VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Revolt Against Dualism: An Inquiry Concerning the Existence of Ideas. By A. O. LOVEJOY. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930. Pp. xii + 325. 15s.

PROF. LOVEJOY in this work deals with a problem central to theory of knowledge. Do we in knowing 'use ideas' and, if we do, what function does the 'idea' fulfil in the knowing, and what kind of existence does it itself possess? The answer of Seventeenth Century Philosophy to these questions—that it is the function of the 'idea' more or less accurately to represent the physical real 'outside', and that an idea exists as an entity 'in the mind'—established two dualisms. On the one hand, there is what Lovejoy calls the 'epistemological' dualism of representations or 'ideas' (of which we are immediately aware) and 'real things outside' (known *through* the representations): on the other, a 'psycho-physical' dualism consisting of the physical world and the equally real mental world. Prof. Lovejoy asks himself whether these dualisms are still to be retained or whether the time has not come for their rejection by philosophy. In seeking to answer the question he finds it necessary to describe the growth of a revolt against both types of dualism in contemporary thought. A brilliant critical survey of that revolt leads him to the conclusion that the reflexions and criticisms of the last three decades do *not* justify us in rejecting either dualism if we wish to remain realist. On the contrary, the failure of the revolt causes him to reassert, firstly, that our knowledge of the external world can only occur indirectly, since we are in immediate contact only with 'ideas' in the Lockean sense; secondly, that such 'ideas' belong to a psychical world not identical in character with the physical. We must, consequently, either reassert the dualisms or be prepared to adopt an idealism. "If you are to believe in a real physical world, then you must necessarily be a dualist in both senses of the term: you must hold (*a*) that there are given in experience particular existents which are not parts of that world, and you must hold (*b*) that whatever knowledge of real objects you have is indirect or representative, that the datum whereby you know any such object is not identical with the object known" (p. 303).

Of the two dualisms it is the 'epistemological' that presents us with the most urgent problem. For the old familiar difficulties immediately return: Granted the dualism of 'ideas' and 'things',

and that we are directly aware of 'ideas' only, are we then ever justified in going beyond our 'ideas'? Is 'representative knowledge' of an otherwise unknown and unknowable external world at all possible? This is the fundamental problem of the book; though it is not squarely faced until the final chapter. But if this is the real problem, then a confusion present in the argument of the final chapter must immediately be corrected. Prof. Lovejoy slips into identifying 'representative' with 'mediate' (also 'indirect') knowledge. If this identification is allowed, it then follows that to deny all representative knowledge is at the same time to deny all mediate knowledge—obviously an absurd denial to make. But, surely, if representative knowledge ever does occur, it is at most merely *one* instance of mediate knowledge, and to deny it is not to deny all the other instances. We use the term 'mediate' loosely to describe, for example, both syllogising and knowing through a representation, but this makes it none the less possible for me to deny with perfect consistency the existence of the latter whilst affirming the former. Therefore, the question at issue is not one as to the possibility of mediate or indirect knowledge, as Lovejoy sometimes erroneously asserts. Our concern is with one particular kind of mediate knowledge, namely, a representative knowledge involving an epistemological dualism of 'idea' and 'thing'. To forget this fact is to invite confusion of thought.

Having made the real issue plain, we must now ask whether Prof. Lovejoy succeeds in proving the existence of such knowledge. He claims to have done so. Indeed, he claims that *all* our knowledge of the external world is of this kind. There is some doubt as to the character of 'pure self-awareness' (*v.* p. 316), but with this 'debatable exception' all knowledge is representative. The first difficulty that meets us, if we accept this view of knowing, is how, when we are confined to 'ideas' in our immediate experience, we ever come to think of real things outside. On pp. 267-268 Prof. Lovejoy suggests a new "starting-point of the argument for physical realism". We have no space here in which to consider his suggestion in detail, but can only say that we find in these pages no solution of the above difficulty. Certainly, when we expressly begin with an epistemological dualism the difficulty of explaining the first step out to the external world is, to say the least, a very real one. But supposing that, in some mysterious fashion, we have come to know that a real world exists beyond the immediate objects of awareness, how now are we to know anything further of that real world, if we still persist in holding that we are directly aware of 'ideas' only? Lovejoy's answer is that the 'ideas' must in certain respects be analogous to the real outside. They must be so, for we *do* know certain details of information about that real world, and we can only gain this information through our 'ideas'. To understand how this is possible we should turn first, he thinks, to memory, where 'representative' knowledge is seen at its best. What we know when we remember

