



## Philosophical Review

---

The Case Against Dualism

Author(s): A. K. Rogers

Source: *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1920), pp. 27-42

Published by: [Duke University Press](#) on behalf of [Philosophical Review](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2178104>

Accessed: 16/05/2014 04:35

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Duke University Press and *Philosophical Review* are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Philosophical Review*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

## THE CASE AGAINST DUALISM.

IT is my purpose in the following pages to comment briefly upon a number of isolated arguments against the theory of 'representationalism,' or 'dualism,' which I happen to have run across in the course of my recent reading, and which I think will be found sufficiently typical. I shall endeavor to show that they are not decisive as against all available interpretations of such a theory, and that a much more thoroughgoing criticism than is common is necessary therefore on the part of opposing philosophies if their foundations are to stand entirely secure, since there is a surprising amount of agreement in the admission that representationalism is a less esoteric theory than any of its rivals, whose more involved and paradoxical constructions would have much less chance of acceptance were it not so that the simpler and more obvious way of interpreting knowledge is definitely bankrupt. And what I mean by representationalism, stated with as few metaphysical implications as possible, is this: There is a real world which we as human beings know, and which is distinct from us and from our human knowledge of it. We know it by means of perceptions or ideas or thoughts, which are in themselves mental or subjective processes. And our ideas are true when the content which they affirm to belong to the real world really does belong to it,—when, therefore, these ideas 'correspond' to the real outer fact which they profess to describe.

I. "It has been one of the specious advantages of the representative theory of knowledge that it satisfied the craving for a real and reliable world . . . by sequestering all error and untruth in a place apart, the 'subjective' world. It is remarkable that this view has been found attractive and serviceable notwithstanding the fact that at the same time it provides that all that any person can experience or know is his own subjective world—the very stronghold of error."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Holt, *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 259.

It is a not unusual misapprehension of the theory in question,<sup>1</sup> to suppose that it places the knowing process and its 'object' on a different footing in the case of truth and of error. This is quite unnecessary; the function of the 'mental' may well be the same in both. Even in error the 'object' is not mental; we believe in what we take to be an actual thing, not in a mental state. But in truth no less than in error, we are able to believe this through an immediate apprehension of content—made possible by its embodiment in 'mental' experiences of our own—which is then assigned by an affirmation of belief to the independent object. The only difference is, that in truth we are correct in so assigning it, whereas in error we are mistaken.

Quite the most universal and most fatal misrepresentation of a reasonable theory of dualism is that indicated in the last phrase of the passage quoted. Unless one can persuade himself not to ignore the distinction drawn by the dualist between 'experiencing' and 'knowing,' he is incompetent to deal with the argument, because he utterly misunderstands what the modern dualist at any rate is trying to say. The fashionable way of convicting the doctrine of 'subjectivism' is by thus taking the statement that the subjective is the only reality we can *experience*,—a harmless claim enough, since being a part of immediate experience is all that 'subjective' is intended to mean,—and then assuming that this is the same as saying that the subjective is all that we can *know*. There is surely no *logical* impossibility in the supposition that while we can only know things *through* experience, we can, through experience, know what is not itself experienced; the medium of knowledge, and the object of knowledge, are not *prima facie* identical.

2. "They (the idealists) have always sharply repudiated the conception that the mind is a sort of vessel of ideas in the sense of phantoms of things, a transition from which to knowledge we have to justify by Epistemology."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "If veridical objects existed in the physical realm, and erroneous objects in the mental realm, and the two realms were exclusive, there could be no explanation of error." Cohen, *J. of P.*, XIV, 265. Cf. also Spaulding, *The New Rationalism*, p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> Bosanquet, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XXVI, 12.

