnation of Lot's daughters. The phrase of particular interest is 'the Spirit of God . . . was commingled and united with flesh,' which, as we will see, both Loofs and Simonetti understand to be Spirit-Christological. A proper understanding of this passage, however, depends upon recognizing that the meaning of the final sentence of *AH* 4.31.2 is determined by its

holds that 'the Word of the Father' is an interpolation, while Simonetti argues that 'the Word of Father' and 'the Spirit of God' stand in parallel. Both opinions have the effect of identifying the Holy Spirit with the pre-existent Christ. Hitchcock has already shown Loofs' reading to be inaccurate (*ZNW* 36 (1938: 36–7)), and his comments also apply to Simonetti's interpretation, though Simonetti appears unaware of them. I will add one observation to Hitchcock's well-reasoned analysis. Hitchcock points out that the context of this statement is Irenaeus' identification of the Word and Spirit as the Hands of God to whom the Father is speaking in Gen. 1:26. I would like to mention that Irenaeus had already interpreted Gen. 1:26 as containing the Father's discourse with his Hands, both the Word and the Spirit, in *AH* 4.pref.4 and *AH* 4.20.1—it is a well-established interpretation by *AH* 5.1.3. Cf. Orbe, who says *AH* 5.1.3 has two possible interpretations: (1) *Verbum Patris* refers to the person, *Spiritus Dei* to the divine nature; (2) *Verbum Patris* refers to the second person, *Spiritus Dei* to the third (Orbe 1985–88 vol. 1: 107). Orbe recommends the second reading.

[6] With regard to *AH* 4.31.2, see Loofs (1930: 101–13); and Simonetti, *Aug* 12 (1972: 213–14). With regard to *Prf* 97, see Robinson (1920: 64–5, 67); Carpenter, *JTS* 40 (1939: 31–6, here 33 n. 3); and Kelly (1960: 148), who refers to Robinson.

[7] The last sentence reads: *Totum autem significabatur per Lot, quoniam semen Patris omnium, hoc est Spiritus Dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, commixtus et unitus est carni, hoc est plasmati suo, per quam commixtionem et unitatem duae synagogae, id est duae congregationes, fructificant ex patre suo filios vivos vivo Deo.*

context—an approach neither Loofs nor Simonetti takes. In order to understand the selection above, then, we must begin in *AH* 4.31.1, where Irenaeus first discusses the typological significance of the figures in the story of Gen. 19.

> So then, since this man (Lot) did not know [what he did], and was not a slave to pleasure, the economy [of God] was brought about, by which the two daughters, that is, the two synagogues, from one and the same father gave birth to children, it was revealed, without the pleasure of the flesh. For there was no other person able to give to them a seed of life and [a means] for the bearing of children.[8]

It is necessary to pay strict regard to the typological referent of each figure in the story in order to understand Irenaeus' allegory. Of utmost importance is the recognition that all of *AH* 4.31.2 expands upon the allegorical reading of Gen. 19 that Irenaeus begins in *AH* 4.31.1. This means that the typological referents he establishes in *AH* 4.31.1–2 never change during the course of this discussion.[9] In *AH* 4.31.1, then, Irenaeus begins his interpretation of the story of Lot and his daughters. He writes that only Lot could impart to his two daughters the 'seed of life' by which they could give birth to children. In so saying, he establishes the paradigm for the production of children that will govern his interpretation in *AH* 4.31.2: the father imparted a 'life-giving seed' to his daughters that enabled them to produce children. In this process, the father, the seed, the daughters, and the children are distinct from each other.[10] Moreover, Irenaeus provides the first typological referent for some of the figures in the story: the daughters are the two synagogues.[11]

Having in place the paradigm for the production of children and the identification of the two daughters as the two synagogues, Irenaeus unfolds the rest of the text's meaning in *AH* 4.31.2. The 'father of the human race' who gave the 'life-giving seed' to the 'older and younger synagogues' is the Word of God. The 'life-giving seed' that the Word, as the father of the human race, '[poured] out upon the human race' is the 'Spirit of the remission of sins.' The Spirit of the remission of sins was poured out on the human race at the time of the Incarnation of the Word: when he ate, drank, and slept.[12]

[8] *Σπέρμα ζωτικὸν καὶ τέκνων ἐπικαρπίαν δυνάμενος δοῦναι αὐταῖς*; *semen vitale et filiorum fructum posset dare eis*; the Armenian has պտղաւորութիւն (*fructificationem*) for *fructum*.

[9] Bacq (1978: 214–15) takes this approach.

[10] The paradigm is a straightforward reference to the physical insemination of a woman by a man in order to produce a child.

[11] The two synagogues refer to the Jewish and Gentile people-groups. Cf. Loofs (1930: 105); Bacq (1978: 214–15).

[12] By saying, 'when having laid down, he fell asleep, and took repose,' Ireneaus probably means the Spirit was given by the Incarnate Word after his death, as he speaks of the sending of the Spirit elsewhere (e.g. *AH* 3.17.1–2). Both Loofs (1930: 107) and Bacq (1978: 214–15) interpret these words as referring to Jesus' death.

We have now all the typological referents for the figures in the story of Gen. 19 which, when placed into the paradigm for the production of children that Irenaeus established in *AH* 4.31.1, produce his complete allegorical reading. At the time of his incarnation, the Word, as the father of the human race, poured out the Spirit of the remission of sins, the life-giving seed, upon the two synagogues, which enabled them to produce children. By the production of children he is referring to the adoption as sons of God, as is indicated by his qualification of the Spirit as the 'Spirit of the remission of sin.' The reception of the Spirit produced a 'spiritual' birth, the modulation of temporal life to eternal life that we discussed in the last chapter. Such is Irenaeus' allegorical interpretation of the story of Lot and his daughters in Gen. 19.

Spirit-Christological readings of this passage depend upon interpretations of the last sentence of *AH* 4.31.2 that do not accord with the allegorical interpretation which precedes it, in effect separating it from its context.[13] Loofs contends the 'Spirit of the remission of sins' cannot be the same as the 'Spirit of God, by whom all things have been made.'[14] This determination permits him to say the Spirit of God is that which was 'commingled and united to flesh' in the Incarnation. Loofs supports his reading with two arguments that must be discarded because of their methodological errors. First, he appeals to a Spirit-Christological reading in Tertullian, *de carne Christi* 18, a text that is immaterial because of its later date. Second, he contends that this interpretation is self-evident if the sentence is allowed to stand on its own—that is, if we do not take into consideration what Irenaeus said earlier in *AH* 4.31.1–2.[15] This approach does not demonstrate his reading so much as it permits any reading of the text. Simonetti, on the other hand, claims that the term 'Spirit of God,' in and of itself, has a personal and specific sense, and is here identical to the Word.[16] His assertion that the meaning of 'Spirit of God' is inherently personal and specific is, however, baseless. Irenaeus uses 'Spirit of God' to refer to both the divine nature and the Holy Spirit.[17] As such, context

[13] Loofs believes that the last sentence in *AH* 4.31.2 reflects the Spirit-Christological theology of the presbyter from whom Irenaeus is borrowing, while the earlier discussion of *AH* 4.31.1–2 reflects the Logos-Christology of Irenaeus himself (Loofs 1930: 103–13, esp. 109–10). Jaschke has argued against the logic that undergirds this move by Loofs (*Der Heilige Geist*, 1976: 227–8). Simonetti does not base his argument on such discord.

[14] I have already shown during the course of this study that Irenaeus does, in fact, ascribe to the Holy Spirit both a role in redemption and a role in creation.

[15] Loofs (1930: 109–10).

[16] Simonetti, *Aug* 12 (1972: 213–14). Simonetti does not argue this point from Irenaeus, but rather asserts it.

[17] For the Spirit of God as the divine nature, see my discussion in chapter 2 of *AH* 2.30 and esp. 2.30.8: 'And truly he is the Spirit of God, not in fact an animal Demiurge, otherwise he never would have brought about the spiritual (pl.). If, on the other hand, he is animal, let them tell us by whom the spiritual (pl.) are made.' For the Spirit of God as the Holy Spirit, *see* (1) the discussions of *AH* 3.9.3 and *AH* 3.17.1 in chapter 4 on the anointing of Jesus by the Holy Spirit and his subsequent sending; (2) the discussions in chapters 5 and 6 of the Spirit of God as one of the

must always be the factor that determines what he means by 'Spirit of God.' A contextual reading of this passage directs the reader to identify the 'Spirit of God, by whom all things are made' with the 'Spirit of the remission of sins' sent by the Incarnate Word.

In fact, the concluding words of *AH* 4.31.2, the portion of this passage that is said to be Spirit-Christological, summarize the interpretation of Gen. 19 that Irenaeus just provided. So much is clear from the opening phrase of that lengthy sentence: 'Now, all (this) was signified by Lot.' Since they reiterate what has come before, any interpretation of these final words that does not conform to the foregoing discussion must be excluded from consideration. From the start, then, we cannot read this passage as Spirit-Christological since the preceding allegory in *AH* 4.31.1–2 militates against this reading. Rather than identifying the Word and the Spirit, it differentiates the two: the father of the human race gave the seed that causes impregnation—the Word poured out the Spirit that produces life.

This *a priori* determination of the meaning of the last sentence is supported by an examination of the words themselves. The 'seed of the father of all' refers to the Spirit of the remission of sins sent by the Word, the father of the whole human race. He inserts the interjection, 'that is, the Spirit of God, by whom all things have been made' in order to make sure his readers continue to identify the seed as the Spirit. As earlier in *AH* 4.31.1–2, here at the end of *AH* 4.31.2 the Spirit is that which was given by the Word to enable the production of children. The seed, the Spirit of God, 'was commingled and united with flesh, that is, with his own formation, by which commingling and unity the two synagogues, that is, the two congregations, produce from their father living sons for the living God.'

It is not necessary to advance a Spirit-Christological interpretation in order to understand what Irenaeus means by the Spirit being 'commingled and united with flesh.' As we saw in the last chapter, he uses this language to refer to the reception of the Spirit sent by Christ to those who believe in him. So, for example, he writes in *AH* 5.6.1, 'when this Spirit commingled (*commixtus*) with the soul is united (*unitur*) to the formation, because of the outpouring of the Spirit the human being is rendered spiritual and perfect, and this is he who was made after the image and likeness of God.'[18] Therefore, we can say these words do not refer to the incarnation of the Spirit of God, but rather to the reception of the Spirit by both Jews and Gentiles, a reception which results in their adoption as 'living sons for the living God.' As such,

Hands of God in *AH* 5.1.3; and (3) numerous references to the Spirit of God in the passages discussed in chapter 6 with regard to the role of the Holy Spirit in redemption.

