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The Context and Meaning of Proverbs 8:30a

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ואהיה אצלו אמון ואהיה שעשעים יום יום משחקת לפניו בכל־עת

As is well known, the word אמון in Prov 8:30 seems to have confused even the earliest translators and commentators, and its interpretation continues to divide modern scholars.[1] Broadly speaking, two different suggestions have dominated the debate in recent years. According to the first, the word is a variant on or error for the noun אמן found in Cant 7:2, where it is generally taken to mean "master craftsman."[2] On this reading, therefore, personified Wisdom is depicted as an active participant in the process of creation: a craftsman, an architect, or the like. The second common proposal is to take the word as a passive participle from the verb אמן meaning "nursling" or, by extension, "child." This relegates the figure of Wisdom to the role of onlooker, but both picks up the preceding references to her birth, and links her childish nature to the subsequent description of her playful joy in the world. A variation on this theme parses the word instead as an infinitive absolute, with the sense "growing up."[3]

[1] I shall not trace here the long history of interpretation. The more recent literature is cited in Gerlinde Baumann, *Die Weisheitsgestalt in Proverbien 1–9* (FAT 16; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 131–38; and in C. L. Rogers, "The Meaning and Significance of the Hebrew Word אמון in Proverbs 8,30," *ZAW* 109 (1997): 208–21. Both also refer to the comprehensive outline in Hans Peter Rüger, "AMON—Pflegekind: Zur Auslegungsgeschichte von Prov 8,30a," in *Übersetzung und Deutung: Studien zu Alten Testament und seiner Umwelt: Alexander Reinard Hulst gewidmet von Freunden und Kollegen* (ed. D. Barthélemy et al.; Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1977), 154–63.

[2] The only other possible attestation is in Jer 52:15, where a number of commentators take האמון to be a collective noun, meaning "artisans." Even were the existence of such a noun plausible, the artisans of Jerusalem had already been deported, according to 2 Kgs 24:14, as Michael Fox points out in "ʾAmon Again," *JBL* 115 (1996): 699–702, esp. 700. We should emend the *ʾālep* to *hê*, to give ההמון, as in the parallel passage in 2 Kgs 25:11.

[3] See Fox, "ʾAmon Again" and his *Proverbs 1–9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 18A; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 287.

We shall look below at a third solution, popular in ancient times but less so today. For the moment, however, it is important to note the significant obstacles that stand in the way of both of these leading solutions. The first has to explain not only the *wāw* in אמון, or at least its absence from Cant 7:2,[4] but also, more crucially, why the active role of Wisdom is introduced only at this late point in the poem and mentioned nowhere else in Proverbs 1–9.[5] Attempts to resolve this problem by taking אמון as an attribute of God, instead of Wisdom,[6] or by giving it a more specific sense,[7] simply raise fresh questions of their own.

The second solution poses a grammatical problem: if אמון is taken as a participle, one might expect the form to be feminine, in agreement with חכמה. More importantly, this solution is often presented in a way that obscures the very technical sense of the verb אמן when it is used in the context of raising children. The verb can be used in the *qal* with the specific sense of caring for children who are not one's own, as nurse, guardian, or foster parent; correspondingly, the passive can be used of children being fostered or nursed.[8] There is nothing to suggest,

[4] The forms cited from later Hebrew, even by advocates of this solution, strongly favor the assumption that the word was generally pronounced in a way close to that found in the Song of Songs (*ʾommān)*, as does the common belief that the term is a loanword from Akkadian *ummānu*. Such a pronunciation would permit אומן, but not אמון.

[5] For those who wish to retain ch. 8 in the context of Proverbs 1–9 as a whole, rather than regarding it as a separate poem, it is important to observe that 3:19–20 portrays Wisdom more specifically as a tool or an attribute, not an actor at the creation.

[6] The most recent proponent of this view is Rogers, who cites earlier supporters back to rabbinic commentators ("Meaning and Significance," 220), and it is accepted by Norman Whybray in his commentary, *Proverbs* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994; London: Marshall Pickering, 1994), 136. While it is grammatically possible for the term to refer to God, the awkwardness of the construction is indicated by the absence of any such interpretation in the ancient versions. It is difficult, moreover, to understand why the writer would have obscured his own meaning by using a redundant suffix pronoun on אצלו.

[7] Richard Clifford (*Proverbs* [OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999], 99–101) builds on a suggestion by Jonas C. Greenfield ("The Seven Pillars of Wisdom [Prov 9:1]: A Mistranslation," *JQR* 76 [1985]: 13–20) and claims that there was a traditional understanding of the *ummānu* as a mediator of divine wisdom to humans. The evidence seems very thin, however, and even if we accept the possibility of such a tradition in Mesopotamia, Clifford's belief that it was also known in Syria-Palestine seems to rest entirely on the mention of Ahiqar in a very late text from Uruk, which shows only a movement of traditions in the other direction. A more general understanding of Wisdom here as counselor was put forward by Theodor Gaster, on the basis of the Akkadian ("Short Notes," *VT* 4 [1954]: 73–79, esp. 77). Pieter de Boer reaches a similar conclusion by a very different route, taking אמון to be a suffixed form of אם, "mother," used as the title of a king's counselor ("The Counsellor," in *Wisdom in Israel and the Ancient Near East* [ed. Martin Noth and David Winton Thomas; VTSup 3; Leiden: Brill, 1955], 42–71). Other issues aside, none of these theories explains how Wisdom is actually acting as a counselor or culture-bringer in the context of Prov 8:30.

[8] The lexica are divided on the question of whether there are two verbs אמן or a single one whose *qal* stem, in particular, is associated with the special sense of looking after children. If they are to be regarded as separate, it is unlikely that they are simple homonyms, as that special sense is probably drawn from the notion of trust.

however, that the verb can refer more generally to the upbringing of children, or to their growing up: the term has a specific reference that would emphasize God's guardianship or fostering of wisdom.[9] Again, this is an idea that has appeared nowhere else in the work, and it seems curious that it should be introduced in a poem that emphasizes wisdom's own power, not her dependence.[10] For both solutions, then, the context poses problems that, if not insuperable, do little to make the suggestions persuasive. If only for that reason, therefore, the place of v. 30 in the poem as a whole would seem to deserve more consideration than it is often given.[11]

Her speech in Proverbs 8 is the second made by the personified figure of Wisdom in chs. 1–9. Like the other speeches, in chs. 1 and 9, it urges the uneducated to heed her words and may be designed to counter the invitation of a more dangerous character—in this case the seductress of ch. 7, who also targets the uneducated.[12] Where Prov 1:20–33 warned of the consequences for those who ignore wisdom, however, the speech in ch. 8 is a more positive affirmation of Wisdom's value, expressed in both worldly and religious terms.

[9] This objection applies also to Fox's attempt to read the word as an infinitive absolute "serving as an adverbial complement," and meaning "'I was with him growing up' ('*ʾāmôn*-ing,' as it were)"; see Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 287. Fox bases his case for an "intransitive" *qal* infinitive on Esth 2:20, arguing that we should read there not a noun *bĕʾomnâ* but a suffixed infinitive *bĕʾomnāh*, "when she was being raised." A similar understanding of the sense in Esther was offered by G. R. Driver, "Problems and Solutions," *VT* 4 (1954): 223–45, esp. 235. There are problems with reading Esth 2:20 this way, not least because of the need to treat the preceding verb as a (feminine) impersonal form, and as essentially redundant; Fox's analysis also seems to require a sense for באמנה that is not so much intransitive as passive. However, the key problem remains meaning, not grammar: even if we follow Fox's parsing, the Esther passage is surely explaining Esther's obedience to Mordecai in terms of the relationship established by his having raised her, so it is hardly saying simply that she grew up alongside him. Recently, Bruce Waltke has also identified the word as an infinitive absolute used adverbially, although he derives it from אמן in the sense "be firm" or "be faithful" (*The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1–15* [NICOT; Grand Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004], 420), and a similar suggestion was discussed by Otto Plöger (*Sprüche Salomos [Proverbia]* [BKAT 17; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1984], 95).

[10] Victor A. Hurowitz has argued that אמן and שעשע are "a conceptual pair where the second restricts the semantic range of the first" ("Nursling, Advisor, Architect? אמן and the Role of Wisdom in Proverbs 8. 22–31," *Bib* 80 [1999]: 391–400, here 397). He links Isa 60:4 to Isa 66:12, where the two terms appear in separate references to the same imagery, but his evidence seems to show no more than that the terms can both be used of children, a fact nobody disputes. This hardly means that they can only have such reference when used in close proximity.

[11] I have some sympathy with the protest of Jean-Noël Aletti that "[m]algré tout, les exégètes continuent à être divisés . . . et il ne semble pas que la seule analyse lexicographique puisse nous aider à comprendre le poème dans son dynamisme" (Aletti, "Proverbes 8,22–31: Étude de Structure," *Bib* 57 [1976]: 25–37, here 25). He pointedly consigns his own lexical preference to a footnote.

[12] On the pairing of Wisdom's speeches with those of other characters, see Jean-Noël Aletti, "Séduction et parole en Proverbes I–IX," *VT* 27 (1977): 129–44; and Gale Yee, "'I have Perfumed My Bed with Myrrh': The Foreign Woman (*ʾiššâ zārâ*) in Proverbs 1–9," *JSOT* 43 (1989): 53–68. I have explored this theme myself at some length in a forthcoming study of Proverbs 1–9.

The chapter as a whole is apparently divided into four sections (vv. 1–11, 12–21, 22–31, and 32–36), the last of which is half the length of the others.[13] The first sets the context for the speech itself and includes Wisdom's opening assertion of her own truthfulness and value, linked to direct invitations. In the next two sections, however, she moves from exhortation to self-description. Verses 12–21 might best be characterized as an outline of Wisdom's worldly benefits, in which, after listing the human qualities she offers or rejects, she affirms her own role in the exercise of power by human rulers and goes on to describe the actual or moral wealth that can be achieved by those who seek her out. The details of this section need not detain us here, although it is interesting to note both that it moves through several different topics, and that, despite the emphasis on worldly success, it twice links wisdom to traditional religious concepts—the "fear of YHWH" in v. 13, and the "way of righteousness" in v. 20. The significance of these links is clarified in the last section of the chapter, when Wisdom explains that her benefits actually proceed from God: to find and heed her is to gain the rewards of divine favor (v. 35).

The third section, with which we are concerned here, is designed to confirm the strength of the relationship between Wisdom and God. This relationship is the basis of Wisdom's promises, and without it her claims to truthfulness and value are empty. Verses 22–31 are crucial, then, as a justification of all that has been said so far. Given the intense speculation to which they later gave rise, it is important to bear in mind that their principal purpose, in the context of the poem as a whole, is to affirm Wisdom's reliability, not to furnish a precise cosmological account of her nature.[14] All of the emphasis, at least in vv. 22–29, is correspondingly on the antiquity of Wisdom's relationship with God and the world. The purpose of this emphasis is apparent from the context but may also be elucidated by the sarcastic use of similar imagery by Eliphaz in Job 15:7–9. There, to be older than creation is to have a special knowledge of the divine purpose, and Eliphaz denies that Job could have such superior understanding.[15] Likewise, the presentation of Wisdom

[13] It seems probable that the three longer sections are meant to consist of twenty-two stichs each, and the fourth of eleven. As several commentators have observed, twenty-two is the length of a "pseudo-acrostic," and the writer shows a fondness for the number elsewhere; indeed, the description of the woman's speech in ch. 7 may itself be twenty-two stichs long. Some caution is required, however, as a number of sections in Proverbs 1–9 come close to this figure but do not achieve it precisely. The writer may have treated the figure as a guideline for length more than as an absolute target. This does, however, furnish an argument for retaining the first two stichs of v. 29, which are lacking in the LXX version.

[14] This is probably why, for instance, the writer freely uses such vague and ambiguous terminology in v. 22 rather than specifying exactly how God acquired Wisdom. It also corresponds, to the view that the personified Wisdom of these chapters is a literary device, not the representation of a being considered to have real existence. See, e.g., Claudia V. Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine in the Book of Proverbs* (Bible and Literature Series 11; Sheffield: Almond, 1985).

[15] The wording in this passage is so reminiscent of that in Proverbs 8 that there may be a

here seems designed to bolster her claims: she is uniquely privileged to have seen God's will for the world from its outset. By implication, therefore, she offers the best way of discerning that will, and of obtaining divine favor.

Not all of the section, however, is concerned with the period of Wisdom's existence before the creation. From v. 26, the poem proceeds to describe her presence at the various events of creation, and finally her delight in the created world and in humanity. Since Wisdom could hardly have rejoiced in something that did not yet exist, the setting is obviously not static, and we must envisage a progression through three periods: before, during, and after the creation.[16] The role of v. 30a in this description is somewhat obscured by the ambiguity of the syntax. It is possible to take the clause as consecutive, completing a temporal expression begun in the previous verses: "when (God created) . . . then I was beside him." This is the most common translation, but there are two important arguments against it.

The first is that the clauses with ב in vv. 27–29 are already tied not to this verb but to שם אני in v. 27. This construction, with the "then" clause sandwiched between "when" clauses, is used also in the preceding vv. 23 ("*Since* long ago *have I been* formed, *since* the first beginnings of the world"), 24 ("It was *when* there were no depths that *I was* born, *when* there were no springs abundant in water"), and 25–26 ("*In the time before* mountains were planted, *before* hills *was I* born, *when he had yet* to make land and ground, or the first of the world's soil"). In vv. 27–29, the same construction is simply extended, so that instead of "when-then-when," we get "when-then-" followed by five "whens." If this seems a little odd, or even stylistically grotesque, we might recall that a single conditional sentence has earlier been stretched to fill the whole of ch. 2—such complicated constructions are characteristic of this work.[17] The significance for our present purpose is that the temporal clause in vv. 27–29 is already complete. Although it could be split into two temporal clauses, with v. 30 serving as an apodosis, there is no need for such a division, and the second clause would have to break with the pattern established in the preceding verses.

The second reason to take v. 30 with v. 31 rather than with vv. 27–29 relates to the use of catchwords. Where vv. 27–29 use ב at the beginning of every stich (except the parenthetical v. 29b) to indicate the events at which Wisdom was present, vv. 30 and 31 use their own catchwords to tie the stichs together. So v. 30a and v. 30b both begin with ואהיה, and v. 30c and v. 31a with משחקת; at the same time, ושעשעי in v. 31b clearly picks up שעשעים in v. 30b. Such catchwords are a

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deliberate allusion to it, if the two are not simply drawing on some familiar popular expression (compare the English "old as the hills"). There may be another allusion to Proverbs 8 in Job 40:19.

[16] This "before, during, after" division is noted by Hurowitz ("Nursling, Advisor, Architect?" 392–94), but he restricts the third period to the time immediately after creation and links the division to Wisdom's "life-cycle."

[17] Without multiplying examples, we might note also the extension of the conditional construction in 1:10–15, of the "lest" clauses in 5:9–14, and of the similes in 7:22–23.

compositional commonplace of sentence literature elsewhere in Proverbs and are arguably a more general feature of much biblical poetry. Although catchwords may be used to mark parallel stanzas, as in Proverbs 2, again, they more usually serve to unify material more directly, and here they unite vv. 30 and 31 as a discrete unit.

In short, a syntactic link between v. 30a and the preceding verses would be redundant, and the poetic techniques tie it very closely and obviously to what follows rather than to what precedes.[18] In that case, there is no good reason to take ואהיה to refer to the period in which the preceding verses are set. Indeed, if it is not serving as the apodosis of the previous temporal expression, then v. 30 more naturally refers to the period after creation: this, after all, is the setting of v. 31, to which it is closely tied. Correspondingly, the expressions of time in v. 30b are likely to have a more general reference than simply to the period of the creation: Wisdom was not a source of delight only while God created the world, but continued to be so, "daily" and "all of the time." In fact, it seems likely that these verses, with their strong emphasis on temporal constancy, should be understood with reference not to a brief interval in the past but to the whole subsequent period: Wisdom was with God before the creation, was present at the creation, and has continued to be beside God all the time, while herself rejoicing in the world.[19] This clarifies the purpose of the section. It is not merely a statement that Wisdom was with God early on, but a declaration that she has been with God throughout the history of the world, and still is. To humans, in whom Wisdom delights, she offers a unique understanding of the divine will, which will enable them to live and prosper with divine favor.[20]

This brings us back to אמון. If Prov 8:30 refers not to the period of creation but to the time since creation, then neither "craftsman" nor "child" is an adequate

[18] For this and other reasons, it seems difficult to accept the division into seven five-line stanzas that is proposed in Patrick W. Skehan, "Structures in Poems on Wisdom: Proverbs 8 and Sirach 24," *CBQ* 41 (1979): 365–79. Skehan's analysis requires not only that we discount the evident continuity of several sections, but also that we excise vv. 11 and 13a.

[19] היה often has the sense "stay" or "remain" when used with adverbial expressions of place, as well as of time (see, e.g., Judg 17:4, 12; Ruth 1:2). Whether one describes the *wāw* on the verb as conjunctive or consecutive, a reference to the present ("and I am"), or perhaps more properly to a present situation established in the past ("and I have been"), is perfectly possible. For a parallel to such a switch from past to present, see, e.g., Ps 29:10. The traditional tendency to translate as a simple past ("and I was") is not demanded by the Hebrew, which does not define the tense as such; the translation arises in part, perhaps, from exegetical presuppositions about the significance of the verse, but mostly, I suspect, from a simple misconstrual of the convoluted sentence structure in the previous verse.

[20] Aletti takes the passage to emphasize, above all, the mediating role of Wisdom, in a context where God does not interact directly with humans ("Proverbes 8,22–31," 34–37). While taking his point about the emphasis, I would not describe Wisdom's role as mediatory without qualifying that term somewhat.

interpretation. Clearly, some other explanation is required, and this leads us to the third interpretation I mentioned earlier. There is another issue altogether that might drive us in this direction, and it is often neglected. This is the use of אמון as a personal name by several biblical characters, not least King Amon of Judah.[21] It is true that the sense of Hebrew proper names can be rather obscure, as in the case of "Manasseh," the tribe or region after which Amon's father was apparently named. It is also true, however, that names were clearly intended to convey meaning and invited interpretation; most of Amon's immediate predecessors and successors bore names expressing YHWH's support for them. Against this background, it seems hard to believe that a king would have borne a name that might be understood as "little child," or that he would deliberately have been named "craftsman."[22] At the very least, the existence of this name suggests that the word אמון must have had some more suitable significance, and the habits of the Judahite monarchy in naming their children would lead us to expect some religious connotation.

This lends weight to the third interpretation, according to which אמון should be understood as a derivative of אמן, not with the unusual sense of "nursing" or "fostering," but with the more common implication of constancy and fidelity.[23] Those who propose such an interpretation show little agreement about whether the word is a part of the verb itself, an adverb, an adjective, or a noun. It is obvious, however, that this approach, which was more popular in ancient times than it is among modern commentators, presents fewer problems with respect to the context.[24] If Prov 8:30–31 does indeed refer to Wisdom's continuing relationship with God, then an expression of constancy would not be out of place in v. 30a; in fact, such an expression would offer an excellent parallel to the emphasis on continuity in the following stichs. The difficulty lies entirely in the identification of a suitable form.

An adverbial expression would give the closest parallel to what follows, but it is difficult to take אמון as a simple adverb. No adverb from the root is attested with

[21] See 2 Kgs 18:21–25. The name is taken to mean "faithful" by *HALOT*.

[22] Although BDB understands the name to mean "master-workman."

[23] The sense of "looking after," which is generally found in *qal* participial forms of the verb, appears in only a few places: Num 11:12; Ruth 4:16; 2 Sam 4:4; 2 Kgs 10:1, 5; Esth 2:7; Lam 4:5; Isa 49:23. Fox, as we have seen, would add a further reference in Esth 2:20, and many take the difficult *niphal* in Isa 60:4 to bear this meaning.

[24] Theodotion and Symmachus both have ἐστηριγμένη. The Targum's והוית צידוי מהימנותא has been translated in a number of ways, but there is clearly some reference to trust or trustworthiness, and the most probable sense is "I was with him out of faithfulness"; cf. the reading of the fourteenth/fifteenth-century Codex Graecus Venetus vii: κἀτελεσα παρ᾽ αὐτῷ πίστις (or πιστός). Such an understanding seems to be absent from the key rabbinic discussions, but since Rev 3:14 apparently draws on this verse, its reference to ὁ Ἀμήν, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστὸς καὶ ἀληθινός suggests that an interpretation of אמון in these terms was known in early Christian circles. I am grateful to Prof. Robert Hayward for his guidance on the targumic usage of הימנותא.

these consonants, and so it would be necessary either to resort to emendation, perhaps taking the *mater lectionis* as the consequence of an early misunderstanding, or to suppose that an unusual adverb was used because none of the more common alternatives had the desired sense. Neither course is impossible, but both are speculative.[25]

The alternative is to take אמון as a noun or an adjective. It cannot, of course, be a simple adjectival predicate or subject complement, as agreement with the subject would demand a feminine form here, and, anyway, such an adjective would more normally stand straight after the verb. It is not uncommon in Hebrew, however, for nouns and substantivized adjectives to be used adverbially, and when they are used in this way, adjectives do not agree with the subject. Such a construction is used at least once with nouns in the next stich, where יום יום serves as an adverbial expression of time, without prepositions, and where an adverbial use is probably the best explanation for שעשעים.

If we are seeking a noun or an adjective with the consonants אמון, then there is an obvious candidate. The term אמ(ו)ן (*ʾēmūn* or *ʾēmûn*) is usually found in the plural, where it can mean either "faithful ones" or "faithfulness," but it is also attested in the singular,[26] and there seems no serious obstacle to translating אמון as an adverbial expression meaning "faithfully": Wisdom is either existing "(as) a faithful one" or "(in) faithfulness." If this expression is straightforward, though, it is harder to see why the writer chose such a mode of expression, when a number of other options were available. In part, the explanation may be poetic, as he was certainly striving to make the stich alliterative and may also have been constrained by considerations of rhythm or word length. It is possible, however, that he also wished to pick up the religious connotations of the noun. When they appear in Pss

[25] The suggestion by Plöger and Waltke, noted above, of an infinitive absolute from אמן used adverbially, has to confront the problem that the *qal* is either not widely attested or else is largely restricted to the specialized sense of caring for children (if that is not a separate verb). The same objection can be made to the view of R. B. Y. Scott, that we are dealing with a *qal* participle, in the sense of "binding," or "uniting"; see his "Wisdom in Creation: The *ʾAmon* of Proverbs VIII 30," *VT* 10 (1960): 213–23; idem, *Proverbs. Ecclesiastes: Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (AB 18; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 71–72. Waltke does not view this as a significant obstacle, observing that "some lexemes occur unexpectedly in isolated forms in otherwise nonproductive stems" (*Book of Proverbs*, 420). He may be right, but the argument is not especially persuasive.

[26] It is not clear whether both senses are found in the singular, and this question is complicated by the possibility that some other occurrences of the consonants in the text, most notably those in Isa 25:1 and 65:16, should be repointed. It is possible that we are dealing with what were originally two separate words: since "faithful one" would provide an excellent way of understanding the proper name Amon, the pronunciation of which is attested with great consistency, a good case might be made for claiming not only that the singular could be used to mean "faithful one," but also that this was the way in which the word, with this sense at least, was originally vocalized. That would tie in well with the pointing of אמון in Prov 8:30 as *ʾāmôn*, but it would be unwise, given the long debates about interpretation, to overstate the significance of the MT vocalization.

12:2 and 31:24, the אמונים are linked to the חסידים and thereby to familiar implications of Jewish religious piety. Similarly, of course, when there is no "faithful one" or "faithfulness" in the "perverse generation" of Deut 32:20, that generation is implicated in idolatry. If he did not wish to say that wisdom was just a "faithful woman," or that she "really" existed beside God, the writer's options may have been quite limited. We might compare the situation in English, where "person of faith" means something quite different from "faithful person." Our present understanding of Biblical Hebrew does not always permit us to catch such nuances, but here it seems reasonable to suggest that the writer chose a construction that allowed him to present Wisdom's fidelity using the vocabulary of religious piety.

To sum up, the explanations that have dominated discussion of Prov 8:30 have rested on the assumption that this verse must refer to the period of creation. It more probably refers to the subsequent relationships between Wisdom and, on the one hand, God, and on the other, humanity. The verse is not a cosmological assertion of Wisdom's intrinsic nature or role at creation, but, like the rest of the poem, it is an assertion of Wisdom's value and reliability. The previous vv. 22–26 and 27–29 emphasize the antiquity of Wisdom's closeness to God, by describing her existence before the creation of the world, and her presence at the fundamental stages of that creation. Verse 30, on the other hand, begins a section that stresses how Wisdom remains, constantly and continually, a source of delight to God while herself delighting in the world God created. The poem as a whole is only incidentally cosmological: its principal concern is with the present status of Wisdom as a route to divine approval, and so to life.

When the place of the verse is understood in this way, then the word אמון may be understood quite readily as a well-attested noun or adjective. This word, when used in the plural, refers to those who are faithful to God, and the expression may have been chosen to reflect such specific religious connotations. In the light of the above remarks, and without going into all the other problems presented by this notoriously difficult passage, I offer the following translation of the section:

> YHWH got me as the start of his way, the beginning of his deeds of old.
> Since long ago have I been formed, since the first beginnings of the world.
> It was when there were no depths that I was born, when there were no springs abundant in water.
> In the time before mountains were planted, before hills was I born,
> When he had yet to make land and ground, or the first of the world's soil.
>
> When he set up the heavens, I was there—when he cut out a disc on the surface of the deep,
> when he fixed clouds above, when he strengthened the springs of the deep,

When he set for the sea its limit—and the waters will not transgress his word—when he dug the foundations of the earth.

And I have remained at his side faithfully, and I remain delightedly, day after day,
Celebrating before him all of the time, celebrating in the earthly world.
And my delight is with the sons of man.

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Zedekiah's Fate and the Dynastic Succession

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Zedekiah's fate has not aroused much scholarly discussion. This is surprising because Zedekiah was Judah's last king and therefore the last reigning heir to David's throne. As a son of Josiah, Zedekiah would represent the Davidic dynastic line. There has been much more attention devoted to the deposed Jehoiachin and his alleged rehabilitation in 2 Kgs 25:27–30, the main question being whether 2 Kgs 25:27–30 presents a positive view about the future of the Davidic dynasty or not (originally von Rad vs. Noth).[1]

Most scholars assume that 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 represents a fairly historical rendering of Zedekiah's final days and fate. His sons would have been slain in front of his eyes, and Zedekiah himself would have been blinded and taken in shackles to imprisonment in Babylon. Without much discussion or analysis, the assumption is that there is no reason to doubt the general historicity of this account.[2]

[1] Martin Noth, *Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien: Die sammelnden und bearbeitenden Geschichtswerke im Alten Testament* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1943), 12, 108; and Gerhard von Rad, *Deuteronomium-Studien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1947), 63–64. This debate has continued; see, e.g., Erich Zenger, "Die deuteronomistische Interpretation der Rehabilitierung Jojachins," *BZ* 12 (1968): 16–30, Jon D. Levenson, "The Last Four Verses in Kings," *JBL* 103 (1984): 353–61; Christopher T. Begg, "The Significance of Jehoiachin's Release: A New Proposal," *JSOT* 36 (1986): 49–56; and Bob Becking, "Jehojachin's Amnesty, Salvation for Israel? Notes on 2 Kings 25,27–30," in *Pentateuchal and Deuteronomistic Studies: Papers Read at the XIIIth IOSOT Congress Leuven 1989* (ed. Chris Brekelmans and Johan Lust; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 283–93.

[2] 2 Kings 24:18–25:7 is viewed as a historical account, for example, by James A. Montgomery, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Kings* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1951), 560–63; Douglas Rawlinson Jones, *Jeremiah* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 639–44; Georg Hentschel, *2 Könige* (NEchtB 11; Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1985), 124–25; J. Maxwell Miller and John Hayes, *A History of Ancient Israel and Judah* (London: SCM, 1986), 415; J. Alberto Soggin,

There are reasons, however, to question whether 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 is as unbiased and reliable as usually assumed. First, it is peculiar that the author describes Zedekiah's fate as an eyewitness. The events are presented as if the author of the passage, or the author of the source that was used, had followed the king to the Judean desert and from there to Ribla in Syria. The author claims to have known that Zedekiah personally saw the slaying of his sons (שחטו לעיניו) and was put in shackles. Such details would be expected from an eyewitness. The question is, Who could the eyewitness be? Or, where did the author of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 receive such detailed information? It is unlikely that the author himself was the eyewitness, and it is also very doubtful that any Judean was present to witness the events.[3] He would have to have followed the Babylonian army from the Judean desert, where Zedekiah was captured, to Ribla. He could have been a person captured with Zedekiah, but, according to 2 Kgs 25:5, his companions fled (כל־חילו נפצו מעליו).[4] Although it is possible that the king was captured with some of his personal aides and friends, there is no reference to any other person being captured. Moreover, it is doubtful that a co-prisoner, someone who was very close to the king, could have been the source that disclosed embarrassing and humiliating details about the king's fate.