A good example of the disposition of certain critics to make out the worst possible case they can for dualism before they proceed to refute it. Is there any reasonable person who actually thinks that ideas are phantom effluvia of objects gathered up into a hollow receptacle called the mind, and then manipulated in some artificial way to produce knowledge? This is pure caricature. Substitute, for the notion of the mind as a vessel, and for the idea as a phantom interposing as a *tertium quid* to veil the object from us, the conception of the self as a concrete experience-process capable of utilizing certain experienced qualities to throw light upon the character of an environment on which it finds itself dependent, and which it is compelled to recognize as separate from itself, and what particular merit attaches to a philosophy, self-evidently, for sharply repudiating *this*? If there is one thing that forces itself upon us every moment of our lives, it is the obvious difference between the big world on the one hand, and man with his scant and imperfect knowledge on the other; most evidently man's knowledge *is* not reality, but is *of* reality. And to evade the need of weighing fairly the 'dualistic' feature in this common sense claim by substituting a caricature, is a not quite reputable form of polemics. Why speak of the mind as a vessel containing ideas, instead of as a reality that experiences itself in the form of ideas, as modifications of its own nature? Why call ideas 'phantoms,' with the evident wish to suggest unreality, when the essential thing is only that there should be some correspondence between the thing we believe in and what we believe about it? Why imply, as so frequently is done, that ideas part us from the object, when the whole point is that they reveal to us the object's true nature? It is not that knowledge separates us from things; it is, rather, that we are separated from things already (or are 'we' *everything*?), and knowledge helps to close the gap. It is true that knowledge does not bring about actual identity with the things we know; fortunately I can know a fool without necessarily becoming a fool myself. But knowledge does not claim this, and it is nothing against it therefore that it fails to supply the place of self-existence. And if ideas are precisely the tools we use to get to things which

are *not* ourselves, why should they be a veil between these things and the mind, any more than money is a barrier between the purchaser and the object of his desire? Meanwhile, the only sense in which we have to justify a 'transition' to knowledge by epistemology, is in the sense that the *fact* that we find ourselves thus knowing objects through our ideas, requires, before it can itself as a process be understood, to be analyzed and placed in connection with other facts, since of course it is not theories of knowledge, but only knowledge itself, that we have by nature. There is not the least ground for claiming that the dualist, any more than any other philosopher, needs to hold that epistemology creates knowledge to begin with.

3. "The representative theory in all its forms contains the following difficulty: On the one hand, there is nothing in the idea by which its correspondence with the thing, or even the existence of the thing, can be attested; and yet on the other hand, it is only through the idea that the nature and existence of the thing can be known."<sup>1</sup>

We cannot know things except through the idea, but it is not through the *idea alone*, as a psychological existent, that we know them. Because the character of a thing is only knowable in case we have a resembling idea, it does not follow that the existence of the resemblance is the only thing involved in the claim *that* it resembles, or that there is no further element in the situation that might serve as a 'test.' I have myself no doubt that there is something more, and something very essential; it is our *active* relationship with things. And is it not conceivable that the acceptance of certain characters in which instinctively we are led to clothe the world,—a world we believe in because of its relation to our active needs,—might rationally find itself justified in so far as it *worked*, practically, or through its logical consistency with other beliefs that also work? It is true that on the theory of representationalism there is always an academic possibility of doubt as to the correctness of our knowledge; but academic doubt is not practical doubt—the only thing worth worrying about. And meanwhile

<sup>1</sup> De Laguna, *Dogmatism and Evolution*, p. 56.

if any other philosophical theory has attained to infallible certitude, will it kindly speak up? The fact that one can formulate a philosophy which theoretically presupposes reality present in a way that ought to make our knowledge indubitable, does not, it should be noticed, actually validate this knowledge, so long as there is any *possibility of doubting the theory*; and as all philosophical theories can up to date apparently be doubted, agnosticism, if by this we mean a lack of intuitive or demonstrative certainty, is our common fate. I should myself prefer not to place the demands of knowledge so high, and so be able to hold that I have perfectly good 'knowledge' whenever I have belief that is able to hold out rationally against suggestions of doubt.