[18] Also in *AH* 5.6.1: 'the perfect human being is the commingling and union (*commixtio et adunitio est*) of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and the admixture (*admixtae*) of that flesh which was formed after the image of God;' and again in *AH* 5.6.1, 'But the commingling (*commixtio*) and union (*unitio*) of all of these (Spirit, soul, and flesh) constitutes the perfect human being.'

Irenaeus' thought remains consistent throughout *AH* 4.31.1–2: the Word, as the father of the human race, poured out the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the remission of sins, so that both Jews and gentiles may be rendered living sons for the living God.

A striking similarity exists between this passage in *AH* 4.31.2 and the selection from *Prf* 97 that some regard as Spirit-Christological. Irenaeus begins *Prf* 97 with an affirmation of thanksgiving to 'God who, through his abundant, inscrutable and unfathomable wisdom, saved us and preached the salvation from heaven, which is the visible advent of our Lord, that is, His human existence.' This introduction, which eulogizes the wisdom of God, leads to an extended quotation of Baruch 3:29–4:1. In this passage, God gives the figure of Wisdom to 'Jacob, his servant, and to Israel, his beloved.' We pick up *Prf* 97 from this point, from the giving of Wisdom to Jacob and Israel. The selection begins with Baruch 3:37 and includes Irenaeus' interpretation of the passage.

> 'After which she appeared on earth and conversed with men. This is the book of the commandments of God, and of the law, which is for ever. All who keep her [are] unto life; but they who forsake her, will die.' 'Jacob' and 'Israel' he calls the Son of God, who received from the Father dominion over our life, and after receiving [it], he 'brought [her] down' to us, to those who are far from her, when 'he[19] appeared on earth and conversed with men,' mixing and blending the Spirit of God the Father with the handiwork of God, that man might be according to the image and likeness of God.

The interpretation of the last lines of this selection from *Prf* 97 as Spirit-Christological dates back to J. Armitage Robinson's comments in the introduction to his translation of the *Proof*. Robinson interprets 'mixing and blending the Spirit of God the Father with the handiwork of God' as a reference to the Incarnation, and compares it to *AH* 4.20.4.[20] In *AH* 4.20.4 Irenaeus speaks of both the Incarnation and the redemption of humanity:

> Now this is his Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times was made a man among men, . . . the prophets . . . proclaimed his advent according to the flesh, by which the commingling and communion (*commixtio et communio*) of God and man was brought about. . . . Causing us to serve him in holiness and righteousness all our days, in order that man, having embraced (*complexus*)[21] the Spirit of God, might pass into the glory of the Father.

Robinson rightly observes about this passage, 'the general thought here is that the restoration of man takes place after the pattern of the Incarnation'[22]

[19] The Armenian could also be read as 'she.'
[20] Robinson (1920: 64–5).
[21] Robinson (1920: 64 n. 1) suggests the original Greek was *συμπλεκόμενος*.
[22] Ibid. 64.

His full comment is less astute: 'the general thought here is that the restoration of man takes place after the pattern of the Incarnation—the intermingling of human flesh with the Spirit of God. If the Spirit of God in the Incarnation is thought of primarily as Christ himself, yet there is no sharp distinction drawn between Christ as Spirit and the Spirit that works in believers.'[23]

This Spirit-Christological reading of *AH* 4.20.4 and *Prf* 97 rests upon assumptions, not a demonstration. Robinson presumes the 'Spirit of God' at the end of *AH* 4.20.4 is identical to the Word, but Irenaeus gives no indication it should be read in this way. We are left to conclude that Robinson identifies the Spirit and the Word just because Irenaeus envisions the union of God and man to occur in a similar way in both the Incarnation and the redemption of human beings. It is better, however, to conclude that Irenaeus envisions a similar process for both because both the Incarnation of the Word and the reception of the Spirit by believers involve the bringing together of the same constituent 'elements': the union of the divine with the human.

This interpretation accords with Irenaeus' clear statements, as discussed in the last chapter, that the redemption of human beings involves the commixture and union of the soul and body of the believer with the Holy Spirit.[24] When Irenaeus writes, 'mixing and blending the Spirit of God the Father with the handiwork of God, that man might be according to the image and likeness of God,' he is referring to the reception by the believer of the Holy Spirit sent by Christ.[25] In fact, a quick comparison of the debated portions of *AH* 4.31.2 and *Prf* 97 with *AH* 5.6.1, which we discussed in the last chapter, will demonstrate that they contain the exact same sentiments.[26]

> (*AH* 4.31.2) . . . the seed of the Father of all, that is, the Spirit of God, by whom all things have been made, was commingled and united (*commixtus et unitus est*) with flesh, that is, with his own formation, by which commingling and unity (*commixtionem et unitatem*) the two synagogues, that is, the two congregations, produce from their Father living sons for the living God.
>
> (Prf 97) . . . after receiving [it], he (the Son of God) 'brought [her] down' to us, to those who are far from her, when 'he appeared on earth and conversed with men,'

[23] Robinson (1920: 64–5). This reading was affirmed about a decade later by Carpenter (*JTS* 40 1939: 33 n. 3), and then again by Kelly (1960: 148), who follows Robinson.

[24] This reading enables Irenaeus' discussion in *AH* 4.20.4 to agree with that of *AH* 4.20.3, which contains his strongest statement about the eternal distinction of the Holy Spirit, as Wisdom, from the Word, the Son. It makes little sense for Irenaeus to blur the identities of the Word and Spirit in *AH* 4.20.4, as Robinson's reading entails, immediately after he establishes their eternal distinction in *AH* 4.20.2–3.

[25] Rousseau writes, 'man, considered not in an abstract fashion, but in a concrete and existential fashion, in the free opening of himself to God by which he finds his supreme completion, "is constituted" of body, of soul and of Holy Spirit' (SC 406 1995: 350).

[26] Rousseau also points out that the 'theological anthropology' we find in *Prf* 97 is 'firmly elaborated' in *AH* 5, SC 406 (1995: 350).

> mixing and blending (խառնեալ եւ զանգեալ) the Spirit of God the Father with the handiwork of God, that man might be according to the image and likeness of God.
>
> (*AH* 5.6.1) . . . when this Spirit commingled (*commixtus*) with the soul is united (*unitur*) to the formation, because of the outpouring of the Spirit the human being is rendered spiritual and perfect, and this is he who was made after the image and likeness of God.[27]

Each of these passages discusses the giving of the Spirit to human beings, the reception of which Irenaeus understands to involve a blending and union of the Holy Spirit with the soul and flesh of the believer. The similarity of *Prf* 97 to Irenaeus' full discussion in *AH* 4.31.2 extends even further. Both refer to the common human activities of Jesus on earth to establish the time at which he gave the Spirit: eating, drinking, and 'sleeping' in *AH* 4.31.2, and holding conversations in *Prf* 97. Therefore, neither *Prf* 97 nor *AH* 4.31.2 should be considered to be a statement of Spirit-Christology. These passages can be well understood as references to the reception by the believer of the Holy Spirit sent by Christ for his or her redemption.

7.1.2 Spirit-Christological Passages

The second part of this discussion considers Irenaeus' utilization of Spirit language to refer to the divine component of Jesus Christ, in other words, to say that Jesus is divine. This type of Spirit-Christology occurs in two places, *AH* 5.1.2 and *Prf* 71. In the past, however, some have identified the references to the Spirit in these texts with the pre-existent Christ. So, for instance, Simonetti states these passages do 'not indicate the divine nature of Christ, but specifically his person.'[28]

In *AH* 5.1.2 Irenaeus is writing against the 'disciples of Valentinus' who maintained Jesus only appeared to be a man so that they could disparage the salvation of the flesh.[29] Against this docetic notion of the advent of the Word, he contends:

[27] Also in *AH* 5.6.1: 'the perfect human being is the commingling and union (*commixtio et adunitio est*) of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and the admixture (*admixtae*) of that flesh which was formed after the image of God;' and again in *AH* 5.6.1, 'But the commingling (*commixtio*) and union (*unitio*) of all of these (Spirit, soul, and flesh) constitutes the perfect human being.'

[28] Simonetti, *Aug* 12 (1972: 214). See also, Robinson (1920: 63–5); Loofs (1930: 240–1).

[29] *AH* 5.1.2: 'For [Jesus] would not have been one truly possessing flesh and blood, by which he redeemed us, unless he had summed up in himself the ancient formation of Adam. Vain therefore are the disciples of Valentinus who put forth this opinion, in order that they may exclude the flesh from salvation, and cast aside what God has fashioned' (ANF translation).

> But vain are those who say he [just] seemed to appear. For these things did not appear, but happened in reality (ὑποστάσει) and truth. Indeed, if he who was not a man appeared to be a man, then neither did he remain what he was in truth, [that is,] Spirit of God, since the Spirit is invisible, nor was any truth in him, for he was not what he appeared to be.[30]

Prior to this selection, Irenaeus begins the chapter in *AH* 5.1.1 with a strong affirmation of the Incarnation of the Word of God: 'For in no other way could we have learned the things of God, unless our Master, existing as the Word, became human . . . Again, we could not have learned in any other way except by seeing our teacher, and by perceiving his voice with our ears.' A few sentences later he refers to the 'Word, who is perfect in all things, since [he is] the mighty Word and true man, redeeming us by his blood in accordance with reason, he gave himself as a redemption for those who had been led into captivity.' The Word's advent, then, resulted in his being able to be seen, to be heard, and to shed blood. That is to say, he was truly human, he did not just appear to be so.

Since the above debated words follow in this train of thought, there can be no doubt that Irenaeus here considers Jesus to be the Incarnation of the Word, not the incarnation of the Spirit. Thus, having established the true Incarnation of the Word in *AH* 5.1.1, he begins *AH* 5.1.2 by arguing that the claims of his opponents are self-contradictory. If the Word only appeared to be a man, then what was seen must be Spirit, for the Word, as God, is Spirit: *Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*. Such a statement rests upon an understanding of the Spirit as that which was divine in Jesus: the Incarnation of the Word was the union of Spirit and humanity.[31] Yet, his opponents claim the Word was seen despite not being truly human, which is a problem since 'the Spirit is invisible.'[32] If Jesus as Spirit alone can be seen, then Jesus was neither truly human, nor was the Word truly Spirit of God—if they say he was not human, then they are also saying he was not divine.[33]

[30] Readers should beware of the discordant ANF translation of this passage.

[31] Cf. Orbe's similar reading (Orbe 1985–8, vol. 1: 83–4).