is the past, but the past event we now know is no longer present. It is 'outside' and 'beyond' my present immediate experience. What is present, however, is a symbol in a pattern of dated events, the symbol standing for the past event known. Thus the remembered event is not present; none the less it is presented. "What his (the epistemological dualist's) thesis means, or should mean, is that at the moment when any man believes himself to be, *e.g.*, remembering, there is before him both a particular concrete datum—usually an image—and the conception of a mode of relatedness in which mutually external existences, including this datum, may stand to one another; and that the character of the datum either is ascribed to a locus (in that relational order) conceived as other than that in which it is actually given (other, namely, than the here-and-now locus), or is at least regarded as capable of presence in that other locus" (p. 312). This, then, is how 'representative' knowledge actually does occur. But can such a process as is here described, we must ask, give us knowledge of which we can continue to be convinced when in a reflective, critical and sceptical mood? On what grounds am I justified in ascribing the character of the datum to a locus other than its own locus? If I answer, because in my present conceived pattern or plan of sequences the symbol at the present place symbolises the event at the other place, how do I know, firstly, that the 'real' sequence is rightly portrayed in the sequence now conceived by me, secondly, that the real event I am trying to recall came just where the symbol is put in the conceived pattern, thirdly, that the present character is an adequate representation of the character not present? These questions are surely pertinent to the issue, and the account given of 'representative' knowledge in remembering cannot be deemed satisfactory until they are answered. Lovejoy proceeds to assert that man's knowledge of the external world is likewise 'representative' in exactly the same sense as is his knowledge in memory. "The something 'before his mind' by means of which he conceptually distinguishes the real object from his sense-datum, is an idea of a character (actually and certainly possessed by the datum) as existing in a place which—in one or the other of the two senses just distinguished—is not the perceptible position of that datum in his visual field" (p. 314). But again, the question inevitably arises, how does he justify himself in holding that there is a 'something before his mind', that is to say, in the immediate data, which is 'an idea of a character' existing in some place other than the immediate data? It may be so; but what proof is given? The moment I begin to reflect I cannot understand why an idea *should* symbolise or represent, even in part, what I can only possibly know, *ex hypothesi*, through such representation. "The being known of a thing", we are told, "is its getting reported where it does not exist" (p. 315). But what we are not told is how we are to know, firstly, that the report is really a report and not a mere pretence or illusion, and, secondly, that the report is correct. We hope

we are doing Prof. Lovejoy no injustice, but we can find but one half-hearted and wholly inadequate effort to answer these questions. On pp. 317-318 he admits the fundamental difficulty—though he does not set it forward in its most general form. In its widest form the difficulty is: How can we admit that anything immediately present in any way symbolises or represents what is not and cannot itself be immediately present? The difficulty which Prof. Lovejoy does admit is "that of discriminating, if possible, those features of the datum which can be taken as reporting characters possessed by the external existent at the locus of reference, and those which are to be taken as additions or modifications due to the cognitive event, or to other extraneous circumstances, and therefore as existing only at the locus of givenness" (p. 317). Having said this, he adds frankly: "There is no summary and purely logical way of complete escape from this embarrassment" (p. 317). All he can suggest is that once it is admitted "that *some* knowing of external existences occurs, that there are realities not now, not here, and not ourselves, which get reported to us here and now" (pp. 317-318), then we must *sometimes* be knowing the external existence indirectly through immediate data. But this, of course, is begging the whole question. Without being able to point at one character possessed by the present datum of which we can be completely certain that it is also possessed by the externally real (the other side of our dualism), we none the less are asked to assume that some such characters do exist, and that we can somehow pick them out from the other characters that are not repeated in the externally real. This miraculous power of selection on our part must be possessed by us, it is urged, if we are beings capable of knowing the external world.