4. "Nothing can represent a thing but that thing itself. . . . The upshot is that there are no such two things as knowledge and the object of knowledge, or thought and the thing thought of. . . . Our ideas are never completely identical with the objects. Hence we have become wedded, or indeed welded to the phrase—my thought is *of* an object—when we ought to say and mean—my thought is a portion of the object,—or better still,—a portion of the object is my thought."<sup>1</sup>

The truth here is that nothing can represent a thing, in the representationalist's sense, unless in so far it is like that thing,—unless, that is, it has characteristics which are identical. But it is only the neo-realist's bad metaphysics which makes identity of *character*, or similarity, equivalent to absolute identity. For the neo-realist, two men with the same shape of nose must be in so far the same man; why not keep to common sense and say that they are existentially quite different men, but are similar in that they have one abstract character in common? In other words, recognize that there are such things as existents which *possess* character, but *are* not themselves bare logical descriptive terms, and the argument loses its point.

5. "I would remind him that I objected to (the representative) theory because it has come to the absurd *impasse* of declaring that the idea which represents is not even like the thing which

<sup>1</sup> Holt, *Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 142, 148, 149.

is represented. The idea of space, it says, is not spatial, the idea of shape is shapeless, of color is not colored, and so forth.”<sup>1</sup>

There is no reason why dualism need come to the absurd *impasse* which Professor Holt mentions, though certain dualists may. I should make no objection to the claim that if the idea of space is truly to represent space, it must be spatial—with proper qualifications. I see no reason why sense experience should not, for example, have the quality of ‘extensity,’ and just because it has this character be able to refer extensity to the outer world as the basis of its spatial nature, though the sensation thus characterized is not thereby in other respects identified with the extended object, and need not itself be *in* space.

6. “The strain of eye-convergence means nearness, not because it resembles it in any way, but because it has been constantly associated with it.”<sup>2</sup>

By picking your examples you can find plenty of psychological facts of this sort, in which ‘meaning’ does in the indirect and practical sense have a connotation due to association. No one ever supposed that eye strain resembled nearness. But if nearness is a *different* idea which eye strain ‘suggests,’ what is the idea of *nearness*, when we stop to ‘realize’ it? Do we not in such a case call up in idea some instance where nearness was an immediate relational experience? and between such an interpretative idea, and actual nearness, is there no resemblance? If there is none, nearness in the end is nothing to us but a word, even though eye strain may enable us to *act* in a manner appropriate to near objects.

7. “If this statement (that an experience ‘points beyond itself’) is taken to mean . . . that my experience has a reference to something not given in the experience, then it is really a contradiction in terms. There can be nothing in an experience which is not experienced. How should we be aware of the something beyond the experience except it is presented in experience?”<sup>3</sup>

It is a contradiction to suppose that something can be in

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 237–8.

<sup>2</sup> De Laguna, *Dogmatism and Evolution*, p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander, *Mind*, XXII, p. 22.

experience which is not experienced, but not, again, that something can be *known* which is not experienced—the only point in question. Of course the referring is experienced, and also the ‘nature’ of that which is referred to. But why should it be *a priori* impossible to have an active belief in the *existence* of something not now present, though its supposed nature may be present, or apprehended, or ‘given.’ (The object also, it may be remarked, may be said to be ‘presented’, but this does not mean the same as *present*.) Anyhow we do have such beliefs; and one may prophesy that it will take a long time to convince the average man by logic that he cannot believe that a real man Julius Caesar once existed who no longer exists, and who, therefore, is not now experienced, by himself, or by anyone else. At least the *meaning* of such a belief is not a contradiction in terms, for I can actually distinguish it as a possibility, and contrast it, as my own thesis for example, with Mr. Alexander’s thesis. The trouble here lies in assuming to begin with that the presence of a ‘nature’ or ‘quality’ in experience is all there is to belief or knowledge.