[32] The reader should not construe the presence of the article in *ἐπεὶ ἀόρατον τὸ Πνεῦμα* to denote the person of the Holy Spirit, for two reasons. First, *Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* is inarticulate, and *τὸ Πνεῦμα* refers to it. And second, Irenaeus has just distinguished the Holy Spirit from the Incarnate Word in the final sentences of *AH* 5.1.1, 'the Lord thus has redeemed us through his own blood, giving his soul for our souls, and his flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit, and, on the other hand attaching man to God by his incarnation' (ANF translation). It seems most likely that Irenaeus intends for the article to identify this Spirit with the previous Spirit: the invisible Spirit is the Spirit of God he has just mentioned.

[33] Or, as Rousseau determines by grammatical analysis: 'the expression *Πνεῦμα Θεου* has nothing to do with the third divine person: it is not a question of the Spirit *who is a member of God* (genitive possessive), but of the spiritual Reality *that is God* (genitive explicative)', SC 152 (1969: 202; author's emphasis).

It is difficult to understand how one can determine, as does Simonetti, that Irenaeus' reference to the Spirit of God in this text refers not to the 'divine nature of Christ, but specifically his person.'[34] That is, unless the context of the statement has received no attention, as is the case with Simonetti, or if the surrounding discussion is both disregarded and altered, as in Loofs' study.[35]

The Spirit language contained in *Prf* 71 has been a focal point of the Spirit-Christology discussion for over a century. At debate, is whether Irenaeus' use of Lam. 4:20[36] entails the identification of the 'Spirit of God' with the person of the Word Incarnate or with his divinity.[37] He writes:

> The Scripture (Lam. 4:20) announces that, being Spirit of God, Christ was going to become a passible man, and also, as if astonished and amazed at his passion, that he was going to endure the passion in this way, under whose shadow [it was said] we would live. And it calls his body a 'shadow,' for just as a shadow derives from a body, so the body of Christ derives from his Spirit. . . . Perhaps he also

[34] Simonetti, *Aug* 12 (1972: 214).

[35] Loofs (1930: 241). Hitchcock has already taken Loofs to task for his poor methodology, *ZNW* 36 (1937: 36).

[36] Lam. 4:20 in *Prf* 71: 'The Spirit of our face is [Christ the Lord]; and how was he taken into their nets, of whom we said, under His shadow we shall live among the nations.'

[37] The interpretation of 'Spirit of God' in this passage as referring to the Word dates back to Hitchcock's statement that this passage contains an 'apparent identification of the Word and Spirit', *Hermathena* 14 (1907: 318–20). The very next year, he said when Irenaeus wrote, 'being Spirit of God, Christ was going to become a passible man,' he identifies the Spirit with the Word, just as Justin did in 1 *Apol* 33.6 (Hitchcock, *JTS* 9 1908: 287).

Robinson based his argument for the personal identification of Christ as Spirit in *Prf* 71 on his determination that Irenaeus uses Lam. 4:20 to identify Christ as Spirit in *AH* 3.10.3. With the identification of Christ as Spirit in place from *AH* 3.10.3, he translates Քանզի որպէս հոկանի ի մարմնոյ լինի, այսպէս եւ Քրիստոսի մարմինն ի հոգւոյն նորա եղեւ as, 'For just as a shadow is made by a body, so also Christ's body was made by his Spirit.' He then reasons, 'This is as much to say that the Word of God was the agent of his own Incarnation' (1920: 63), thereby arriving at the personal identification of the Word of God as the Spirit of God. (In chapter 4 of this study I have already shown that Irenaeus does not use Lam. 4:20 to identify the Word as the Spirit in *AH* 3.10.3, but rather to affirm the role of the Spirit, as the Unction of Christ, in making known the Incarnate Word, Salvation, to believers.)

A few years prior to Robinson, J. Barthoulot offered the first French translation of this passage, 'Car, comme l'ombre vient du corps, ainsi le corps est venu de son Esprit.' He then suggested that 'sans doute' Irenaeus had in mind the agency of the Holy Spirit in the impregnation of Mary as conveyed in Matt. 1:18, 20 and Luke 1:35 (Saint Irénée, *Démonstration de la Prédication Apostolique* [PO 12.5; tr. and ann. J. Barthoulot; ed. J. Tixeront; 1917, repr. Turnhout: Brepols, 1989], 790 n. 4). Because of the logic of *Prf* 71 the identification of the Word and Holy Spirit follows from Barthoulot's suggestion, though he himself does not go so far as to advance that opinion.

In contrast to earlier identifications of the Spirit of God with the person of the pre-existent Christ, Rousseau supports his interpretation of Irenaeus' use of Spirit language in that passage by comparing it to *Prf* 71. Both, then, refer to the 'spiritual Reality that is God,' rather than the 'Spirit who is a member of God', SC 152, (1969: 202). In the same way that he betrays no awareness of Hitchcock's work on *AH* 5.1.3, Simonetti seems unaware of these comments by Rousseau, when he identifies the Spirit of God in *Prf* 71 with the person of the pre-existent Christ (*Aug* 12 1972: 214)—a curious state of affairs.

named the body of Christ a 'shadow' as having become a shade for the glory of the Spirit and covering it.

Though it has not been commented upon in the past, the analogy that Irenaeus deploys to explain Lam. 4:20 governs our interpretation of the relationship of the Spirit of God to Christ.[38] Irenaeus says the Spirit is the source of the body of Christ in the same way that a body is the source of its shadow. Now, a body is the basis for the existence of its shadow because it is the object that is acted upon when light shines on it, not because it is the subject of the action that produces the shadow. According to this logic, a body is the basis for the existence of its shadow simply because of its prior existence to the shadow. In the same way, the existence of the body of Christ is contingent upon the prior existence of Christ as the Spirit of God. That is to say, the Incarnation of the Word, the production of his human body, is contingent on the pre-existence of the Word as divine Spirit, just as the Father and Holy Spirit exist as Spirit.

Thus, this passage does not result in the personal identification of the Word and Spirit of God, nor does it result in the identification of the Word as the agent of his own Incarnation, because Irenaeus is not at all speaking of the agency behind the Incarnation. Rather, Irenaeus' identification of Christ as the Spirit of God refers to the divine pre-existence of Christ that is necessary for his Incarnation. Behr's translation agrees with the logic of the analogy much better than Robinson's: 'And it calls his body a "shadow," for just as a shadow derives from a body, so the body of Christ derives from his Spirit.'[39] Therefore, in *Prf* 71 Irenaeus is also speaking of the two components of Jesus, his divinity and humanity.[40]

Section Conclusion

We have found Spirit-Christology to exist in two passages, *AH* 5.1.2 and *Prf* 71. Irenaeus' Spirit-Christology, however, never identifies the Holy Spirit with the Word/Son, or substitutes the Holy Spirit for the Word/Son as that which was Incarnated. In both of these passages, he uses 'Spirit of God' to refer to the divine component of Jesus. The Word, as God, is Spirit. Therefore, Jesus, as the Incarnate Word, was the union of Spirit and humanity, was divine and human. This, and this alone, is the purport of his Spirit-Christology.

[38] Robinson (1920: 63) deliberately disregards the context of the passage. He writes: 'Here again we are not concerned with the general argument [of *Prf* 71], but only with these two statements: Christ was Spirit of God, and Christ's body was made by his Spirit'. Conclusions based upon such an ill-conceived method stand little chance of being correct.

[39] For Robinson's translation, see note 36.

[40] This reading gains substantial support from the fact that both Joseph Smith (St Irenaeus, ACW 16 1952: 202 n. 303: 'Identifications of Christ with the Holy Spirit are found in early writers . . . but they are eschewed by Irenaeus.') and John Behr (St Irenaeus of Lyons 1997: 115 n. 188) join Rousseau in this interpretation.

7.2 ANGELOMORPHIC PNEUMATOLOGY

In our study of Justin's pneumatology we saw that angelomorphism contributed toward his failure to adequately distinguish between the activity and identities of the Son and Holy Spirit.[41]In fact, angelomorphism commonly features in second-century theological accounts containing binitarian logic.[42] As a result, the existence of an angelomorphic pneumatology or christology in the thought of a second-century theologian suggests the presence of, or at least a susceptibility to, a binitarian orientation.

It is with renewed interest, then, that we consider the commonly accepted notion that Irenaeus of Lyons makes use of an angelomorphic Christology and pneumatology. If angelomorphism is in fact a part of Irenaeus' account, then it could provide the logical basis for the identification of the Holy Spirit with the pre-existent Christ, as it does for Justin. If angelomorphism is not a part of Irenaeus' account, then suggestions of a binitarian tension in his thought become that much more tenuous.

Only one passage in all of Irenaeus' work has met with the suggestion of angelomorphic pneumatology or Christology.[43] That passage, the length of two sentences, occurs in *Prf* 10:

> This God, then, is glorified by his Word, who is His Son, continually,[44] and by the Holy Spirit, who is the Wisdom of the Father of all. And their Power[s], of this Word and of Wisdom,[45] who are called Cherubim and Seraphim, glorify God

[41] For the meaning of 'angelomorphic,' Gieschen provides a convenient definition: '"Angelomorphic" is an inclusive term which means having some of the various forms and functions of an angel, even though the figure may not be explicitly called an "angel" or considered to have the created nature of an angel' (Gieschen 1998: 1 n.2).

In the contemporary discussion of angelomorphic pneumatology in early Christian thought, Levison's work is foundational (among others, see: 'The Angelic Spirit in Early Judaism', *SBLSP* 34 (1995)). The most important recent work on angelomorphic Christology in early Christian thought is Gieschen's *Angelomorphic Christology: Antecedents and Early Evidence* (1998). A convenient summary of the history of scholarship in this field can be found in Gieschen's first chapter. He also presents a brief discussion of angelomorphic pneumatology (1998: 114–19, 217–20).

[42] A connection between angelomorphism and binitarianism has also been identified in the *Shepherd of Hermas* and Clement of Alexandria. See: Bucur, *ZNW* 98 (2007) and *VC* 61 (2007).

[43] My present concern is, of course, with Irenaeus' pneumatology. But in this particular case, the arguments for and against angelomorphism apply to both Irenaeus' pneumatology and christology.

[44] The position of հանապազորդ in the sentence makes it difficult to determine to what 'continually' refers; Behr's punctuation upholds this ambiguity. That being said, I believe Rousseau is correct to connect it with the glorification being offered: 'Ce Dieu est donc glorifié continuellement.' SC 406 (1995: 247).

[45] A more literal translation of the first half of this sentence is: 'And [the] Power[s] of these, of the Word and of Wisdom.'