The conclusion, we must admit, is inevitable if one begins with an epistemological dualism; yet it is like enough to a *reductio ad absurdum* to make us hesitate before accepting it. What are the other alternatives? We may accept an idealism, in which we deny the existence of a world independent of us as knowing it. Lovejoy, rightly we think, rejects this alternative as soon as it is put forward. On the other hand, we may hold that in knowing we are directly aware of our object and that we do not become aware of it indirectly through the mediation of an 'idea' or 'ideas'. "But this epistemological monism," Lovejoy would say, "I have already shown to be impossible. In spite of its difficulties, a dualism is the only possibility." We should like, however, to question this assertion. Prof. Lovejoy thinks the fact of dualism in knowledge to be established beyond all doubt by a consideration of the content, firstly, of sense-experience and, secondly, of memory. Now, to consider sense-experience first, we are prepared to admit that the 'given' in sensation is not the real object existing outside. The 'real' objects, which we believe to exist in the natural world, are not private but public; they possess qualities (or do not possess them) independently of whether any one is (or is not) aware of these qualities at the time

But the 'given' in sensation certainly does not possess this independence; it is in some measure dependent upon the physico-physiological constitution of whatever is concerned in the process which ends in our having a sense-experience. There exists a dualism, therefore, between the 'given' in sensation and the desired object of knowledge—to use Lovejoy's phraseology, between the *datum* of sense and the *cognoscendum*. But in thus admitting that the object in sensing is not identical with the physical object in the real world, have we not also admitted an epistemological dualism? Certainly not. The fact that what I sense is not the externally existing physical object (or a quality of the physical object) in no way proves that I can only come to know the physical object *through* what I sense. The point is a subtle one, but it is of the first importance for understanding the problem of knowledge. It is possible definitely to deny that the 'given' of sense is the real external physical object and yet to retain an epistemological monism. (Elsewhere I have tried to show how this may be done. Here I have only room to state my conclusion.) If this is so, Prof. Lovejoy's argument from the private, subjective character of the content in sense-perception does not establish an epistemological dualism. An epistemological monism is still a possible alternative. If, again, we turn to memory, something of the same kind may be urged here. When one remembers a past event we must admit that the past event itself is not present, and yet something is present. "Retrospection is thus a case in which the duality of the datum and the thing known is immediately manifest" (p. 306). In a certain sense the dualism here must be granted. But is memory or retrospection a knowing of the thing known *through* the datum? Is this an adequate analysis of memory? In what exact respect can memory be said to be knowing? And is the actual knowing present the 'representative' kind of process which Lovejoy claims it to be? Perhaps no problem to-day is more in need of the attention of philosophers (although it gets so little of it) than is this one of analysing the experience of memory correctly and adequately. Prof. Lovejoy himself is particularly interested in memory, but in the preface to this work he himself hints (p. xi) that the whole of the final chapter, including the discussion on memory, is fragmentary and inadequate. We wonder whether a fuller analysis might not reveal facts to him (and to us) as to the character of knowing in connexion with memory which might provoke some doubt in his mind as to the validity of his epistemological dualism. We half suspect it would. And our suspicion in this connexion, together with our conviction as to the true character of sensation, make it impossible for us to accept, as something not to be questioned, Lovejoy's assertion that reflexions upon the content of sense-experience and memory themselves lead inevitably to the rejection of a monistic realism, and to the substitution of an epistemological dualism in its place.