8. “Concluding that the content of perception is subjective because it is other than and subsequent to an objective process which produces it, and then concluding that we must question or reconstruct the objectivity of the process because the only means by which we know it is the content.”<sup>1</sup>

A sound argument against subjective idealism, but not against a reasonable dualism. If in the first phrase ‘content of perception’ means only the character of the immediate psychological medium, and not the *object* of knowledge,—the only sense in which dualism need speak of it as ‘subjective,’—its subjectivity has no bearing at all upon the objective character of the known process which produced it, or of anything else that is ‘known.’

9. “Is not what we perceive red? . . . Is it not then plainly repugnant to conclude that the contents of the mind are, all of them, immaterial? . . . It (the world) may be made only of the stuff of consciousness, but then consciousness is the kind of stuff that may be condensed into a lump of sugar with which

<sup>1</sup> Woodbridge, *Essays in Honor of William James*, p. 157.

to sweeten coffee. Nor can we hope to obscure the fact by insisting that 'states of consciousness' are at best 'representations' of other things, which other things have the qualities in question. For, however that may be, the 'representations' have also the same qualities and obey the same laws. . . . A representative world which can thus so faithfully copy, even in part, another world which is somehow its cause, would appear to contain within itself all the elements necessary to show how process and result are related to each other, at least 'in representation.' And if 'in representation,' then surely the need of duplicated worlds has disappeared so far as any positive result for knowledge is concerned, for process and result would in that event be given in a manner wherein their relation to each other could be defined."<sup>1</sup>

A dualistic theory need not hold that there are two *objects*—a real and a represented one; there is one real object *and* the medium or machinery of acquaintance with it. And while this medium may embody logical qualities which it refers to the object, it is as an existent different from the objective existent, and has such qualitative differences also as follow from this. Because therefore the quality sweetness must be embodied in a taste sensation to give concreteness and actuality to my meanings, there is no necessity that this mental existent should *act* like the other and objective existent, and sweeten coffee. And accordingly the fact that the idea has a sufficient identity to enable us in terms of its own content to *define* a given reality, does not mean that it is a *substitute for* the process thus defined. Because the mind is able through characters which come home to it in immediate experience to understand what is meant by the constitution of the solar system, it does not follow that this knowing idea could itself take the place of a solar system, or create one. The realm of knowledge, and the realm of natural history, involve different starting points and different problems. The world must first be presupposed in order that knowledge of it should *be*, and knowledge must be presupposed in order that the world should be *known*; but this is no circular process, since being, and being known, are not the same.

<sup>1</sup> Woodbridge, *ibid.*, pp. 160, 163.

10. "In what sense can a concept correspond point for point to an object, when admittedly no general object exists? If therefore representationalism be true, conceptual thought must be a progressive falsification of the true nature of reality."<sup>1</sup>

Apparently here, as not infrequently, the notion of representation is interpreted too narrowly to mean a literal picture or image of a concrete thing. All that representation implies is that any character of reality in particular in terms of which reality is known, can also be experienced in an immediate psychological way; to what extent the nature of the world is substantive, or relational, or what not, it reserves for further inquiry.

11. "So long as I maintain my independent position over against the object, its inner center and essence remains inaccessible, refusing to be 'reduced' to sensations and relations in my mind. Only by stripping off its subjective opinions and sinking itself in the object does the mind render itself capable of becoming the bearer of truth. . . . If this be granted (that objects are capable of being known), there must be more than an external correspondence between the idea and the object. The idea, we say, is the interpretation of the object, the revelation of its nature. . . . Logical experience does not construct an image or subjective picture of the object, but reveals its essential nature and relations as an element in an organized system of ideas. The relation between 'idea' and real object is not external like that of a copy and its original, but the more intimate inner relation of existence and meaning. It would therefore seem to follow that the question whether the real object and the idea are numerically identical cannot properly be raised. . . . The 'cognizing' experience is not an object at all; it cannot even be regarded as an existing psychological process."<sup>2</sup>

Such statements have a perfectly good meaning, to most of which I should not hesitate to subscribe; but they ignore the particular aspect of the problem with which dualism happens to be dealing. If we understand by the 'idea' the ideal significance of the object, its meaning aspect, its relationships and

<sup>1</sup> Jones, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XX, p. 418.