> with unceasing voices, and everything, whatsoever that is in the heavenly realm, gives glory to God the Father of all.[46]

Emmanuel Lanne was the first to find angelomorphism in this passage.[47] His evaluation merits quotation since it is the basis for those who continue to find this motif here:

> The term, power, employed by the bishop of Lyon is certainly related in a direct way to the Word and Wisdom. It cannot be a question, as the French version[48] understood it, of diverse angelic powers which would be dependents of the Word and of the Spirit and would be called Cherubim and Seraphim. It must be necessarily understood that the Word and Wisdom who are the powers of the Father, also called Cherubim and Seraphim, render glory to God with their incessant voices.[49]

Lanne's determination that 'powers' (զաւրութիւնք) must refer to the Word and Spirit, thereby identifying them with the Cherubim and Seraphim, has gained a noteworthy following and has gone unchallenged.[50] This, despite the fact that his reading emerges not from an analysis of this particular text nor even of its context, but rather from the simple observation that Irenaeus never refers to the Cherubim and Seraphim when he speaks of the angelic classes

[46] Արդ՝ Աստուածս այս փառաւորի ի Բանէն իւրմէ, որ է Որդին նորա հանապազորդ, եւ ի Հոգւոյն սրբոյ, որ է իմաստութիւն Հաւրն բոլորեցուն. Եւ սոցա զաւրութիւն՝ բանիս եւ իմաստութեան, որ կոչին Քերովբի ն եւ Աերովբին, անդադար ձայնիւք փառաւորեն զԱստուած, եւ ամենայն, որ ինչ միանգամ է յերկինս բաղկացութիւն՝ փառս մատուցանել Աստուծոյ, Հաւրն բոլորեցուն։

[47] Lanne, *RSR* 43 (1955: 524–35).

[48] The occasion for Lanne's article is the publication of Smith's English translation of *Proof* for ACW in 1952 (though Lanne's reading is at odds with Smith's own comments on the matter, p. 148 n. 62). Lanne describes the first French translation of *Proof* made for *Patrologia Orientalis* 12.5 (1919) by Barthoulot as 'more an interpretation than a translation' (p. 524). Barthoulot's translation reads, 'Et ces deux (personnes divines), le Verbe et la Sagesse, ont à leur service une armèe (d'esprits angéliques) appelée les Chérubins et les Séraphins, qui glorifient Dieu par leur chant perpetuel.' Barthoulot, himself, notes that this translation interprets the meaning of the Armenian sentence, for which he provides the literal translation in 762 n. 1, 'La force de ceux-ci, du Verbe et de la Sagesse, s'appelle les Chérubins et les Séraphins.' It seems to me that Barthoulot's interpretive-translation is conditioned by the presence of the singular զաւրութիւն (Fr. 'force;' Eng. 'power'): it is the singular form of this term that leads him to refer to 'an army of angelic spirits.' More recent translations, including that of Smith, follow Weber's (1912) suggestion that the singular զաւրութիւն should be emended to the plural զաւրութիւնք for it to agree with the following verbs. This modification allows for a more straightforward meaning of the text, and thus eliminates the need for the circuitous translation offered by Barthoulot.

[49] Lanne, *RSR* 43 (1955: 530).

[50] Lanne's reading is followed by Daniélou (1964: 138–40); Stroumsa, *RevBib* 88 (1981: 42–61, here 47); and Mackenzie (2002: 98–9).

created by God.[51] The implication is that Irenaeus does not understand them to be created beings, and so they should be identified with the Son and Spirit here.

Lanne supports this reading by attempting to locate Irenaeus' statement in *Prf* 10 on a line that connects Philo and certain angelomorphic passages in Origen. This argument has failed to win acceptance, as Daniélou, Stroumsa, and Rousseau have pointed out the dissimilarities between the logic of Philo and Irenaeus.[52] Instead of Philo, Daniélou and Stroumsa propose *Ascension of Isaiah* as the basis for their angelomorphic readings of *Prf* 10. I am getting ahead of myself, however, because parallels with external sources only matter if Irenaeus does in fact identify the Word and Spirit as Powers, that is, as the Cherubim and Seraphim. It is my contention that he does not.

In the following discussion I will make three points against Lanne's argument. First, there is no textual basis for thinking that Irenaeus understood Cherubim and Seraphim to be uncreated. Second, there is a textual basis for thinking that Irenaeus understood them to be created. Third, the grammatical construction of *Prf* 10 itself does not permit Lanne's reading. After these points, I will offer an alternative reading of *Prf* 10 that I believe explains the passage better.

7.2.1 No Textual Basis for Understanding Cherubim and Seraphim as Uncreated

I have already mentioned that Lanne's angelomorphic reading of *Prf* 10 does not issue from the passage itself, as indeed it cannot, for the passage contains no explicit identification of the Word and Spirit with the Powers, the Cherubim and Seraphim. As I have said, Lanne's reading follows from his predetermination that Irenaeus does not classify the Cherubim and Seraphim among created angelic beings. Yet, an argument from silence is never self-sufficient and this one is not an exception to the rule. A text that supports his understanding of the Cherubim and Seraphim, then, is of the utmost importance to his argument.

Lanne believes that Irenaeus' earlier discussion of the four-faced Cherubim of Ezk. 1:6, 10 will suffice. In this discussion, found in *AH* 3.11.8, Irenaeus argues that the written Gospel accounts are properly four in number. To bolster his case he declares:

> . . . it is evident that the Word, the Artificer of all, he who sits on the Cherubim, and holds together all things, he who was manifested to human beings, has given to us a quadriform Gospel which is held together by one Spirit. As also David,

[51] Lanne, *RSR* 43 (1955: 526).
[52] Daniélou (1964: 138–40); Stroumsa, *RevBib* 88 (1981: 47); Rousseau, SC 406 (1995: 248).

> entreating his coming, says, 'He who sits on the Cherubim, shine forth' [Ps. 80:1; 79:2 LXX]. For the Cherubim also are four-faced (τετραπρόσωπα/*quadraformia*), and their faces (τὰ πρόσωπα/*formae*) are images of the disposition (εἰκόνες τῆς πραγματείας/*imagines . . . dispositionis*) of the Son of God.

Lanne argues the Cherubim have nothing to do with 'inferior powers, a category of created angelic powers. To the contrary, the Cherubim are a manifestation of the incarnate Word himself, the image of the activity of the Son of God, in his ontological reality, in the attributes that he assumes, in the economy of the mystery of the salvation that he accomplishes.'[53]

I would like to make two points in response. First, Irenaeus does not say that the Cherubim themselves are 'a manifestation of the incarnate Word himself,' but rather that the faces of the Cherubim are 'images of the disposition of the Son of God.'[54] That the analogy is between the faces of the Cherubim and the πραγματεία of the Son comes out again in a paragraph toward the end of *AH* 3.11.8:

> Therefore, as such is the disposition (πραγματεία/*dispositio*) of the Son of God, so also is the form (ἡ μορφή/*forma*) of the living creatures; and as such is the form (ἡ μορφή/*forma*) of the living creatures, so also is the character of the Gospel. For the living creatures are quadriform (τετράμορφα/*quadraformia*), and the Gospel is quadriform (τετράμορφον/*quadraforme*), as is also the disposition (ἡ πραγματεία/*dispositio*) of the Lord.

Here the πραγματεία of the Son corresponds to the μορφή of the living creatures: both are quadriform. Exactly what Irenaeus means by πραγματεία is difficult to determine. It seems to me, however, that the discussion of the symbolism of the four living creatures that Irenaeus provides in the middle of *AH* 3.11.8 suggests that πραγματεία refers to aspects of, or moments in, the economy of the Son. If such is the case, then each face or form of the living creatures represents one of four parts of the economy of the Son. In any case, the fact that it is difficult to determine exactly what Irenaeus means by πραγματεία does not change the terms of the analogy. Both toward the beginning and toward the end of *AH* 3.11.8, the fourfold form or visage of the Cherubim is a figure of the fourfold πραγματεία of the Son of God: the Cherubim themselves are not a type of the Incarnate Son of God himself.

[53] Lanne, *RSR* 43 (1955: 532–3): 'des puissances inférieures, à une catégorie de puissances angéliques créées. Au contraire le Cherubim sont une manifestation du Verbe incarné lui-même, l'image de l'activité du Fils de Dieu, dans sa réalité ontologique, dans les attributs qu'il assume, dans l'économie du mystère du salut qu'il accomplit.'

[54] The reference to the four living creatures of Rev. 4:7 does not change this fact: he appeals to Rev. 4 in support of Ezk. 1. The four-faced Cherubim of Ezekiel must be the dominant and governing image of this discussion, for it alone is analogous to the quadriform gospel united by one Spirit.

This brings me to the second point. Irenaeus is here using the four faces or forms of the Cherubim as a type of the fourfold πραγματεία of the Son. The logical premise of a typological construction is that a thing, person, or idea represents some thing, person, or idea other than itself. As such, Lanne has no basis for his determination that the Cherubim are a 'manifestation of the incarnate Word himself.' For in so saying, he identifies the Cherubim with their typological referent, failing to maintain their distinction.

It is rather the opposite: the fourfold visage or form of the Cherubim figures something other than itself, the fourfold πραγματεία of the Son. As such, the Cherubim remain 'angelic powers,' though they bear a typological referent other than themselves. Therefore, the proper identification of the terms of the analogy and the logical premise of a typological construction prove that Lanne cannot rely upon this passage to support his interpretation of the Cherubim in *Prf* 10 as uncreated beings. Since this is the only passage Lanne offers, he then has no basis for approaching *Prf* 10 with this predetermination in place.

7.2.2 A Textual Basis for Understanding Cherubim and Seraphim as Created

While Lanne has no basis for considering the Cherubim and Seraphim to be uncreated beings, it is clear that Irenaeus considers 'Powers' to be created beings that are distinct from the Son and Holy Spirit. Since everyone agrees that Irenaeus identifies the Cherubim and Seraphim in *Prf* 10 as Powers, and since Irenaeus gives no indication that he regards some Powers as uncreated and others as created,[55] then any passage that explains to us his understanding of Powers helps us to grasp his understanding of Cherubim and Seraphim. Three passages stand out in this regard: *AH* 2.30.3, *AH* 4.20.1, and *Prf* 5.

In *AH* 2.30.3 Irenaeus places together a series of questions to highlight the glory and wisdom of God's creation. In the middle of this section occur the following lines:

> And who can enumerate one by one all the remaining things constituted by the power of God and governed by his wisdom? Or, [who can] search out the greatness of his wisdom by which God created? And what [can be said] of those [beings] which are above heaven and which do not pass away, such as, Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, and Powers innumerable? Against which one of these works, then, do they (the Gnostics) set themselves in opposition? What have they similar to show, which has been made through themselves

[55] In contrast to Justin, for instance, who holds some Powers to be irreducible and others to be reducible. See Goodenough (1923; repr. 1968: 148–50, 155–9), with reference to *Dial* 128.3 and 128.4.

> or by themselves, since even they are themselves the workmanship and formation of this [Creator]?