Another possibility is that the account that describes Zedekiah's fate was based on rumors and/or Babylonian propaganda, which were then used by the author of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7. In principle, it is possible that the Babylonians, for political reasons, would have wanted to spread a report or rumor that Zedekiah's fate was particularly brutal because of his rebellion. This would have functioned as a warning to anyone who planned rebellion. However, since Judah, as a nation, was utterly destroyed, the purpose of such a message in the post-state context is not immediately clear. In any case, even if the Babylonians had circulated such an account, its uncritical acceptance by the author of the DtrH (= Deuteronomistic History) would be of significance. Why would the author of the DtrH accept

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A History of Israel: From the Beginnings to the Bar Kochba Revolt AD 135 (2nd ed.; London: SCM, 1993), 264–65; Georg Fohrer, *Geschichte Israels* (Uni Taschenbücher 708; 6th rev. ed.; Heidelberg/Wiesbaden: Quelle & Meyer, 1995), 182–84; and Herbert Donner, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel und seiner Nachbarn in Grundzügen 2* (ATD 4/2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 411–12. But note John Applegate, "The Fate of Zedekiah: Redactional Debate in the Book of Jeremiah. Part I," *VT* 48 (1998): 137.

[3] For example, Walter Dietrich assumes that the author very probably had personal knowledge about Zedekiah's fate (*Prophetie und Geschichte: Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum deuteronomistischen Geschichtswerk* [FRLANT 108; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972], 140). According to Ernst Würthwein, the writer of the Deuteronomistic History used a source for the account of Zedekiah (*Die Bücher der Könige: 1. Kön 17–2. Kön 25* [ATD 11/2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984], 475).

[4] Zedekiah had fled with his army to the desert. Although Josephus assumes that Zedekiah also took his wives, children, and friends with him (*Ant.* 10.8.2 §§135–41), 2 Kgs 25:4 refers only to the army, which later abandoned him.

Babylonian propaganda without question? In other words, it is very unlikely that the author of the DtrH had a reliable source for the events described in 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7. At most, he had a vague rumor or Babylonian propaganda at his disposal, which he could have used as the basis for his account.

Although it is theoretically possible that Zedekiah experienced the fate described in 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 (but see below), for now our main interest is that the author of the DtrH adopted the account as conclusive and presented it as history, even though he did not have an unproblematic and reliable source for the events. That the author not only described Zedekiah's fate in general terms, as one would expect from an author who does not have a direct source, but also seemed to know curious, even humiliating, details (shackles and Zedekiah seeing the slaughter of his sons), makes the author's approach even more peculiar. There is only one possible conclusion: the author must have had an interest in presenting Zedekiah's fate in such terms.[5]

Furthermore, 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 is incompatible with some passages in the book of Jeremiah. The characterization of Zedekiah in Jeremiah is confusing, and the picture is ambiguous. There are several passages that, being very probably dependent on 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7, follow the DtrH version of Zedekiah's fate. The king is portrayed in a negative light (e.g., Jer 39:4–7; 52:1–11). In some later additions to Jeremiah, the negative tendency of the DtrH is even amplified, as shown by Hermann-Josef Stipp.[6] Zedekiah becomes more and more evil. By the end of this development, in the Alexandrian textual tradition of the LXX, Zedekiah is depicted as the source of evil.[7] It is probable that the negative portrayal of Zedekiah in Jeremiah has its roots in the DtrH.

Our interest lies in the passages of Jeremiah that portray Zedekiah in a more positive light and seem to contradict 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7. These passages were apparently unaffected by the picture of Zedekiah portrayed by the DtrH and must represent a different tradition. It is necessary to examine them more closely.

According to the prophecy in Jer 32:1–5 (MT),[8] Zedekiah will have to face the Babylonian king and be imprisoned,[9] but there is no reference to the killing of Zedekiah's sons or to his blinding. The lack of reference to blinding is emphasized by the remark that Zedekiah will have to see the king eye to eye (v. 4). This implies that the author of the verse was unaware of or consciously contradicting

[5] The historicity of Zedekiah's fate is further undermined by its similarity to the fate of Jehoahaz, described in 2 Kgs 23:31–35. Both were first brought to Ribla and then imprisoned.

[6] Hermann-Josef Stipp, "Zedekiah in the Book of Jeremiah: On the Formation of a Biblical Character," *CBQ* 58 (1996): 632–38.

[7] Ibid., 638–41. Stipp notes that "the Alexandrian textual tradition was adapted to a stance violently hostile to the last Judean king" (p. 640).

[8] In this article I refer to verses in the MT unless indicated otherwise.

[9] Although vv. 3b–5 are presented as a prophecy, it is very likely that the passage was written after the conquest of Jerusalem.

the tradition that the king was blinded. Most scholars, however, disregard or try to avoid the contradiction between 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 and Jer 32:4. For example, William L. Holladay assumes that the reference to eyes in Jer 32:4, given "the fate that ultimately befell Zedekiah," must be ironic.[10] This is unlikely, for the context is not ironic at all. It is evident that Holladay takes 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 as the historical basis and does not question its reliability.

Perhaps the most intriguing detail of this passage is the phrase עד־פקדי אתו in v. 5.[11] The meaning of פקד in this context is not entirely clear. The word could refer to Zedekiah's punishment, "and he will take Zedekiah to Babylon and there he will remain until I punish him," or to the reversal of his fate, "and he will take Zedekiah to Babylon and there he will remain until I attend to him."[12] Although semantically possible, the first alternative is improbable in this context because the loss of kingship and expulsion to Babylon are an extreme punishment already. A reference to an upcoming punishment would make little sense. In fact, עד־פקדי אתו is comprehensible only if it refers to the opposite of what has been described in the previous text. The previously described state—misery in the form of imprisonment and shame as described in Jer 32:5aα—will continue until Yahweh intervenes.[13] Therefore, it is probable that the phrase refers to the reversal of Zedekiah's fate.[14] This is significant in view of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7, which leaves

[10] William L. Holladay, *Jeremiah 2: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah Chapters 26–52* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 213. According to Arnold B. Ehrlich, the text is corrupted and originally contained a negation before the verb: "you will not see the king eye to eye" (*Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel: Textkritisches, Sprachliches und Sachliches, IV Jeremia* [Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912], 324). Such an emendation without any textual support is hazardous, and the evident motive for the emendation is to bring the text into harmony with 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7.

[11] Despite some varying opinions, it is likely that the suffix of אתו refers to Zedekiah. Wilhelm Rudolph also mentions the possibility that אתו could refer to Nebuchadnezzar (*Jeremia* [HAT 12; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1947], 175), but this is unlikely, for the passage deals with Zedekiah's fate, which would then be left open. Moreover, a reference to Nebuchadnezzar's fate would make little sense in this context.

[12] See the different possibilities for interpreting the verb in, e.g., *HALAT*.

[13] The phrase has been interpreted in many ways. Winfried Thiel assumes that the phrase is a threat to Zedekiah (*Die deuteronomistische Redaktion von Jeremia 26–45* [WMANT 52; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1981], 30). According to Rudolph, the phrase may refer to Zedekiah's death (*Jeremia*, 175), but this would be an exceptional use of the word פקד. Numbers 16:29, to which Rudolph refers in this context, uses the word in connection with death, but there is no reason to assume that פקד means death. It rather refers to visitation or punishment by Yahweh. Rudolph also mentions the possibility that, instead of Zedekiah, Nebuchadnezzar may have been meant (but see n. 10 above). Jones suggests that the author may have left the precise meaning open: "until I decide what his future shall be" (*Jeremiah*, 407–8). Robert P. Carroll notes that in view of other passages in Jeremiah where the word is used (15:15; 27:22; 29:10), the meaning is probably positive in Jer 32:5 as well, that is, "to visit graciously" (*Jeremiah: A Commentary* [London: SCM, 1986], 619).

[14] Compare the passage with Jer 27:22, where the word פקד is similarly used to refer to a reversal of fate, in this case, the fate of the temple vessels.

practically no space for a reversal of Zedekiah's fate. It would be difficult to reverse the fate of a blinded king whose children had been slain. Therefore, Jer 32:1–5 undermines and contradicts the message of the DtrH concerning Zedekiah.[15]

It is not without interest that the parallel passage in the LXX (39:5) omits the phrase altogether. In the LXX, the verse refers only to Zedekiah's continued imprisonment in Babylon, not to the reversal of his fate.[16] It is probable that the phrase was later intentionally omitted from the LXX tradition, because its addition would run counter to the general direction of the textual development that gradually made Zedekiah more and more evil.[17] Moreover, its addition would have been less relevant and more unrealistic in later times when the image portrayed by the DtrH had established itself as the standard. Its omission, on the other hand, would be understandable because it challenged and contradicted 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7. Through its omission, the picture of Zedekiah's fate would have been harmonized. In any case, the phrase עד־פקדי אתו makes less sense if written after the death of Zedekiah, making a late dating unlikely if not impossible.[18] Consequently, despite the problems caused for conventional views of this king, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the phrase in the MT is original and refers to Zedekiah's rehabilitation and the reversal of his fate.

Like Jer 32:1–5, Jer 34:1–22 seems to contradict 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7. According to Jer 34:5, Zedekiah will die in peace (בשלום תמות) and receive a royal burial as his ancestors did. It is evident that this verse is not compatible with the account in the DtrH.[19] It would be absurd to characterize the death of a blinded, exiled, and imprisoned man whose sons had been killed before his eyes as peaceful. Against the backdrop of ancient Israelite beliefs, it would be difficult to imagine a more humiliating destiny for a king than the one described in 2 Kgs 25:5–7. It is also significant that Jer 34:5 implies that Zedekiah was a legitimate king who could be likened to his royal fathers (אבותיך המלכים). One cannot avoid the impression that, for the author of this verse, Zedekiah represents the royal line. In comparison, the DtrH ignores what happened to Zedekiah after he was taken to Babylon; there is no word of his death and burial. The silence is intended to imply that Zedekiah

[15] Applegate's suggestion ("Fate of Zedekiah", 155) that the verb is deliberately used in an ambiguous way to refer to both possibilities seems improbable.

[16] Καὶ εἰσελεύσεται Σεδεκιας εἰς Βαβυλῶνα καὶ ἐκεὶ καθιεῖται (LXX Jer 39:5).

[17] Stipp, "Zedekiah in the Book of Jeremiah," 632–38.

[18] Many scholars assume that the LXX represents the original reading, for example, Holladay, *Jeremiah*, 203; William McKane, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Jeremiah* (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh/New York: T&T Clark, 1996), 2:836–37. The LXX is assumed to be secondary by Rudolph, *Jeremia*, 174–75.

[19] This contradiction has been generally noted in research. For example, Carroll writes: "It is also highly unlikely that such a wretched prisoner should then be accorded the full state funeral honours of a foreign country after his death in prison" (*Jeremiah*, 642). Carroll continues by trying to show that Jer 34:5 is only a conditional statement. Like the consensus, he takes 2 Kgs 25:1–7 as the historical basis and tries to harmonize Jer 34:5 with it.

died shackled and forgotten in prison. The honorable burial of a royal would obviously disturb this picture. In addition, Zedekiah's royal burial would also cause serious problems for the message of 2 Kgs 25:27–30 (see below).[20]

Jeremiah 38 is usually assumed to contain early material that reflects the last days of Judah better than most other texts of the Hebrew Bible. Verses 18 and 23 imply that Zedekiah was taken captive by the Babylonians, but there is no reference to the brutalities mentioned in 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7. Jeremiah 38 generally implies that Zedekiah was imprisoned in Babylon, but the author does not seem to be aware of any dramatic details that would be worth mentioning.

It is not necessary here to discuss the relative age of these three passages in Jeremiah. Like most of the book, they may have been heavily edited.[21] It would be very difficult to expose their early cores or to determine their exact editorial development. Nevertheless, it can be established with moderate certainty that they contain material that was unaffected by the view of the DtrH on Zedekiah. Otherwise the existence of elements that conflict with 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 could not be explained. Moreover, these three passages seem to support one another, providing a generally consistent view of the events related to Zedekiah's fate. They suggest that Zedekiah's imprisonment was a fairly unspectacular event. Before his deportation to Babylon, he would have been taken to see the Babylonian king, but no drama or brutality is connected to the event. This tradition may also have held some hope for the rehabilitation of Zedekiah. The meaning of עד־פקדי אתו in Jer 32:5 is not explicit, but it is probable that the comment was written in a context where Zedekiah lived in exile and imprisonment, when there was still hope that his fate could be reversed. Combined with the idea that honors due to a royal would be given to him at burial (Jer 34:5), it seems that the circles behind this tradition regarded Zedekiah as the legitimate king even after he had been taken to Babylon as prisoner. The historicity of events described in the Hebrew Bible is usually very difficult to determine, but it is clear that if Zedekiah had experienced the fate described in 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7, the alternative tradition reflected in the three passages of Jeremiah would be inconceivable. Consequently, one has to ask what is really going on in 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7.

We have seen that the author of the DtrH passed on a tradition that he should not have adopted uncritically and, furthermore, provided details that he could not have known. With the challenge posed by the alternative tradition of Jeremiah, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the account in 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 serves

[20] For example, puzzled by the contradiction with 2 Kings 25, Rudolph adds בירושלם after בשלם in Jer 34:5 (*Jeremia*, 186). With this addition—but without any textual support—Rudolph reduces the passage to an unfulfilled prophecy. It is evident that 34:2–5 clearly implies that Zedekiah was buried as a king in Babylon. Rudolph's position is an excellent example how a preconception — the certainty that 2 Kgs 25:1–7 is reliable history—has influenced an analysis of Jeremiah. Without any textual support, emendations of this kind should be avoided.

[21] See, e.g., Holladay, *Jeremiah*, 210, 233, 290.

the author's compositional and other motives more than it provides an unbiased description of historical events. The author wanted to give the impression that Zedekiah's fate was definite and exceptionally humiliating. The king himself was physically ruined and treated as a low criminal. James A. Montgomery has noted also that the blinding may have served to show that Zedekiah's royal potency was destroyed.[22] Nevertheless, the killing of his sons may be the key to the passage. Zedekiah would not have a successor to the throne and, blinded and imprisoned in Babylon, would not be in a position to beget any further heirs. In other words, the passage makes it clear that Zedekiah's royal line would not continue.[23]

The extinction of Zedekiah's royal line is in accordance with 2 Kgs 25:27–30, which attempts to show that Jehoiachin, representing an alternative royal line, was, at least in part, rehabilitated. Although 2 Kgs 25:27–30 does not describe the return of Jehoiachin as a king to Judah, the author implies that he would have been treated like a king by the Babylonians and that there was hope of a complete rehabilitation and a return to Jerusalem to rule as king. When we compare the fates of Jehoiachin and Zedekiah in the DtrH, one cannot avoid the impression that there is a conscious contrast. The main author of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:30[24] implied that Zedekiah's royal line had come to an end, whereas Jehoiachin would represent the future (cf. the contrast between Jer 34:5 and 2 Kgs 25:27–30).

The contrast between these two kings may be seen in some other details as well. For example, it is peculiar that according to 2 Kings Zedekiah's court would have been slain (25:19–21), whereas Jehoiachin's court and family would have been saved (24:12). More than revealing historical circumstances, the author probably wanted to imply that Zedekiah did not have any followers or servants left, whereas Jehoiachin's court was still intact and his family alive. Erich Zenger has further argued that there is a difference in the evaluation of Jehoiachin and Zedekiah. Whereas the deeds of Zedekiah caused Yahweh's anger (2 Kgs 24:20), the evaluation of Jehoiachin lacks this comment.[25]

What is going on in these passages? It is about the dynastic succession. It is

[22] Montgomery, *Kings,* 562.

[23] One should not exclude the possibility that there is a conscious allusion to the fate of Saul's sons (see 2 Sam 21:4-14), whose killing may also have served the purpose of showing that Saul's dynasty would not continue. This would have removed all doubts about the legitimacy of David's line. Only Mephibosheth, the lame grandson of Saul was saved (2 Sam 21:7). That Mephibosheth was described as lame may have implied that he was not a suitable person to represent a royal line. I warmly thank Dr. Marko Marttila for pointing out that there may be a connection between the fates of Saul's sons and Zedekiah's sons.

[24] The passage was certainly edited, but in relation to Zedekiah and Jehoiachin there does not seem to be any change in attitude or perspective.

[25] Zenger, "Die deuteronomistische Interpretation," 29. He has further noted that Zedekiah is reported to have acted not like Jehoiachin but like Jehoiachim, Jehoiachin's father. According to Zenger, this was done consciously so as to put Jehoiachin and Zedekiah on the same level.

about which royal line is legitimate. By deposing Jehoiachin and replacing him with Zedekiah, Nebuchadnezzar had created two branches of the royal line (2 Kgs 24:8–17).[26]



When examined in the context of the events, the legitimacy of both lines could be justified. Both Zedekiah and Jehoiachin served as kings and could therefore have a claim to the throne. Zedekiah was Josiah's son, whereas Jehoiachin was Josiah's grandson. Both were thus direct descendants of the royal line. In addition, Zedekiah had the advantage of having been the last king. Moreover, his reign was much longer than that of Jehoiachin: eleven years versus three months. Jehoiachin did not have any time to establish his kingship. In other words, it would not have been easy to reject the legitimacy of Zedekiah's line in favor of Jehoiachin. The only way to undermine Zedekiah's line would have been to show that it had ended and could never provide an heir to the throne, and 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 serves this purpose. The emphasis of the DtrH on this issue is incomprehensible if the dynastic succession was clear and undisputed. The dynastic succession seems to have been a relevant and acute issue during the time 2 Kgs 24:18–25:30 was written.[27] The question is all the more important once we have established that there was a competing tradition. This indicates that there must have been an early exilic dispute about the dynastic line. In the first years after the destruction of Jerusalem there was still hope that the Davidic dynasty would rise to the throne,

[26] In fact, there were three potential royal lines, since Jehoahaz, a son of Josiah, had also been deposed (2 Kgs 23:33–34). His whereabouts and fate are unknown after he was captured and brought to Ribla (v. 33). According to Jer 22:10–12, he died in prison.

[27] In comparison, in 2 Chronicles 36 the fates of both kings are disregarded, evidently because the issue had become irrelevant. Hope for the reestablishment of the dynasty had faded by the time of the Chronicler(s)'s activity. For him (them), the future of Israel as a nation (e.g., its identity and existence) was a much more relevant issue.

but, with two existing lines, there emerged a disagreement over which one would represent the dynasty.

In addition to the passages already mentioned, Jer 22:24–30 could also be a vestige of this conflict. According to this passage, Jehoiachin would not have a follower to the throne (v. 30). Instead, he would be thrown out like a broken and unusable vessel (v. 28). It is evident that this passage conflicts with 2 Kgs 25:27–30. It seems to reject Jehoiachin's dynastic line. Although Zedekiah is not mentioned, the passage is well in line with those passages in Jeremiah that are more positive to the legitimacy of Zedekiah.

The tradition that Zedekiah represents the legitimate king must derive from a period when Zedekiah or at least his descendants were still alive and had realistic claims to the throne. The critical attitude of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7 to Zedekiah seems to confirm the existence of such claims. The author of this passage wanted to reject those claims by asserting that Zedekiah's sons had been killed. He would have implied that all who claim to be of the line of Zedekiah were usurpers and liars. Such a critical attitude and the extent of the attempt to humiliate Zedekiah are comprehensible only if the author felt that Jehoiachin's line was threatened by Zedekiah or his line. One does not attack something that does not pose a threat.

Unfortunately, we do not have any information about Zedekiah's children beyond 2 Kgs 25:7, and therefore it is difficult to draw any further conclusions. The most probable context for the dispute is a situation in which both Zedekiah and Jehoiachin were still alive and were still potentially eligible for the throne. It is significant that the death of neither king is described in 2 Kings. In comparison, the deaths of all other Judean kings are described in the books of Kings. By describing Zedekiah's death, the author of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:30 certainly served the purpose of showing that Zedekiah's line was not going to continue.

Considering the potentially biased nature of 2 Kgs 24:18–25:7, one may also cast some doubt on the historicity of Zedekiah's escape from the besieged Jerusalem (25:4). It is improbable that the Babylonians would make such a mistake in their military strategy that the entire Judean army (כל־אנשי המלחמה) could have escaped from the besieged city. The Babylonian army was a professional military machine experienced with sieges and would certainly have been aware that the king and the elite would try to escape when the city was about to fall. It is therefore more probable that the author of 2 Kgs 25:4 wanted to show that Zedekiah was a coward who only wanted to save his own neck and left the people to suffer the consequences of his unwise politics. This would be well in accordance with the author's interest in showing that Zedekiah was a failure as a ruler.

One should also be skeptical about the historicity of Jehoiachin's rehabilitation as described in 2 Kgs 25:27–30. Although some change in attitude toward imprisoned kings may have occurred in 562/561 B.C.E.,[28] it is difficult to see

[28] See, e.g., Becking, "Jehojachin's Amnesty," 283–90.

what would have been the motive of the new Babylonian king, Evil-Merodach (Amel-Marduk), in raising Jehoiachin, an ex-king of an insignificant state destroyed almost three decades earlier, above all other imprisoned kings. The idea that Jehoiachin received special treatment is certainly exaggerated. More than revealing a historical reality, the passage serves the purpose of showing that the royal line represented by Jehoiachin was recognized even by the Babylonians, whereas Zedekiah's line was forgotten. The message may be that the supporters of Zedekiah's line would have to challenge even the Babylonians, who stood behind Jehoiachin.

Although without additional information, it may not be possible to say more about the historical circumstances concerning Zedekiah and Jehoiachin, some issues in the composition of the DtrH are illuminated. The author's interest in the kingship and dynasty is not only about the continuity of the dynasty,[29] but also about the continuity of a certain dynastic line that he favored. Moreover, if we accept that the dynastic conflict was an important theme of the history writer, it confirms that 2 Kgs 25:27–30 is an inherent part of the composition. Several scholars assume that these verses are a later addition,[30] but without 2 Kgs 25:27–30, the emphasis on Zedekiah's negative fate would not be comprehensible. If we accept that Zedekiah was still alive during the time of writing, it is probable that the author wrote in the time shortly after 562 B.C.E.[31] Since Zedekiah was approximately fifty-seven years old in 562 B.C.E., he would have ceased to pose a serious challenge to Jehoiachin not long after that date.

It now seems evident that the history writer was preoccupied with the kingship not only in terms of its history and the continuity of the Davidic dynasty. He wrote in a context where two dynastic lines could justify their legitimacy. The history writer was a firm supporter of one line. He rejected Zedekiah's line as a dead end in favor of Jehoiachin. Perhaps the conflict over which was the legitimate line played a larger role in the whole composition of the DtrH, but this lies beyond the scope of this article. In any case, it is significant that, despite massive editing by redactors influenced by the DtrH, the book of Jeremiah preserves some vestiges of an alternative tradition that treats Zedekiah as the legitimate king whose line could provide heirs to David's throne.

[29] See Timo Veijola, *Das Königtum in der Beurteilung der deuteronomistischen Historiographie: Eine redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (AASF B 198; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1977), 115–19.

[30] E.g., Dietrich has argued that 2 Kgs 25:27–30 was later added by DtrN (*Prophetie und Geschichte*, 140–43); similarly, Hentschel, *2 Könige*, 124–25; and Jones, *Jeremiah*, 648. According to Würthwein, 2 Kgs 25:22–30 was added by a post-Dtr editor (*Die Bücher der Könige*, 481–84).

[31] The last events described in 2 Kings can be dated to 562 B.C.E., for 2 Kgs 25:27 refers to the thirty-seventh year after the beginning of the exile.

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Taxo's Martyrdom and the Role of the *Nuntius* in the *Testament of Moses:* Implications for Understanding the Role of Other Intermediary Figures

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The *Testament of Moses*, also known as the *Assumption of Moses*, is a pseudepigraphon that contains Moses's farewell discourse to his successor, Joshua. In this document, Moses predicts a series of historical events from the conquest of Canaan to the partial destruction of the temple during the reign of Herod the Great's sons (*T. Mos.* 1–6). Moses tells Joshua that a Levite named Taxo will appear at this time of persecution and say to his seven sons, "let us go into a cave which is in the open country, and let us die rather than transgress the commandments of the Lord of Lords, the God of our fathers, for if we do this and die, our blood will be avenged before the Lord" (*T. Mos.* 9:6–7). In the remainder of the work, Moses describes the eschaton and the arrival of God's "messenger," the *nuntius*, who will punish the wicked (*T. Mos.* 10–12). The relationship between Taxo's martyrdom and the *nuntius* continues to be the most debated topic among scholars seeking to understand the *Testament of Moses*'s date of composition as well as its philosophy of noble death.

The purpose of this study is to present a new scenario for understanding Taxo's martyrdom and his relationship with the *nuntius*. In the first section I

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examine previous scholarship on the *Testament of Moses,* while the second part offers a proposal for dating the *Testament* to the Herodian period. This is followed by an examination of how the writer of the *Testament of Moses,* like the authors of many of the Dead Sea Scrolls, has combined traditions from Deuteronomy 31–34 and Numbers 25 to portray his current situation in the Herodian era as a modern-day wilderness experience to accentuate the vulnerability of Israel and to emphasize the importance of strict adherence to the words of Moses. In the fourth section I explore the identity and function of the *nuntius*. The *Testament of Moses,* once it is properly dated to the Herodian period, emerges as a valuable, yet largely neglected, source for understanding the role of other intermediary figures of the Second Temple period.

I. Critique and Analysis of Scholarship on the *Testament of Moses*

The *Testament of Moses* is a prophecy attributed to Moses that survives in a single, incomplete, partly illegible sixth-century C.E. Latin palimpsest in the Bibliotheca Ambrosiana in Milan, Italy.[1] This Latin copy was apparently translated from a Greek edition, which was most likely based on a Semitic original.[2] The references to the work in ancient lists of apocryphal books, which mention both a *Testament of Moses* and an *Assumption of Moses*, suggest that it circulated widely during the early Christian era.[3] Based on the Christian references to the *Testament*

[1] The manuscript was reused for the *Excerpts from Augustine* by Eugippius. For the Latin text, see Antonio Maria Ceriani, *Monumenta sacra et profana ex codicibus praesertim Bibliothecae Ambrosianae* (Milan: Bibliotheca Ambrosiana, 1861), 1:55–64. An emended text of Ceriani's edition is found in Johannes Tromp, *The Assumption of Moses: A Critical Edition with Commentary* (SVTP 10; Leiden: Brill, 1993). For a detailed description of this manuscript, see E.-M. Laperrousaz, *Le Testament de Moïses (généralement appelé 'Assomption de Moïse'): Traduction avec introduction et notes* (Semitica 19; Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1970), 8–12; Gustav Volkmar, *Mose Prophetie und Himmelfahrt: Eine Quelle für das Neue Testament zum ersten Male deutsch herausgegeben, in Zusammenhang der Apokrypha und der Christologie überhaupt* (Leipzig: Fues, 1867), 1–3, 153–56. Unless indicated, the Latin text in this study follows Ceriani's edition.

[2] See Laperrousaz, *Le Testament de Moïses*, 16–25. For the view that the original language of the *Testament of Moses* was Hebrew, see R. H. Charles, *The Assumption of Moses: Translated from the Latin Sixth Century MS., the Unemended Text of which is Published Herewith, Together with the Text in its Restored and Critically Emended Form* (London: A. & C. Black, 1897), xxxviii–xlv; David H. Wallace, "The Semitic Origin of the Assumption of Moses," *TZ* 11 (1955): 321–28. See also Sigmund Mowinckel, "The Hebrew Equivalent of Taxo in Ass. Mos. IX," in *Congress Volume: Copenhagen 1953* (ed. G. W. Anderson et al.; VTSup 1; Leiden: Brill, 1953), 88–96. For a detailed argument that the *Testament of Moses* was originally composed in Greek, and a thorough analysis of its Latin vocabulary and grammar, see Tromp, *Assumption*, 27–85.

[3] The fifth-century C.E. ecclesiastical historian Gelasius of Cyzicus quotes twice from the work

of Moses, including a possible quotation from a lost portion of the text in Jude 9, it is very likely that it once contained an account of Moses's assumption to heaven and possibly a dispute between Michael and the devil over the final disposition of his body.[4]

Because the extant version of the *Testament of Moses* contains Moses's final instructions to his successor, Joshua, it is generally classified as a testament.[5] Since

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and calls it Ἀνάληψις Μωσέως (*Hist. Eccl.* 2.17.17; 2.21.7). For the text of Gelasius's quotations, see Albert-Marie Denis, *Fragmenta pseudepigraphorum quae supersunt graeca una cum historicorum et auctorum Judaeorum hellenistarum fragmentis* (PVTG 3; Leiden: Brill, 1970), 63–64. The ninth-century C.E. Stichometria of Nicephorus and the early-sixth-century C.E. Pseudo-Athanasius's *Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae* list both a Διαθήκη Μωυσέως and an Ἀνάληψις Μωυσέως. See *PG* 28, cols. 432, 1057. Scholars continue to debate whether these titles refer to two separate books or if they are alternative names for the same composition. It is also possible that the *Testament of Moses* is actually two independent works that were later combined into a single text. See further Tromp, *Assumption*, 270–85; also Richard J. Bauckham, *Jude. 2 Peter* (WBC 50; Waco: Word Books, 1983), 67–76; Scott J. Hafemann, "Moses in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha: A Survey," *JSP* 7 (1990): 79–104; James D. Tabor, "'Returning to the Divinity': Josephus's Portrayal of the Disappearances of Enoch, Elijah, and Moses," *JBL* 108 (1989): 225–38; Carl Clemen, "Die Himmelfahrt Moses," *APAT* 2:311–12; Laperrousaz, *Le Testament de Moïses*, 29–63; Tromp, *Assumption*, 87–89, 115–16.