<sup>2</sup> Creighton, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XXI, pp. 313, 314, 315.

bearings as these extend beyond its bare isolated existence, this to be sure *is* no 'copy.' It is, as it claims to be, a description of the larger scheme to which the object belongs,—a logical scheme that can be thought apart from any particular 'knower.' In this sense idea means simply 'intelligible content of knowledge,' or, since the object of knowledge and reality are one, it means reality itself on its descriptive side. But while knowledge or truth may be used properly as referring to the logical content known, 'knowing,' or 'believing to *be* true,' involves something in addition—something which *is* an existing psychological process, whose relation to the object which it knows cannot be left out of a complete epistemological statement. And if this latter relation is not 'copying,' at any rate we give up any hope of identifying it when we merely fall back on the *other* sense of knowledge as an intelligible description of the object abstracted from any particular knowing act. Meanwhile I am willing to agree (1) that if by the object's inner center and reference one were to mean its *existence*, it is in a sense *not* accessible to knowledge, though this is God's fault and not the fault of knowing; in any other sense the independence of the self—the fact that it is other than the object—is no drawback to perfectly valid and comprehensive knowledge: (2) that the object is quite justified in refusing to be reduced to sensations and relations in my mind, though if the object's *qualities* and relations are not capable somehow of coming home to me in psychological experience, I do not see how *I* could ever get any notion of what they are; and, (3) that while of course one should strip off his mere subjective opinions and sink himself in the object, this does not mean either that he should try to *become* the object (he can't do this if he tries), or that he should try to *think* the object without having any ideas in his mind to do the thinking with.

12. "Representative theories of perception avoid the logical paradox, but on the other hand they violate the reader's sense of life, which knows no intervening mental image, but seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically exist."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, *Radical Empiricism*, p. 11.

A true statement of the fact; but dualism need not mean that we have two objects, one of which we perceive (the subjective one), while the other we only infer. It is quite possible to interpret it in a way to account perfectly for the unity of the object in experience. And meanwhile it should not be overlooked that when we cease perceiving, and start to examine the perceiving experience itself, the burden of proof is now against the monist; common sense *has* usually found reason to believe that here it has to do with a *second* more or less substantive kind of fact, not identical with the permanent physical object perceived.

13. "How is it possible for such an external object to impress its image on the mind?"<sup>1</sup>

If this means to ask how, or why, reality is as it is, the question of course cannot be answered. But there seems no particular reason why the *fact* might not be so that, on occasion of a nerve process, an existence should appear possessing some of the characteristics of the object setting up the process; or why, if knowledge or belief be assumed possible at all, this characteristic might not then be referred to such an object.

14. "I suspect that the view is fostered by the dislike of relations, and that it is felt the mind could not know objects unless there were something 'in' the mind which could be called the state of knowing the object. Such a view, however, leads at once to a vicious endless regress, since the relation of idea to object will have to be explained by supposing that the idea itself has an idea of the object, and so on *ad infinitum*."<sup>2</sup>

There is no objection that I am aware of to 'relations,' though there might very well be to Mr. Russell's conception of a particular relation called knowing, in which one term *is* just the relation to (awareness of) the other term. If to escape this it is thought we need a substantive mental term to which the object is in that relationship of correspondence which knowledge involves, this means no reduction of the relation itself to an idea or 'state,' and leads to no endless regress.

15. "Truth (as correspondence) becomes a relation, the ex-

<sup>1</sup> Creighton, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XII, p. 601.