It is clear from this passage that Irenaeus considers Powers to be created works of God, just as he regards the other classes of celestial beings mentioned here. We turn then to a selection from *AH* 4.20.1, which we already considered in chapter 4 but which is worth reexamining in this context.

> And it is this one (the Creator) of whom Scripture said, 'And God formed man, taking dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life' [Gen. 2:7]. Therefore, angels did not make us, nor did they form us, nor, indeed, were angels able to make an image of God, nor anyone else besides the true God, nor a Power far removed from the Father of all things. For God did not need these [beings] to do what he had himself beforehand determined to do, as if he himself did not have his Hands. For always present with him were the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit, by whom and in whom, he made all things freely and of his own will, to whom he also speaks, when he says, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness' [Gen. 1:26].

According to Irenaeus, there is One God who creates: the Father by means of his Son and Spirit. These three alone participate in the creation of human beings, which in *AH* 5.15.2 Irenaeus declares to be the work proper to God.[56] On the other hand, Irenaeus excludes from creative activity 'a Power far removed from the Father of all things.'[57] The ascription of creative activity to the Son and Spirit, in contrast to the proscription of creative activity from a Power, reveals the firm divide that exists between the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are constituent members of the one Creator God, and Powers, who are not.

This division between the Word and Spirit as the divine agents of creation and Powers as created beings is reaffirmed just a few chapters prior to *Prf* 10, in *Prf* 5:

> In this way, then, it is demonstrated [that there is] One God, [the] Father, uncreated, invisible, Creator of all, above whom there is no other God, and after whom there is no other God. And as God is verbal, therefore He made created things by the Word; and God is Spirit, so that He adorned all things by the Spirit, as the prophet also says, 'By the Word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all their power by His Spirit' [Ps. 33:6]. Thus, since the Word 'establishes,' that is, works bodily and confers existence, while the Spirit arranges

[56] *AH* 5.15.2: 'Now the work of God is the forming of man. For, as the Scripture says, He made [man] by this kind of work: "And the Lord took clay from the earth, and formed man" [Gen. 2:7].'

[57] In *AH* 1.26.1 Irenaeus says that the ascription of creative agency to a Power is a notion belonging to Cerinthus.

> and forms the various 'powers,' so rightly is the Son called Word and the Spirit the Wisdom of God.

Here, Irenaeus quotes Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) to make his case for the creative agency of the Son and Spirit. The quotation of this particular verse, however, also provides Irenaeus with the occasion to illustrate the creative agency of the Spirit in the arrangement and formation of 'the various "powers".'[58] Thus, just a few chapters prior to *Prf* 10, we find a text that brings together the observations we made from *AH* 2.30.3 and *AH* 4.20.1 to establish that Irenaeus regards Powers to be created beings who are separate from the One God who creates. Therefore, the identification of the Cherubim and Seraphim as Powers in *Prf* 10 precludes their identification with the Son and Holy Spirit.

Lanne's argument, then, not only lacks a basis for understanding the Cherubim and Seraphim to be uncreated beings, but other statements by Irenaeus render his position untenable. Nevertheless, neither of these factors is the largest obstacle to his interpretation of the passage because the grammatical construction of *Prf* 10 does not admit Lanne's reading.

7.2.3 The Grammatical Construction of *Prf* 10 does Not Permit Lanne's Reading

Though he fails to draw the attention of his readers to it, Lanne would require us to alter the forms of three words. We would need to substitute the genitive singular, unրա (of this), for the genitive plural, unգա (of these), and we would need to substitute the nominative forms, բանս (the Word) and իմաստութիւն (Wisdom), for the genitive forms, բանիս (of the Word) and իմաստութիան (of Wisdom).[59] These substitutions are not only problematic in themselves, since there is no textual basis for their existence, but as Rousseau has observed, they produce a tautological pair of sentences for which no satisfactory explanation exists. The passage with Lanne's emendations would read: 'This God, then, is glorified by his Word, who is his Son, continually, and by the Holy Spirit, who is the Wisdom of the Father of all. And the Powers of this one (of the Father), the Word and the Wisdom, which are called Cherubim and Seraphim, glorify God by their unceasing voices.'[60]

[58] Rousseau, in his discussion of *Prf* 10, points to a similar statement in *Apostolic Constitution* 8.12.8, wherein God creates by his Son the invisible beings, first among which are the Cherubim and Seraphim (SC 406 1995: 247).

[59] Rousseau, SC 406 (1995: 248). Rousseau observes, 'Curiously, F. Lanne does not breathe a word of this accumulation of corrections.'

[60] Ibid. 248; the second, theoretical, sentence is a modification of Rousseau's proposal.

On the basis, alone, of the unfounded grammatical alterations necessary for this reading, it is clear that Lanne's interpretation is conjecture.

To summarize then, the absence of textual support for understanding the Cherubim and Seraphim as uncreated beings, the presence of texts that distinguish the Son and Spirit from created Powers, and most importantly, the exigencies of the grammatical construction of the passage, negate any possibility of an angelomorphic pneumatology or Christology in *Prf* 10.

7.2.4 An Alternative Reading of *Prf* 10

Having eliminated the possibility of an angelomorphic reading, I may now offer a positive statement with regard to the content of this passage. Prior to Lanne's reading, there was universal acknowledgement that these sentences reflect Irenaeus' vision of a celestial liturgy in which the Son and Spirit are accompanied by the angelic host in the glorification of the Father.[61] Lebreton, however, was uneasy with the idea of the Son and Spirit glorifying the Father, as he believed it to be a subordinationist notion that contradicts the equality of the Three that Irenaeus affirms elsewhere in his work.[62] He suggested that *Prf* 10 should be understood in light of *AH* 4.14.1, where Irenaeus works from John 17:5 to affirm the mutual glorification of Father and Son.[63] Yet, the contexts of these two statements differ to such an extent that we cannot read them together: *AH* 4.14.1 speaks of the mutual glorification of the Father and Son alone prior to creation, whereas *Prf* 10 refers to the glorification of the Father by the Son and Holy Spirit after creation.[64]

This being the case, the first substantial evaluation of this passage offered long ago by J. Armitage Robinson remains valid. In an effort to understand Irenaeus' depiction of a celestial liturgy that includes the glorification of the Father by the Son and Spirit, Robinson called attention to similar statements in an early form of the so-called Clementine Liturgy of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, in the liturgy of Serapion, and in the *Ascension of Isaiah*.[65] After commenting upon these parallels, he concluded: 'We see then that Irenaeus by no means stands alone in his statement that the God and Father of all is glorified by the Son and by the Holy Spirit. Strange as the conception is to us, it was not strange to the religious mind of the second Christian century.'[66]

[61] Hitchcock, *Hermathena* 14 (1907: 328); Robinson (1920: 39–43); Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 631–3); Barbel (1941: 275–6).
[62] On this, Barbel follows Lebreton (1941: 275–6).
[63] Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 632–3).
[64] Cf. Lanne, *RSR* 43 (1955: 525–6).
[65] Robinson (1920: 39–43).
[66] Ibid. 43.

An examination of other sources, however, is not the only way to garner an understanding of Irenaeus' words in *Prf* 10, for the broader context provides clues that should not be overlooked. I would like to suggest that Irenaeus wrote *Prf* 10 in order to explain the activity of the celestial hierarchy over against the notion that angels or a certain Power aided God in the creation of Adam, a polemic present throughout Irenaeus' work. Two observations encourage this interpretation.

First, references to the creation of human beings bracket *Prf* 10. In *Prf* 8 Irenaeus states that certain names are ascribed to the Father by the Spirit so that we may learn that 'this one Himself, He is the maker of heaven and earth and the whole world, the Creator of angels and men.' And just following our text, in *Prf* 11, Irenaeus offers a discussion of the formation of Adam by the Hands of God.

My second observation comes from the beginning of *Prf* 9, where Irenaeus writes: 'But this world is encompassed by seven heavens, in which dwell [innumerable] powers and angels and archangels rendering service to God, the Almighty and Creator of all, not as to One in need, but so that they might not be idle nor useless.' With these words Irenaeus introduces his well-known discussion of the seven heavens in *Prf* 9 and his description of the celestial liturgy in chapter 10; passages which, according to this statement, exist in order to explain that the angelic host are not 'idle nor useless.' The most immediate explanation—that is, the most contextual explanation—for why Irenaeus is concerned that his readers may be thinking of these celestial beings as 'idle' and 'useless' is his refusal to acknowledge their participation in creation. According to this reading, then, Irenaeus draws upon the celestial liturgy to explain what the Powers, and the rest of the celestial hierarchy, are doing since they are not involved in creation.[67]

Section Conclusion

In *Proof* 10 Irenaeus writes not of the identity of the Son and the Holy Spirit with the Powers of God called Cherubim and Seraphim, but of their sharing with these Powers in the worship of the Father. Even so, while *Prf* 10 should not be read in light of *AH* 4.14.1, as he suggested, Lebreton was nonetheless right to want to avoid a subordinationist reading of the passage. Irenaeus' ascription of equal divinity to each of the Three is too firm to find such a meaning in *Prf* 10.[68]

[67] My reading of *Prf* 10 would suit Irenaeus' polemic against Cerinthus, who understood creation to occur by the agency of 'a certain Power' far removed from and ignorant of the transcendent God (*AH* 1.26.1). Irenaeus provides a statement that stands against the involvement of Powers in creation, and argues that Powers are not far removed from and ignorant of God, by placing them in the celestial choir glorifying God.

[68] For instance, as we saw in chapter 5 of this study, Irenaeus declares, 'the work of God is the forming of man' (*AH* 5.15.2), which when combined with his references to the Son and Spirit as

The ascription of equal divinity to the Three prevents a subordinationist reading, insofar as subordinationism refers to gradations of divinity in the Godhead. Yet, the ascription of equal divinity does not at this time in Christian history rule out a hierarchical understanding of the Trinitarian relations by which second-century theologians often differentiated the Three.[69] It may be that a hierarchical conception of the Trinity explains his inclusion of the Son and Spirit in the celestial liturgy[70]—at the very least we see the two are compatible. Therefore, *Prf* 10 does not suggest the existence of a binitarian orientation that accompanies angelomorphism, but rather the existence of a non-subordinationist, hierarchical conception of the Trinitarian relations.

Chapter Conclusion

Unlike Justin, Irenaeus eschews Spirit-Christology, in the strict sense, and angelomorphism. As a result, the binitarian orientation that often attends these notions has no place in Irenaeus' thought. His logic remains unyieldingly Trinitarian. That Irenaeus is a thinker of his age is evident from his utilization of a hierarchical scheme to define the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Nevertheless, the very avoidance of two themes so often featured in second-century theological accounts suggests a sensitivity far in advance of his time.

the Hands of God to whom the Father speaks in Gen. 1:26 (*AH* 4.pref.4, 4.20.1, 5.1.3), defines the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as divine.