The fact is that Prof. Lovejoy's attempted restoration of a

representative theory of knowledge brings back into epistemology so many awkward and baffling difficulties, which one had hoped had disappeared for ever, that he will have to produce much more evidence in its favour than he has done in this book before he can expect to convince responsible thinkers of the soundness of his argument. We should readily grant that sensations, images and concepts exist, and if Lovejoy wants to term these 'ideas' we should have no objection. Also, there is one sense of the phrase in which we should be ready to admit that the mind in the whole cognitive experience 'uses sensations, images and concepts' or, again, 'ideas'. It is for ever striving to use them, we think, to help itself into a position in which it can know. What we do object to, however, is the Lockean view, which Lovejoy reasserts, that what is immediately 'before the mind' is such an 'idea' and *never* anything else: that, accordingly, knowing is merely a something's-getting-reported through the medium of an 'idea' at another place. We think this interpretation of knowing makes a true understanding of its character wholly impossible, and one can only regret to find it reintroduced into epistemological speculation.

We have very little room to discuss the second dualism, that between body and mind, termed in this book the 'psycho-physical' dualism. On the whole, we think, we could accept most of what Prof. Lovejoy asserts in this connexion. The biggest difficulty, we should think, lies in the precise meaning of the term 'dualism' itself in this context. We all know, for instance, that the mind is not the same thing as a chair, but a book also is not the same thing as a chair. Are we then to hold that there is a dualism consisting of book and chair? Obviously when we talk of the 'dualism' of body and mind we mean by the word 'dualism' more than that the things considered are merely different. Do we mean, then, that the things are different in every possible respect? But, in this sense, surely, there could be no psycho-physical dualism; for mind and body are at least alike in existing in the same universe—more, they frequently seem to co-exist in the same organism. Thus the word 'dualism' as used in this connexion, needs very careful definition. Are we really thinking of two substantival *things* here? Can we apply the category of substance at all? These, and many like questions, we feel, should first be raised and answered before one can be expected to say whether one actually does believe in a 'psycho-physical dualism' or not.

We may pass this matter by, however, without further comment in order to draw the attention of the reader to the very admirable critical analysis contained in the body of this work. If this review has been rather unfavourable up to this point, it will be understood that it is so not because of the unworthiness of the book as a whole, but because of what we believe to be the too-ready acceptance in one final chapter of an old, one had hoped, out-worn theory. But there can be no two opinions about the excellence of Prof. Lovejoy's critical estimate of contemporary thought. Were this book as

strong on the constructive as it is on the destructive side, it would be a classic; and one can heartily congratulate Prof. Lovejoy on the six middle chapters. We append a very brief and fragmentary summary of these chapters so that the reader may have some idea of the lines upon which the criticism proceeds. We shall attempt to discuss neither the criticisms passed nor the general questions raised.

The 'first phase' of the revolt against dualism, the outcome of reflexion upon the realist suggestions of Moore in England and of James in America, was the work of the New Realists and of such people as Professors Alexander, Kemp-Smith, Laird and Dawes Hicks. The criticisms through which they developed the realist theories were often unfair, being frequently directed against a caricature of the dualistic theories. Lovejoy enumerates seven such inadequate criticisms and shows wherein each was defective. Their efforts led either to a separation of 'existences' from 'subsistences', 'particulars' from 'universals', 'events' from 'essences', and so to the implicit reassertion of a dualism, or to openly absurd theories, particularly about sensation. In the latter connexion, Lovejoy makes much play with the argument from the finite velocity of light and shows how utterly indefensible the position becomes if one argues that what we see when we look at a star a thousand light-years away is the star as it is *now*.