<sup>2</sup> Russell, *Proc. Aris. Soc.*, 1910-11, p. 119.

istence of which can never be revealed to us. For the Real which is required to verify it is itself by definition inaccessible to our experience."<sup>1</sup>

In so far as this is the old assumption that because a thing is not present to *experience* it cannot be *known*, it has already been discounted. But if we do not beg the question by asserting *a priori* that knowledge of something not immediately experienced is impossible, the existence of the relation *can* be revealed to us. Just as I can compare Alexander with Julius Cæsar and see a likeness, for the reason that, though neither are present existentially, they are both alike present in idea, so I can think of an object known and a past perception of this object, and discover (if it happens to be there) a point of resemblance, since both are now present in thought, and present together. It is of course presupposed that agreement is a relationship discovered by later inspection, and not a part of the original perceptual experience, which is aware only of the object.

16. "A green and leafy mental state could not, as such, be distinguished from a green and leafy object, if the greenness and leafiness in object and mental state were wholly identical."<sup>2</sup>

So, I suppose, I could not distinguish red hair from a red sunset if the redness were the same. Naturally I could *not* distinguish a green and leafy mental state from a green and leafy object if the two *things*, as *wholes*, were the same; but then by definition they are different. A 'green and leafy mental state,' by the way, is a misleading description on a view such as I should want to defend, since it implies that the mental state would *look like* a green leaf to an observer, which it is unnecessary to suppose. Surely we could have a feeling of green through sensation without the sensation *looking* green.

17. "It is a fundamental error to take the agreement formula, the notion that true ideas are those that copy or agree with reality, as the original, natural, instinctive and obvious meaning of truth. Such a formula is, in fact, unintelligible until after the appearance of the sceptical individualism which would separ-

<sup>1</sup> Schiller, *Proc. Aris. Soc.*, 1908-9, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Leighton, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XIX, p. 11.

ate the knower from the world of reality which he seeks to know. . . . If the truth seeker . . . has any doubt as to his success in getting truth, it is clear that what he doubts is not whether his judgments agree with or copy reality, but rather whether they do or do not successfully read the meaning of this particular fact or group of facts before him in the light of their total experiential context. . . . One should reserve the word 'truth' to describe the quality which judgments have when they successfully report for thought the significance of the experienced fact or facts."<sup>1</sup>

This is approximately true. The naïve man is concerned with the content of truth, or *that which is* true; and he measures this content by comparison with other content, all equally objective in form. He is a scientist in other words, rather than an epistemologist. But for just that reason the epistemologist cannot take off-hand his definition from the common man. The philosopher needs to distinguish *two* problems. He may, presupposing that everybody knows what 'trueness' is, ask what quality distinguishes one claimant to truth from another; here 'what is truth' is equivalent to, 'what 'truths' are true?' Or he may go back of this and inquire what we mean by 'trueness'; what does any claim that *my belief is true* involve as such? And here we *do* need to bring into the definition some reference to 'belief' on the one hand, and reality on the other.

18. "Truth is not a copy of reality. Truth is in question just as much when we are dealing with unrealities as when we are dealing with realities. Centaurs are unreal, yet for all that it is true that Cheiron was a centaur."<sup>2</sup>

Doesn't 'It is true that Cheiron was a centaur' mean, 'my assertion of this corresponds with the actual nature of the fable as a fact in Greek mythology'?

19. "In strict dualism there is no possibility of inferring from my content to your content, or to you, because there is not a single experienced factor common to both."<sup>3</sup>

There may be likeness, or identity of *character* involved, which ought to be enough for inference.

<sup>1</sup> Bakewell, *PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, XVII, pp. 582, 589, 590.

<sup>2</sup> Bakewell, *ibid.*, p. 584.

<sup>3</sup> Dunlap, *Psychol. Rev.*, XXIII, p. 63.

20. "Since truth goes beyond the given, it is impossible to understand how truth can copy reality. For, before the reality has been reached, there is no original to copy, and, when the reality has been attained, that attainment already is truth, and you cannot gain truth by transcribing it."<sup>1</sup>

The representative theory does not say that the idea copies reality, as if it had reality there to copy from, but that a given content is *believed to be a copy of* (a true account of) reality. Before reality is reached (in knowledge) there can indeed be no original (in knowledge) which is copied from; but there may *exist* an original of which the cognitive account is believed to be a true one, and which may very well have been concerned in producing the conditions that now make it possible to give an account of it. So when a true description of reality has been attained, you do not indeed gain truth by describing it over again. There is no question of one description copying another; the description itself is true. But it is already a description *of* something else, and a description embodied in a mental process; and here the notion of resemblance is already present. The alternative is that 'when reality has been attained' may mean, 'when it is present bodily in the knowledge of it.' This may be Mr. Bradley's notion of complete knowledge, but it is not the dualist's; for him, the presence of reality in this sense would mean that we *are* reality, and so no longer 'know' it.