[69] Perhaps the most straightforward statement is made by Athenagoras in *Embassy for the Christians* 10.5, 'Who then would not be amazed hearing those called atheists who call God Father and Son and Holy Spirit, proclaiming their power in unity and in rank (τάξει) their diversity' (Athenagoras, ACW 23 1955). We have seen in chapter 1 that Justin makes a similar statement in 1 *Apol* 13.

Rather than ordering the Three sequentially, Irenaeus would be envisioning a hierarchical arrangement in which the Father is at a certain, equal remove from the Son and Holy Spirit—such as in an isosceles triangle. This arrangement finds support in the notion of the Hands of God. Identifying the Son and Spirit as Hands suggests a hierarchical equality with each other, since Irenaeus never refers to the right or left hand, but it does not go so far as to suggest a hierarchical equality with the Father.

[70] See also *AH* 4.7.4, where the Father's Offspring and his Similitude, the Son and Holy Spirit, the Word and Wisdom, 'minister to him in all respects' (*ministrat ei ad omnia*).

Conclusion and Epilogue

At the beginning of this work I listed three purposes of this study. The first was to provide an in-depth examination of certain principal, often distinctive, aspects of Irenaeus' account of the Holy Spirit. Second, I desired to demonstrate that Irenaeus' theology of the Holy Spirit consists of a combination of Jewish traditions with New Testament doctrine—a combination that produced the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the period. My third purpose was to show Irenaeus to be the first author, following the New Testament writings, to construct a theological account in which binitarian logic does not diminish either the identity or activity of the Holy Spirit. This last purpose involved contrasting the appropriation of Jewish traditions by Justin Martyr with their appropriation by Irenaeus.

We have seen that Irenaeus' understanding of the Holy Spirit developed over the course of his writing. The elementary pneumatology that we found in the first two Books of *AH* blossoms in the third Book into the complex and insightful theology of the Holy Spirit that we encounter in *AH* 4 and 5 and the *Proof*. In *Against Heresies* 3 the Holy Spirit governs the preservation and spread of the Gospel message, and anoints the humanity of Jesus so that he could fulfill his Messianic mission. As the Unction of Christ, the Spirit anoints members of the Church, uniting individuals into the one body of Christ and rendering them productive. The Spirit is the gift who vivifies those who receive him by uniting believers to himself and to the glorified Christ. Lastly, the agency of the Spirit in creation enables created beings to know the love and infinite kindness of God, while simultaneously marking the limit of that knowledge.

In *AH* 4 Irenaeus emphasizes the creative activity of the Holy Spirit by identifying the Spirit as Wisdom and one of the Hands of God. The ascription of creative agency to the Spirit secures the Spirit's divinity, for creation is the work of God. Moreover, the identification of the Spirit as Wisdom and a Hand of God, and the characterization of Wisdom as the one who produces harmony in creation combine to distinguish the Spirit from the Father and the Son.

In *AH* 5 the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit is the source of life, both temporal and eternal. The divine economy entails a progression by which the Holy Spirit becomes more closely united to believers over the course of time. After the redemptive work of Christ, the Spirit is present in and possessed by believers. It is an essential element in perfect human beings, who ultimately become like unto God, the possessors of eternal life.

Thus, our consideration of Irenaeus' account of the Spirit in *Against Heresies* has shown that he adopted and adapted Jewish traditions that enabled him to clarify and strengthen his understanding of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, our discussion of his *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* has shown that Irenaeus eschewed Jewish traditions that so often hindered the theological accounts of his contemporaries. He does not incorporate a Spirit-Christology which identifies the Holy Spirit with the pre-existent Christ, nor does he integrate angelomorphism into his theology. He was the first to produce a pneumatology in which binitarian logic does not diminish either the identity or activity of the Holy Spirit. As a result, a Trinitarian logic accompanies his Trinitarian beliefs.

By the time he finished writing, then, Irenaeus had constructed the most complex Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the early Church. The difference that we have seen between his account of the Spirit and the one offered by Justin is an example of the first pneumatological transition that occurred in Christian theology during the second and third centuries. A rudimentary account of the Spirit gave way to a sophisticated pneumatology. The second transition that occurred during this period is marked by the loss of several Jewish traditions that were constituent and critical elements of Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit. The sophisticated pneumatology of Irenaeus gave way to a more rudimentary account of the Spirit. How and why this regression occurred merits further investigation. I will finish this study with a few brief comments which I hope will be a slight contribution to future explorations along these lines.[1]

Theologians of the third and early-fourth centuries no longer identified the Holy Spirit as Wisdom, as one of the Hands of God, or as the Creator. The absence of these themes in Irenaeus' successors should be seen as contributing to the frequent devaluation of the Spirit in their writings, for they no longer had recourse to significant ways of ascribing distinction, equality, eternality, and divinity to the Holy Spirit. The writings of Origen and Tertullian, one generation after Irenaeus, and the works of Novatian, two generations later, illustrate the pneumatological changes that occurred during this period.

[1] The four articles by Lewis Ayres and Michel René Barnes in *Augustinian Studies* 39.2 (2008) are a good starting place for the reader interested in this field.

ORIGEN

Origen's identification of the Word as Wisdom has received a fair amount of attention in the past.[2] At this time, I desire to briefly compare his Christological utilization of Wisdom in *On First Principles* (*PA*) to Irenaeus' pneumatological appropriation of the title. This discussion will then lead us to consider their contrasting interpretations of Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX).

Origen wastes no time identifying the Son as Wisdom: he does so in the first paragraph of his chapter on Christ (*PA* 1.2.1). There he quotes Prov. 8:22–5 to support his identification of the Word as Wisdom, and then finishes the section by quoting 1 Cor. 1:24, 'Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.'[3] The title is central to his Christological account. In *PA* 1.2.2 he utilizes the Son's identification as Wisdom to establish both his eternality and his involvement in creation. With regard to his eternality, he writes:

> Let no one think, however, that when we give him (the Son) the name 'wisdom of God' we mean anything without hypostatic existence[4] . . . And can anyone who has learned to regard God with feelings of reverence suppose or believe that God the Father ever existed, even for a single moment, without begetting this wisdom? . . . Wherefore we recognise that God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son, who was born indeed of him and draws his being from him, but is yet without any beginning . . .

According to Origen, one cannot very well imagine a time at which God the Father did not have his Wisdom.[5] Since God must always have possessed his Wisdom, then due to the identification of the Son as Wisdom, it may be inferred that God was always the Father of his only-begotten Son. Thus, the identification of the Son as Wisdom secures the Son's divinity by establishing his everlasting presence with the Father, his eternality.[6]

Though Irenaeus does not construct so complex an argument, the reader will recall that he uses his identification of the Holy Spirit with Wisdom to establish the eternality, and thus the divinity, of the Spirit. This he accomplishes in *AH* 4.20.3 by quoting passages from Proverbs 3 and 8 which indicate the presence of Wisdom prior to creation. Once he has established the existence of the Spirit prior to creation, Irenaeus can restate with confidence

[2] e.g. Grant, *SP* 7 (1966: 462–72); Schoedel (1975: 169–99); Logan (1985: 123–9); Horbury (1995: 182–98).

[3] All quotations of *On First Principles* are taken from Origen (1936; repr. 1973).

[4] *Aliquid insubstantivum.*

[5] According to Origen, to do so would suggest that either (1) there was an earlier point in time at which the Father was unable to bring wisdom into existence, and a later point in time at which the Father was able; or (2) that while always able to bring his wisdom into existence, he was at first unwilling to do so, and then later, willing.

[6] On the divinity of the Son in Origen's thought, see Barnes (2001: 111–24).

in *AH* 4.20.4 that one God created all things by means of his Word and Wisdom, who is the Spirit.

While Irenaeus uses the title Wisdom to ascribe creative activity to the Spirit, Origen uses it to support the involvement of the Son in creation.

> Wisdom, therefore, must be believed to have been begotten beyond the limits of any beginning that we can speak of or understand. And because in this very subsistence of wisdom there was implicit every capacity and form of the creation that was to be, both of those things that exist in a primary sense and of those which happen in consequence of them, the whole being fashioned and arranged beforehand by the power of foreknowledge, wisdom, speaking through Solomon in regard to these very created things that had been as it were outlined and prefigured in herself, says that she was created as a 'beginning of the ways' [Prov. 8:22] of God, which means that she contains within herself both the beginnings and causes and species of the whole creation.[7]

Origen's identification of Wisdom with the Son strengthens his account of the Son,[8] but it comes at the cost of a weakened account of the Spirit. He does not find another way to ascribe creative activity to the Spirit. Instead, Origen restricts the work of the Holy Spirit to the Church alone. His comments on Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) well illustrate his understanding:

> Let no one indeed imagine from what we have said about the Holy Spirit being bestowed on the saints alone, while the blessings and activities of the Father and the Son extend to both good and evil, just and unjust, that we are hereby exalting the Holy Spirit above the Father and the Son or claiming that his dignity is greater than theirs; for this by no means follows. What we have been describing is the peculiar grace and work of the Holy Spirit. But more, nothing in the Trinity can be called greater or less, for there is but one fount of deity, who upholds the universe by his word and reason, and sanctifies 'by the spirit of his mouth' all that is worthy of sanctification, as it is written in the Psalm, 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens established, and all their power by the spirit of his mouth.'[9]

Origen's interpretation, which he provides prior to the quotation of Ps. 33:6, divides the verse into two halves. The first half of the verse refers to the creative activity of the Word, the one 'who upholds the universe.' The second half of the verse, on the other hand, refers to the sanctifying activity of the Holy Spirit. This restriction of the work of the Holy Spirit to the Church alone, in contrast to the

[7] *PA* 1.2.2.

[8] The affirmation of the Son's eternality is not the only benefit Origen reaps from identifying the Son as Wisdom. For example, in *PA* 1.2.4, he quotes Wisd. 7:25 to explain the production of the Son; *PA* 1.2.9–13 contains an extended exposition of that verse.

[9] *PA* 1.3.7.

activity of the Father and Son toward all creation, corresponds to the subordination of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. So he can write in *PA* 1.3.5:

> The God and Father, who holds the universe together, is superior to every being that exists, for he imparts to each one from his own experience that which each one is; the Son, being less than the Father, is superior to rational creatures alone (for he is second to the Father); the Holy Spirit is still less, and dwells within the saints alone. So that in this way the power of the Father is greater than that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Son is more than that of the Holy Spirit, and in turn the power of the Holy Spirit exceeds that of every other holy being.