The 'second phase' of the revolt modified the first so as to meet criticisms. It held that the object in knowing is always seen from a point of view, from a certain perspective, but that the object *is* known as it is *from this perspective*. Knowledge is thus relative. Your knowledge is not mine; none the less, there is no subjectivism and no dualism. We are both in direct contact with the objectively real. (We must be allowed to venture the opinion that criticism of this theory ought to be a simple matter. Such theorists have merely confused knowledge with sensation, and all we need do to refute them is to point this out. Lovejoy, however, adopts another line of criticism.) In this book the theory is termed an 'objective relativism'. The main criticism urged against it runs as follows: While it is true that objectively real existences may have relations without thereby losing any of their objectivity, the relation of a percept to a perceiver may not be wholly identical in character with the relations between purely objective things, and a certain subjectivity may be essential to *this* relation. To understand the position fully we need to define our terms 'relative', 'objective', and 'subjective'. Lovejoy, in some excellent pages (pp. 90-100), proceeds to define and analyse these terms, and to point out that there are, at least, four senses of the term 'objective' and that in only one of these senses can the percept be said to be 'objective'—in the other three it is 'subjective'. In the fourth chapter he discusses the outcome of this 'second phase'. Objective relativism agrees with dualism in holding that the content perceived is relative to the

perceiver, but affirms that it is yet objective. There ensue many difficulties which Lovejoy proceeds to consider. Firstly, there is the difficulty that if what we see is in physical space then illusions, hallucinations—which we also see—must also be in space, and are physical objects. This is well nigh impossible, however, for such objects do not obey the rules which all physical objects obey. If they are physical objects they are very different in character from all other physical objects, and it becomes difficult to talk consistently and sensibly about such objects once we assert them to be physical. Again, if the objective relativist modifies his position to meet this attack and argues that the datum is an essence, adjectival and universal, so that the (universal) quality I perceive *may* belong to a physical object as well, Lovejoy can point to equally great difficulties attendant upon this new position. Actually, he holds, data are not such 'universals' or 'essences'. But if they were, objective relativism could not possibly be justified by an appeal to the 'essence', for the objectivity of the latter is of the kind pertaining to Platonic Ideas and not to objects 'in nature'. Surely, it cannot be the aim of objective relativists to establish a Platonic Realism. And, even if it were, they would not, by this means, rid themselves of a dualism. Lovejoy argues further from the fact that a knowledge which is relative is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. If I can only know a thing from a perspective, and if knowing it from a perspective modifies its character, then such knowledge is not real knowledge of the thing itself, and this hypothesis makes it impossible for me ever to come to know the thing itself, since I must always see it from a perspective. Strictly speaking, objective relativism is a subjectivism and a scepticism. But to *know* is to apprehend what is not relative, what is not 'from a perspective'. Finally, Lovejoy points out that the support from modern physics claimed by such objective relativists is one in appearance only. The Relativity of the physicist provides philosophers with no confirmation of any belief in 'relative' knowledge—knowlege 'from a perspective'. On the contrary, Relativity may truly be said to be the effort to rid our physical knowledge of its perspectivity. If, then, we are to speak consistently, these 'data' perceived, which are relative to the perceiver, must be other than the real external physical objects which we wish to know, and the objective relativist himself must end by affirming some kind of dualism. Actually, the dualism has been present in implication throughout. "The recent and current phase of the revolt against dualism is in fact carried on almost exclusively by dualists" (p. 155).

There remain three chapters of critical work concerned with the theories of Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. Lovejoy considers critically the development of Whitehead's thought (up to, but not including, *Process and Reality*). He shows how Whitehead begins by emphatically rejecting the dualism between qualities perceived and qualities pertaining to things 'in nature'. The 'bifurcation'