Because Nicephorus and other ancient catalogues mention a *Testament of Moses* immediately before the *Assumption of Moses*, I use the former title, which more accurately describes the content of the extant work. The designation of this text as the *Testament of Moses* does not exclude the possibility that the original title of the composition may have been the *Ascension of Moses* or some similar name. For an exhaustive list of other related texts, as well as extensive bibliographies on the *Testament of Moses*, see Albert-Marie Denis with Jean-Claude Haelewyck, *Introduction à la littérature religieuse judéo-hellénistique,* Tome 1, *Pseudépigraphes de l'Ancien Testament* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 460–75; Lorenzo DiTommaso, *A Bibliography of Pseudepigrapha Research 1850–1999* (JSPSup 39; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 731–53.

[4] See further Bauckham, *Jude. 2 Peter*, 67–76; Denis, *Fragmenta*, 63–67. Similar traditions are found also in such texts as the Byzantine *Palaea Historica* and *Pseudo-Oecumenius* on Jude 9, both of which may preserve portions of the *Testament of Moses*'s lost ending. On this issue, see further Denis, *Fragmenta*, 67; David Flusser, "*Palaea Historica:* An Unknown Source of Biblical Legends," in *Studies in Aggadah and Folk-Literature* (ed. Joseph Heinemann and David Noy; ScrHier 22; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1971), 48–79; A. Hilgenfeld, "Die Psalmen Salomo's und die Himmelfahrt des Moses," *ZWT* 22 (1868): 299; A. Vasiliev, *Anecdota Graeco-Byzantina* (Moscow: Imperial University Press, 1893), 257–58. A similar Jewish tradition about an angelic dispute, which is apparently unrelated to our text, is found in 4QVisions of Amram^{b} (4Q544). See also Johannes Tromp, "Origen on the *Assumption of Moses*," in *Jerusalem, Alexandria, Rome: Studies in Ancient Cultural Interaction in Honour of A. Hilhorst* (ed. Florentino García Martínez and Gerard P. Luttikhuizen; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 323–40.

[5] See further John J. Collins, "The Testament of Moses," *JWSTP,* 345–46; Anitra Bingham Kolenkow, "The Assumption of Moses as a Testament," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses: Seminar Papers* (ed. George W. E. Nickelsburg, Jr.; SBLSCS 4; Cambridge, MA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1973), 71–77; Eckhart von Nordheim, *Die Lehre der Alten I: Das Testament als Literaturgattung im Judentum der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit* (ALGHJ 13; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 194–207; Tromp, *Assumption*, 111–14.

the *Testament* largely imitates Deuteronomy (*T. Mos.* 1:5), it is perhaps best to view this work as belonging to the genre of literature commonly referred to as "rewritten Bible," which is a type of literature that generally contains a narrative that follows Scripture and also includes substantial amounts of supplements and interpretative discussions.[6] This designation of the work accurately describes the content of the *Testament of Moses,* since it is largely a rewritten version of the historical material found in Deuteronomy 31–34, where Moses recounts Israel's past and future history in his final charge to Joshua.[7] The author of the *Testament* likely chose to base his composition primarily on Deuteronomy because he believed that Moses had predicted the recent burning of the temple (*T. Mos.* 6:9). For the author of the *Testament*, Moses is primarily a prophet whose teachings, if properly understood, foretell the events that will herald the eschaton.

There is no agreement about the sectarian affiliation of the author of the *Testament of Moses*. The writer of this pseudepigraphon has been identified as a Pharisee, a Sadducee, an Essene, a Zealot, a Samaritan, or a member of some unknown Jewish sectarian community.[8] The only possible hint at the composi-

[6] For a more detailed listing of the literary characteristics of this genre, see P. S. Alexander, "Retelling the Old Testament," in *It Is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture* (ed. Donald A. Carson and Hugh G. M. Williamson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 99–120. For some relevant comments on the difficulties inherent in attempting to distinguish this genre from other biblically based works in the Qumran texts, see Emanuel Tov, "The *Discoveries in the Judaean Desert* Series: History and System of Presentation," in Emanuel Tov et al., *The Texts from the Judaean Desert: Indices and An Introduction to the Discoveries in the Judaean Desert Series* (ed. Emanuel Tov; DJD 39; Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 10–12, 14. See further Norbert Johannes Hofmann, *Die Assumptio Mosis: Studien zur Rezeption massgültiger Überlieferung* (JSJSup 67; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 40–44. For examples of this genre, see Emanuel Tov and Sidnie White, "Reworked Pentateuch," in *Qumran Cave 4.VIII: Parabiblical Texts, Part 1* (ed. Harold Attridge et al. in consultation with James C. VanderKam; DJD 13; Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 187–351; Denis and Haelewyck, *Introduction à la littérature religieuse judéo-hellénistique*, 1:460–75; Eugene Ulrich, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Origins of the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 17–33; George W. E. Nickelsburg, *Ancient Judaism and Christian Origins: Diversity, Continuity, and Transformation* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 12–15; idem, "The Bible Rewritten and Expanded," *JWSTP*, 89–156.

[7] For a listing of texts classified as "rewritten Bible" based on the biblical figure Moses, see Armin Lange with Ulrike Mittmann-Richert, "Annotated List of the Texts from the Judaean Desert Classified," in *The Texts from the Judaean Desert: Indices,* 115–21, 124.

[8] For identification as a Pharisee, see Charles, *Assumption of Moses*, li–liv; idem, "Assumption of Moses," *APOT* 2:411; Clemen, "Die Himmelfahrt Moses," 314–15; Jonathan A. Goldstein, "The Testament of Moses: Its Content, Its Origin, and Its Attestation in Josephus," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses*, 50; W. J. Ferrar, *The Assumption of Moses* (New York: Macmillan, 1918); J. Bonsirven, "L'Assomption de Moïse," in *La Bible apocryphe: En marge de l'Ancien Testament* (ed. J. Bonsirven; Paris: Cerf-Fayard, 1953), 222–26.

For Sadducee, see Abraham Geiger, "Apokryphische Apokalypsen und Essäer," *Jüdische Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Leben* 6 (1868): 41–47; Rudolf Leszynsky, *Die Sadduzäer* (Berlin, 1912), 267–73.

tion's sectarian provenance is the statement in 4:8 that "two tribes" will lament because they cannot offer sacrifices. Because the next chapter mentions the defilement of the temple offerings (*T. Mos.* 5:4), this enigmatic reference most likely refers to the writer's rejection of the Second Temple and its priests.[9] Although the author's sectarian affiliation is uncertain, the content of the work, particularly its criticism of the Herodian dynasty and its focus on Jerusalem, suggests that the *Testament of Moses* was written either in Jerusalem or somewhere in Palestine.[10]

II. The *Testament of Moses*: An Antiochan or a Herodian Period Composition?

The *communis opinio* regarding the date of the *Testament of Moses* is largely based on the dating of the work proposed by R. H. Charles coupled with the

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For Essene, see M. Schmidt and A. Merx, "Die Assumptio Mosis mit Einleitung und erklärenden Anmerkungen," *Archiv für wissenschaftliche Erforschung des Alten Testaments* 1/2 (1869): 111–52; A. Dupont-Sommer, *The Essene Writings from Qumran* (Paris: Payot, 1961), 296; M. Delcor, "Contribution à l' étude de la législation des sectaires de Damas et de Qumrân (suite)," *RB* 62 (1955): 54; Laperrousaz, *Le Testament de Moïse,* 95; P. E. Lucius, *Der Essenismus in seinem Verhältniss zum Judenthum* (Strasbourg: C. F. Schmidt, 1881), 101–2.

For Zealot, see C. Wieseler, "Die jüngst aufgefundene Aufnahme Moses nach Ursprung und Inhalt untersucht," *JDT* 13 (1868): 622–48; Ferdinand Rosenthal, *Vier apokryphische Bücher aus der Zeit und Schule R. Akiba's* (Leipzig: O. Schulze, 1885), 34–38; W. J. Deane, *Pseudepigrapha: An Account of Certain Apocryphal Sacred Writings of the Jews and Early Christians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1891), 95–130. See also David M. Rhoads, "The Assumption of Moses and Jewish History: 4 B.C.–A.D. 48," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses*, 53–58.

For Samaritan, see Klaus Haacker, "Assumptio Mosis: Eine samaritanische Schrift?" *TZ* 25 (1969): 385–405.

For other Jewish sectarian identifications, see John J. Collins, "The Date and Provenance of the Testament of Moses," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses*, 31–32; John Priest, "Testament of Moses (First Century A.D.): A New Translation and Introduction," *OTP* 1:919–34; Günter Reese, *Die Geschichte Israels in der Auffassung des frühen Judentums: Eine Untersuchung der Tiervision und der Zehnwochenapokalypse des äthiopischen Henochbuches, der Geschichtsdarstellung der Assumptio Mosis und der des 4 Esrabuches* (Berlin: Philo, 1999), 70–97, 124; Tromp, *Assumption*, 118–19.

[9] For this view, see Charles, *Assumption of Moses*, 15. For the opinion that this passage refers to the longing of the two tribes in the exile for the temple, see Robert Doran, "T Mos 4:8 and the Second Temple," *JBL* 106 (1987): 491–92; Daniel R. Schwartz, "The Tribes of As. Mos. 4:7–9," *JBL* 99 (1980): 217–23; Tromp, *Assumption*, 181–82. See also John J. Collins, "The Testament (Assumption) of Moses," in *Outside the Old Testament* (ed. Marinus de Jonge; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 149.

[10] See further Denis and Haelewyck, *Introduction à la littérature religieuse judéo-hellénistique*, 459; Emil Schürer, "The Assumption or Testament of Moses," in *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.–A.D. 135)* (rev. and ed. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Martin Goodman; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973–87), 3/1:283–84; Priest, "Testament," 921; Tromp, *Assumption*, 93–94, 117. For suggestions that the composition was written in Rome or Babylon, see Denis and Haelewyck, 459–60; Tromp, *Assumption*, 93–96.

exegetical insights of Jacob Licht. These theories were subsequently expanded upon by George W. E. Nickelsburg, whose form-critical arguments continue to dominate scholarship on the text. This view maintains that the original composition was written during the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes and was redacted shortly after 4 B.C.E. According to this interpretation, the Herodian-period redactor turned the account of the Antiochan period in chs. 8–9 into an eschatological vision by inserting chs. 6–7, which mention Herod and his sons.[11] Nickelsburg, largely following Licht, proposed that the apparent vividness in chs. 8–9 demonstrates that they were composed by an eyewitness to Antiochus's persecutions. According to his thesis, once the Herodian material (chs. 6–7) is excised, then the surrounding chapters (5, 8–10) display the same fourfold pattern of sin, punishment, turning point, and salvation as chs. 2–4. Recognizing the similarities between the Taxo story and 1 Maccabees 2 and 2 Maccabees 7, Nickelsburg also postulates a common source for these latter two books, which he takes to be closely related to the *Testament of Moses*.[12] The consensus interpretation has been challenged by a few scholars, most recently John Priest and Johannes Tromp, who have sought to maintain the text's literary integrity and defend a first-century C.E. date for the entire composition.[13] This debate, whether the *Testament of Moses* is an expanded version of an earlier Antiochan-era document or an original composition that was written during the Herodian period, must first be resolved in order to understand the author's use of the theme of the wilderness as well as the roles that Taxo and the *nuntius* play in bringing about the eschaton.

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[11] Charles believed that chs. 8–9 describe the Antiochan persecution while chs. 5–6 depict the Hasmonean and Herodian periods (*Assumption of Moses*, lv–lviii, 29–30; idem, *APOT* 2:420). He proposed that chs. 8–9 be restored to their proper place before ch. 5. Jacob Licht argued that chs. 8–9, which he also believed reflect the Antiochan persecution and the beginning of the Maccabean revolt, are connected with ch. 10 ("Taxo, or the Apocalyptic Doctrine of Vengeance," *JJS* 12 [1961]: 95–103). He considered chs. 6–7 to be an adaptation of a Hasmonean apocalypse that was reworked in the post-Herodian era.

[12] See further George W. E. Nickelsburg, "Introduction," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses*, 6; idem, "An Antiochan Date for the Testament of Moses," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses*, 33–37; idem, *Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 80–83; idem, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism* (HTS 26; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 43–45; idem, *Ancient Judaism,* 71. John J. Collins, after first maintaining a Herodian date for the entire text, subsequently endorsed Nickelsburg's thesis. According to Collins's revised view, the *Testament of Moses* was updated in the Herodian period with the insertion of chs. 6–7, which turned the account of the Antiochan persecution in chs. 8–9 into an eschatological scenario in the revised document. For Collins's initial thesis, see his "The Date and Provenance," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses,* 15–32. For his revised dating, see his "Some Remaining Traditio-Historical Problems in the Testament of Moses," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses,* 38–43. For the impact of Nickelsburg's interpretation, see Schürer, "Assumption," 282–83; Tromp, *Assumption*, 105, 110–11, 120–23.

[13] Priest, "Testament," 919–34; Tromp, *Assumption*, 115–21.

H. Ewald was the first scholar to recognize that the forthcoming thirty-four-year reign of the "petulant king" (*rex petulans*) described in 6:2–6 corresponds to the duration of Herod the Great's period in office as indicated by Josephus (*Ant.* 17.191).[14] Because the author predicted that Herod's children would "rule for shorter periods" (*breviora tempora dominabunt* [6:7])[15] of time than their father, this passage certainly refers to Herod's sons Antipas (4 B.C.E.–39 C.E.), Philip (4 B.C.E.–34 C.E.), and Archelaus (4 B.C.E.–6 C.E.), all of whom governed portions of their father's territory.[16] Because the author of the *Testament of Moses* described Herod's sons as currently reigning and expected the imminent demise of the Herodian dynasty, at least some of these heirs to their father's kingdom were still in power at the time of the text's composition.

Immediately after predicting the end of the Herodian dynasty, the author of the *Testament of Moses* (6:8–9) describes a "powerful king of the West" (*occidentes rex potens*) who will attack Jerusalem, take away captives, burn part of the temple and crucify some of the city's inhabitants. This reference is commonly associated with the attack on the Jews under P. Quinctilius Varus in 4 B.C.E. that took place after Herod the Great's death.[17] After Herod's son Archelaus departed from Judea

[14] H. Ewald, review of Ceriani, *Monumenta sacra et profana*, I/I, *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* 124 (1862): 1–9. A few scholars have proposed later dates of composition for the *Testament of Moses*. G. Hölscher dated the *Testament of Moses* to the time of the Bar Kokhba revolt but thought that 6:8–9 referred to Titus's destruction of the temple ("Über die Entstehungszeit der 'Himmelfahrt Moses,'" *ZNW* 17 [1916]: 111–12). A Bar Kokhba dating was most recently defended by Solomon Zeitlin, "The Assumption of Moses and the Revolt of Bar Kokba: Studies in the Apocalyptic Literature," *JQR* 38 (1947–48): 1–45. Volkmar and T. Colani identified the *rex regum terrae* of ch. 8 as Hadrian (Volkmar, *Mose,* 72–84; T. Colani, "L'Assomption de Moïse," *Revue de Théologie* 6 [1868]: 74–75). For the history of scholarship on this issue, see further Tromp, *Assumption,* 87–117.

[15] A number of scholars suggest emending *donarent* of the manuscript to *dominabunt*. See further Charles, *Assumption of Moses*, 76; O. F. Fritzsche, ed., *Libri apocryphi Veteris Testamenti Graece: Accedunt libri Veteris Testamenti pseudepigraphi selecti* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1871), 713; Laperrousaz, *Le Testament de Moïses*, 120; Tromp, *Assumption*, 14; Volkmar, *Mose,* 144.

[16] For the reigns of Antipas, Philip, and Archelaus, see Emil Gabba, "The Social, Economic and Political History of Palestine 63 BCE–CE 70," in *CHJ* 3:126–34; Emil Schürer, "The Death of Herod the Great to Agrippa I 4 B.C.–A.D. 41: The Sons of Herod," in *History of the Jewish People*, 1:336–57; E. Mary Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 104–19, 181–87.

[17] For this identification, see Charles, *Assumption of Moses*, lvii, 22–23; idem, "Assumption of Moses," 419; Egon Brandenburger, "Himmelfahrt Moses," in *Apokalypsen* (ed. Werner Georg Kümmel; JSHRZ 5; Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1976), 60, 62, 74; Adela Yarbro Collins, "Composition and Redaction of the Testament of Moses 10," *HTR* 69 (1976): 183–86; Collins, "Testament of Moses," 347–48; idem, "Date and Provenance," 15–17, 29–30; idem, "Some Remaining Traditio-Historical Problems," 38, 43; Otto Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 624; Heinrich Hoffmann, *Das Gesetz in der frühjüdischen Apokalyptik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 195–96, 203–4; John Priest, "Some Reflections on the Assumption of Moses," *PRSt* 4 (1977): 95; Rhoads, "Assumption of Moses and Jewish History:

and sailed for Rome to secure his political position, Varus's lieutenant Sabinus inflamed tensions in Jerusalem when he took control of Herod's palace (*Ant.* 17.222–23, 252–53; *War* 2.18–19). A riot erupted during Pentecost and Sabinus's troops became trapped in the temple court by a mob that climbed atop its porticoes and proceeded to massacre his forces. Afraid for his life, Sabinus ordered his army to set fire to the temple's porticoes (*Ant.* 17.256–68; *War* 2.45–54). After burning a substantial portion of the temple's porticoes, Sabinus's troops massacred many Jews and plundered the temple treasury. When Varus heard of these events, he left Antioch and proceeded to Jerusalem. Upon his arrival, he crucified two thousand people and sent the leaders of the revolt to the emperor (*Ant.* 17.295–98; *War* 2.76–78; *Apion* 1.34).

Although a few scholars, such as G. Hölscher and Tromp, object on both historical and literary grounds to identifying Varus with the "king of the West," the evidence suggests otherwise.[18] *Testament of Moses* 6:9 clearly predicts that, following Herod the Great's death, the "king of the West" will "burn part of their temple with fire, some he will crucify near their city" (*et partem aedis ipsorum igni incendit, aliquos crucifigit circa coloniam eorum*). Because Varus burned part of the temple during his attempt to halt the Jewish insurrection, in addition to crucifying two thousand Jews in Jerusalem (*Ant.* 17.256–68, 295–98; *War* 2.45–54, 76–78), it is inconceivable that this passage refers to any event other than the Jewish rebellion of 4 B.C.E. If Adela Yarbro Collins's proposal that 10:8–9 is an allusion to the pulling down of the eagle over the temple by the disciples of Judas and Matthias, this may suggest that the *Testament of Moses*'s description of the final exaltation of Israel was also modeled on the events that took place in 4 B.C.E.[19]

The attack of Varus and the partial destruction of the temple are the key to understanding the *Testament of Moses*. Varus was forced to suppress many insur-

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4 B.C.–A.D. 48," 53–58; Schürer, "The Assumption or Testament of Moses," 3:281; Smallwood, *Jews under Roman Rule*, 113.

[18] See further Kenneth Atkinson, "Herod the Great as Antiochus *Redivivus:* Reading the *Testament of Moses* as an Anti-Herodian Composition," in *Of Scribes and Sages: Early Jewish Interpretation and Transmission of Scripture,* vol. 1, *Ancient Versions and Traditions* (ed. Craig A. Evans; London: T&T Clark, 2004), 134–49. Hölscher disputes this association, because Varus was not a king and because he approached Jerusalem from Antioch, not from the West ("Über die Entstehungszeit der 'Himmelfahrt Moses,'" 111–12). Tromp comments that this figure is not necessarily Varus, since the description of the Western king's actions are rather generic and follow the traditional formula, common in such accounts, of a defeat, captivity, destruction, and execution (*Assumption*, 204–5).

[19] Yarbro Collins, "Composition and Redaction," 186. Herod had erected a golden eagle over the great gate of the temple as a votive offering. Judas and Matthias, along with forty of their disciples, were executed in 4 B.C.E., before Herod's death, for removing this image (*Ant.* 17.151–62; *War* 1.648–55). Despite recognizing this passage as a reference to the events of 4 B.C.E., Yarbro Collins nevertheless sees evidence of redactional activity in 10:8–10 that supports Nickelsburg's two-stage theory of composition.

rections that erupted in 4 B.C.E. following Herod's death and the installation of his sons. Virtually the entire country was affected by Varus's intervention, and many cities were destroyed. Josephus wrote that after Herod died "continuous and countless new tumults filled Judea" (*Ant.* 17.269) and that "Judea was filled with brigandage (λῃστηρίων)" (*Ant.* 17.285). In this year, Herod's cousin Achiab fought two thousand of Herod's soldiers who had participated in the revolt against Archelaus (*Ant.* 17.269–70; *War* 2.55). Judas and Simon seized the royal palaces at Sepphoris and Jericho, armed the people, and returned property that had been taken by the Herodian officials (*Ant.* 17.271–77; *War* 2.56–59). Athronges put on the royal crown, proclaimed himself king and, with his four brothers, commanded bands of raiders who attacked the Romans and their Herodian partisans (*Ant.* 17.278–84; *War* 2.60–65). Shortly after Varus's intervention, an imposter appeared claiming to be Herod's son Alexander and a descendant of the Hasmoneans (*Ant.* 17.324–38; *War* 2.101–10). This man, after winning the support of the Jewish community in Crete, Melos, and Rome, was unmasked by Augustus. Although this false Alexander was not directly involved in the events that transpired in Jerusalem, he was one of many insurrectionists who appeared at this time and attempted to incite rebellions against the Romans and the Herodian dynasty.[20] The period immediately following Herod the Great's death was clearly among the most turbulent years in Judean history.[21]

Following the reference to Varus and his crucifixion of the Jewish rebels (*T. Mos.* 6), the *Testament*'s author predicts a series of events that will precede the eschaton. In the succeeding chapter, largely ignored by those who question the composition's literary integrity, the author warns, "After this will have happened, the times will quickly come to an end" (*ex quo facto finientur tempora momento* [7:1]).[22] In this passage the author warns the reader that Varus's burning of the temple is a sign marking the beginning of a series of eschatological events.[23] Although the following verses are incomplete, the extant text mentions that "four

[20] For discussions of these figures as messianic pretenders opposed to the Herodian dynasty, see Collins, "Date and Provenance," 28–30; Gabba, "Social, Economic and Political History of Palestine," 105–13; Martin Hengel, *Die Zeloten: Untersuchungen zur jüdischen Freiheitsbewegung in der Zeit von Herodes I bis 70 n. Chr.* (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 235–38, 296–307; Richard A. Horsley and John S. Hanson, *Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 111–17; Schürer, "Disturbances after Herod's Death 4 B.C.," in *History of the Jewish People*, 1:330–35; Smallwood, *Jews under Roman Rule*, 105–19.

[21] For the significance of the rebellion of 4 B.C.E., see Eliezer Paltiel, "War in Judaea—After Herod's Death," *RBPH* 59 (1981): 107–36. See also Josephus, *Ant.* 17.286–98; *War* 2.66–79. Josephus wrote that the war of Varus was one of the most important events that occurred between Pompey's and Vespasian's conquests (*Apion* 1.34).

[22] Translation based on Tromp, *Assumption,* 67, 206.

[23] For this interpretation, see Charles, *Assumption of Moses*, 23; idem, "Assumption of Moses," 419; Brandenburger, "Himmelfahrt Moses," 59–60; Eissfeldt, *Old Testament*, 624; Hoffmann, *Das Gesetz in der frühjüdischen Apokalyptik*, 195–96, 203–4; Tromp, *Assumption*, 206.

hours will come" (*horae IIII veniant* [7:2]). This calculation is likely an apocalyptic formulation similar to the "time, two times and half a time" of Dan 7:25.[24] *Sibylline Oracle* 5:155 provides an even closer parallel to the enigmatic figure in the *Testament of Moses*. This oracle documents the career of Nero and his flight to the East; it then mentions a cosmic destruction that will occur "after the fourth year a great star shines."[25] The *Testament of Moses* presumably contained a calculation similar to Dan 7:25 about the duration of this stage of history. If the four years are to be taken literally, ch. 7 of the *Testament* may have been written less than four years after Varus's assault. The author apparently believed that the partial destruction of the temple and the other tumultuous events that followed Herod the Great's death were signs that signaled the beginning of the final age of history.[26]

The consensus view understands chs. 6–7 as a disruption of the composition's chronological sequence, since they reflect the Herodian period and because chs. 8–9 appear to describe the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes. Chapter 8, however, which continues the description of the suffering recounted in ch. 7, is largely a generic listing of stereotypical woes that appear to be based on legendary accounts of the Antiochan persecution. The author's description of this time of great distress, moreover, is similar to stereotyped apocalyptic patterns found in other texts in which the final woes are clearly future and of a mythical character.[27] Here the author warns that people will be punished by "torments and fire and sword" (*T. Mos.* 8:4).[28] The writer magnifies his description of this suffering by including a prediction that the righteous will be compelled to carry idols in public

[24] See further George Wesley Buchanan, *The Book of Daniel* (Lewiston: Mellen, 1999), 219–23; John J. Collins, *Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 322, 399; idem, "Date and Provenance," 17; Louis Hartman and Alexander A. Di Lella, *The Book of Daniel: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary* (AB 23; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), 215–17, 312.

[25] John J. Collins comments on this passage: "The 'fourth year' is an equivalent of the 'three and a half times' of Dan. 7:25; 12:7, at the end of which comes deliverance from persecution. The star here performs the role of a destroying angel in accordance with the widespread identification of stars and angels in the OT and intertestamental writings" ("The Sibylline Oracles," *OTP* 1:397).

[26] For this interpretation, see also Lars Hartman, "The Functions of Some So-Called Apocalyptic Timetables," *NTS* 22 (1976): 7–9. The destruction of the temple is connected with God's judgment also in other texts. See, e.g., *T. Jud.* 23:3; *2 Bar.* 7:1; 80:3; *Sib. Or.* 4:125–29; 5:398–401; *Apoc. Abr.* 27:3; cf. Mark 13:2; Luke 19:44; Acts 6:14; *Gos. Thom.* 71.

[27] See, e.g., *4 Ezra* 6:9; *2 Bar.* 25; 32; 70; *1 Enoch* 102; *Jub.* 23; *Sib. Or.* 3:532–51, 796–807. See further Collins, "Date and Provenance," 20–21. Collins (p. 21 n. 28) also notes that *Jub.* 23:25, which Nickelsburg (*Resurrection,* 46–47) dates to the Antiochan persecution is likewise of a mythical character. See Collins's later comments on this topic in his "Some Remaining Traditio-Historical Problems in the Testament of Moses," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses,* 38–43. See also Tromp, *Assumption,* 121–22; Priest, "Testament," 1:921.

[28] Because this list of punishments is frequently found in biblical literature it need not refer to historical events. See Kenneth Atkinson, *An Intertextual Study of the Psalms of Solomon* (Lewiston: Mellen, 2001), 255–61; Hartman and Di Lella, *Book of Daniel*, 299–300; Tromp, *Assumption*, 220.

and blaspheme God in a secret place (8:4–5). Although these travails are reminiscent of the Antiochan persecution, they are perhaps closer to the eschatological woes found in Mark 13. The "abomination of desolation" of Mark 13:14 is clearly modeled on Dan 9:27 and the events of the Antiochan era.[29] The beast in the book of Revelation, moreover, is also likely fashioned after the portrayal of Antiochus IV Epiphanes in Daniel 7.[30]

The Qumran text 4Q248, written in Herodian formal script and dated to about 30–1 B.C.E., provides another example of a text that bears witness to the existence of legends that apparently circulated during the first century B.C.E. concerning the Antiochan period. This document reportedly recounts Antiochus's campaigns in Egypt.[31] Magen Broshi and Esther Eshel, the editors of this Qumran document, suggest that it is a "genuine historical composition which is part of an apocalyptic work" and that it represents historical events in an "accurate way" in order to persuade the reader that its apocalyptic vision will soon come to pass.[32] Nevertheless, 4Q248, as recognized by its editors, contains a mixture of historical fact and fiction. According to 4Q248, during Antiochus's siege of Alexandria in 169 B.C.E. people were forced to eat the flesh of their children ([ו]בכן יאכלו[את] [בשר בנ]יהם ובנותי[ה]ם במצור ב[נא אמון](4) [4Q248 lines 3b–4]).[33] 4Q248, like the *Testament of Moses*, exaggerates the details of Antiochus's cruelty for polemical

[29] See Adela Yarbro Collins, "The Influence of Daniel on the New Testament," in Collins, *Daniel,* 107–9; eadem, *The Beginning of the Gospel: Probings of Mark in Context* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 73–91.