The limitation of the Holy Spirit's activity relative to that of the Father and that of the Son is based upon the lower status of the Spirit's being relative to that of the Father and that of the Son.[10] As a result, the fact that Origen withholds creative activity from the Spirit reveals the inferiority of the Spirit relative to the Father and Son. Indeed, Origen's refusal to ascribe creative activity to the Spirit clears the way for him to regard the Holy Spirit to be the first among the creatures created by the Word.

> But if it is true that 'all things were made through him' [John 1:3], we must investigate if the Holy Spirit, too, was made through him. I think that one who declares that he was made and who advances the statement, 'All things were made through him,' must accept that the Holy Spirit too was made through the Word, since the Word is older than he. But it follows that one who does not wish the Holy Spirit to have been made through Christ, if he judges the things in this Gospel to be true, says he is 'unbegotten.' (74) But there will be a third person also besides these two. . . . This third person teaches that the Holy Spirit has no distinctive essence different from the Father and the Son. . . . (75) We, however, are persuaded that there are three hypostases, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and we believe that only the Father is unbegotten. We admit, as more pious and true, that the Holy Spirit is most honored of all things made through the Word, and that he is [first] in rank of all the things which have been made by the Father through Christ.[11]

[10] Immediately following this quotation, Origen argues for the restriction of the Holy Spirit's activity in comparison to that of the Father and Son (*PA* 1.3.5–6). This argument depends partly on the association of the Son with Wisdom.

[11] *Commentary on John* 2.73, 74, 75; trans. Origen, *Commentary on the Gospel according to John, Books 1–10* (1989).

This passage from *Comm. John* should be read in the context of two passages in his earlier work, *On First Principles*. In *PA* 1.pref.4 he writes, 'the apostles delivered this doctrine, that the Holy Spirit is united in honour and dignity with the Father and the Son. In regard to him it is not yet clearly known whether he is to be thought of as begotten or unbegotten, or as being himself also a Son of God or not; but these are matters which we must investigate to the best of our power from holy scripture, inquiring with wisdom and diligence.' In *PA* 1.3.3 he states, 'But up to the present moment we have been able to find no passage in the holy scriptures which would warrant us in saying that the Holy Spirit was a being made or created, not even in that manner in which we have shown above that Solomon speaks of wisdom, nor in the manner in which the

As we saw earlier, the creative activity of the Spirit indicated his status relative to the Father and Son in Irenaeus' thought as well. In contrast to Origen, though, Irenaeus ascribes creative activity to the Holy Spirit. He thereby unites the Spirit with the Father and Son as a member of the Creator God and places the divinity of the Spirit on a par with that of the Son. The Holy Spirit, in Irenaeus' thought, is clearly located on the divine side of the Creator-creature divide.

Thus, Origen's identification of the Son as Wisdom provides structure and content for his Christology, but it leaves his pneumatology ill-defined and deficient when compared to that of Irenaeus. Origen has lost a significant way to speak of the Holy Spirit's creative activity, eternality, and divinity. He does not tender an adequate replacement for the logic he has rejected.

TERTULLIAN

Tertullian also identifies the Word as Wisdom[12] and offers his own interpretation of Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX). An excellent example of his logic can be found in his treatise *Against Praxeas* (*Prax*). He finds the occasion to identify the Word with the figure of Wisdom early in his argument:

> This power and disposition of the Divine Intelligence is set forth also in the Scriptures under the name of Σοφία, Wisdom; for what can be better entitled to the name of Wisdom than the Reason or the Word of God?[13]

After making this identification, Tertullian proceeds to appropriate key sapiential passages in order to support the distinction of the Word from the Father. Both Prov. 8:22–5 and 8:27–30 are utilized for this reason in *Prax* 6. The beginning of *Prax* 7 illustrates his reasoning:

> Then, therefore, does the Word also Himself assume His own form and glorious garb, *His own* sound and vocal utterance, when God says, 'Let there be light' [Gen.1:3]. This is the perfect nativity of the Word, when He proceeds forth from God—*formed* by Him first to devise and think out *all things* under the name of Wisdom—'The Lord created or formed me as the beginning of His ways'

expressions we have dealt with, such as life, or word, or other titles of the Son of God, are to be understood.'

[12] See Evans' comments in *Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas* (1948: 216–23).

[13] *Prax* 6. All English quotations of *Against Praxeas* are taken from Holmes' ANF translation (1999). Latin quotations are taken from Tertullian, *Opera montanistica* (1954).

> [Prov. 8:22]; then afterward begotten, to carry all into effect—'When He prepared the heaven, I was present with Him' [Prov. 8:27].[14]

Central to Tertullian's conception of the Word's production is his agency in creation. As *Prax* 7 progresses, he quotes several verses in order to substantiate the Word's creative activity. Prov. 8:22, 25 come first, then John 1:3, and finally Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX):

> again, in another place [. . .], 'By His word were the heavens established, and all the powers thereof by His Spirit' [Ps. 33:6]—that is to say, by the Spirit [. . .] which was in the Word: *thus* is it evident that it is one and the same power which is in one place described under the name of Wisdom, and in another passage under the appellation of the Word, which was initiated for the works of God [Prov. 8:22], which 'strengthened the heavens' [Prov. 8:28]; 'by which all things were made' [John 1:3], 'and without which nothing was made' [John 1:3]. Nor need we dwell any longer on this point, as if it were not the very Word Himself, who is spoken of under the name both of Wisdom and of Reason, and of the entire Divine Soul and Spirit.[15]

Rather than referring to the creative activity of both the Word and Holy Spirit, as does Irenaeus later in his theology, Tertullian applies both halves of Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) to the agency of the Word.[16] He understands the term 'Spirit,' in the latter half of the verse, to refer to that which is common to the Three, along the lines of John 4:24 ('God is Spirit'). Such an interpretation permits him to argue the Word is a substantive being 'in such a way that He may be regarded as an objective thing and a person . . . '[17] This is an aid to his Christology, but it comes at a cost to his pneumatology. With the quotation of Ps. 33:6, Tertullian has applied to the creative activity of the Word almost all of the verses vital to Irenaeus' attribution of creative activity to the Holy Spirit. The lone exception is Gen. 1:26, which he interprets just a few chapters later, in *Prax* 12:

> If the number of the Trinity also offends you, as if it were not connected in the simple Unity, I ask you how it is possible for a Being who is merely and absolutely One and Singular, to speak in plural phrase, saying, 'Let us make man in our own image, and after our own likeness' [Gen. 1:26] . . . was it to the angels that He spoke, as the Jews interpret the passage, because these also acknowledge not the Son? Or was it because He was at once the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, that He

[14] Holmes' emphasis.
[15] ANF translation with modifications.
[16] Indeed, Tertullian's interpretation of Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) could be seen as a development of Irenaeus' early use of this verse in support of the creative activity of the Word alone (*see* chapter 2, pp. 33–5).
[17] *Prax* 7; *Non uis enim eum substantiuum habere in re per substantiae proprietatem, ut res et persona quaedam uideri possit*.

> spoke to Himself in plural terms, making Himself plural on that very account? Nay, it was because He had already His Son close at His side, as a second Person, His own Word, and a third Person also, the Spirit in the Word, that He purposely adopted the plural phrase, 'Let us make;' and, 'in our image;' and, 'become as one of us.' For with whom did He make man? and to whom did He make him like? (The answer must be) the Son on the one hand, who was one day to put on human nature; and the Spirit on the other, who was to sanctify man. With these did He then speak, in the Unity of the Trinity, as with His ministers and witnesses.[18]

This is the closest that Tertullian comes to attributing creative activity to the Holy Spirit. The dialogue contained in Gen. 1:26 confirms the presence of the Holy Spirit, along with that of the Father and Word, prior to creation. As he writes, 'it was because He had already His Son close at His side, as a second Person, His own Word, and a third Person also, the Spirit in the Word, that He purposely adopted the plural phrase, "Let us make;" and, "in our image;" and, "become as one of us".' The dialogue that occurs in the verse, however, does not substantiate the creative activity of both the Word and Holy Spirit, as it does in Irenaeus' interpretation.[19] While both the Word and Spirit were participants in the conversation, the Word alone acted upon the Father's words. So much is clear from the rest of the discussion in *Prax* 12, which only refers to the creative activity of the Word. As Tertullian says, 'God willed creation to be effected in the Word, Christ being present and ministering unto Him: and *so* God created.'[20] In contrast, Tertullian does not once attribute a role in creation to the Holy Spirit.

Thus, verses that played a crucial role in Irenaeus' pneumatology, Tertullian appropriates for the Word. As a result, he loses a significant means to attribute creative activity, distinction, eternality, and divinity to the Spirit. His pneumatology is poorer for the loss, as he fails to produce suitable alternatives in his own theology of the Holy Spirit.

NOVATIAN

Novatian also identifies the Word as Wisdom.[21] Here, however, I am most interested in the detailed argument he makes against anthropomorphic

[18] The last sentences read: *Cum quibus enim faciebat hominem et quibus faciebat similem, Filio quidem qui erat induiturus hominem, Spiritu uero qui erat sanctificaturus hominem, quasi cum ministris et arbitris ex unitate trinitatis loquebatur.*

[19] Irenaeus quotes Gen. 1:26 in conjunction with the Hands tradition in *AH* 4.pref.4, *AH* 4.20.1, *AH* 5.1.3, and *AH* 5.28.4.

[20] *Prax* 12; cf. *Prax* 19 where he again quotes Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) and arrives at a similar conclusion.

[21] Novatian, *ANF* 5 (1999: 31).

language in *On the Trinity* (*Trin*) 6. He begins this section of his work by highlighting several Old Testament verses that contain anthropomorphic statements, including Ps. 136:12 (135:12 LXX), which refer to the hand of God. He then provides a hermeneutical principle for the interpretation of these, and other, anthropomorphic descriptions of God.

> We who say that the law is spiritual do not include within these lineaments of our bodily nature any mode or figure of the divine majesty, but diffuse that character of unbounded magnitude (so to speak) over its plains without any limit. . . . For we recognise the plan of the divine Scripture according to the proportion of its arrangement. For the prophet then was still speaking about God in parables according to the period of the faith, not as God was, but as the people were able to receive Him. And thus, that such things as these should be said about God, must be imputed not to God, but rather to the people. . . . It is not therefore God who is limited, but the perception of the people is limited . . . [22]

Novatian contends the words of Scripture were suited to the ability of the original 'hearers' to understand what was being said about God. The use of anthropomorphic statements, then, reflects the limited understanding of the people at that time, and represents a way to speak about God in the context of those limitations. Moroever, according to Novatian, each anthropomorphic statement denotes an activity of God that corresponds to a particular aspect of his being. So, when Scripture speaks of the hand of God:

> it is proved that He is the author of every creature . . . [for] why should He seek for hands whose will is, even when silent, the architect for the foundation of all things? . . . Moreover, [these members] are not needful to God, whose will the works attend not so much without any effort, as that the works themselves proceed simultaneously with the will. Moreover, He Himself is all eye, because He all sees; and all ear, because He all hears; and all hand, because He all works; and all foot, because He all is everywhere. For He is the same, whatever it is. He is all equal, and all everywhere. For He has not in Him any diversity in Himself, being simple.