21. "If the judgment is false, that is not because my *ideas* do not correspond to reality, but because such a conjunction of concepts is not to be found among existents."<sup>2</sup>

Why may not *both* be so? Ultimately it is the fact that such a conjunction of characters is not to be found among existents which make a particular judgment false (though it does not give to falsehood its *meaning*); and so long as we think of truth as 'truths,' and abstract the content of the judgment from the judging act, we can confine our reference thus to the 'reality' side. But it still remains so that judgment involves something more than existence, or subsistence; it is a human process of

<sup>1</sup> Bradley, *Mind*, XVI, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Moore, *Mind*, VIII, p. 179.

judging. And while the 'character of reality' is the standard by which the claim of any judgment in particular to be true is tested, the bare fact of needing such a real standard itself implies the presence of a *claim* to truth, or belief, which is not this reality, but whose relation to reality is what gives meaning to 'trueness.'

22. "It is similarly impossible that truth should depend on a relation to existents, or to an existent, since the proposition by which it is so defined must itself be true, and the truth of this can certainly not be established, without a vicious circle, by exhibiting its dependence on an existent. . . . An appeal to the facts is useless. For in order that a fact may be made the basis of an argument, it must first be put in the form of a proposition, and, moreover, this proposition must be supposed true. . . . All true inference must be inference from a true proposition, and that the conclusion follows from the premise must again be a true proposition: so that here also it would appear that the nature of a true proposition: is the ultimate *datum*. . . . When an existent is said to be involved in truth, a vicious circle is committed, since the proposition 'something is true,' in which 'something exists' is supposed to be involved, must itself be true, if the latter is to be so."<sup>1</sup>

Because we cannot talk about anything except by putting it in the form of a proposition, it cannot *be* anything but a proposition, so that knowledge moves entirely inside the circle of 'logical system.' The main trouble with this claim is that we are sure it isn't so. The question-begging assumption here seems to be, that the 'truth' of a proposition consists only in certain inner relationships between the terms, *i. e.*, that all knowledge reduces in the end to the intuitive perception of actual relationships. But such a 'fact' is in the distinctive sense not 'true.' It is simply real; just as when we say that a conclusion truly follows from a proposition this does not mean that the conclusion is true, but only that it really follows. The thesis simply leaves out of consideration that experience of 'belief' wherein logical relationships appear to be transcended, and we find ourselves

<sup>1</sup> Moore, *ibid.*, pp. 181-82.

accepting an 'existent' reality of which terms and relationships are assumed to hold,—the experience on which physical and contingent, as opposed to logical and necessary knowledge rests. And unless we arbitrarily set aside this natural claim at the start, we have no right to ignore the relation to existents which it implies because it cannot be intuited or logically deduced, since its evidence does not rest to begin with upon any truths of logic. The objection, again, seems to assume that 'establishing' a truth means deducing it from something else that is true; this alone would render us liable to a vicious circle. But a *definition* so far as I can see is not established in this manner; and here I seem to detect another ambiguity. 'Trueness' is what we are setting out to define, as a character of all truths; and we establish the definition by applying it to instances, and recognizing that it actually interprets what we mean when we use the word. Now the truth *that* trueness is so definable is *not* the quality we are defining, but one of these cases in particular; and why the fact that the definition is found applicable here should be against it I confess I do not see. Certainly we should not regard a definition of truth as very successful if the truth *that* it was true proved an exception to it.

A. K. ROGERS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.