[30] For Antiochan traditions in Daniel, Mark, and Revelation, see Wilhelm Bousset, *The Antichrist Legend* (London: Hutchinson, 1896), 158–70; Collins, "Date and Provenance," 21–22; Yarbro Collins, "Influence of Daniel," 97–98, 102–5, 109–10. For the importance of Antiochan traditions, especially Dan 9:24–27, in subsequent Christian literature, see William Adler, "The Apocalyptic Survey of History Adapted by Christians: Daniel's Prophecy of 70 Weeks," in *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity* (ed. James C. VanderKam and William Adler; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 201–38.

[31] Magen Broshi and Esther Eshel, "4QHistorical Text A," in *Qumran Cave 4.XXVI: Cryptic Texts and Miscellanea, Part 1* (ed. Stephen J. Pfann et al.; DJD 36; Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 192–200; eidem, "The Greek King is Antiochus IV (4QHistorical Text = 4Q248)," *JJS* 48 (1997): 120–29. 4Q248 was previously referred to as "Acts of a Greek King" or "Pseudo History."

[32] Broshi and Eshel, "4QHistorical Text A," 192.

[33] 4Q385b is a similar polemical text that likely refers to this same Egyptian campaign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes. See Devorah Dimant, "385b. 4QPseudo-Ezekiel^{c}," in *Qumran Cave 4.XXI: Parabiblical Texts, Part 4: Pseudo-Prophetic Texts* (DJD 30; Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 71–75. See also the historical discussion of the Pseudo-Ezekiel materials and Antiochus IV Epiphanes in Devorah Dimant, "4QPseudo-Ezekiel: Introduction," in *Qumran Cave 4.XXI,* 7–16; eadem, "4Q386 ii–iii: A Prophecy on Hellenistic Kingdoms?" *RevQ* 72 (1998): 511–29. Regarding the place-name נא in 4Q248, Broshi and Eshel comment: "נא is identified as Alexandria in *Tg. Jonathan,* the writings of Jerome, and *Genesis Rabbah.* It is possible that the same identification of biblical נא as Alexandria is used in 4Q385 6" ("385b. 4QPseudo-Ezekiel^{c}," 194).

purposes to enhance the horrors of its apocalyptic scenario.[34] Both compositions view the desecration of the temple as the climax of history and the event that marks the beginning of a new era. Broshi and Eshel observe that the last event mentioned in 4Q248 is Antiochus's second invasion of Egypt followed by a phrase from Dan 12:7, "And when the shattering of the power of the holy people comes to an end then shall all these things be fulfilled (4Q248 9–10)."[35] As the editors of this text note, this passage represents a turning point in 4Q248, which departs from the genre of *vaticinium ex eventu* to assume a prophetic stance that is similar to the same shift found in Dan 11:40–45. Although Dan 11:21–39 shows a familiarity with the basic history of Antiochus Epiphanes, the following six verses of this biblical book, like the forecasts of 4Q248 9–10, are a prediction of events that never took place.[36] If the paleographical dating of the sole surviving copy of 4Q248 is correct, it provides additional evidence for the existence of a body of polemical traditions concerning Antiochus IV Epiphanes, similar to those found in *Testament of Moses* 8, that were in circulation during the first century B.C.E.[37]

[34] Broshi and Eshel comment on the description of cannibalism in this text that it is a "gross exaggeration, lacking historical substance" ("4QHistorical Text A," 197; eidem, "Greek King," 126–29). These authors cite the following biblical texts to show that cannibalism was a recurrent polemical theme in the Hebrew Bible: Deut 28:53–55; 2 Kgs 6:26–29; Lev 26:29; Jer 19:9; Ezek 5:10; Lam 2:20; 4:10; cf. Josephus, *War* 6.201–13.

[35] Broshi and Eshel suggest that the final editor of the book of Daniel took this phrase from 4Q248 ("4QHistorical Text A," 199). For the possible Egyptian background of Daniel's traditions regarding Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and the use of earlier legends by this biblical writer to portray this Seleucid king as an eschatological enemy of God, see J. C. H. Lebram, "König Antiochus im Buch Daniel," *VT* 25 (1975): 737–72; Jan Willem van Henten, "Antiochus IV as a Typhonic Figure in Daniel 7," in *The Book of Daniel in the Light of New Findings* (ed. A. S. van der Woude; Leuven: Peeters, 1993), 223–43. For other examples of the ways various writers sought to reshape the memory of Antiochus's sacrilege for polemical purposes, see Steven Weitzman, "Plotting Antiochus's Persecution," *JBL* 123 (2004): 219–34. Although 4Q248 is a Herodian composition that draws on traditions about Antiochus IV, it does not move from the Herodian period to the Antiochan period in the same sequence as the *Testament of Moses* does from chs. 6–7 to 8. Nevertheless, the similarities between these two works suggest that the Antiochan period was regarded as the prototypical period of trial in the Herodian period when these two texts were written. The authors of the *Testament of Moses* and 4Q248 adapted these earlier Antiochan traditions to show that the desecration of the temple marked the climax of history. Other Qumran texts, such as 4Q386, likewise build upon earlier historical events and traditions to show that the tragic events associated with the Roman period and the desecration of the temple marked the end of a preordained sequence of history. See further Hanan Eshel, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Hasmonean State* (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2004), 136–44.

[36] Broshi and Eshel, "4QHistorical Text A," 199; Collins, *Daniel,* 388–89.

[37] Although paleography is an important tool for examining manuscripts, it cannot conclusively prove that a particular Dead Sea Scroll is an autograph, a copy, or a revision of an earlier document. Paleography can only indicate the approximate date when a particular text was copied, not when it was composed. Despite its limitations, recent archaeological evidence and radiocarbon examinations of the Dead Sea Scrolls have confirmed remarkably well their paleographical datings

Nickelsburg has commented that the similarities between Taxo and related stories in 1 and 2 Maccabees suggest that the bulk of the *Testament of Moses* was originally composed during the Antiochan period. The theme of a righteous person who resolves to die with his family, however, is a stock motif that is rather commonplace in Jewish literature. Josephus's *Antiquities* contains many accounts of Jews who sought refuge in caves during times of persecution and pledged to die rather than transgress the Law.[38] Josephus even recounts a story that is very similar to the episode of Taxo, in which a man killed himself, his wife, and his seven sons in a cave rather than submit to Herod (*Ant.* 14.429–30).[39] Because the story

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and demonstrate that the Dead Sea Scroll texts cited in this study were in circulation during the first century C.E. See further G. Bonani et al., "Radiocarbon Dating of the Dead Sea Scrolls," *'Atiqot* 20 (1991): 27-32; Rick van de Walter, "Reconsidering Paleographic and Radiocarbon Dating of the Dead Sea Scrolls," *RevQ* 7 (2000): 423-40. For some reservations, see Joseph Atwill, Steve Braunheim, and Robert Eisenman, "Redating the Radiocarbon Dating of the Dead Sea Scrolls," *DSD* 11 (2004): 143–57; Kaare L. Rasmussen et al., "The Effects of Possible Contamination on the Radiocarbon Dating of the Dead Sea Scrolls I: Castor Oil," *Radiocarbon* 43 (2001): 127–32.

[38] For example, Hyrcanus constructed many hidden caves for protection from his brothers (*Ant.* 12.230–34). During the Maccabean period a thousand Jewish rebels, along with their wives, refused to resist the Syrian assaults on the Sabbath and were burned in their caves (*Ant.* 12.274–75). When Demetrius sent Bacchides against Judas, he besieged Judas's men who had taken refuge in the Arbela caves (*Ant.* 12.420–21). Herod also besieged rebels in the Arbela caves (*Ant.* 14.413–30). During Herod's reign, Zenodorus led a group of bandits in Trachonitis who hid in caves (*Ant.* 15.345–48). Josephus's *Antiquities* also records many occasions during the Maccabean and Herodian periods when Jews, like Taxo, were prepared to die rather than transgress the Torah. These include Mattathias (*Ant.* 12.267, 281), Judas (12.304), Jonathan (13.5–6), Simon (13.199–200), Hyrcanus's mother (13.230–35), and the citizens who opposed Herod (15.282–91). Josephus also mentioned that Jews actually committed suicide on many occasions, including in the temple during Pompey's assault (*Ant.* 14.69–71), when Herod besieged the Arbela caves (14.413–30), when the Gadarenes opposed Herod (15.358–59), and when Judas and Matthias urged their followers to remove Herod's golden eagle from the temple (17.151–62). During the siege of Jotapata in 67 C.E., several of Josephus's lieutenants committed suicide (*War* 3.331). When the Romans captured Jotapata, Josephus and forty other survivors hid in a cave and were supposedly prepared to take their own lives rather then surrender (*War* 3.340–91). The Jewish rebels at Masada engaged in a mass suicide rather than surrender to the Romans (*War* 7.389–406). The Jews in possession of Gamla, in a similar fashion, refused to surrender and likewise succumbed to a terrible death (*War* 4.62–83). For additional discussions of Jews who were willing to die or commit suicide, see Arthur J. Droge and James D. Tabor, *A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in Antiquity* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 53–112; Arthur J. Droge, "Suicide," *ABD* 6:228; Jan Willem van Henten, *The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviors of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees* (Leiden: Brill, 1997); L. D. Hankoff, "Flavius Josephus: First-Century A.D. View of Suicide," *New York State Journal of Medicine* 77 (October 1977): 1986–92.

[39] The Jewish renegade Simon, during the battle for control of Scythopolis, likewise killed his family and parents, all of whom willingly accepted death, before committing suicide (*War* 2.469–75). Josephus, like the authors of the other texts examined in this section, recounts actual historical events but often distorts them for polemical purposes. Like the author of the *Testament of Moses,* Josephus recycled earlier material and legends, which often portray certain people in an

of Taxo and his seven sons is not unique to the Antiochan period, it cannot be used to date the *Testament of Moses* to the second century B.C.E.

Two additional details in ch. 8 of the *Testament of Moses* suggest that it was written in the Herodian era. First, the author predicted that Jews would be crucified (*T. Mos.* 8:1). Josephus is the only writer who mentions that Antiochus IV Epiphanes crucified Jews (*Ant.* 12.256), whereas the books of the Maccabees upon which he relied for much of his information regarding this period do not mention crucifixion.[40] His graphic description of Antiochus's cruelty suggests that Josephus was not concerned with historical accuracy, but that he merely wanted to exaggerate the persecutions endured by the Jews in order to enhance the achievements of the Maccabees. Second, the author of the *Testament of Moses* predicted that young boys will be cut by physicians in order to conceal their circumcision (*T. Mos.* 8:3). While 1 Macc 1:15 records that some renegade Jews used medical procedures to hide their circumcision, this is not what the author of the *Testament* forecasted. Rather, the writer used the theme of the removal of circumcision to show that after the eschatological events described in ch. 6 had occurred everything will be reversed. Young boys will be operated on not to be circumcised but in order to provide them with a foreskin (*Et filii eorum pueri secabuntur a medicis [pueri] inducere acrobis[ti]am illis* [*T. Mos.* 8:3]).[41] This passage, although inspired by the Antiochan persecution, does not accurately describe the events of the second century B.C.E.[42] Although the practice of epispasm existed in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, literary evidence suggests that it reached its greatest popularity during the first century C.E.[43]

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unfavorable light. Although many of Josephus's accounts of noble death likely never occurred, they are important as witnesses to the popularity of these traditions during the Herodian period when the *Testament of Moses* was in circulation. For this issue, see further Per Bilde, *Flavius Josephus between Jerusalem and Rome: His Life, His Works, and Their Importance* (JSPSup 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1988); Jan Willem van Henten, "Martyrion and Martyrdom: Some Remarks about Noble Death in Josephus," in *Internationales Josephus-Kolloquium Brüssel 1998* (ed. Jürgen U. Kalms and Folker Siegert; Münster: Lit, 1990), 124–41.

[40] Collins comments on the reference to crucifixion in the *Testament of Moses* and its absence from earlier Maccabean-period texts, "It is remarkable that crucifixion is not mentioned in the books of the Maccabees" ("Date and Provenance," 19). Tromp, in his argument for a Herodian dating, also notes that Josephus mentioned crucifixions during Antiochus Epiphanes' reign but that the books of the Maccabees, on which he relied, do not mention any crucifixions (*Assumption,* 218).

[41] For this observation and this restored text, see Tromp, *Assumption*, 219–20.

[42] Jonathan A. Goldstein, *I Maccabees: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 41; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 200–201. Goldstein dates the *Testament of Moses* to the Antiochan period and views chs. 6–7 as Herodian revisions (pp. 39–40; see also idem, "The Testament of Moses: Its Content, Its Origin, and Its Attestation in Josephus," in *Studies on the Testament of Moses*, 44–52). Cf. 1 Macc 2:46.

[43] See further the extensive references and discussion in Robert G. Hall, "Epispasm and

The allusions to Antiochus IV Epiphanes in the *Testament of Moses,* and in other texts previously cited in this section, suggest that, by the first century C.E., various authors used legends about his persecution of the Jews to describe and condemn evil rulers as well as to enhance their apocalyptic scenarios.[44] Moreover, the persecution described in the *Testament* is similar to other eschatological scenarios in which a foreign tyrant unsuccessfully attempts to eradicate God's people.[45] Once chs. 8 and 9 of the work are understood as an eschatological tableau that was merely inspired by events of the Antiochan and Herodian periods, then the reason for their combination of accurate and fallacious historical information becomes clear. The author simply incorporated ancient polemical traditions regarding the Antiochan persecution to demonize the Herodian kings.[46] Because the mention of Varus's burning of the temple in 4 B.C.E. is the latest historical reference in the composition, the *Testament of Moses* was likely written before Archelaus's deposition since it refers to the present reign of Herod's sons (*T. Mos.* 6:7). If so, the author apparently believed that the partial destruction of the temple signaled the imminent arrival of the eschaton. Based on its historical content, the *Testament of Moses* should likely be dated sometime slightly after 4 B.C.E. to shortly after 6 C.E.

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the Dating of Ancient Jewish Writings," *JSP* 2 (1988): 71–86. Hall comments that the practice of epispasm attained a plateau in popularity in the first century C.E. and that the restoration of the foreskin described in the *Testament of Moses* presupposes the type of operation documented by Celsus. It differs from the custom of infibulation, which merely bounds the foreskin in place, as recorded by Dioscorides and Soranus. Celsus's surgical operation was the only method of epispasm that proved successful for those who had been circumcised. It was, therefore, the only option for Jewish men who wished to obliterate their circumcision. Because Celsus, Dioscorides, and Soranus wrote their medical treatises between 40 and 150 C.E., the *Testament of Moses*, as Hall notes, best fits the medical procedures available in the first century C.E.

[44] Émile Puech likewise believes that the person in 4Q246 is an "Antichrist" figure who should be identified with Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Émile Puech, "Fragment d'une Apocalypse en araméen (4Q246 = Pseudo-Dan^{d}) et le "Royaume de Dieu,'" *RB* 99 (1992): 98–131, esp. 115–16, 127; idem, "Some Remarks on 4Q246 and 4Q521 and Qumran Messianism," in *The Provo International Conference on the Dead Sea Scrolls: Technological Innovations, New Texts, and Reformulated Issues* (ed. Donald W. Parry and Eugene Ulrich; STDJ 30; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 545–51. See further the *editio princeps* of Émile Puech, "4QApocryphe de Daniel ar," in *Qumran Cave 4.XVII: Parabiblical Texts, Part 3* (ed. George Brooke et al.; DJD 22; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 165–84.

[45] Tromp observes this setting in the following texts: *1 En.* 56:5–6; 90:16; *Jub.* 23:24; Dan 7:23–25; 8:9–12, 23, 25; 9:26–27; 11:30–32; *4 Ezra* 13:34; *Sib. Or.* 3:663–66 (*Assumption,* 214). In these texts, Tromp notes that God frustrates the efforts of the foreign tyrant by intervening to judge the nations (Dan 7:25–26; 8:25; 12:1–3; *1 En.* 90:17–19; *Sib. Or.* 3:666–731), or the people repent and God saves them (*Jub.* 23:26).

[46] See further Collins, "Date and Provenance," 22; Hilgenfeld, "Die Psalmen Salomo's," 305; Laperrousaz, *Le Testament de Moïses*, 122; Tromp, *Assumption*, 120–23.

III. The Wilderness Experience in the *Testament of Moses*

The author of the *Testament of Moses* not only used legendary tales about Antiochus IV Epiphanes but also incorporated biblical traditions from Deuteronomy, especially the accounts of the wilderness period, to explain the eschatological significance of the tumultuous events of the Herodian era. A brief look at these texts will help to show how the author used these legends to explain the necessity of Taxo's death.

Several of the Dead Sea Scrolls, like the *Testament of Moses,* portray Moses as a prophet who both predicts the future and intercedes for his people. In these texts, Moses denounces transgressions committed by the priests and the people. The document 4Q390, like the *Testament of Moses*, interprets history as a sequence of preordained periods.[47] Alluding to the exodus experience, the writer of 4Q390 describes the temple's defilement by the priests and the coming period when God will permit Israel to be ruled by the Angels of Mastemoth as punishment for their transgressions. This text closely parallels the prediction of *T. Mos.* 7:1 and reads, "the ho[ly] temple […not] has been done; and so […for] these things will happen to them" (4Q390 2 I, מקדש הקד[ש...לא] נעשה וכן [...כי] אלה יבואו עליהם 2–3]). The Qumran text 2Q21 I, 1–2 contains a dialogue between Moses and God concerning the confrontation with Nadab and Abihu, who were killed by God (Lev 10:1–3) for offering incense from an illicit source: "(1) [Nadab and] Ab[i]hu, Elea[zar and Itamar...] (2) [...in order to do] you justice in truth, and in order to reprove with faith[ful]ness [...]"

(1) [...נדב ו]אב[י]הוא אלע[זר ואיתמר...] (2) [...לעשות] לך משפט באמת ולהוכיח באמו[נ]ה.[48]

The "Words of the Heavenly Luminaries[a]," moreover, contains a prayer that beseeches divine forgiveness on the basis of God's past mercy that was bestowed on the people in the time of Moses.[49] This text (4Q504 1–2 II, 7–11a) reads:

(7) אנא אדני עשה נא כמוכה כגדול כוחכה אש[ר נ]שאת[ה]
(8) לאבותינו בהמרותם פיכה ותתאנף בם להשמידם ותחס
(9) עליהמה באהבתכה אותם ולמען בריתכה כיא כפר מושה

[47] For the *editio princeps*, see Devorah Dimant, "390. 4QApocryphon of Jeremiah C[e]," in *Qumran Cave 4.XXI: Parabiblical Texts, Part 4: Pseudo-Prophetic Texts,* 235–54. For this phenomenon in the *Testament of Moses*, see further Ida Fröhlich, "*Time and Times and Half a Time*": *Historical Consciousness in the Jewish Literature of the Persian and Hellenistic Eras* (JSPSup 19; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 154–73.

[48] For the *editio princeps*, see Maurice Baillet, "2QApocryphon of Moses," in *Les 'petites grottes' de Qumrân* (ed. Maurice Baillet et al.; DJD 3; Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 79–81.

[49] For the *editio princeps*, see Maurice Baillet in *Qumran Grotte 4.III (4Q482–4Q520)* (DJD 7; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 137–68.

(10) בעד חטאתם ולמען דעת כוחכה הגדול ואת רוב חסדכ[ה]
(11) לדורות עולם

(7) O Lord, act then, in accordance with yourself, in accordance with your great power, You, wh[o did for[give
(8) our ancestors when they made your mouth bitter. You became angry with them as to destroy them; but you took pity
(9) on them in your love for them, and on account of your covenant, for Moses atoned
(10) for their sin, and so that they would know your great power and your abundant mercy
(11a) for everlasting generations.

This prayer portrays Moses as Israel's intercessor by alluding to his speech following the episode of the golden calf (Exod 32:30). In this biblical story, Moses sought atonement for the sin of the golden calf and ordered the Levites to kill three thousand Israelites. After completing their slaughter, Moses told the Levites, "Today you have ordained yourselves for the service of the Lord, each one at the cost of a son or a brother, and so have brought a blessing on yourselves this day" (Exod 32:29). In this story, Moses not only interceded for his people but also sanctioned the use of violence to uphold the Law.

The use of these biblical traditions regarding the wilderness experience to describe Moses's role as the supreme interpreter of the Law shows the importance in which he was held during the Second Temple period. 4Q390, while not as explicit as 2Q21 or 4Q504, nevertheless, connects the exodus with a future defilement of the temple similar to the prediction of its defilement in the *Testament of Moses* (4:8; 5:4). Here, as in other Qumran texts, the exodus period when Moses led the nation is looked upon as the ideal era. Because Moses was chosen to receive the Torah, he was also viewed as an example to follow: those who did not obey Moses opposed God. The *Damascus Document* even states that those who refused to listen to Moses in the wilderness led others astray and "spoke rebellion against the commands of God by Moses and also by his anointed of holiness" (כי דברו סרה על מצות אל ביד משה וגם במשיחו הקודש [CD 5:21–6:1]). The *Community Rule* even charges members to seek God and do good "as He [God] commanded through Moses and all his servants the prophets" (צוה ביד מושה וביד כול עבדיו הנביאים [1QS 1:3]).

The rebellions and events that took place during the exodus were important for many Jews who, like the writer of the *Testament of Moses*, believed that they were living in a time they viewed as analogous to the wilderness period.[50] For this reason, the writers of the Dead Sea Scrolls frequently cited Moses's wilderness

[50] See Shemaryahu Talmon, "The 'Desert Motif' in the Bible and in Qumran Literature," in *Biblical Motifs: Origins and Transformations* (ed. A. Altmann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 31–63.

experiences to illustrate the Qumran community's present struggle between the cosmic forces of good and evil.[51] The *War Scroll,* for example, recalls the wilderness events and compares the camp of the Sons of Light to the camps in the wilderness (1QM 3:13–4:17). Because the Qumran community physically removed itself to the wilderness in order to follow the Torah, the author of 4QMMT appealed to Moses's authority to assert that those who understand Moses's words and obey his commandments must also accept the interpretations of 4QMMT's author (4QMMT C 6–32). The author warned, "we are aware that part of the blessings and curses have occurred that are written in the book of Moses, and this is the end of days" (ואנחנו מכירים שבאוו מקצת הברכות והקללות שכתוב בס[פר מו]שה וזה הוא אחרית ימים [4QMMT C 20–21]).[52] Like the writer of 4QMMT, the author of the *Testament of Moses* believed that some of the curses in the Torah had occurred and the end was therefore near.

The writer of the *Testament of Moses,* like the authors of these Dead Sea Scrolls, used the wilderness experience as a vehicle both to interpret the events of his own time and to buttress the prophetic authority of his writing. According to the author of the *Testament of Moses*, Israel is in a vulnerable position just as it was in the wilderness: the priests have transgressed Moses's commandments to such an extent that they are no longer qualified to make atonement for the sins of the people (*T. Mos.* 5:4). Something drastic must be done to remedy the nation's hopeless situation in order to bring about the vengeance promised to Joshua (Deut 32:43; *T. Mos.* 9:7; 10:1). The only means available to accomplish this is through a strict obedience to God's commandments as taught by Moses (*T. Mos.* 1:10, 14; 9:4–5; 12:10). Such observance of the Torah will enable God's "holy and sacred spirit" (*T. Mos.* 11:16) to dwell with the people and save them from their enemies as it did with Moses's successor, Joshua.[53]

In ch. 9 of the *Testament of Moses* the author introduces an innocent Levite named Taxo, who, like Moses, will seek to make atonement for his people's sins.[54] Taxo encourages his sons to remain faithful by telling them that their strength lies in their purity. Unlike the Levitical priests, who have forsaken their roles as

[51] For this motif in the Qumran texts, see James E. Bowley, "Moses in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Living in the Shadow of God's Anointed," in *The Bible at Qumran: Texts, Shape, and Interpretation* (ed. Peter W. Flint; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 159–81.

[52] Elisha Qimron and John Strugnell, *Qumran Cave 4.V: Miqṣat Maʿăśe Ha-Torah* (DJD 10; Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 13–15. Citations from 4QMMT follow Qimron and Strugnell's composite text.

[53] See Stefan Schreiber, "Hoffnung und Handlungsperspektive in der *Assumptio Mosis*," *JSJ* 32 (2001): 252–71. For the biblical basis for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in Moses, see Isa 63:11–12; also Wis 10:18. See also Tromp, *Assumption,* 251–59.

[54] There is at present no satisfactory proposal to explain Taxo's apparently symbolic name. For efforts to decode this name, see Denis and Haelewyck, *Introduction à la littérature religieuse judéo-hellénistique*, 434–45; Tromp, *Assumption*, 124–28.

intercessors for the people, or the Herodian kings, who the author states are not from a priestly family, Taxo, lacking sin, is the perfect mediator between God and the nation. Taxo resolves to fast for a three-day period with his sons and then to go into a cave exhorting them, "Let us die rather than transgress the commandments of the Lord of Lords, the God of our fathers. For if we do this, and die, our blood will be avenged before the Lord" (*T. Mos.* 9:7).[55] Although the text does not describe Taxo's fate, the author's mention of "blood" suggests that Taxo expected that he and his sons would die a violent death.

In contrast to the other members of the priesthood, who have forfeited their right to be called priests (*T. Mos.* 5:4), Taxo and his sons constitute the faithful and sinless remnant (*T. Mos.* 9:4). Jan Willem van Henten suggests that Taxo's assertion that his family has never sinned or tempted God is an allusion to Moses's blessing of Levi in Deut 33:8–11.[56] This biblical passage paraphrases the episode near the waters of Massah and Meriba during Israel's forty-year period in the wilderness (Exod 17; Num 20). In this biblical blessing, Moses and Levi were praised because they were tested yet remained faithful to the Lord. Taxo's claim to hereditary innocence, in light of the writer's assertion that the priests have abused the temple cult, suggests that only he and his sons have remained faithful to the covenant. Because the *Testament of Moses* in ch. 4 apparently denies the cultic validity of the Second Temple to remove the effects of sin, the author's community presumably believed that they could not make atonement for their transgressions within the sanctuary.[57] Since Taxo and his sons believe that they are the only priests who have observed the Law, they alone are qualified to act as intercessors for the people by seeking atonement apart from the temple cult.

IV. The Role and Function of the *Nuntius*

Taxo's cry for vengeance is immediately followed by the appearance of the eschaton and the arrival of God's messenger, the *nuntius*, who will seek vengeance

[55] For the relationship between atonement and fasting, see Kenneth Atkinson, *I Cried to the Lord: A Study of the Psalms of Solomon's Historical Background and Social Setting* (JSJSup 84; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 193–97.

[56] Jan Willem van Henten, "Moses as Heavenly Messenger in *Assumptio Mosis* 10:2 and Qumran Passages," *JJS* 54 (2003): 218. See also John C. Poirier, "The Endtime Return of Elijah and Moses at Qumran," *DSD* 10 (2003): 221–42.

[57] For a related discussion of the rejection of the temple and its priests in the first-century B.C.E. *Psalms of Solomon* and contemporary Qumran texts, see Kenneth Atkinson, "4QMMT and Psalm of Solomon 8: Two Anti-Sadducean Documents," *Qumran Chronicle* 11 (2003): 57–77; idem, "Theodicy in the Psalms of Solomon," in *Theodicy in the World of the Bible* (ed. Antti Laato and Johannes C. de Moor; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 546–75.

for the deaths of Taxo and his sons (*T. Mos.* 10:3).[58] Taxo's relationship to the mysterious *nuntius* is the most debated topic in the *Testament of Moses*. It is not necessary to assume that the word *nuntius* must refer to a human messenger simply because the translator does not use the word *angelus*. The word *nuntius* refers to angels in several fifth- and sixth-century C.E. Latin texts that are contemporary with the date of the sole surviving Latin manuscript of the *Testament of Moses*.[59] The *nuntius*, like Taxo, is also a priest, since the author writes, "Then the hands of the *nuntius*, who will be in heaven, will be filled, thereupon he will avenge them of their enemies" (*Tunc implebuntur manus nuntii qui est in summo constitutus, qui protinus vindicavit illos ab inimicis eorum* [10:2]). The idiom "to fill the hand" in the Hebrew Bible is a technical term that refers to the consecration of the priests.[60] Because the *nuntius* is described as performing a priestly act in heaven, he must be both an angel and a priest.