consequent on such a dualism only occurs, Whitehead would claim, when one first has committed 'the fallacy of simple location', to wit, that certain elements in nature must be in one place and cannot possess a duplicity or, for that matter, multiplicity of spatial situations. After much close reasoning Lovejoy concludes that the denial of 'simple location' does not enable us to do away with the distinction between public objects having public qualities and private sense-data, and that Whitehead himself, in spite of his avowed rejection of dualism in this connexion, is implicitly proposing a dualism between sense-data and a world of real things not conditioned in perception. Perhaps Prof. Lovejoy is at his best in the two chapters which he devotes to criticising Mr. Bertrand Russell. It is Mr. Russell's aim to rid philosophy not so much of the epistemological dualism but of the psycho-physical. He has endeavoured to do this in two ways. Firstly, he so defined the *physical* object as to give room in it for what we see (a 'mental' something). Thus, for instance, a table is defined as "the set of all those particulars which would naturally be called 'aspects' of the table from different points of view". The set, however, is to include all possible, though as yet, perhaps, unperceived, 'aspects', related according to the laws of perspective. He thus avoids a mere phenomenalism while at the same time identifying what we see with the physical. Lovejoy subjects this first theory to a rigorous criticism. He shows how it contradicts itself; how it is opposed to the scientific teaching of the day; how it leads to absurd consequences, particularly if we think of our own brains as physical objects; and, lastly, how it is applicable to *visual* sense-data only. The dualism between, for instance, tactual sense-data and physical objects would presumably still remain. Russell's second and more famous attempt to overcome psycho-physical dualism in his *Analysis of Matter* and *Outline of Philosophy* of 1927 is also criticised. Here, a difference between sense-data and the external object which causes them is admitted, but no dualism of mind and body is allowed, because sense-data are 'in my brain'. But this, Lovejoy points out, is an easier theory to state then to hold consistently. If sense-data are physical, then they are so in a very peculiar way. The laws of physics do not apply to them, as Russell himself seems to admit. To make the theory consistent we should have to assert that the electrons of brain-matter possess a characteristic which other electrons do not possess. This is near enough to a dualism to satisfy Lovejoy that Russell has not, as yet, established a psycho-physical monism. Lovejoy claims that Russell's position collapses suddenly, at the end of the *Analysis of Matter*, when it is finally argued that the ground for holding the 'common stuff' theory is not the fact that psychical events exist in the brain or in anything physical, nor again that there is a likeness between psychical and physical, but merely that psychical events are causally related to physical. This, Lovejoy asserts, leaves us with a definite dualism; on the one hand, the world

of experienced content 'outside physics', on the other, its physical cause. Mr. Russell has not shown that the content of perception, of imagination, of memory, and so on, are so many elements in the physical world. A psycho-physical dualism still remains as the only consistent theory.

Prof. Lovejoy has written a book of real importance. His examination and analysis of the present situation in epistemology is worthy of serious attention both because of its acumen and because of its admirable thoroughness. But we doubt whether his 'epistemological dualism' will be generally accepted. Prof. Lovejoy's arguments in connexion with this matter are certainly not strong enough to convince the unbeliever; nor can we see that there is any future for the representative theory of knowledge.

R. I. AARON.

Studies in Philosophy and Psychology. By G. F. STOUT. Macmillan & Co., 1930. Pp. xiii + 408. 15s.

THIS book is a collection of Prof. Stout's scattered philosophical papers, written during the period of thirty-nine years from 1888 to 1927. All have been published before, mostly in MIND or the *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, except the essay "In What Way is Memory-Knowledge Immediate?" (1927). Certain small changes have been made in most of the papers, and the titles of two of them have been altered.

Two of the essays are mainly expository, *viz.*, "The Herbartian Psychology" (1888) and "Ward as a Psychologist" (1926). The former is a very clear and most useful account of the psychological theories of an eminent thinker who is too little read in England. It is much to be wished that Prof. Stout or some other writer with a gift for sympathetic understanding and lucid exposition would write a similar essay on the Herbartian metaphysics. It is obvious that much of the dialectic in Book I. of *Appearance and Reality* was greatly influenced by Herbart. It is also difficult to see the point of several passages in Lotze's *Metaphysics* unless one is acquainted with Herbart's views. Yet, so far as I know, no English translation or commentary exists.

Three of the essays are predominantly psychological, *viz.*, "Voluntary Action" (1896), "Perception of Change and Duration" (1899), and "The Nature of Conation and Mental Activity" (1906). The essential parts of the first and third of these are now, I take it, contained in the *Analytic Psychology* and the *Manual*; but Prof. Stout warns us that he no longer holds that the activity of the self can be ascribed to the mind alone in abstraction from the body which it animates. For the further exposition of his present views of the self