In the end, anthropomorphic statements about God are inaccurate because they fail to reflect the simplicity of God. For instance, metaphorical references to the hands of God suggest a lapse of time between his willing and his working—a lapse that does not accord with his simplicity of being. Or, anthropomorphisms suggest God is himself a composite being with hands, eyes, feet, etc., whereas the truth is that 'He is the same, whatever it is. . . . For he has not in him any diversity . . . .'

[22] All English quotations of Novatian come from Wallis' ANF translation (1999). Latin quotations come from Novatianus, *Opera* (1972).

Despite this argument against anthropomorphic language, Novatian refers to the hands of God once, a few chapters later. In *Trin* 10 he briefly notes the challenge Irenaeus devoted so many words to refute, the heretical belief that the flesh cannot be saved. As with Irenaeus (e.g. *AH* 5.9.1), Novatian identifies 1 Cor. 15:50 ('flesh and blood do not inherit the kingdom of God') as the text utilized to support this point of view, and as with Irenaeus (e.g. *AH* 4. pref.4), his response includes a reference to the hands of God.

> For a law of resurrection is established, in that Christ is raised up in the substance of the body as an example for the rest; because, when it is written that 'flesh and blood do not inherit the kingdom of God' [1 Cor. 15:50], it is not the substance of the flesh that is condemned, which was built up by the divine hands that it should not perish (*quae divinis manibus ne periret extructa est*), but only the guilt of the flesh is rightly rebuked, which by the voluntary daring of man rebelled against the claims of divine law.

It is tempting to find here, in the middle of the third century, an appropriation of the Hands of God tradition which Irenaeus used so many years beforehand to defeat the same challenge. After all, Novatian did just express his concerns about the use of anthropomorphic language and its potential to misrepresent the activity and being of God, so why would he use such language himself just a few chapters later? Perhaps, then, it would be best to understand this reference as a momentary appropriation of the Hands tradition necessitated by polemical exigency. On the other hand, Novatian does not identify the hands of God as the Son and Spirit, nor does he attribute elsewhere a role to the Spirit in the creation of human beings. Therefore, it appears that we should not regard *Trin* 10 as incorporating the Hands of God tradition, but as an instance when the usefulness of anthropomorphic language overcomes Novatian's reticence to use it.[23]

In addition to avoiding the identification of the Holy Spirit as a Hand of God and refraining from attributing a role in the creation of humanity to the Spirit, Novatian refuses to acknowledge any connection between the Spirit and creative agency. While he proves the divinity of the Son by establishing his creative activity,[24] the Holy Spirit never appears as an agent of creation in Novatian's writings.[25] He refrains from quoting the passages in Proverbs 3 and 8 whose references to the involvement of Wisdom in creation sustained

[23] It is possible that Novatian is not reluctant to use anthropomorphic language, but rather incorporates it here willingly. There are two potential benefits in choosing to refer to the hands of God. First, he is using traditional language that is familiar to his audience. Second, he is requiring his audience to recall the hermeneutical principles he stated earlier, which reemphasizes them. I owe this suggestion, as well as other insights into Novatian's thought, to Daniel Lloyd, who is writing his dissertation on Novatian's Christology at Marquette University.

[24] e.g. *Trin* 13.

[25] Novatian restricts the activity of the Spirit to the Church, see for example, *Trin* 29.

Ireneaus' attribution of eternality to the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Novatian never argues for the divinity or the eternality of the Holy Spirit as he does for the Son.

He does declare, on the other hand, that the Spirit is inferior to the Son (*Trin* 16).[26] He also says the Son is inferior to the Father (e.g. *Trin* 27),[27] but his ascription of inferiority to the Son is, in *Trin* 27 at least, motivated by a desire to differentiate the Father and the Son.[28] On the other hand, his affirmation of the Spirit's inferiority to the Son does not occur in order to differentiate the Son and Spirit, but rather to affirm the Son's divinity. The question, then, arises as to the nature of the inferiority of the Holy Spirit. Does his ascription of inferiority to the Spirit signal a lower regard for the divinity of the Holy Spirit when compared to the Son? At the very least, we may say that Novatian does not offer a logical basis for the equal divinity of the Holy Spirit and the Father or the Son.

Thus, Novatian avoided the identification of the Holy Spirit as Wisdom and as a Hand of God, while also avoiding in general the ascription of creative activity to the Spirit. At the same time, Novatian fails to account for the equal divinity of the Holy Spirit. It seems to me that these points are interconnected. In any case, such a limited account of the Holy Spirit stands in stark contrast to the 'high pneumatology'[29] offered by Irenaeus just two generations earlier.

The incorporation of Jewish traditions into his theology of the Holy Spirit distinguishes Irenaeus from all who follow him. Those who come after Irenaeus follow the path established by the New Testament writings and Justin

[26] *Trin* 16: 'But if He (the Paraclete) has received from Christ what He may declare to us, Christ is greater than the Paraclete, because the Paraclete would not receive from Christ unless He were less than Christ (*quoniam nec paracletus a christo acciperet, nisi minor christo esset*). But the Paraclete being less than Christ, moreover, by this very fact proves Christ to be God, from whom He has received what He declares: so that the testimony of Christ's divinity is immense, in the Paraclete being found to be [. . .] less than Christ, and taking from Him what He gives to others (*dum minor christo paracletus repertus ab illo sumit quae ceteris tradit*) . . . '. NB: the broader argument in *Trin* 16 establishes the superiority of the Spirit over humanity, for the Spirit does not receive from human beings but gives to them.

[27] *Trin* 27: 'Even here (John 10:36) also He said that He had the Father. He is therefore the Son, not the Father: for He would have confessed that He was the Father had He considered Himself to be the Father; and He declares that He was sanctified by His Father. In receiving, then, sanctification from the Father, He is inferior to the Father. Now, consequently, He who is inferior to the Father, is *not the Father*, but the Son (*Dum ergo accipit sanctificationem a patre, minor patre est; minor autem patre consequenter [non pater] est, sed filius*); for had He been the Father, He would have given, and not received, sanctification. Now, however, by declaring that He has received sanctification from the Father, by the very fact of proving Himself to be less than the Father, by receiving from Him sanctification, He has shown that He is the Son, and not the Father.' Cf. *Trin* 17.

[28] Whether the inferiority of the Son to the Father is simply an expression of a hierarchical conception of the divine relations or a subordinationist expression that includes gradations of divinity in the Godhead is debated.

[29] This expression is Barnes'; it refers to 'a theology which attributes to the Holy Spirit the same functions by which the Word-Son is shown to be divine' (Barnes, *NV* 7 2009: 71, 93).

Martyr: the Word is identified as Wisdom. The association of the Word with the figure of Wisdom is a Christological gain, but it is a severe pneumatological loss. Hands imagery is also abandoned at this time, and the refusal to identify the Holy Spirit as Wisdom or a Hand of God contributes toward the denial of creative activity to the Holy Spirit. The absence of these themes in his successors ought to be seen as a factor in the frequent devaluation of the Holy Spirit in their writings, for they no longer have recourse to a significant means of ascribing creative activity, distinction, equality, eternality, and divinity to the Holy Spirit.

The theology of the Holy Spirit remained weak until the Church once again found a way to define and affirm key features once present in the pneumatology of Irenaeus but subsequently absent in those of the third and early fourth centuries. One way was the reaffirmation of creative activity to the Spirit. Toward the end of the fourth century Nicetas of Remesiana preached a sermon on the Holy Spirit that could almost have been taken from Irenaeus:

> (6) We may now turn to the other powers and works of the Holy Spirit. These will help us to realize His nature and greatness. It is only by their works that we know the Father and the Son—'believe the works' [John 10:38], said the Lord. In the same way, we shall not fully know the nature of the Holy Spirit unless we know how wonderful are His works . . . (7) What kind of faith would it be to believe that man's sanctification and redemption depended on the Holy Spirit, but that his formation and creation did not? . . . Remember what the Prophet David said of our creation: 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth' [Ps. 33:6]. By the 'word' we must here understand the Son, through whom, as St. John declares, 'all things were made' [John 1:3]. And what is 'the spirit of his mouth' if not the Spirit whom we believe to be Holy? Thus, in one text, you have the Lord, the Word of the Lord and the Holy Spirit making the full mystery of the Trinity . . . (8) it adds to the glory of the Father to refer the creation of all things to a Word of which He is the Father or to a Spirit of which He is the source. The fact remains that when His Word and Spirit create, it is He who creates all things. (9) The Trinity, then, creates.[30]

[30] Niceta of Remesiana, *The Power of the Holy Spirit* 6–9 (1949).

APPENDIX

Language of Revelation in Justin's *First* and *Second Apologies* and *Dialogue with Trypho*

Term	Spirit as Subject	Word as Subject
Ἀναφθέγγομαι	D74.2	—
Βοάω	D25.1, D84.1	—
Δηλόω	D91.4	D62.4
Διδάσκω	1A44.1, D91.4	—
Εἰρέω	D34.1	—
Θεοσφορέω	1A35.3	1A33.9
Καλέω	1A32.8, 1A53.4, D54.1, D61.1	D77.4, D128.4
Λαλέω	D52.1, D56.3, D77.4	—
Λέγω	D25.1, D43.3, D55.2, D56.5, D73.2, D78.8, D114.2 (×4), D124.1	1A36.2, D56.4, D57.2, D62.1, D63.5, D122.1, D129.2
(*κύριος*)*Λογίζομαι*	D56.14, D56.15	*ὀνομάζω* seems to parallel this in D56.13
(*θεός*)*Λογίζομαι*	D56.15	—
Μαρτυρέω	—	D61.3, D63.5
Μεστόω	D9.1	—
Μηνύω	1A41.1	D129.1
Ὁμολογέω	D55.1	—
Ὀνομάζω	D53.4	D56.6, D56.13
Πληρόω	D7.1	—
Προεῖπον	1A53.6	—
Προερέω	1A32.2	—
Προκηρύσσω	1A31.1, D84.2	—
Προμηνύω	1A33.2, 1A48.4, 1A60.8	—
Πρόφημι	D43.4	—
Προφητεύω	1A39.1	—
Σημαίνω	D91.4	—
Φημί	1A33.5, 1A51.1, D115.4	D58.4, D93.3
Φθέγγομαι	1A38.1, D114.1(×2)	1A36.2

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