The identification of the *nuntius* as a priestly angel should not be considered problematic, since many Jewish texts associate divine vengeance with a heavenly figure who is sometimes portrayed as a priest. During the wilderness experience, as recounted in Exodus 14 and 23, angels of the Lord fought with the armies of Israel. In 1QM 10, the chief priest in the context of battle invokes Moses while reciting a lengthy prayer concerning the halakic purity of the camps. The purpose of this petition is to affirm that God will go forth with them to fight against

[58] Jan Willem van Henten and Friedrich Avemarie comment: "The coherence of 9:1–10:10 strongly suggests that Taxo and his sons' death brings about the end of time. Their faithfulness to God's commandments leads to salvation for Israel and eternal punishment for its enemies" (*Martyrdom and Noble Death: Selected Texts from Graeco-Roman, Jewish and Christian Antiquity* [New York: Routledge, 2002], 80). See also van Henten, "Moses as Heavenly Messenger," 217. John J. Collins, moreover, comments on Taxo's behavior: "The way to bring about a change in the course of history is not by violent rebellion but by moving God to action—specifically by letting oneself be killed rather than break the law. Then God will consecrate an angel to take vengeance on the enemy and will himself rise from his throne and punish the Gentiles" (*The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Apocalyptic Literature* [2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998], 131).

[59] See R. E. Lathan, *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 316–17. For the use of *nuntius* to refer to angels, see D. C. Carlson, "Vengeance and Angelic Mediation in *Testament of Moses* 9 and 10," *JBL* 101 (1982): 93 n. 37. For various uses of the word *nuntius* in Latin literature, see also P. G. W. Glare, *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), fasc. 5:1207; D. R. Howlett, *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), fasc. 7:1954–55.

[60] See, e.g., Exod 28:41; 29:29, 33, 35; Lev 8:33; 16:32; 21:10; Num 3:3; Judg 17:5, 12; 1 Kgs 13:33; 2 Chr 13:9; Ezek 43:26; *T. Levi* 8:10; *Jos. Asen.* 27:2. Although the plural *implebuntur manus* is found in the *T. Mos.* 10:2, the MT uses the singular יָד (וּלְמַלֹּא־בָם אֶת־יָדָם). The LXX, however, frequently renders this idiom in the plural (Exod 29:29, 33, 35; Lev 8:33). In addition, five medieval manuscripts and the Samaritan Pentateuch read the plural "hands" in Lev 8:33 while the *qere* of Ezek 43:26 is ידיו. See further Carlson, "Vengeance and Angelic Mediation," 93–94; Tromp, *Assumption*, 230; van Henten, "Moses as Heavenly Messenger," 218–21; van Henten and Avemarie, *Martyrdom and Noble Death,* 80 n. 160.

their enemies (1QM 10:8–12:9). The angels fight alongside humans in 1QM and help to inflict great carnage on the unrighteous (1QM 1:10–11).[61] Likewise, in 11QMelchizedek a heavenly priest seeks vengeance against Belial. Paul J. Kobelski notes that in this text Michael plays a special role, similar to his function in Dan 12:1–3 and 1QM 17:5–8, in the final age by defeating Belial and that he functions as a heavenly high priest.[62] The *nuntius* in the *Testament of Moses* is similar to these violent angelic figures, all of whom play active roles in eschatological warfare.

In *T. Mos.* 10:2 the author describes the violent role of the *nuntius* and writes, "then the hands of the messenger, when he will be in heaven, will be filled, and he will then avenge them against their enemies." Tromp suggests that Taxo and his sons must be the antecedent of "them," since it is their blood that will be vindicated according to 9:7, to propose that it is the *nuntius* who is consecrated as a priest in heaven.[63] Although Moses is called "the great messenger" (*magnus nuntius*) in 11:17 and had an intercessory role in the past (*T. Mos.* 12:6), this does not mean that he should be equated with the *nuntius* of 10:2.[64] Although the Hebrew Bible frequently describes Moses's intercession, it does not state that he will continue his intercessory role after his death. Rather, Moses's intercession was limited to the exodus and the wilderness period. During this time, Moses frequently interceded for the nation to avert God's wrath, such as the time when the people had sinned

[61] For angelic participation in eschatological battle, see Maxwell J. Davidson, *Angels at Qumran: A Comparative Study of 1 Enoch 1–36, 72–108 and Sectarian Writings from Qumran* (JSPSup 11; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 28–30. Adela Yarbro Collins views the *nuntius* as analogous to Michael in the *War Scroll* (*Cosmology and Eschatology in Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism* [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 203). See further *1 En.* 9:1–10:3; 97:5; 99:3; Rev 8:3–5.

[62] Paul J. Kobelski, *Melchizedek and Melchirešaʿ* (CBQMS 10; Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1981), 49–74. For portrayals of Moses and priests as angels in other Qumran texts, see Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, "Some Reflections on Angelomorphic Humanity Texts among the Dead Sea Scrolls," *DSD* 7 (2000): 292–312.

[63] Tromp *Assumption*, 229–31; idem, "Taxo, the Messenger of the Lord," *JSJ* 21 (1990): 200–209. Van Henten also observes that if 9:1–10:10 do form a coherent unit, then Taxo and his sons must be identified as "them" in 10:2 ("Moses as Heavenly Messenger," 219–20). See also R. W. Huebsch, "The Testament of Moses: A Soteriological Consideration," *Proceedings of the Eastern Great Lakes Biblical Society* 2 (1982): 22–33.

[64] For the identification of Moses as the *nuntius*, see van Henten, "Moses as Heavenly Messenger," 218–21; Wayne A. Meeks, *The Prophet-King: Moses Traditions and the Johannine Christology* (NovTSup 14; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 160–61. Tromp comments that *nuntius* here should be regarded as a translation of ἄγγελος, which is a word that may refer to human messengers of God or angels. He also observes that, according to Philo, the priests, Moses, and the λόγος all have the role of mediator in common (*Assumption,* 256–57). For similar portrayals of angelic advocates, see *1 En.* 89:70–77; 90:17; *T. Dan* 6:1–5; 11QMelchizedek. In *T. Levi* 5:6–7 the angel declares, "I am the angel who makes intercession for the nation of Israel."

by making the golden calf.[65] Moses's intercessory prayers provided food and water for the people and saved them from their enemies.[66] Without Moses's powers of intercession, Joshua feared that the nation would be overcome by its adversaries as punishment for its transgressions.[67] For this reason, Moses assured the people that leadership would continue under Joshua, who would take Moses's place on earth as intercessor.[68]

In the *Testament of Moses,* Moses tells Joshua that he had served as intercessor not because of his own virtue or strength but because of God's mercy (12:7–8). God's "holy and sacred spirit" (11:16), therefore, was not limited to Moses, and Joshua was assured that he too would defeat Israel's enemies despite the nation's sin (12:6–8). Tromp comments, "Whether Moses or Joshua prays for the people, it is the Lord who has mercy on them (see again Exod 14:13 and Deut 8:16); therefore, intercessory prayer will always be possible, with or without Moses (see esp. *As. Mos.* 4:1)."[69] Because the *Testament of Moses* emphasizes that both Joshua and Taxo are successors to Moses's intercessory role, intercession is possible apart from Moses's physical presence.[70] The author of the *Testament*, by expanding on the wilderness event, portrays Taxo as an intercessory figure like Moses. Both Taxo and Moses (Exod 2:1) were of priestly descent and, therefore, qualified to act as mediators for the people and call for God's vengeance.[71] Taxo, however, differs

[65] Exodus 32:11–14, 28–35; Ps 106:19–23; see also Philo, *De vita Mosis* 2.166; 4Q504 1 II, 7–10.

[66] See, e.g., Exod 14:15; 15:25; 17:4–7; 32:11–13, 30–35; Num 11:2, 11–15; 14:11–20; Deut 9:23–29.

[67] See Num 10:9; 14:8–9; Deut 1:41–45; 6:14–19. For this concept, see Hafemann, "Moses in the Apocrypha," 91–92.

[68] See Josh 7:6–9; Sir 46:5 7 (9); *4 Ezra* 7:107.

[69] Tromp, *Assumption*, 247; see also *T. Mos.* 12:1–13; Deut 9:5–6; cf. CD 8:14–15.

[70] Although one must be cautious in speculating about the content of the *Testament of Moses*'s lost chapters, it is nevertheless clear that they continue the dialogue in which Moses discussed Joshua's leadership. If the author commented on Deuteronomy 34, then it is likely that he would have included the biblical statement that "Joshua son of Nun was full of the spirit of wisdom, because Moses had laid his hands on him; and the Israelites obeyed him, doing as the Lord had commanded Moses" (Deut 34:9; see also Num 27:18–23). This passage seems to be alluded to earlier in the *Testament of Moses,* where Joshua is described as Moses's successor (1:7; 2:1–3; 10:15; 12:2), and the author assumes that Moses's intercessory role ended with his death. Tromp (*Assumption,* 264–69) observes that this interpretation is corroborated when 12:6 is read in connection with 12:7–9, which portrays Joshua as the perfect individual to replace Moses as intercessor on earth for the people. Deuteronomy 18, moreover, legitimates a prophetic movement that traces its origin to Moses and will continue with the regular appearance of prophets in the Mosaic tradition. See further Hans M. Barstad, "The Understanding of the Prophets in Deuteronomy," *SJOT* 8 (1994): 236–51.

[71] 11Q13 II 13; 1QSb 4:24–26; *T. Levi* 2:1–7:4; see also van Henten, "Moses as Heavenly Messenger," 223–27. Both Melchizedek and Levi in Second Temple literature were also depicted as angelic figures who exacted divine vengeance.

from Moses because he is the nation's final intercessor, whose cries for vengeance are to be fulfilled through the final destruction of the wicked.[72]

In ch. 10 the author describes the arrival of God's kingdom and the final defeat of the "devil" (*zabulus* [10:1]). It is at this moment that the *nuntius* will arrive and avenge the death of Taxo and his sons. In contrast to the devil, who traditionally occupies a role in the heavenly court as a prosecutor, the *nuntius* is apparently an advocate for Taxo and his sons.[73] Because Taxo expects that his martyrdom will bring God's vengeance upon his enemies, he cites the Song of Moses (Deut 32:43) to encourage his sons to become martyrs. In this biblical passage, Moses asks God to "avenge the blood of his children, and take vengeance upon his adversaries." Taxo also alludes to the Deuteronomic blessing of Levi, in which God is asked to accept the righteous work of Levi's hands and to crush the loins of his adversaries and those who hate him (Deut 33:11). In the *Testament of Moses*, the *nuntius* intercedes on Taxo's behalf and presents his prayers for vengeance (9:7) as an offering before God. God responds to the shedding of Taxo's innocent blood by sending the *nuntius* to kill the wicked and avenge Taxo's death. Because Taxo seeks the death and destruction of the unrighteous, he should not be viewed as a quietist figure who suffers passive martyrdom. Rather, Taxo is a militant individual who seeks his own death as a means to exterminate the wicked for all time.

V. Conclusion

The *Testament of Moses,* in light of the historical background and texts cited in this study, shows that some Jews during the first century B.C.E. and the early first century C.E. believed that God required the shedding of innocent blood by an intermediary figure to save humanity. In many of these texts, the wilderness theme is used to emphasize Israel's vulnerability and to stress the importance of strict adherence to Moses's words. For the author of the *Testament of Moses,* Israel now stands somewhere in the wilderness between the period of Moses's past

[72] For this understanding, see David P. Moessner, "Suffering, Intercession and Eschatological Atonement: An Uncommon Common View in the Testament of Moses and in Luke-Acts," in *The Pesudepigrapha and Early Biblical Interpretation* (ed. James H. Charlesworth and Craig A. Evans; JSPSup 14; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 201–15. Warren J. Heard states: "The innocent slaughter of Taxo and his sons would be so reprehensible that it would force the finger of God" ("The Maccabean Martyrs' Contribution to Holy War," *EvQ* 4 [1986]: 305). Collins, moreover, comments on Taxo's actions, "The human role is no longer merely to draw the Lord's atttention to the fact that things have gone far enough. It can actually do something which will get an automatic response from God" ("Some Remaining Traditio-Historical Problems," 42).

[73] See Werner Foerster and Gerhard von Rad, "διαβάλλω κτλ.," *TWNT* 2:69–80.

redemption of the nation from Egypt and the fulfillment of God's eschatological promises. Like the wilderness generation of Moses's day, the nation is now once again in danger of committing apostasy and forfeiting their place in God's forthcoming kingdom.[74]

The author of the *Testament of Moses* introduces the figure of Taxo, who, like Moses, is a priestly intercessor. Moreover, Taxo is Moses's ultimate successor, since the writer believes that he is the final intercessor for Israel. While the *Testament of Moses* does not affirm Taxo's divinity, it provides valuable insight into the historical development of the belief that the martyrdom of a righteous person was necessary to summon God's violent messenger and bring about the final destruction of the wicked. The messiah of *Psalm of Solomon* 17, like Taxo, was also expected to be "pure from sin" (17:36).[75] *Testament of Judah* 21:1, which is likely a Christian passage that may build upon prior Jewish tradition, says of the messiah, "no sin whatever will be found in him." These parallels suggest that many Jews during the Second Temple period believed that a righteous figure must be completely pure and without sin in order to fulfill God's eschatological plan. This theological doctrine found in the *Testament of Moses,* along with the belief in a sinless mediator, the necessity of martyrdom, and the divine vengeance brought about by the *nuntius*, would later be used by the nascent Christian community to explain the necessity of Jesus's death. Both Taxo and Jesus are sinless, and their deaths serve as a trigger for the eschaton; both are intercessors who offer themselves in sacrificial deaths, and both associate the temple's destruction with innocent suffering and divine vengeance. The *Testament of Moses,* once dated to the Herodian period, provides a valuable, yet largely neglected, source for understanding these NT doctrines as well as the roles of other intermediary figures during the Second Temple period.

[74] For this same motif in Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, see T. A. Wilson, "Wilderness Apostasy and Paul's Portrayal of the Crisis in Galatians," *NTS* 50 (2004): 550–71. Wilson also comments that in Galatians Paul depicts Christ's accomplishment in "delivering us from this evil age" (Gal 1:4) after the pattern of the exodus.

[75] See further Atkinson, *I Cried to the Lord,* 139–44; idem, "On the Herodian Origin of Militant Davidic Messianism at Qumran: New Light from *Psalm of Solomon* 17," *JBL* 118 (1999): 135–60; G. L. Davenport, "The 'Anointed of the Lord in Psalms of Solomon 17,'" In *Ideal Figures in Ancient Judaism: Profiles and Paradigms* (ed. John J. Collins and George W. E. Nickelsburg; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1980), 67–92.

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Questioning and Conviction: Double-voiced Discourse in Mark 3:22–30

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Literary irony is usually defined as a radical disjunction between what a text or a character in a text says and what that text or character means.[1] It refers to the controlled divergence of intended from apparent meaning, a divergence the careful reader must discern in order to privilege authentic over ostensible significance. Mikhail Bakhtin, however, provides a theoretical approach to this mode of semantic disjunction that at once resists straightforwardly promoting one level of meaning over another and at the same time refuses to allow the irreducible semantic difference that ensues to undermine a discourse's coherence: he invites the reader to consider the possibility that the contending meanings of a potentially ironic text might stand in dialogic relationship with one another.

In a passage from "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin considers controlled incongruity between authorial intention and semantic appearance under the heading of "double-voiced discourse." As he defines it, double-voiced discourse "serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different

[1] As Wayne Booth points out, "irony" is a broad term that can encompass a multitude of phenomena one could call "cosmic ironies," "ironies of fate," or "ironies of event" (*A Rhetoric of Irony* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974], 2; see also 241 n. 7). By limiting my discussion to "literary irony," I intend to avoid as much confusion about this ambiguous term as possible.

J. A. Cuddon, to cite a standard dictionary of literary terms and theory, concludes his discussion of irony in literary history by stating "it seems fairly clear that most forms of irony involved the perception or awareness of a discrepancy or incongruity between words and their meaning, or between actions and their results, or between appearance and reality" (*A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory* [3rd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell Reference, 1991], 460). See also Brian Lee, "Irony," in *A Dictionary of Modern Critical Terms* (ed. Roger Fowler; rev. ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 128: "Irony is a mode of discourse for conveying meanings different from—and usually opposite to—the professed ostensible ones."

intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author." These two voices, Bakhtin explains, may be "dialogically interrelated": "they—as it were—know about each other; . . . it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other."[2] Bakhtin's concept of double-voiced discourse provides a useful lens through which to examine the Beelzebul controversy of Mark 3:22–30, a puzzling pericope in which Jesus's words' apparent meaning and what they must mean when read carefully within the context of Mark's opening chapters stand in sharp, potentially ironic contrast. This semantic incongruity, as Bakhtin helps us to see, actually constitutes a theologically meaningful dialogue, which may be understood as dialogue between Jesus and Mark or, more broadly, between faithful commitment to and skeptical questioning of Jesus's ministry and message. Bakhtin's model of double-voiced discourse ultimately lays bare an important dynamic characterizing Mark's narrative throughout: failure to recognize the theologically significant dialogue inscribed in the double-voiced discourse of this pericope and others forecloses on precisely the ideological tension Mark attempts to cultivate in his readers.

At the center of Mark's Beelzebul controversy narrative lies a pair of parables (3:23b–26 and 3:27) that initially seem to deny the scribal charge that Satan authorizes Jesus's exorcisms, which they immediately follow (3:22).[3]

> Parable 1: πῶς δύναται Σατανᾶς Σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν; καὶ ἐὰν βασιλεία ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μερισθῇ, οὐ δύναται σταθῆναι ἡ βασιλεία ἐκείνη· καὶ ἐὰν οἰκία ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μερισθῇ, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ οἰκία ἐκείνη σταθῆναι. καὶ εἰ ὁ Σατανᾶς ἀνέστη ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐμερίσθη, οὐ δύναται στῆναι ἀλλὰ τέλος ἔχει. (3:23b–26)
>
> How can Satan cast out Satan? If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. And if a house is divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand. And if Satan has risen up against himself and is divided, he cannot stand, but his end has come. (NRSV)

[2] Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination* (ed. Michael Holquist; trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist; University of Texas Press Slavic Series 1; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 324.

[3] In 3:23 Mark refers to Jesus's discourse in this passage as "parables" (ἐν παραβολαῖς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς). I, like Joel Marcus, discern two distinct parables, and I shall follow Marcus's taxonomy by calling them the "parable of the divided dominion" (3:23b–26) and the "parable of the strong man" (3:27) (*Mark 1–8: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 27; New York: Doubleday, 2000], 277–78). On the equation of Beelzebul, ruler of the demons (see, e.g., *T. Sol.* 3:1–6; 6:1–3), with Satan, which the parallelism between 3:22b and 3:23b assumes, see Marcus's discussion ad loc (*Mark 1–8,* 272).

> Parable 2: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ εἰσελθὼν τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ διαρπάσαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δήσῃ, καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει. (3:27)
>
> But no one can enter a strong man's house and plunder his property without first tying up the strong man; then indeed the house can be plundered. (NRSV)

It makes no sense, the parables suggest, to hold Satan responsible for Jesus's exorcisms, for if Satan were responsible for them then he would be opposing himself, and his "house" or dominion could not stand. On the contrary, Jesus invades Satan's house from the outside and plunders his property. Far from satanically authorized, Jesus the exorcist violently opposes Satan's authority. The fact of this opposition, to which Jesus's parables draw attention, sufficiently refutes the scribal interpretation of his exorcisms as evidence that Jesus is in league with the devil (3:22).

Mark's discourse, however, makes a number of rhetorical gestures hinting that these parables might not straightforwardly oppose Jesus's understanding of his exorcisms to that of the scribes after all. Mark introduces the parables with the statement that Jesus "having invited them (προσκαλεσάμενος αὐτούς), began to speak to them" (3:23a). The basic meaning of προσκαλέω (used exclusively in the middle in the NT) is to invite or to summon, and Mark regularly uses this verb to describe Jesus's inviting his disciples or the friendly crowd to hear him teach.[4] Mark 3:23a, in fact, represents the only occasion in the entire Gospel when Mark uses the word in the context of Jesus refuting his detractors. This peculiarity of diction has led Howard Clark Kee to suggest that when Jesus "summons them" (προσκαλεσάμενος αὐτούς) in 3:23, he is actually inviting his disciples, even though Mark has not mentioned the disciples since 3:19 and the scribes represent the nearest grammatical antecedent for "them" (αὐτούς).[5] Joel Marcus, on the other hand, notes that προσκαλεῖσθαι has less than friendly connotations in other NT texts: "it has a nuance of imperious command (cf. 15:44 . . .), and . . . can be a legal term for the act of subpoenaing someone (see Acts 5:40)." Marcus on that basis concludes that the word choice, though unusual for Mark, is appropriate.[6] If one assumes and subsequently insists that the present context is simply

[4] See BDAG, 881, s.v. προσκαλέω, §1a. For examples of Mark's standard use of the term, see 3:13; 6:7; 7:14; 8:1, 34; 10:42; 12:43.

[5] Howard Clark Kee, *Community of the New Age: Studies in Mark's Gospel* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), 52. Robert H. Gundry also considers the possibility that αὐτούς refers to the friendly crowd, whom Jesus had apparently just summoned in 3:13 in order to choose from them the twelve apostles. Gundry rightly rejects this possibility, however, observing that in 3:20 "the crowd have already pressed around him so closely that he and his disciples cannot take a meal—i.e. the crowd are sitting around him in the house and do not need to be summoned (cf. vv. 32–35)" (*Mark: A Commentary on His Apology of the Cross* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993], 172).

[6] Marcus, *Mark 1-8,* 272.

polemical, then, as Marcus demonstrates, one can construe προσκαλεῖσθαι to make it fit that context, even though such a construal stands at odds with Mark's normal use of the word. But it is also possible to interpret Mark's uncharacteristic use of this verb in an apparently polemical context as a hint that 3:23–27 might not be straightforwardly polemical after all. Something may operate in Jesus's discourse besides the mere refutation of an obviously erroneous, even unfairly hostile, scribal interpretation of his exorcisms. Although Kee's proposal that Jesus addresses his parable discourse explicitly to the disciples makes Mark's positively nuanced προσκαλεῖσθαι carry too much weight, the peculiar diction may still suggest to the reader—as perhaps does the very fact that Mark includes this episode in his Gospel at all—that what Jesus says has particular relevance to his friendly followers, whom Jesus usually invites to hear him (προσκαλεῖσθαι), as well as to his hostile opponents.

This suggestion coheres with the narrative context surrounding the parables, which likewise challenges the assumption that Jesus straightforwardly refutes the scribes' accusation. The Beelzebul controversy occupies the center of a chiasmus beginning with Mark 3:13 and ending with 3:35, which, as I construe it, sandwiches narratives of ignorant "insiders" whom Jesus rebukes and excludes (B and B′) between stories of "outsiders" whom Jesus brings into his fold (A and A′):[7]

A) Jesus chooses twelve from his followers whom he authorizes to preach and to cast out demons (3:13–19).
B) Jesus's family tries to seize him because they believe him insane (3:20–21).
C) Conflict dialogue between Jesus and the scribes (3:22–30).
B′) Jesus's family calls Jesus to come to them (3:31–32).
A′) Jesus refuses, claiming that those who follow him constitute his true family (3:33–35).

In 3:13–19 (A) Jesus selects twelve of the multitude following him to establish an intimate relationship with himself (ἵνα ὦσιν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ [3:14]), commissioning them to preach and granting them authority to cast out demons. Apart from noting that Jesus had once stayed at the house of Simon and Andrew (1:29), up until this point in his narrative Mark has not suggested that any of the twelve Jesus

[7] For an astute discussion of the well-known sandwich structure in Mark (a.k.a. Mark's "interpolation technique") see James R. Edwards, "Markan Sandwiches: The Significance of Interpolations in Markan Narratives," *NovT* 31 (1989): 193–216. I along with other commentators discern a chiastic structure in Mark 3:13–35 rather more elaborate than those Mark's other interpolations display. See, e.g., Marcus, *Mark 1–8,* 278; Ben Witherington III, *The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 153–54; Vernon K. Robbins, "Rhetorical Composition and the Beelzebul Controversy," in *Patterns of Persuasion in the Gospels* (ed. Burton L. Mack and Vernon K. Robbins; FF; Sonoma, CA: Polebridge, 1989), 172 n. 27.

chooses has an intimate relationship with or knowledge of him.[8] Indeed, before this episode Mark has mentioned the names of only four of the twelve men whom Jesus appoints as apostles in 3:13–19. Outsiders therefore become insiders.

In 3:20–21 (B) Jesus's family mistakenly interprets his immense popularity as evidence that he must be insane and surprisingly turns against him, going so far as to try to overpower him (ἐξῆλθον κρατῆσαι αὐτόν [3:21]). Although Mark calls Jesus's family οἱ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ (v. 21),[9] thereby emphasizing intimacy between them that one might expect to provide privileged knowledge of his divine identity, the family's accusation of insanity reveals that it completely misunderstands Jesus and his mission.[10] Insiders have become outsiders.

The material following the Beelzebul controversy confirms this reversal of positions. In 3:31 (B´) Jesus's mother and brothers are now literally standing outside (ἔξω στήκοντες) as they call Jesus out, and in 3:33–35 (A´) Jesus responds by denying any familial relationship with them at all.[11] Looking at the crowd of

[8] It may be argued that the callings of Simon and Andrew and of James and John gesture at Jesus's intimacy with the two pairs of brothers (Mark 1:16–20), but I would contend the contrary: this surprisingly stark narrative's power depends on the distance between Jesus and these men, who are so overcome by his authoritative charisma that they leave their familiar livelihoods (and, in the case of James and John, their family itself) in order to follow him. Indeed, embarrassment about the implausibility of the disciples' unmotivated willingness to follow Jesus would seem to have provoked Luke's decision to place Jesus's healing of Simon's mother-in-law and others at Simon's house (4:38–41) before Jesus's call of Simon and the other fishermen (5:1–11). The fact that Simon witnessed these miraculous healings helps to explain at least his willingness to leave everything and follow Jesus.

[9] As Vincent Taylor notes, οἱ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ in the LXX and other Hellenistic writings can mean relatives (see Prov 31:21; Josephus, *A.J.* 1.193; and a multitude of other texts he cites), a meaning that the context requires, since Mark certainly refers to this same group as Jesus's mother and brothers in 3:31 (*The Gospel According to St. Mark* [2nd ed.; London: Macmillan, 1966], 236). In support of this reading, see Rudolf Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (trans. John Marsh; New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 29; John Dominic Crossan, "Mark and the Relatives of Jesus," *NovT* 15 (1973): 84–85; Robert A. Guelich, *Mark 1–8:26* (WBC 34A; Dallas: Word Books, 1989), 172; Gundry, *Mark,* 171; Marcus, *Mark 1–8,* 270. Henry Wansbrough ("Mark 3,21–Was Jesus out of his mind?" *NTS* 18 [1972]: 233–35) and David Wenham ("The Meaning of Mark 3:21," *NTS* 21 [1974–75]: 295–300) argue that 3:21 describes Jesus's disciples or even the Twelve (οἱ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ) going out to restrain the crowd (κρατῆσαι αὐτόν). For a compelling critique of this construction, see John Painter, "When Is a House Not a Home? Disciples and Family in Mark 3.13–35," *NTS* 45 (1999): 503–8. Nonetheless, Painter's own reading of the passage, which concludes that Jesus's disciples go out to restrain Jesus because the crowd said he was crazy, also seems forced (pp. 507–9).

[10] This expectation would be especially strong if Mark's readers were familiar with traditions about Jesus's birth, such as those Matthew and Luke record.

[11] Mark consistently portrays Jesus's relatives in a harsh light. The classic study is Crossan, "Mark and the Relatives of Jesus." Werner H. Kelber argues that this reflects Mark's attempt to diminish the authority of oral traditions about Jesus traced back to his family and intimates, which could compete with his innovative written Gospel (*The Oral and the Written Gospel: The*

followers gathered around him, he declares that the community of those doing God's will (ὃς . . . ἂν ποιήσῃ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ) constitutes his true family. Jesus again grants his disciples and followers intimate insider positions while excluding his family as outsiders.

Mark's implication is clear: insiders (Jesus's family) whom one would expect to have privileged knowledge about Jesus's divine identity and mission become outsiders who do not recognize the truth about Jesus at all, while outsiders with no special claims on Jesus (the crowd of followers [3:32] out of whom Jesus calls the Twelve [3:13–14]) move so decisively to the inside that they replace the outcast intimates (3:33–35). Like the odd participle introducing the parables, the episodes sandwiching them, with their reiterated reversals of insiders and outsiders, restrain the attentive reader from simply dismissing the scribes as outsiders inimical to Jesus, the hero of Mark's Gospel. Those on the outside, the narrative context suggests, may have access to privileged knowledge about Jesus that eludes even people whom one would expect to be closest to him.[12]

The participle introducing Jesus's discourse and the narrative context surrounding it constitute not the only evidence challenging a reading of the parables

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Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983; repr., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997], 102–4).

[12] This slippage between insiders and outsiders is related to Mark's so-called messianic secret, on which see the classic study by William Wrede, *The Messianic Secret* (trans. J. C. C. Greig; Library of Theological Translations; Cambridge: James Clarke, 1971); and Heikki Räisänen, *The "Messianic Secret" in Mark's Gospel* (trans. Christopher Tuckett; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990). The two themes come together just a few verses later, in Mark 4:10–11, where Jesus responds to the uncomprehending questions that "those who were with him along with the twelve" ask about his parables (4:10) as follows: ὑμῖν *τὸ μυστήριον* δέδοται *τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ*· ἐκείνοις δὲ *τοῖς ἔξω* ἐν παραβολαῖς τὰ πάντα γίνεται ("to you has been given *the secret* of the kingdom of God, but *to those outside* everything comes in parables . . ." [4:11, emphasis added]). The necessary implication is that in Mark 4 those who are with Jesus, including the Twelve, have again become outsiders (cf. 3:13–19, 34–35) from whom the secret of God's kingdom is hidden. Although Mark's Jesus explicitly calls the disciples outsiders only in 8:14–21, where his rebuke of their failure to understand about the bread clearly assimilates them to the outsiders he mentions in 4:11–12, I see the disciples' movement toward the outside beginning virtually at the moment Jesus chooses the Twelve.

I believe that Mark's closely related insider-outsider and messianic secret motifs have their origins in the social situation of Mark's community, which had to explain why those who would, from Mark's perspective, be expected to embrace Jesus as Messiah (namely, Jews) are not coming to faith in him in large numbers, while many of those who are not expected to embrace him (namely, Gentiles) are. (This is, incidentally, precisely the problem Paul wrestles with in Romans 9–11.) On this see, e.g., G. H. Boobyer, "The Secrecy Motif in St. Mark's Gospel," *NTS* 6 (1959–60): 234–35; T. A. Burkhill, *Mysterious Revelation: An Examination of the Philosophy of St. Mark's Gospel* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 69, 110, 320, passim; and Francis Watson, "The Social Function of Mark's Secrecy Theme," *JSNT* 24 (1985): 60–65. For a related interpretation, see Räisänen, *"Messianic Secret,"* 135–43, which interprets the version of the messianic secret presented in Mark 4:10–13 in light of "mission problems" Mark's community faced.

that straightforwardly opposes Jesus's interpretation of his exorcisms to that of the scribes. The strongest challenge comes from careful attention to the internal logic of the parables themselves. The parable discourse of 3:23b–26 argues that if Satan were authorizing Jesus's exorcisms, then Satan would be exorcising himself; and if Satan were attacking himself, then his kingdom (v. 24) or house (v. 25) or he himself (v. 26) would be divided and "unable to stand" (οὐ δύναται σταθῆναι, v. 24). Since this would be absurd, the conclusion that Satan must not authorize Jesus's exorcisms implicitly follows.[13] It is crucial to recognize, however, that Jesus's series of parabolic statements persuasively denies that Satan empowers his exorcisms only insofar as the proposal that Satan's house cannot stand really is absurd. As Marcus points out, "The controversy . . . [hinges on] a *reductio ad absurdum:* it is patently absurd to think that Satan's kingdom has been laid waste or is about to fall; therefore it cannot be divided in the way that Jesus's opponents allege."[14] The rules of valid logical inference, applied to a reconstruction of Jesus's argument, bear this out. If Satan authorizes Jesus's exorcisms (**p**), then Satan attacks himself (**q**); if Satan attacks himself (**q**) then Satan's divided house falls (**r**). Satan's house obviously does not fall (not **r**—assumed in order to avoid an absurdity); therefore Satan does not authorize Jesus's exorcisms (not **p**). In variable form:

Premise 1: if **p**, then **q**;
Premise 2: if **q**, then **r**;
Premise 3: not **r**;
Conclusion: therefore not **p** (modus tollens; hypothetical syllogism).

According to Jesus's argument, in order for Satan not to be authorizing Jesus's exorcisms, Satan's kingdom must not fall: it must be able to stand.[15] The validity of Jesus's argument therefore depends on the self-evident absurdity of the proposal that Satan's house cannot stand and has fallen, which would appear to be so patently ridiculous as to demand its own negation (premise 3: not **r**).

[13] William L. Lane paraphrases Jesus's parabolic argument to bring out the logic: "His argument is cumulative in its force: If what you say is true there exists the impossible circumstance that Satan is destroying his own realm. For it is self-evident that a kingdom divided against itself will fall, while a household divided against itself cannot be established. If your accusation is factual, then Satan has become divided in his allegiance. This should mean that he has become powerless. *Yet this is clearly not so.* Satan remains strong, and this fact exposes the fallacy of your charge" (*The Gospel according to Mark* [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974], 142–43).

[14] Joel Marcus, "The Beelzebul Controversy and the Eschatologies of Jesus," in *Authenticating the Activities of Jesus* (ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig A. Evans; New Testament Tools and Studies 28.2; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 248. See also Ulrich Luz's comment on the parallel passage in Matthew (12:25-26): "The logic is formally convincing if it is obvious to us that the kingdom of the devil is intact" (*Matthew: A Commentary,* vol. 2, *8-20* [trans. James E. Crouch; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001], 203).

[15] Marcus reconstructs the argument similarly ("Beelzebul Controversy," 248–49). Robbins provides a less formal and therefore less clear reconstruction, but still articulates the same logical moves ("Rhetorical Composition," 165–66).

Jesus's argument has a serious problem, then, for according to Mark's Gospel Satan's kingdom *does fall,* which is to say, Satan's kingdom *cannot stand.* In other words, instead of giving us not **r**, which the parabolic argument of 3:23b–26 requires for validity, Mark's narrative insists on **r**, and so Jesus's argument is invalid by the rules of logical inference.

There is simply no denying that Mark's Gospel requires us to understand Satan's kingdom to have fallen, to supply, that is, **r** as opposed to not **r**. Immediately after Jesus emerges from Satan's temptation (1:12–13), he begins to proclaim the kingdom of God (1:14–15), against which Satan's dominion can put up no resistance at all. The numerous exorcisms Jesus performs in Mark's opening chapter alone (1:21–28, 34, 39) testify decisively to the fact that Satan's kingdom, in the words of Mark 3:26, οὐ δύναται στῆναι ("cannot stand") and does indeed τέλος ἔχει ("have its end").[16] It requires no especially attentive reader to recognize this. After all, the indisputable power over demons that Jesus demonstrates in the exorcisms Mark reports is precisely what gives rise to the scribes' suspicions that Jesus's exorcisms might constitute an inside job in the first place![17] Read in the context of the opening chapters of Mark, then, the logic of Jesus's parable in 3:23b–26 does not so much resolve the scribes' questions about his authority as beg them: if, as Jesus himself asserts in 3:23b–26, Satan's kingdom will fall as a result of civil conflict, then Jesus's undeniable victory over Satan's dominion in Mark's opening chapters cannot but suggest that Jesus is a demonic party in such a conflict. Jesus's argument reiterates rather than refutes the basis of the scribes' skeptical accusations, namely, the possibility of satanic civil war.

When one recognizes that Jesus's first parable perpetuates the very questions about his supposedly satanic authority that it ostensibly aims to resolve, then this necessarily affects the second parable's interpretation as well. In this parable Jesus implicitly likens himself to a robber who enters the house of a strong man and plunders his property (3:27). Since the context of Jesus's parable is a dispute about exorcisms, its parallels with the situation it addresses are exceptionally precise. The word Mark uses for property, σκεῦος (literally "vessel"), can refer to a body or, by extension, a person; and ἰσχυρός ("strong") is a not uncommon designation for a demon.[18] In its present context the second parable seems to suggest that Jesus enters Satan's realm of authority, restrains him, and rescues the people he controls. This, in fact, accurately reflects Mark's presentation of Jesus in the open-

[16] Marcus reflects on the contradiction between Jesus's argument in 3:23b–26 and Jesus's patent defeat of Satan in Mark, surveying in detail different interpreters' attempts to downplay or resolve it. Marcus rightly finds these attempts universally unsatisfying ("Beelzebul Controversy," 249–60).

[17] Mark's reports of Jesus's exorcisms feature assaulted demons' wild cries of fear (1:24) and Jesus's authoritatively silencing their outbursts lest they reveal his identity (1:25, 34; 3:11–12).

[18] BDAG, 927–28, s.v. σκεῦος, §3 (for a famous parallel, see 1 Thess 4:4); 483, s.v. ἰσχυρός, §1a (for parallels, see *PGM* 5.144–47; 13.197, 202–3, 541–43).

ing chapters, where he repeatedly silences and casts out demons in order to rescue possessed people from their grips.[19]

Despite this allegorical configuration, however, carefully read, the parable of the strong man also perpetuates the scribal suspicions about the origin of Jesus's authority it ostensibly seeks to resolve. Jesus calls Satan's realm of defunct authority a house (οἰκία) in 3:27, which echoes v. 25, where Jesus claimed that a house (οἰκία) divided against itself cannot stand. Since Jesus himself has just declared that a house falls because of internal division (v. 25), the fact that the house of v. 27 precisely does not stand (its strong man is bound and it is robbed) necessarily perpetuates the idea that Jesus's plundering of possessed people constitutes an inside job.[20] The parable of the strong man (3:27), read in conjunction with the parable of the divided dominion (3:23b–26), to which it is appended, therefore sustains the possibility the scribes initially raised, namely, that Jesus's authority originates with Satan, even if Jesus himself opposes the devil.

In light of the fact that Jesus's parables beg rather than resolve the scribes' questions, Jesus's fashioning himself a robber in the parable of the strong man takes on a new significance. Although the scandalous inappropriateness of the metaphor is not untypical for Jesus's parables—it fits into the category of the unexpected that Paul Ricoeur has labeled "extravagance" in his study of Jesus's parable discourse—Jesus's suggestion that in his role as an exorcist he functions as an illicit thief is still disconcerting in its Markan context.[21] Even if Jesus's rob-

[19] Gundry spells out the allegory in some detail (*Mark,* 174); see also Marcus, *Mark 1–8,* 274. Mary Ann Tolbert proposes an ironic reading of the passage, which identifies Jesus as the strong man, his disciples as the vessels, and the religious authorities who will arrest him as the robber. Since Jesus's arrest does involve his being bound (15:1) and his disciples deserting (14:43–50) and denying (14:66–72) him (i.e., being plundered), the idea that the parable foreshadows Jesus's demise is defensible. The parable of the strong man perhaps does fill the especially attentive reader "with chilling forebodings concerning what is coming," as Tolbert proposes (*Sowing the Gospel: Mark's World in Literary-Historical Perspective* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989], 100).

[20] It is remarkable, given the obvious links and tension between the two parables, that commentators often simply reiterate their mutually contradictory "logic." For instance, while Lane accurately observes that the logic of Jesus's first parable assumes that Satan and his kingdom remain powerful (*Gospel according to Mark,* 142–43 [see n. 13 above]), he has no problem going on to write that the second parable presents Jesus's "expulsion of demons" as "nothing less than a forceful attack on the lordship of Satan. Jesus' ability to cast out demons means that one stronger than Satan has come *to restrain his activity*. . . . The heart of Jesus' mission is to confront Satan and *to crush him on all fields,* and in fulfillment of his task he is conscious of being the agent of *irresistible power*" (ibid., 143, emphasis added). The first parable's persuasiveness depends, Lane admits, on the assumption that Satan's kingdom stands strong, but the second parable indicates, Lane likewise admits, that Satan's kingdom cannot stand against Jesus at all. Nonetheless, he notes no contradiction between them!

[21] For other scandalous parables, see, e.g., the parable of the unjust steward (Luke 16:1–13), the parable of the widow and the unjust judge (Luke 18:1–8), and the parable of the assassin (*Gos.*

bery is in some sense justified as hostility toward the devil resulting in demoniacs' spiritual deliverance, his description of this opposition to Satan as illicit robbery cannot but perpetuate the scribal suspicions about his authority's legitimacy that prompted the parables to begin with. By the time Mark's attentive reader finishes 3:27, he or she must conclude that the authority by which Jesus casts out demons is spiritually ambiguous, to say the least. Sensitive readers will therefore have some empathy for the scribes' skeptical questions, even if they refuse fully to embrace the hostile perspective their questions imply.

If this reading of Jesus's parable discourse in Mark 3:23b–27 seems somewhat strained or even subversive because it suggests a disturbing link between Jesus and satanic forces, that is not because it violates the integrity of Mark's text or, to follow popular usage of the term, "deconstructs" it.[22] On the contrary, care-

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Thom. 98). On parabolic extravagance, see Paul Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia* 4 (1975): 32, 99, 115, passim. For a related discussion, see Kelber, *Oral and the Written Gospel,* 60–62.

The parable of 3:27 can perhaps be traced back to Jesus himself, although its precise meaning in the context of the historical Jesus' ministry would be impossible to determine. Walter Grundmann constructs a fascinating though speculative argument about the history of this logion and its place in the Synoptic tradition ("ἰσχύω, ἰσχυρός, ἰσχύς, κατισχύω," *TDNT* 3:401, §3b). Since the earliest communities of believers understood Jesus' death and resurrection to be central to the defeat of Satan and his demonic powers (see, e.g., 1 Cor 15:23–26), the saying of Mark 3:27, which presupposes their defeat without reference to either, must predate such theological reflection and therefore "brings us face to face with Jesus' understanding of Himself, with primitive Christology, which is quite simply grounded in the fact that Jesus is the ἰσχυρότερος [cf. Mark 1:7] who has overcome the ἰσχυρός and robbed him of his prey" (ibid.). (Joel Marcus, as I shall discuss below, agrees with this starting point.) The final verses of the final so-called Suffering Servant Song in Isaiah (53:11–12), which were applied to Jesus by the earliest Jesus-believing communities (see Luke 22:37), join together both the strength and the sacrificial death of the Servant. Since the logion recorded in Mark 3:27 bears significant similarities to Isa 53:12a (αὐτὸς κληρονομήσει πολλοὺς καὶ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν μεριεῖ σκῦλα, "he will inherit many people and will divide up the strong men's spoils"), with reference to this Isaianic passage, Grundmann argues, "the saying [of Mark 3:27] may be connected with the later theological statements" (ibid.). That is to say, early believers may have read Mark 3:27 in light of the Suffering Servant passage and thereby connected Jesus' earthly battle against demonic forces to free people from their authority (i.e., his ministry of exorcism) with his death and resurrection. Indeed, Jesus himself may point in this direction in Mark 10:45, where he claims that the Son of Man will die "as a ransom for many," which may mean in order to free many from slavery to Satan. One can therefore see how the Isaianic Suffering Servant Songs were used by early Christian writers as a lens through which to discern a christology that would embrace Jesus' ministry (which involved exorcism), death, and resurrection as "the decisive act of liberation for men" (ibid.).

[22] Although my reading takes an approach to Mark's text similar to the deconstructive readings of, e.g., George Aichele (*Jesus Framed* [London: Routledge, 1996]) and Stephen Moore (*Mark and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspectives: Jesus Begins to Write* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992]), I am not content with the kind of "deconstructive" methodologies in vogue among many

ful textual analysis that takes Mark's words very seriously lays the foundation for every interpretive step taken above. I would therefore go so far as to assert that the reading I have constructed submits to the authority of what Mark and Jesus *actually say,* as opposed to preconceived ideas about what Mark and Jesus *must say.* Above all, my reading does not uncritically assume that the rhetorical figures Jesus employs (parables) in Mark 3:23b–27 must support the concluding contention the reader initially expects, namely, that Jesus's authority as an exorcist is not satanic or evil.[23] The reading rather attends carefully to the parables' language,

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NT scholars, which often operate under the assumption that to "deconstruct" means, as Christopher Norris explains, to "take things apart (literary texts, philosophical arguments, historical narratives, truth-claims or value-systems of whatever kind) in a spirit of game-playing nihilist abandon" (*Deconstruction: Theory and Practice* [3rd ed.; London: Routledge, 2002], 135; see his discussion of popularizations of deconstruction on pp. 134–36). This vulgar understanding of "deconstruction" unhelpfully violates the ways in which groundbreaking theorists and critics such as Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man understood it. In an interview with Stefano Rosso in 1983, for instance, de Man insisted, "I have a tendency to put upon texts an inherent authority. . . . I assume, as a working hypothesis . . . that the text *knows* in an absolute way what it's doing. I know this is not the case, but it is a necessary working hypothesis that Rousseau knows at any time what he is doing and as such there is no need to deconstruct Rousseau. In a complicated way, I would hold to that statement that 'the text deconstructs itself, is self-deconstructive' rather than being deconstructed by a philosophical intervention from outside the text" (*The Resistance to Theory* [Theory and History of Literature 33; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986], 118). In her introduction to Jacques Derrida's *Of Grammatology* (trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; corrected ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997], lxxvii), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak analogously writes: "To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive level of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle *in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed.* Deconstruction in a nutshell" (emphasis added).

[23] This is the difference between my reading of the parables and others that draw attention to problems in argumentation, such as those on which I have focused, but insist that they are matters of ultimately irrelevant textual detail. See, e.g., Hans-Josef Klauck, *Allegorie und Allegorese in synoptischen Gleichnistexten* (NTAbh 13; Münster: Aschendorff, 1978), 178–79; Luz, who insists that the parallel passage in Matthew (12:25–27), whose logic is similarly problematic, contains arguments that are "more rhetorical than material" (*Matthew 8–20,* 203); and Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News According to Mark* (trans. Donald H. Madvig; Richmond: John Knox, 1970), 86. Marcus discusses and refutes the first two of these interpretations ("Beelzebul Controversy," 251–52). Like these, Schweizer's reading assumes that the parable makes its point despite the fact that "in terms of pure logic [it] is not thoroughly convincing" (*Good News According to Mark,* 86). His reading, however, takes the problematic textual details seriously, even as it advocates ultimately ignoring them. Schweizer apparently views Mark's logical shortcomings as a call to faith in Christ that necessarily overrides such problems for the courageous believer: "The final answer is left open, because the reader is the only one who can give that answer. The very fact that this parable is a summons to faith demonstrates that it is a genuine saying of Jesus. Therefore, this is the meaning of the mighty acts of Jesus: Man should take courage to live in the presence of almighty God and under his promise, because God's presence has already become a reality in the acts of Jesus. . . . When one understands the parable in this way, . . . one must abstain from any such interpretation

to what they actually say and to the ways in which they engage with the narrative material surrounding them, even when such attention undermines initial expectations and uncritical intuitions about their meaning.

Western readers, especially those steeped in the Platonic-Christian philosophical tradition, with its emphasis on a clear distinction between external letter and internal, intuited meaning, have traditionally privileged such "uncritical" reading.[24] As Jacques Derrida observes, "writing, the letter, the sensible inscription, has always been considered by Western tradition as the body and matter external to the spirit, to breath, to speech, and to the logos."[25] Although Derrida is discussing the relationship between written and oral language, his observations apply equally well to the distinction between figure—the artificial or, to use Paul de Man's term, the "material" component of language, commonly understood as serving to illustrate or to ornament—and persuasion of philosophical truth, rhetoric's highest goal.[26] Mark 3:23b–27, where figure (parable) surprisingly works against rather than for persuasion, brings this distinction into sharp relief and complicates the relationship between them.

De Man effectively applies Derrida's observations to this relationship in *Alle-*

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of details as saying that . . . the 'plundering' [of the house is described in] the exorcising of demons" (ibid., 86). My understanding of Mark's view of faith, as shall emerge below, is somewhat more complex than Schweizer's and makes room for precisely the problematic attention to detail that he suggests faith will ultimately reject.

Marcus addresses and dismisses a number of other attempts to resolve or eliminate the logical problems the passage presents in the subsequent pages of his study ("Beelzebul Controversy," 252–60), including interpretations manipulating the grammar of the parables to insist that Jesus does not really accept the premise he proposes in 3:26, namely, that Satan's house has fallen (e.g., Joachim Gnilka, *Das Evangelium nach Markus* [2 vols.; EKKNT; Zurich: Benziger, 1978], 1:150; Graham H. Twelftree, *Jesus the Exorcist: A Contribution to the Study of the Historical Jesus* [WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr, 1993], 106), and a large number of related interpretations that insist the passage ultimately has nothing to say about "*whether* Satan's kingdom is under threat, but [only about] *how* it is being attacked" (Marcus, "Beelzebul Controversy," 254, on which see n. 34 below).

[24] See, for instance, Origen's discussion of biblical interpretation in *Princ.* 4, where he claims that faithfulness to the biblical text's external letter (the "body" of Scripture, 4.2.4[11]) may result in heretical interpretations, including the unthinkable conclusion that the creator God is evil, while attention to the internal meaning (the "soul" or "spirit" of Scripture—its mysterious spiritual wisdom) leads to appropriate moral and spiritual edification. In fact, according to Origen and other church fathers, it is often precisely problems with the literal meaning of the text that lead the spiritually minded interpreter to search out its true, inner meaning. See Robert M. Grant and David Tracy, *A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible* (2nd ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1984), 53.

[25] Derrida, *Of Grammatology,* 35.

[26] For de Man's ideas about the materiality of language, see, e.g., "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," in *Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects* (ed. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica; Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 144; and "Reading and History," in *Resistance to Theory,* 68. See also Christopher Norris's comments in *Paul De Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 65–101, esp. 70–73.

gories of Reading, where he shows how the figural and persuasive aspects of rhetoric may be associated with exteriority and interiority respectively and discusses Nietzsche's privileging of "figure over persuasion."[27] De Man ultimately argues that reducing rhetorical language to a logical grammar of figures that writers straightforwardly employ in order effectively to persuade a reader of philosophical truth constitutes a critical mistake. Such a simplistic account of rhetoric simply does not cohere with how it actually functions in much philosophical discourse. This becomes obvious, de Man suggests, when one attends carefully to the rhetorical language of philosophical texts, attention that constitutes a mode of reading often called "literary." Christopher Norris reflects on de Man's literary reading of texts with philosophical (or theological) import in his study of the theorist:

> What results from the "literary" reading of philosophic texts is . . . by no means a retreat from argumentative cogency and rigor. It requires that analysis should not stop short at the point of confirming its own deep-seated suppositions about language and thought, that it should always be prepared to find those suppositions disturbed or undermined by what actually occurs in the process of reading. When de Man talks of the stubborn "materiality" of language, what he means is precisely this resistance to received or canonical forms of understanding, those which effectively *know in advance* what the text has to say, and which therefore tend to repress or simply bypass any details that get in their way.[28]

"Literary" readings of philosophical (or theological) texts by definition attend carefully to what the texts say, even when such attention would disconfirm the reader's initial expectations about what the texts should or must mean. Such readings often focus on texts' rhetorical or figurative aspects, which include, in Mark's case, the specific illustrative language of Jesus's parables. When attention to texts' rhetoric raises problems, one must address these problems with reference to the texts themselves. One must not dismiss them by privileging uncritical assumptions about what the text must mean or with reference to tendentious, hypothetical formulations about how such problems may have entered the text from the outside.[29] Approaches such as these, examples of which I shall discuss below, obscure the fact that "rhetorical" problems are not external to texts' meanings but rather precisely constitute them—and this is especially true of Mark.

[27] Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 130. De Man's entire chapter on the rhetoric of tropes in Nietzsche is relevant (pp. 103–31).

[28] Norris, *Paul De Man,* 71.

[29] I would argue that Marcus takes the latter approach in "The Beelzebul Controversy and the Eschatologies of Jesus," where he is not, admittedly, as interested in resolving the rhetorical problem presented by Mark 3:23b–27 as he is in suggesting what the presence of this problem in Mark's Gospel might reveal about the historical Jesus. I shall discuss his interpretation in detail below.

The standard commentaries and other scholarship on Mark sometimes observe the problems I have noted with Jesus's parable discourse in ch. 3, especially the fact that it fails to refute the scribal accusation of demonic collusion to which the parables respond.[30] For Mark 3:23b–27 to refute the scribes persuasively, Satan must be able to stand, but the exorcisms of Mark's first three chapters and the parable of the strong man in Mark 3:27 combine to suggest that Satan has in fact fallen. In his essay "The Beelzebul Controversy and the Eschatologies of Jesus" and in his Anchor Bible commentary, Joel Marcus addresses this problem by explaining how the parable of 3:27, which undermines the ostensible intent of the parable of 3:23b–26, came to be juxtaposed with it in Mark's Gospel. He begins by arguing that the historical Jesus originally spoke both parables, but that they represent early and later stages of Jesus's understanding of his ministry. At some point, Marcus suggests, Jesus the exorcist "began to view himself as the effective opponent of Satan, the Stronger One whose exorcisms testified to his role as the spearhead of the inbreaking age of God's dominion; it is this stage in his self-understanding that is reflected in Mark 3:27."[31] Earlier in his ministry, however, Jesus did not understand himself to have defeated Satan decisively; his exorcistic ministry "was episodic rather than programmatic": "The people whom he exorcised . . . were individual brands plucked from the Satanic fire of the present evil age; he did not yet see himself as the fireman whose task it was to put the fire out." It is reasonable, Marcus suggests, to posit such a radical change in Jesus's self-image over time, for as Jesus's exorcisms and other miracles began to occur on a wider scale, he would naturally have come to see his activities not simply as discrete incursions into satanic territory, but rather as the sign of "a momentous alteration in the structure of the universe, the beginning of the longed-for defeat of cosmic evil."[32] The suggestion that Jesus attached different significances to his exorcisms at different times in his life, according to Marcus, begins to explain why one encounters two contradictory ideas about Jesus's exorcisms in the two parables of Mark 3:23b–27: the historically later parable (3:27, the parable of the strong man) assumes that they signal the fall of Satan's kingdom, while the earlier one (3:23b–26, the parable of the divided dominion) betrays no such assumption.

Speculation about the development of Jesus's self-understanding may in fact explain how parables with contradictory meanings both found their way into the Synoptic tradition. Since both were authentic parables of the historical Jesus, albeit originating in different stages of his ministry, Mark did not feel at liberty

[30] See n. 23 above.

[31] Marcus, "Beelzebul Controversy," 266. The saying attributed to Jesus in Luke 10:17 would likewise reflect this later stage.

[32] Marcus, "Beelzebul Controversy," 266, 267.

to eliminate either. However, such speculation does not explain why Mark juxtaposed them in such a way as to draw attention to the fact that the latter contradicts the former, thereby undermining Jesus's ostensible attempt to refute the scribal charge of demonic collusion in his Gospel. In his commentary Marcus tries to resolve this problem by arguing that the meaning of the parable of the divided dominion shifts over the course of the conflict narrative. His argument is complicated, and not altogether clear, but begins with the idea that Mark retains the parable of 3:23b–26 in order "to refute the scribal charge of demonic collusion," even though it stands in tension with the parable of the strong man in 3:27. The force of the latter parable, however, buttressed by its central position in the chiasm Marcus observes structuring Mark 3:20–35, serves to subordinate the Parable of the Divided Dominion semantically to it, so that the earlier parable's "meaning shifts."[33] In order to defend himself from the scribal accusation that he is a demonic participant in a civil war resulting in Satan's evident downfall, Jesus initially assumes that Satan's kingdom has not actually fallen (3:23b–26), and Mark expects the reader to embrace this assumption. But once that reader reaches 3:27 and encounters the parabolic allegory of Jesus successfully assaulting Satan, he or she learns no longer to assume this, but instead to understand that Satan's kingdom has fallen after all, and that the earlier parable was merely suggesting that it did not self-destruct.[34] This shift in meaning, however, cannot be retroactive, Marcus's interpretation implies, for if the reader revises his or her interpretation of the first parable in light of the new information provided by the second, that revision will undermine Jesus's refutation of the scribal accusation.[35] Rather, the

[33] Marcus, *Mark 1–8,* 282.

[34] Ibid. The interpretation he proposes here is closely related to the interpretative approach he discusses in "Beelzebul Controversy" (pp. 254–60) under the heading "Interpretations That Focus on the Logic of the Two Parables." He describes this approach, which he abstracts from a number of commentators and scholars (e.g., C. K. Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition* [New York: Macmillan, 1947], 60; Donald H. Juel, *Mark* [ACNT; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1990], 63; Walter Schmithals, *Das Evangelium nach Markus* [2 vols.; Gütersloher Taschenbücher 503–4; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1979], 222; etc.), as asserting "that the point at issue in the two parables is not *whether* Satan's kingship is under threat, but *how* it is being attacked" (p. 254). This is almost identical to the language Marcus adopts in his commentary: "The Parable of the Divided Dominion and House is retained because it is important to refute the scribal charge of demonic collusion, but its meaning shifts: now it establishes not *whether or not* Satan's dominion has fallen, but *in what manner* it has been devastated" (*Mark 1–8,* 282). Although Marcus draws attention to problems with this interpretive approach in the earlier essay ("Beelzebul Controversy," 255), he also asserts that it "is a clever way of putting the Parable of the Divided Kingdom together with the Parable of the Strong Man, and it may well correspond to the canonical writers' understanding of the link between the two sections" (p. 255). So it is not surprising that this is the approach to the passage he will later adopt in his own commentary.

[35] As Marcus himself observes ("Beelzebul Controversy," 255).

reader must generate a second interpretation that stands beside the first independently, in no way challenging it even though absolutely contradicting it.

Marcus's reading in the end merely insists that the parable of the divided dominion (Mark 3:23b–26) refutes the scribal accusation that Jesus's exorcisms are satanically authorized with implicit reference to the self-evident fact that Satan's house has not fallen, even while it simultaneously demands that this parable cohere with the parable of the strong man (Mark 3:27), which suggests precisely the opposite, that Satan's house has fallen. Is it not, however, more reasonable to recognize that if Mark 3:23b–27 cannot straightforwardly refute the scribal charge of satanic collusion without patently violating logic in this way, then it does not straightforwardly refute it at all? Furthermore, is it not reasonable to conclude that if Mark 3:23b–27 does not refute this charge, then the evangelist does not want to refute it?

Readings such as the one Marcus presents assume that Mark does not fully control his narrative.[36] Either piety constrains him to include without alteration material such as 3:27 that does not further his intent to show Jesus refuting the scribes, or Mark simply does not perceive or does not care that some of the material he includes undermines this intent. In itself this might not be an offensive assumption.[37] However, the fact that Mark introduces the parable discourse of ch. 3 with an oddly warm invitation to the scribes (3:23a) and the fact that the parables both independently and especially in relationship to each other perpetuate—perhaps even legitimize—precisely the suspicions that these scribes have raised about Jesus's authority combine to suggest that in this case the assumption is demonstrably false.[38] It is not the case that Mark has inadvertently included material that undermines Jesus's straightforward refutation of the scribes' accusation; it is rather the case that a straightforward refutation is not what Mark narrates. Mark, I submit, means for the parables of 3:23b–27 to be read as in some sense sympathetic to the problems with Jesus's ministry that the scribes raise.

The narratives framing the conflict story, with their reiterated reversals of insiders and outsiders, may also gesture at the possibility that Jesus's scribal accusers—perhaps the ultimate outsiders with respect to knowledge about Jesus—actually have arrived at a crucial insight about him. In addition to dramatizing

[36] It is possible, I imagine, that Marcus believes Mark meant for his readers to go through the complex hermeneutical gymnastics he lays out, but it seems more likely that Marcus sees himself as merely tracing the gymnastics the reader must undertake in order to understand what the evangelist was trying, but ultimately failed, to accomplish.

[37] Räisänen (*"Messianic Secret"*) makes an especially compelling argument that recent NT scholarship has overemphasized the degree of artistic control Mark exercises over his narrative.

[38] The initial problem with 3:23b–26 is that Jesus's reiterated exorcisms indicate that Satan cannot stand up against Jesus. It is precisely because of this that the scribes accuse Jesus of satanic collusion: his assault on Satan's dominion is so effective that it must amount to an inside job. Verse 27 merely draws attention to and intensifies this problem, as I discussed above.

the reversal of expectations as to who is included in and excluded from the group that understands Jesus, the framing narratives also intimate what I have tried to demonstrate above, namely, that the parables at the center of the chiasmus do not lend themselves to an intuited "insider" interpretation that those sympathetic to Jesus and his ministry could easily endorse. They rather demand attention to hermeneutically problematic textual details that may initially appear peripheral (if they are noticed at all), such as the logical problems that emerge from a formal reconstruction of Jesus's argument in the parable of the divided dominion (3:23b–26), especially when it is read in juxtaposition with the subsequent parable of the strong man (3:27), as well as the latter parable's scandalous use of the metaphor of the robber. The parables' narrative context, then, may entail not only the reversal of insiders and outsiders but also the exclusion of intuitive "insider" interpretations of the parables that conclude that Jesus simply cannot be satanic, and openness to "outsider" readings that draw the opposite conclusion on the basis of careful attention to supposedly external or supplemental rhetorical details in Mark's text.

Though fully supported by the text, the possibility that Jesus's parables merely appear to refute the scribes' hostile questions while actually perpetuating them disorients the reader, at least initially. Mark is, after all, entertaining questions about the fundamental holiness of Jesus, the hero of his Gospel, and ultimately about the Spirit who inspires and authorizes Jesus's activity (see 3:28–29, which I shall discuss at length below). Mark, however, has prepared the careful reader to work through this puzzlement without excessive difficulty. In the opening chapter of Mark, which 3:22–30 loudly echoes, John the Baptist introduces Jesus as follows: ἔρχεται ὁ ἰσχυρότερός μου ὀπίσω μου. . . . ἐγὼ ἐβάπτισα ὑμᾶς ὕδατι, αὐτὸς δὲ βαπτίσει ὑμᾶς ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ ("The one who is stronger than I is coming after me. . . . I have baptized you with water, but he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit" [Mark 1:7–8 NRSV, with alterations]). As scholars sometimes observe, the Beelzebul controversy echoes this earlier pericope: by metaphorically binding "the strong one" (ὁ ἰσχυρός) in 3:27, Jesus becomes "the stronger one" (ὁ ἰσχυρότερος) whom John prophesied in 1:7.[39] Moreover, the Holy Spirit, to which Jesus assigns responsibility for his exorcisms in 3:28, is mentioned by John in 1:8, and Jesus sees it descend on himself during his baptism two verses later. In 3:22 the scribes, according to Jesus's interpretation of their accusation in 3:28, question the sanctity of this spirit by implying that it is unclean. This comes very close to what the narrative voice of Mark's Gospel insinuates in 1:9–13, where Mark declares that the heavens were rent (σχιζομένους τοὺς οὐρανούς) when the Spirit descended on Jesus as a dove (ὡς περιστεράν [1:10]). The odd juxtaposi-

[39] James M. Robinson offers the best discussion of the relationship between these two sections of Mark's Gospel (*The Problem of History in Mark* [SBT 21; Naperville, IL: Allenson, 1957], 28–32).

tion of the Spirit's dovelike descent with this forceful tearing of the heavens draws attention to its violence, which the Spirit perpetuates in the subsequent verses by driving Jesus out into the wilderness so that Satan can tempt him: καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτὸν ἐκβάλλει εἰς τὴν ἔρημον. καὶ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τεσσεράκοντα ἡμέρας πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ ("And the Spirit immediately drove him out into the wilderness. He was in the wilderness forty days, tempted by Satan" [1:12–13]). It is worth noting that Mark uses the word ἐκβάλλειν to express the idea that the Spirit forces Jesus into the wilderness, his standard word for exorcise and the very same word the scribes use to describe Jesus's exorcistic activity in 3:22.

Modern translators sometimes soften the violent hostility toward Jesus that the Holy Spirit displays in Mark's first chapter. The RSV incorrectly translates σχιζομένους in 1:10 as "opened" instead of as "rent," and the NIV translates ἐκβάλλει in 1:12 (a historical present) as "sent out" instead of as "drove out." Two of Mark's earliest readers also noticed the Holy Spirit's evident hostility toward God and God's Son and, like modern translators, did their best to reduce it. Matthew changes σχιζομένους τοὺς οὐρανούς to ἠνεῴχθησαν [αὐτῷ] οἱ οὐρανοί ("the heavens were opened" [3:16]); Luke independently chooses the same word to replace σχίζεσθαι: Ἐγένετο . . . ἀνεῳχθῆναι τὸν οὐρανόν ("it came about that . . . heaven was opened" [3:21]).[40] Matthew and Luke may also both replace Mark's forceful ἐκβάλλειν with forms of the much blander verb ἄγειν (4:1 in each), although it is possible that their versions of the temptation story are independent of Mark, deriving solely from Q, whose introduction to Jesus's temptation (Matt 4:1–2//Luke 4:1–2) would then overlap substantially with Mark's temptation narrative (1:12-13).[41]

[40] As Gundry recognizes, "the usual reference [is] to the heavens' being 'opened'" with a form of the word ἀνοίγνυμι employed, which is "tame in comparison" to Mark's diction (*Mark,* 48). Cf. Isa 63:19 and Ezek 1:1 (in the LXX); Acts 7:56. Less precise parallels include Gen 7:11; Isa 24:18; Mal 3:10; Rev 4:1. The only other example of heaven being rent (σχίζεσθαι) is found in *Jos. Asen.* 14:3. Desire to assimilate Mark's "rent" heavens to the more conventional "opened" heavens probably accounts for Matthew's and Luke's minor agreement here against Mark.

[41] Kee argues that Matthew and Luke soften Mark here, as they do in Mark 1:10//Matt 3:16 //Luke 3:21 (*Community of the New Age,* 51). E. P. Sanders and Margaret Davies argue that the substantial agreement between Matt 4:1–2 and Luke 4:1–2 against Mark 1:11–12 points to their sole dependence on Q (*Studying the Synoptic Gospels* [London: SCM, 1989], 80–82). Most scholars, however, adopt a moderate position on this issue, concluding that Matthew and Luke conflate Mark and Q in their version of the temptation story. See, e.g., Tim Schramm, "Der Markus-Stoff bei Lukas: Eine literarkritische und redaktionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung" (Ph.D. diss., Universität Hamburg, 1966), 26–27; W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Jr., *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew* (ICC; 3 vols.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 1:350–54; Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 54. Even if Matthew and Luke do not actually conflate Mark and Q here, attention to specific differences between the passage of Mark (1:12–13) that overlaps with Q's introduc-

The common impulse Matthew, Luke, and modern translators display to alter Mark's representation of the Holy Spirit testifies to the interpretive problems it presents. The violent, heaven-rending Spirit of Mark 1:10–13 shockingly treats God's Son, Jesus, much like Jesus treats unclean spirits, driving him out of the community of the baptized and into the realm of Satan. Mark therefore calls into question not only the holiness of the spirit empowering Jesus but also the integrity of God's kingdom, which appears to be beset by precisely the internal violence and conflict that the scribes in 3:22 assume to characterize Satan's dominion. When Jesus emerges from the wilderness in 1:14 and proclaims πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεου· μετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ ("the time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is near; repent and put faith in the gospel" [1:15]), the thoughtful reader will wonder exactly how good the news of the kingdom Jesus announces and exemplifies really is.[42] And is this not precisely the question lying at the heart of the scribes' accusation that Jesus casts out demons by the power of the devil? Mark's readers, even if they eschew the scribes' hostility toward Jesus, must empathize with the skeptical impulse their inadequately refuted accusation displays, at least if they have been reading attentively.

Even if in Mark's opening chapters the Spirit-empowered Jesus persistently defeats Satan by exorcising his demonic minions, healing disease, and forgiving sins, the careful reader cannot forget that the Spirit descending on Jesus at the moment of his introduction and empowering him throughout his ministry is in some sense complicit with the demonic forces Jesus battles, for it violently rends the heavens and drives Jesus out into the wilderness for the devil to tempt him. If in Mark's introduction of Jesus the Holy Spirit operates against him and in the interest of the demonic forces he will later oppose, it comes as no surprise that the evangelist later does not allow his readers simply to dismiss the scribal assertion that the spirit empowering Jesus's exorcisms may be an unclean one engaging in a demonic civil conflict (3:28–30). On the contrary, Mark demands that his readers take this accusation seriously indeed.

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tion to the temptation story (Matt 4:1–2//Luke 4:1–2) may still help to explain why Matthew and Luke independently choose to follow Q as opposed to Mark. Even if they do not provide evidence of how Matthew and Luke rewrite Mark, they may still suggest problems with Mark that Matthew and Luke observed, prompting them both to favor Q's introduction to the story over Mark's.

[42] This question regularly arises, as I and many colleagues who have read Mark's introduction of Jesus (1:1–15) carefully with students new to biblical narrative can testify. Novice readers are initially puzzled that "the son of God" (1:1) has to undergo a "baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins" (1:4) in the first place, and they are then confused by the fact that immediately after Jesus' extraordinary baptism, the same Spirit that confirms his divinity (1:9–11) apparently punishes him by expelling him into the desert for Satan to tempt him (1:12–13). Mark's Jesus simply does not correspond to the reader's initial expectations about the divine subject of Mark's "good news" (1:1).

Perhaps the most straightforward way of coming to terms with the complicated parable discourse of Mark 3:23b–27 is to understand it ironically, as meaning the opposite of what it actually says. Although Jesus appears to refute the scribal accusation that his exorcistic authority is satanic, he actually affirms it; although he appears to be holy, he is really unclean. In fact, the above analysis of the passage in question demonstrates that it displays criteria Wayne Booth identifies in his classic study *A Rhetoric of Irony* as clues of intentional irony: (1) the passage conflicts with facts made known earlier in the work (e.g., Satan's defeat); (2) the passage is patently illogical, clearly violating "normal reasoning processes."[43] An ironic reading of Mark 3:23b–27 would constitute a subversive reading of Mark indeed and, more to the point, one that Mark's discourse seems to refuse, for the verses immediately following the passage explicitly condemn the kind of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit to which an ironic reading would amount (3:28–30). Although Mark 3:23b–27 inscribes a disjunction between Jesus's apparent rebuke of the scribes' skeptical accusations and the perpetuation of their skepticism, this disjunction may more fruitfully and faithfully be understood as dialogic than as ironic. Instead of encouraging the rejection of the former understanding of Jesus's words in favor of the latter, Mark, I submit, orchestrates a complex dialogue between the two.

As Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us, writers of novelistic narratives like Mark rarely speak in their own voices; rather they speak through their characters. Indeed, even when they speak through the voices of so-called omniscient third-person narrators, they often focalize such discourse through a particular character's point of view. The total impression of a narrative may therefore be similar to that of a complex conversation or dialogue: a series of distinct voices each representing different, perhaps even mutually exclusive, ideologies. It is narrative achieving such a dialogic effect that Bakhtin labels novelistic: "The author participates in the novel (he is omnipresent in it) with *almost no direct language of his own.* The language of the novel is a *system* of languages that mutually and ideologically interanimate each other. It is impossible to describe and analyze it as a single unitary language."[44] The complex polyphony of novelistic discourse,

[43] Booth, *Rhetoric of Irony,* 61–67, 75–76.

[44] Bakhtin, "From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse," in *Dialogic Imagination,* 47. See Austin Busch, "Convictions and Questions: Philosophy and *Muthos* in Paul, Mark, and the Senecan Corpus" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Bloomington, 2004), 18–24, for a more thorough discussion of the appropriateness of categorizing Mark as novelistic, in Bakhtin's sense of the word. See also Michael E. Vines (*The Problem of Markan Genre: The Gospel of Mark and the Jewish Novel* [SBL Academia Biblica 3; Leiden: Brill, 2002]), who applies Bakhtin's theoretical concepts to Mark's Gospel. Vines, however, is interested not in using Bakhtinian dialogism as a lens through which to

which necessarily resists hermeneutical reduction to a unitary point of view, appears with especial clarity when one recognizes that since the author addresses the reader indirectly, through the words of characters or through words presenting views affected by particular characters' perspectives, even statements that seem relatively straightforward or single-voiced may actually be dialogic, making distinct, even competing claims:

> Heteroglossia, once incorporated into the novel (whatever the forms for its incorporation), is *another's speech in another's language,* serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way. Such speech constitutes a special type of *double-voiced discourse.* It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they—as it were—know about each other (just as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other); it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other.[45]

Bakhtin's discussion invites application to Jesus's parables in the Beelzebul controversy. In Jesus's ambiguous denial of the scribal charge of satanic collusion (3:23b–27) we hear simultaneously two voices: one communicating "the direct intention of the character who is speaking" (Jesus) and the other "the refracted intention of the author" (Mark), which actually challenges that speaker. In other words, we simultaneously hear Jesus's denial of the scribes' accusations and Mark's willingness to consider them. We may therefore understand the ironic disjunction between what Jesus's words initially appear to say and the meaning that emerges from a more careful examination of them as a kind of dialogic exchange between Jesus, who insists that his ministry is entirely above board, and the evangelist, who, as his introduction of Jesus likewise indicates, is not entirely convinced.

The dialogism Mark's Gospel displays is ultimately not the product of an author so fully and powerfully imagining his characters that they succeed in attaining a kind of autonomy from the monologic control his own ideology exerts, which is the imaginative genesis of Dostoevskian dialogism, according to Wayne Booth in his introduction to the English translation of Bakhtin's *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.*[46] It is rather, I suspect, a by-product of Mark's conviction that his "character" Jesus has risen from the dead and lives on to continue engag-

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interpret Mark, but rather in applying Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope to Mark in order to link Mark generically with the Hellenistic Jewish novel.

[45] Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," 324.

[46] Wayne C. Booth, introduction to *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* by Mikhail Bakhtin (ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson; Theory and History of Literature 8; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xx.

ing in dialogue with his followers. Although I admit it is ultimately impossible for the reader of Mark to distinguish between this explanation and the former, the double-voiced discourse of Mark 3:23b–27 may very well inscribe what the evangelist understood to be an authentic exchange between himself or his community and the risen Christ. Even as on one discursive level Jesus attempts to refute the scribes' accusations, Mark seizes upon the dialogic possibilities the risen Jesus offers to echo and press their challenging questions, to which the risen Jesus will again respond—but which he will not resolve—in 3:28–29.[47]

Although I cannot prove it here, I believe that the Beelzebul controversy manifests an impulse that characterizes Mark's Gospel throughout, namely, the tendency to voice questions challenging Jesus that are not successfully or completely settled. Mark consistently places voices presenting distinct points of view on Jesus's message and ministry and death and resurrection into a subtle and complex dialogue with one another. The open-endedness of the Gospel's conclusion, which has fascinated as many readers as it has frustrated, virtually guarantees that this dialogue never achieves final resolution, despite redaction criticism's pervasive attempts to uncover a distinct and unified theological perspective for Mark as for the other Synoptic Gospels. Indeed, Mark's foundational decision to produce a composite narrative incorporating heterogeneous and sometimes theologically incompatible traditions and literary forms (including miracle stories that present Jesus as a "divine man" and a passion narrative that presents him as decisively human, as well as historical and legendary stories, controversy dialogues, parables, extended speeches, etc.) ensures that his Gospel does not present a unified theology straightforwardly, but that it rather orchestrates a complex dialogue between distinct theological perspectives.[48] Mark's decision was certainly not accidental: is not open-ended dialogue a discursive mode more appropriate than dogmatic insistence to religious communities claiming to serve a living savior, who continues to interact with his followers in a personal way?

Although Mark's willingness to interrogate the spiritual and ethical legiti-

[47] If the notion of dialogue between the evangelist and the risen Christ is pressed, the reading of Jesus's parable discourse in 3:23b–27 that I am proposing is in some ways analogous to the two-level drama J. Louis Martyn discerns in John 9 and elsewhere, although my reading of Mark finds the levels of reference/meaning conflated in a more pervasive and complex way than does his reading of John (*History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel* [New York: Harper & Row, 1968], 3–41). The parabolic logic that the Jesus of history addresses to the scribes in 3:23b–27, which, when not pressed too hard, refutes the kind of knee-jerk hostility toward his exorcistic ministry at which their accusation appears to gesture (3:22), stands in dialogue with the risen Jesus's words to the Markan community, which legitimize a limited degree of questioning about him, as 3:28–29 will reveal.

[48] On tension and conflict between diverse literary forms and traditions in Mark, see, e.g., James M. Robinson and Helmut Koester, *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 187–93; Theodore J. Weeden, Sr., *Mark: Traditions in Conflict* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971); and Busch, "Convictions and Questions," 20–24, 166–220, 360–94, 431–45.

macy of Jesus's ministry may seem surprising, it fits squarely into the apocalyptic eschatological tradition the evangelist inhabits.[49] Apocalyptic eschatology often posits the existence of evil spiritual forces that have control over the world, but at the same time assigns the one good God ultimate responsibility for the creation—and sometimes even for the deployment—of these hostile spirits.[50] Susan Garrett therefore argues that the Markan temptation narrative, which features the Holy Spirit driving Jesus into the wilderness in order for Satan to tempt him, reflects ethical tensions latent in this tradition. It, like other apocalyptic texts (e.g., *Testament of Job* and *Jubilees*), assumes God's willingness to work with evil spirits or even with Satan himself.[51] As Garrett observes, this kind of cooperation is especially common in narratives involving heroes' tests and temptations—precisely the

[49] On Mark as apocalyptic eschatological discourse, see Marcus, *Mark 1–8,* 70–73; and Vernon K. Robbins, "The Intertexture of Apocalyptic Discourse in the Gospel of Mark," in *The Intertexture of Apocalyptic Discourse in the New Testament* (ed. Duane F. Watson; SBLSymS 14; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 11–44. Older, but still useful, is Norman Perrin's chapter on the Gospel of Mark (which he calls the "The Apocalyptic Drama") in *The New Testament: An Introduction—Proclamation and Parenesis, Myth and History* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 143–67.

[50] Martinus C. de Boer argues for the existence of a track of Jewish apocalyptic eschatology called "cosmological-apocalyptic eschatology" ("Paul and Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology," in *Apocalyptic and the New Testament: Essays in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* [ed. Joel Marcus and Marion L. Soards; JSNTSup 24; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989], 169–90). Cosmological-apocalyptic eschatology posits that "the world has come under the dominion of evil, angelic powers" by whom "God's sovereign rights have been usurped"; God, however, will eschatologically "invade the world under the dominion of the evil powers and defeat them in a cosmic war. Only God has the power to defeat and to overthrow the demonic powers that have subjugated and perverted the earth" because he has created them and exercises ultimate authority over them (de Boer, "Paul and Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology," 180–81). Marcus argues that Mark's Gospel exhibits precisely this mode of apocalyptic eschatological thought, viewing Jesus's ministry (especially his numerous exorcisms [1:21–28, 32–34, 39; 3:11–12; 5:1–20; 9:14–29] and the "healings that take on exorcistic features" [1:31, 41–43; 7:33–35]) as the beginning of God's eschatological battle to free the world from demonic forces (*Mark 1–8,* 72–73).

The notion that God created and continues exercising his authority over the evil forces who oppose God sometimes lies implicit in apocalyptic eschatological texts, but it is often made explicit as, for instance, in *1 Enoch* 9 (*OTP*), which decries the evil the wicked angels have wrought on earth (9:1–3) but at the same time insists that God has "made everything," has "authority for everything" God has made (9:5), and "know[s] everything (even) before it came into existence" (9:11). The chapter also explicitly states that God gave Semyaz, the leader of the angelic rebellion that resulted in the world's corruption, "power to rule over his companions" (9:7), even though God knew Semyaz would lead them into rebellion against Godself (9:11; cf. 6:2–5). For an especially thoughtful treatment of this tension, see Susan Garrett, *The Temptations of Jesus in Mark's Gospel* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 19–49, which explores a number of apocalyptic traditions involving God's employment of the evil spiritual forces who oppose him in order to test heroes faithful to him.

[51] Garrett, *Temptations of Jesus,* 44–48 and 55–60.

theme of Mark 1:12–13.[52] The suggestion that God's Son is in cahoots with Satan, which emerges from a careful reading of 3:23–27 (a passage thematically linked to the story of Jesus's temptation, as I demonstrated above), therefore coheres with tensions conventional in the Jewish apocalyptic tradition in which Mark's Gospel is situated. This is not to suggest that Mark's decision to seize on this cooperation in order to perpetuate the scribal charges that God's agent Jesus may actually be satanic is without problems. The reading of Mark 3:23–27 that I proposed above suggests that Mark puts more pressure on this traditional ambivalence than do the other apocalyptic texts Garrett discusses. In fact, it is only when the severity of this pressure is recognized that Jesus's words following the parables of Mark 3:23b–27, which often trouble commentators and to which I shall now turn, make sound theological sense.

Mark 3:28–29 reads: πάντα ἀφεθήσεται τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ αἱ βλασφημίαι ὅσα ἐὰν βλασφημήσωσιν· ὃς δ᾽ ἂν βλασφημήσῃ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ ἔνοχός ἐστιν αἰωνίου ἁμαρτήματος ("Every sin will be forgiven the sons of men and as many blasphemies as they blaspheme. But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will never have forgiveness but is guilty of an eternal sin" [NRSV, with alterations]). Commentators regularly approach this passage by limiting its significance as severely as they can. Those with pastoral sensitivity, like Joel Marcus, cannot fathom that it would have any real significance to those within the community of faith:

> Pastors who counsel . . . troubled souls that, if they are worried about having blasphemed against the Holy Spirit, they probably have not done so, have good biblical grounds for their position. In the Markan context blasphemy against the Spirit means the sort of total, malignant opposition to Jesus that twists all the evidence of his life-giving power into evidence that he is demonically possessed (see 3:22, 30).[53]

According to this reading, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is the quintessential "outsider" sin. No one following Jesus would commit it, and so no one attempting to follow him need seriously worry about it. Such a reading implies that the statement serves to distinguish insiders from outsiders, to encourage the former and categorically to condemn those among the latter who oppose Jesus's Spirit-inspired ministry by claiming it is spiritually corrupt.

Some commentators limit the saying's relevance even further than this by insisting that it addresses blasphemy only against the Spirit-empowered ministry of the historical Jesus, and not blasphemy against the continuing activities of the

[52] See ibid., 19–49. Examples of God cooperating with Satan in order to test his hero would include Job 1–2; *T. Job* (cf. 4:3–10 and 37:1–7); *Jub.* 17:15–18:2; 2 Cor 12:1–10, esp. v. 7.

[53] Marcus, *Mark 1–8,* 284; see also, e.g., Schweizer, *Good News According to Mark,* 87.

risen Lord.[54] Ben Witherington goes so far as to argue that it is therefore impossible to commit the "unforgivable sin" now: "Clearly this whole discussion is about something which could only be true during Jesus' ministry, for we are not talking about blasphemy against the risen Lord, but rather against the Spirit who empowered Jesus to act while on earth."[55] It is worth dwelling on Witherington's statement for a moment in order to underscore the lengths to which commentators will go to limit the relevance of this troubling dominical saying, for his comment is patently illogical. Even if one were to grant the tendentious claim that the logion only forbade blasphemy against "the Spirit who empowered Jesus to act while on earth," the contemporary reader of Mark, whom Witherington is trying to preserve from anxiety, could still blaspheme against that Spirit. If a reader insisted that the spiritual power of the Jesus of history encountered in Mark's Gospel originated with Satan rather than with God, then the reader precisely blasphemes against "the Spirit who empowered Jesus to act while on earth." Whether Jesus presently dwells on earth or at the right hand of God is irrelevant to the status of the reader's potential blasphemy against the Spirit who inspired the Jesus about whom Mark writes.[56]

It is not only pastoral sensitivity that limits the relevance and significance of this problematic dominical saying. Eugene Boring's form-critical analysis reaches a conclusion analogous to those of Marcus and Witherington by tracing the logion Mark transmits back to a hypothetical conflict between first-century Jews who held prophecy in high regard (among whom would have stood Mark's Jesus-

[54] Gnilka, *Das Evangelium nach Markus,* 1:151; Guelich, *Mark 1–8:26,* 180; Gundry, *Mark,* 183.

[55] Witherington, *Gospel of Mark,* 159. Arland J. Hultgren offers precisely the opposite interpretation: the saying's focus on the Holy Spirit suggests that it distinguishes between opposition to the Spirit's activity in the early church and opposition to the ministry of the historical Jesus. Hultgren speculates that the saying may therefore represent the early church's attempt to embrace postresurrection believers who might have opposed the historical Jesus and his ministry. His theory, however, assumes that Q preserves the saying's original form (Matt 12:32//Luke 12:10), which makes a clear distinction between blasphemy against the Holy Spirit and blasphemy against the Son of Man that Mark neglects to make in 3:28–29, and therefore has limited relevance for an understanding of Mark's deployment of the logion (*Jesus and His Adversaries: The Form and Function of the Conflict Stories in the Synoptic Tradition* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1979], 105–6).

[56] Lane also denies the relevance of 3:29 to contemporary readers of Mark on a dubious historicizing basis. He observes that the saying's warning "was not addressed to laymen but to carefully trained legal specialists whose task was to interpret the biblical Law to the people" and on that basis tendentiously insists that "the admonition concerning blasphemy of the Holy Spirit is not to be divorced from this historical context and applied generally" (*Gospel according to Mark,* 146). But Lane offers no explanation for his unique refusal to allow this particular logion to be "divorced" from its "historical context." He is clearly, and rightly, unprepared to assert that the rest of Mark, which is likewise situated in a particular historical context, has no general application for later followers of Jesus (see, e.g., ibid., 1–2), and so one wonders what makes Mark 3:29 so different.

believing community) and those who did not.[57] Mark 3:29, Boring proposes, originated with "Christian" constituents of the former and was directed at the latter:

> It would seem . . . that at some time in the pre-Marcan tradition a prophetic Christian group fashioned a response to the kinds of charges it was meeting by combining traditional (and probably historical) words of Jesus (vss. 24-27) . . . with . . . a Christian prophetic oracle directed against such outsiders (vss. 28-29). . . . The church behind this pericope in Mark knows itself to be possessed of pneumatic power, over against its environment.[58]

In a later article on the same saying, Boring offers a different, though related hypothesis, namely, that the oracle recorded in 3:28-29 represents a Jesus-believing prophet's alteration of the historical Jesus's "unconditional declaration of universal forgiveness" (3:28) in the first few years of the church's existence. The revised saying (3:28 and 29), according to Boring, "proleptically pronounced the doom of the last day" on Jews who rejected the nascent church's claim prophetically to announce eschatological forgiveness.[59]

Despite the saying's broad reference (ὃς δ᾽ ἂν βλασφημήσῃ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον), NT scholars generally conclude—regardless of the hermeneutical approach they take—that it applies only (or applied only) to a discrete group of people different from Mark's readers. The blasphemy against the Holy Spirit that Jesus discusses in 3:28–29, in short, is always the other's sin. Anyone worried about having committed it may rest assured in the knowledge that no one with that concern would blaspheme against the Holy Spirit to begin with (Marcus). Indeed, the role or status of the Holy Spirit has changed since Jesus's resurrection so that it is impossible for anyone today to commit this sin at all (Witherington). Moreover, the saying ultimately reflects a parochial first-century conflict between Palestinian Jesus-believers prophetically announcing God's forgiveness, as Mark's community certainly did, and nonbelieving Jews rejecting their right to do this (Boring). It has, by implication, no direct relevance to any of Jesus's followers, in Mark's time or in any other. It is the quintessential outsider sin.

The problem with readings that so radically limit the saying's scope, especially the first two of the three I discussed above, is that they fail to cohere with the Markan context in which the saying about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit appears, or indeed with the broad theological impulse of Mark's Gospel. In the immediate context of the passage, Mark goes to great lengths to suggest that precisely those who are expected to be intimate insiders with respect to Jesus (i.e.,

[57] Eugene M. Boring, "How May We Identify Oracles of Christian Prophets in the Synoptic Tradition? Mark 3:28–29 as a Test Case," *JBL* 91 (1972): 518; cf. Robin Scroggs, "The Exaltation of the Spirit by Some Early Christians," *JBL* 84 (1965): 360–65.

[58] Boring, "Oracles of Christian Prophets," 520.

[59] Eugene M. Boring, "The Unforgivable Sin Logion: Mark III 28–29/Matt XII 31–32/Luke XII 10: Formal Analysis and History of the Tradition," *NovT* 18 (1976): 277–79.

his family) find themselves on the outside, and that those expected to be outsiders (i.e., the crowd hanging around Jesus) actually have an intimate relationship with and understanding of him. Mark's point here is not simply that Jesus's own family unexpectedly failed to grasp the truth about his identity while crowds of peasants, fishermen, and other unlikely characters managed the feat. Mark is more radically suggesting that the boundaries between inside and outside are perpetually unstable, and that anyone who assumes he or she is on the inside is always liable to be pushed out. Luke Timothy Johnson highlights this in his NT introduction: Mark's "message is mainly one of warning against smugness and self-assurance. He seems to be saying 'If you think you are an insider, you may not be; if you think you understand the mystery of the kingdom and even control it, watch out; it remains alive and fearful beyond your comprehension.'"[60] The end of Mark's narrative confirms Johnson's penetrating insight, for there the positions of the insiders and outsiders from Mark 3 find themselves precisely reversed: the Twelve, demonstrating a remarkable unwillingness to understand or sympathize with Jesus's ministry and message, betray (14:10–11, 43–46), desert (14:50), and deny (14:66–72) him at the moment of his arrest, while Jesus's mother appears among the women who faithfully attend his execution and ultimately attempt to anoint his dead body (15:40; 16:1; cf. 6:3). Indeed, in Jerusalem Jesus even tells a scribe that he is οὐ μακρὰν . . . ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ ("not far . . . from the kingdom of God" [12:34]) and Mark suggests that this is one of the scribes who had challenged Jesus's exorcistic authority, for he explicitly identified them in 3:22 as οἱ γραμματεῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰεροσολύμων καταβάντες ("the scribes having come from Jerusalem"). No reading can be faithful to Mark's Gospel if it aims to solidify a conventional insider-outsider boundary by suggesting that Jesus's warning about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit functions as a litmus test to assure one of insider status (i.e., if one worries about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, then one knows by that concern one has not committed the unpardonable sin), for Mark's Gospel consistently emphasizes the instability of precisely the boundary that such a distinction assumes.

If it is wrong to claim that the saying from Mark 3:28–29 applies straightforwardly and exclusively to outsiders, then it must bear some application to Mark's community of readers. I would argue that inasmuch as the words Mark has written in the previous verses (3:23b–27) perpetuate the possibility that Jesus's Spirit-inspired ministry might not be unambiguously holy but might rather be tinged with satanic evil, *the saying applies directly to the evangelist himself.* Indeed, the possibility—even the necessity—of such an application is precisely the point

[60] Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Writings of the New Testament: An Interpretation* (rev. ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 169.

of the saying. Mark wants to raise sincere and difficult questions about Jesus, including questions about his integrity as a representative of God and about the spiritual legitimacy of his ministry. Challenging dialogue about these issues surfaces not only in Jesus's ambivalent response to the scribes' accusations in the Beelzebul controversy but also in the baptism-temptation narrative's ambiguous representation of the Holy Spirit, and elsewhere in Mark's Gospel as well.[61] In the midst of Mark's aggressive questioning, the saying about blasphemy establishes a point of no return, a limit of skepticism or of suspicion beyond which Mark will not go. The saying about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit functions as a line in the sand that, once having been drawn, may be confidently approached without fear of overstepping. The dialogic interpretation of the parables of 3:23b–27 that Mark's Gospel demands, therefore, in no way invites the reader to adopt a cynical perspective toward Jesus or toward faith in him, but it does point to rigorous, even severe, interrogation of the most fundamental convictions of Jesus-believing faith: the goodness of Jesus and his status as the holy God's representative on earth. The very reason Mark must locate the brink of this kind of skeptical questioning with such stark emphasis in 3:28–29 is that he wants to approach it confidently—as closely as he may as often as he can.

Mark is not ultimately interested in settling these questions to establish that God and his representatives are, in the end, unambiguously good and holy. He rather recognizes that the problems latent in the apocalyptic eschatological worldview that he holds, especially the "Holy" Spirit's willingness to cooperate with demons hostile to God and to God's Son (1:10–13), raise troubling and irresolvable questions about the character of God and Jesus. But despite the evangelist's commitment to skeptical interrogation of Jesus's ministry and message in a Jewish apocalyptic eschatological context, Mark will not go so far as to reject Jesus outright as a representative of Satan. Mark insists on undertaking his vigorous questioning of Jesus from the perspective of faith in him, remaining convinced that Jesus is, in the end, the good Son of God (cf. 1:1) and that to abandon this conviction would constitute a literally unpardonable transgression (3:28–29). Maintaining this conviction, however, does not preclude the possibility of sincere inquiry, of raising and pressing troubling questions about the Lord. Rather, Mark 3:22–30 suggests that authentic faith precisely consists of dialogue between conviction and skepticism. It is inherently dialogic, open to skeptical questioning of Christ even as it remains committed to him. The real dialogue of Mark 3:22–30 is not finally between Jesus and the scribes or even between the risen Christ and the evangelist. These are all manifestations of a larger dialogue, one characterizing any thoughtful believer's attitude toward his or her Lord: the dialogue between

[61] E.g., in Mark 4:1–20, on which see Busch, "Convictions and Questions," 366–72.

conviction and questioning. Far from resolvable, this dialogue for many of us actually constitutes faith in a God who, if not complicit with, is also not as hostile toward evil as we might hope. It is therefore no accident that Jesus, whose miraculous healings in Mark often depend precisely on faith (2:5–12; 5:34; 6:5–6; 10:52), restores to health the demoniac son of a man whose faithful confession is dialogic through and through: πιστεύω· βοήθει μου τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ ("I have faith; help my lack of faith" [9:24]). But that would require an article of its own.

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The Disputed Words in the Lukan Institution Narrative (Luke 22:19b–20): A Sociological Answer to a Textual Problem

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At first glance there might not appear to be much of a prima facie case for seeking answers to textual problems within the social world of early Christianity, and even less a possibility that the results of such an inquiry might have implications for the present. The relationship between a manuscript and the community for which it is produced is, however, both a fluid and a dynamic interchange, in which one is shaped and formed by the other. For good reason, the imperative for understanding and interpreting a biblical text against its *Sitz im Leben* is long established and routinely applied. Less widely recognized is the possibility that a similar dynamism and a similar methodology can and ought to be applied to the study of the textual transmission of individual manuscripts and to the study of particular textual issues within them. Manuscripts do not simply appear, nor were the earliest textual witnesses of the NT produced in isolation from a community. Only from the fourth century, with the rise of monasticism and the Edict of Milan, does a professional class of scribes and scholars emerge to assume responsibility for the transmission of the sacred text. Throughout the course of the second and third centuries, the most fluid age for the textual transmission of the NT,[1] manuscripts were produced by, and for the use of, religious communities. Even when transmitting verbatim from an exemplar, and certainly when translating from one language into another (since all translation is at once interpretation), the scribes who produced these manuscripts inevitably reflected within them the social, political, and theological proclivities of the worlds in which they lived and worked. This can be seen most clearly in the critical examination of what is

[1] So the famous lament of Augustine, that "in the early days of the faith every man who happened to get his hands upon a Greek manuscript, and who thought he had any knowledge, were it ever so little, of the two languages, ventured upon the work of translation" (*Doctr. chr.* 2.16).

included, what is omitted, and what is altered, among particular manuscripts. That the dogmatic and theological controversies of the times are reflected in the textual history of the NT has been observed from ancient times.[2] But manuscripts are a window into more than the history of dogmatics. They function as textual mirrors (very often the only mirror we have) that invite us also into the world inhabited by the scribes who produced them and the communities for whom they wrote. The variance, dissonance, and agreement in manuscripts are, then, more than statistical units to be compiled in columns and cited in apparatuses; these features function as "a window into the social world of early Christianity."[3] This is true also of individual emendations in particular manuscripts, a point I hope to establish in the particular case of the well-known omission of a portion of the words of institution from part of the Western recension (principally Codex Bezae-Cantabrigiensis, D) of Luke's Gospel (Luke 22:19b–20), a passage that has very definite ongoing relevance to the present-day church in the theaters of both its theological reflection and liturgical practice.[4]

[2] See, e.g., Tertullian, *Praescr.* 28; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.23.12; 5.28.18; Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 31. For recent discussions of the issue, see Bart D. Ehrman, *The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: The Effect of Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Peter M. Head, "Christology and Textual Transmission: Reverential Alterations in the Synoptic Gospels," *NovT* 35 (1993): 105–29. For discussions of specific texts and manuscripts, see Bart D. Ehrman, "1 Joh 4^3 and the Orthodox Corruption of Scripture," *ZNW* 79 (1988): 221–43; idem and Mark A. Plunkett, "The Angel and the Agony: The Textual Problem of Luke 22:43–44," *CBQ* 45 (1983): 401–16; Mikeal C. Parsons, "A Christological Tendency in P^{75}," *JBL* 105 (1986): 463–79; George Rice, "Western Non-Interpolations: A Defense of the Apostolate," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar* (ed. Charles H. Talbert; New York: Crossroad, 1984), 1–16. Frederik Wisse has warned against uncritical acceptance of the notion of theologically motivated emendations ("The Nature and Purpose of Redactional Changes in Early Christian Texts: The Canonical Gospels," in *Gospel Traditions in the Second Century: Origins, Recensions, Text, and Transmission* [ed. William L. Petersen; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989], 39–54). Even Bart Ehrman concedes that "scribes were apparently more inclined to 'correct' or 'improve' a passage" than to emend it (*Orthodox Corruption*, 277). Indeed, over a century ago Westcott and Hort saw "no signs of deliberate falsification of the text for dogmatic purposes" at all (*The New Testament in the Original Greek* [2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1881], 2:282).

[3] Bart D. Ehrman, "The Text as Window: New Testament Manuscripts and the Social History of Early Christianity," in *The Text of the New Testament in Contemporary Research: Essays on the Status Quaestionis* (ed. Bart D. Ehrman and Michael W. Holmes; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 361–79; see also Eldon Jay Epp, "The 'Ignorance Motif' in Acts and Anti-Judaic Tendencies in Codex Bezae," *HTR* 55 (1962): 51–62; Frank Stagg, "Textual Criticism for Luke-Acts," *PRSt* 5 (1978): 152–65; Ernest W. Saunders, "Studies in Doctrinal Influences on the Byzantine Text of the Gospels," *JBL* 71 (1952): 85–92.

[4] For a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this article, see my forthcoming book, *Do This in Remembrance of Me: The Disputed Words in the Lukan Institution Narrative: An Historico-Exegetical, Theological and Sociological Analysis* (Library of New Testament Studies [JSNTSup] 314; London: T&T Clark, 2006).

I. The Disputed Words in the Lukan Institution Narrative (Luke 22:19b–20): An Ongoing Conundrum

> [14]When the hour came, he took his place at the table, and the apostles with him. [15]He said to them, "I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer; [16]for I tell you, I will not eat it until it is fulfilled in the kingdom of God." [17]Then he took a cup, and after giving thanks he said, "Take this and divide it among yourselves; [18]for I tell you that from now on I will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God comes." [19]Then he took a loaf of bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and gave it to them, saying, "This is my body, which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of me." [20]And he did the same with the cup after supper, saying, "This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood" [21]But see, the one who betrays me is with me, and his hand is on the table." (Luke 22:14–21 NRSV)

The crux of the textual difficulty surrounding these familiar words is, succinctly, that although almost all of the manuscript evidence—including that of the extant Greek texts (P^{75} ℵ A B C), the ancient versions, patristic citations, and most other witnesses—includes vv.19b–20 (the so-called longer reading), a small number of Italic ($it^{b,e}$) and Syriac (syr^{c}, syr^{s}, syr^{p}) witnesses follow D in breaking off the narrative at v. 19a ("this is my body . . .") resuming it at v. 21 ("but see . . ."), thus omitting vv. 19b–20 and producing the enigmatic "shorter reading."[5] As Johannes Knudsen has recognized, the presence of the same textual difficulty represented also by D in a second group of independent and early (second-century) witnesses in the form of the Italic and Syriac manuscripts cited above is, in itself, highly significant, since this additional set of evidence corroborates the Western text at least to some extent and provides external testimony that the manuscript tradition presented at this point a difficulty that second-century scribes have attempted to remedy.[6] Further attempts to explain the perplexing difficulty represented by Codex Bezae at this point have proliferated since the rise of biblical criticism.

1. It has long been noticed that the words of the "longer reading" are demonstrably non-Lukan and do not conform to the usual style, syntax, and vocabulary of the third evangelist. The Lukan "longer reading," furthermore, exhibits several clear correspondences to the words of institution preserved by Mark (14:22–25) and by Paul (1 Cor 11:23–26). This gives rise to the widely held theory that the "shorter reading" is original and that the "longer reading" is a conflation of Mark and Paul imported into the third Gospel by a later scribe so as to harmonize

[5] For an overview of the text-critical issue, the witnesses involved, and the possible solutions, see Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994), 174.

[6] Johannes Knudsen, "The Problem of the Two Cups," *LQ* 2 (1950): 74–85.

the biblical accounts of the Last Supper.[7] The correspondences between Luke 22:19b–20; 1 Cor 11:23–26; and Mark 14:22–25, all of which are highly traditional passages occurring in liturgical contexts, are, however, just as easily explained by common dependence of all three on an underlying oral source, possibly the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus himself.

2. A further argument for the authenticity of the Lukan "shorter reading" proceeds from the basis that the theological substance of the "longer reading" is alien to the theology of Luke, principally in its implications of an atonement soteriology, and instead represents a deliberate addition to the manuscript tradition imported into the third Gospel by orthodox scribes as a bulwark against docetic and other early christological heresies.[8] This theory, too, proves to be highly tenuous, in that it is not by any means proven that Luke lacks an atonement theology, nor that second-century scribes routinely made the sort of theological emendations required by such a thesis.[9]

3. A far more substantial and long-standing solution to the textual conundrum represented by the Lukan institution narrative accepts the authenticity of the "longer reading" on the grounds of the overwhelming external evidence and seeks an explanation in the cup–bread–cup sequence produced by the occurrence of the two cups in Luke's narrative (vv. 17, 20). The origin of the "shorter reading" is then explained by positing that an early scribe, sufficiently removed in time and space from the Jewish origins of Christianity so as to be ignorant of the paschal context in which the words were transmitted, was so perplexed by the two cups in Luke's account of the Last Supper that one was expunged altogether so as to bring the narrative into line with that of Mark and Paul. Although this appears, at first hearing, an attractive and convincing solution, it fails to satisfy on the grounds that it assumes that the liturgical customary surrounding the practice of the community meal was sufficiently fixed from a very early time so as to warrant such a substantial emendation, a circumstance not borne out by the fluidity of eucharistic practices present in the NT itself and in the second- and third-century witnesses.[10] Furthermore, as Joachim Jeremias has convincingly concluded, such a theory "cannot explain why, conforming to the sequence of the supper, one did

[7] Most prominently, Westcott and Hort, who numbered the passage among their "Western Non-Interpolations" (*New Testament in the Original Greek*, 2:148–49, 175).

[8] Bart D. Ehrman has been a prominent recent exponent of the theory; see his *Orthodox Corruption*, 198–209.

[9] Conversely, the textual histories of Matt 27:9 and Luke 11:2–4, to cite just two examples, testify to the general unwillingness of scribes to alter the text, even where it contained obvious errors and difficulties.

[10] E.g., the differing terminologies of Acts 2:42; 1 Cor 11:20; Jude 12; and the variety of practice reflected by Justin, *1 Apol.* 65; Hippolytus, *Trad. ap.* 4; *Acts Thom.* 29, 49, 133, 158; *Acts John* 106; *Acts Paul* 7; *Acts Pet.* 2. The cup–bread sequence occurs in 1 Cor 10:16–17 and *Did.* 9.2–3.

not rather delete the first mention of the cup, which is much less significant theologically and liturgically."[11]

4. It is further possible that the textual problem preserved by Codex Bezae simply represents a scribal blunder. Against this, however, is the obvious importance of the text concerned, which would have been "far too important and familiar" for such a careless mistake to be made and then perpetuated.[12]

5. A final, more innovative theory is that espoused at length by Jeremias in his *Eucharistic Words*—that the truncated "shorter reading" is what Luke actually wrote, the enigmatic v. 19a ("this is my body") being deliberately left in the text so as to conceal the words of institution from outsiders and the uninitiated and to function as a cue or prompt for the baptized, who would then be capable of supplying the missing words from their catechesis.[13] Although an engaging and thought-provoking possibility, the theorem of Jeremias and his followers inevitably falters on the grounds that it posits an esotericism that is not characteristic of early Christianity and for which there is only highly subjective and inconclusive literary evidence.[14]

As David Parker has demonstrated in an extensive and careful study of the manuscript, "whilst Codex Bezae is a free text . . . it is essentially not a careless one."[15] It seems reasonable, then, to maintain that the scribe who produced D wrote the "shorter reading" because it came to him in his exemplar and therefore genuinely represented the textual tradition he sought to transmit. It must also be acknowledged, however, that the sheer volume of the external evidence in favor of

[11] Joachim Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (trans. Norman Perrin; London: SCM, 1966), 157.

[12] F. C. Burkitt, "On Luke xxii 17–20," *JTS* 28 (1927): 178; see also Bart D. Ehrman, "The Cup, the Bread, and the Salvific Effect of Jesus' Death in Luke-Acts," in *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 1991* (ed. Eugene H. Lovering; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 576–91. C. F. Evans calls this a "somewhat desperate solution" (*Saint Luke* [London: SCM, 1990], 788). Further mitigating against the possibility of a scribal error are the physical characteristics of Codex Bezae itself. The extant manuscript at the crucial juncture (Folio 272b) for our purposes reads το σωμα μου πλην ιδου η χειρ του, thus indicating that to the Bezan scribe the two halves of the disputed text constituted a single unit of thought (colophon) and came to him as such in the exemplar.

[13] Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 156–58; see also N. H. Bate, "The 'Shorter Text' of St Luke XXII 15–20," *JTS* 28 (1927): 362–68; J. Behm, *TDNT* 3:732; G. D. Kilpatrick, "Luke XXII. 19b–20," *JTS* 47 (1946): 49–56; Norval Geldenhuys, *Commentary on the Gospel of Luke* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 558–59.

[14] Ehrman, "The Cup, The Bread," 588; R. D. Richardson, "A Further Inquiry into Eucharistic Origins with Special Reference to New Testament Problems," in Hans Lietzmann, *Mass and Lord's Supper: A Study in the History of the Liturgy* (trans. Dorothea H. G. Reeve; repr., Leiden: Brill, 1979), 260–66.

[15] David Parker, *Codex Bezae: An Early Christian Manuscript and Its Text* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 285.

the Lukan "longer reading" is overwhelming to the point that it must be admitted with Jeremias that "to hold the Short Text as original would be to accept the most extreme improbability."[16] If, however, in pursuit of a solution to this long-standing dilemma, we are going to give any credence at all to the normally readily accepted principles and canons of textual criticism rather than resort to simply counting manuscripts, then at the very least the origin of the textual variant represented by D must be explained and accounted for in some way. Indeed, the fundamental weakness afflicting all of the explanations outlined above is their failure to explain adequately and account for the very existence of the elliptic "shorter reading" in Codex Bezae and its allies. In what follows, a new possibility is suggested by focusing attention on the historical, cultural, and social circumstances in which the manuscript tradition represented by Codex Bezae was transmitted, with a view to ascertaining to what extent such factors may have shaped the textual witness of the Codex as we now have it.

II. Strangers and Aliens: The Social Experience of the Early Christian Community

If manuscripts such as Codex Bezae function as mirrors of the communities who produced them and as windows into the world inhabited by them, the logical question to ask is, What is seen in that mirror and through that window? The pursuit of an answer directs us to an examination of the social situation of the Christian community at the time the textual tradition represented by Codex Bezae and its allies was at its formative stage. To this end we find that, at the turn of the first century C.E., Christianity was regarded by educated Romans (if it was noticed at all) as a small, crude, degenerate and antisocial *superstitio*,[17] unworthy

[16] Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 144.

[17] *Superstitio* was a charge that carried with it the accusation of an irrational or fanatical devotion to a foreign (and therefore anti-Roman) religion that might result in behavior prejudicial to state and society. See Cicero, *Flac.* 67; Dio Chrysostom, *Dialexis (Or. 42)* 26.2 and *De Gloria iii (Or. 68)* 32.1–2; Tacitus, *Hist.* 1.11; 2.4; 4.54; 5.8; 13.32; *Ann.* 1.29; 2.85; 11.15. The prominent example in antiquity is the Bacchanalian scandals of 186 B.C.E. For primary source accounts, see Livy 39.8–18, and Cicero, *Leg.* 2.36–37. Following the Bacchanalia, "Rome would never lose its suspicion of a foreign cult which appeared as a mystery religion. A deep seated fear of magic and witchcraft and, in fact, of anything which might appear to the Romans as superstitious remained" (Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament* [trans. Helmut Koester; 2 vols.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982]), 1:349). See also Steven C. Barton, "The *Acts of the Apostles* as Evidence of the Relations between the Early Christian Communities and Roman Authorities," *Ancient Society* 6 (1976): 120–41; Glanville Downey, "Un-Roman Activities: The Ruling Race and the Minorities," *ATR* 58 (1976): 432–43; A. N. Sherwin-White, "The Early Persecutions and Roman Law Again," *JTS* 3 (1952): 199–213; Walter H. Wagner, *After the Apostles: Christianity in the Second Century* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 132.

of prolonged attention and of little influence outside of the lower strata of the social spectrum.[18] By the mid-second century, however, well after the decisive break with the synagogue and the advent of Christianity as a missionary religion to both Jews and Gentiles, the Christian community is gaining increasing attention and being (self) socialized as a "third race" (*tertium genus*) distinct from that of Greco-Roman paganism and Judaism.[19] Interaction between Christians and the wider social world of the Roman Empire, at a literary level at least, escalates from this point onward, wherein the extended contact and engagement with the syncretic "melting pot" of spirituality, philosophy, and ideas that characterized the "spirit of the age" is occasion for an increasingly elaborate and verbose body of Christian apologetic and heresiologic literature. It is in the midst of this gradual process that the pre-Nicene Christian community comes to full experience of the implications of its socialization as ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις διασπορᾶς (1 Pet 1:1) and παροίκους καὶ παρεπιδήμους (1 Pet 2:11) and is increasingly conscious

[18] For the first century of its life Christianity was largely ignored by the Greco-Roman world and regarded as a sectarian movement within Judaism. Apart from the disputed passage in Josephus (*Ant.* 18.63–64), who was in any case a "Romanized" Jew, the life and ministry of Jesus and the existence of his followers are attested among the extant literature only by the brief references of Suetonius (*Nero* 16) and Tacitus (*Ann.* 15.44) until the famous correspondence with Trajan of Pliny the Younger (*Ep.* 10.96–97 [ca. 112 C.E.]). In his section on Palestine the elder Pliny makes no reference at all to the Christians, although he does mention other sectarian Jewish groups such as the Essenes (*Nat.* 5.70–73). For the idea that the early Christians were seen as a movement that drew its members from among the poor and lower classes, see 1 Cor 1:26–28; Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 36; Origen, *Cels.* 3.44. The extent to which the first- and second-century church actually was a predominantly lower-class movement has been seriously challenged by modern commentators with a consensus emerging to the effect that the Christian community of the time was a socially mixed group that comprised all strata of the society. So E. A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of the Christian Groups in the First Century: Some Prolegomena to the Study of New Testament Ideas of Social Obligation* (London: Tyndale, 1960), 52–60; Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (2nd ed.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 29–59; Rodney Stark, *The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33–47; Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (ed. and trans. John H. Schütz; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 96–106; Derek Tidball, *The Social Context of the New Testament* (repr., Carlisle: Paternoster, 1997), 90–103.

[19] The description of Christianity as a *tertium genus* is supplied by Tertullian, *Scorp.* 10, but is located in the preaching of Peter by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 6.5). See also the similar καινὸν τοῦτο γένος in the *Epistle to Diognetus* 1. The subsequent use of *tertium genus* as both a self-description by Christians and as a term of abuse against them by pagans is traced by Adolf von Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (ed. and trans. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1904–5), 1:273–75. See also R. A. Markus, *Christianity in the Roman World* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1974), 3. Both Clement and Tertullian use the term in the sense that Christians are a "third race" because they have broken decisively with both Judaism and the pagan religions of the Greco-Roman world. W. C. van Unnik evokes, in the same way, the Petrine use of ἀναστροφή—Christianity as a "way of life" marked, and entered into, by baptism ("Christianity according to 1 Peter," *ExpTim* 68 [1956]: 81).

of its precarious social existence in the world.[20] Despite the sometimes strenuous attempts of the Christian apologists, commencing with Justin's *First Apology* (ca. 152 C.E.),[21] to convince their social peers that the Christian cult was not a dangerous and insidious *superstitio*, the historical record of the ante-Nicene era is characterized by occasional persecutions and continued accusations of antisocial and treasonous behavior against the Christian community. This normally manifested itself in occasional, localized, and sporadic outbursts of "mob violence" rather than the sustained campaign of imperial terror that is often imagined. Indeed, what is generally true of the first two centuries is that the Roman authorities acted against Christianity only insofar as it was perceived to be a threat to the cherished Roman peace and social order. In this sometimes tense environment, the initial missionary concern, present in the NT itself, is to protect the gospel and to resist accusations of "shameful practices" and "disgraceful acts" (*flagitia*) that might impede its preaching and reception, a critical imperative in the context of an "honor/shame" society.[22] From the turn of the second century a secondary and more urgent imperative is added to this—the need to protect the community itself

[20] John H. Elliott has demonstrated this in the case of 1 Peter in a way that has yet to be achieved for any other part of the NT; see "The Rehabilitation of an Exegetical Step-Child: 1 Peter in Recent Research," *JBL* 95 (1976): 243–54; and *A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981). See also Kevin Giles, *What on Earth Is the Church? An Exploration in New Testament Theology* (Melbourne: Dove, 1995), 161. Paul R. Spickard and Kevin M. Cragg acknowledge that it is "difficult to understand the violent hatred Christians produced in their neighbours" (*God's People: A Social History of Christians* [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994], 43). On the methodology of social-scientific criticism, see John H. Elliott, "Social-Scientific Criticism of the New Testament: More on Methods and Models," *Semeia* 35 (1986): 1–33; E. A. Judge, "The Social Identity of the First Christians: A Question of Method in Religious History," *JRH* 11 (1980): 201–17; Robin Scroggs, "The Sociological Interpretation of the New Testament: The Present State of Research," *NTS* 26 (1980): 164–79; Jonathan Z. Smith, "The Social Description of Early Christianity," *RelSRev* 1 (1975): 19–25.

[21] Justin's aim was to present Christianity as "inoffensive and politically and morally harmless." See E. C. Ratcliff, "The Eucharistic Institution Narrative of Justin Martyr's First Apology," *JEH* 22 (1971): 98.

[22] Christians wanted to be seen as "living a quiet life, causing no trouble and needing nothing" (Wayne A. Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993], 49–51). In the Deutero-Pauline letters the sociological conventions of the Roman world governing meals and the conduct of the household (the *Haustafeln* or "household codes") are clearly expected as normative (Eph 5:22–6:9; Col 3:18–4:1). In the Pastoral Epistles they are insisted on (1 Tim 2:9–15; 5:4–16; 6:1–2; Titus 2:1–3:2). The *Haustafeln* are present in intertestamental Judaism (Sir 7:18–35; Tob 4:3–21; also Josephus, *Ag. Ap.* 2.199–208), and, in addition to the NT passages cited above, occur throughout the apostolic literature (*1 Clem.* 1.3–2.8; 21.6–9; *Barn.* 19.5–7; *Did.* 4.9–11; Pol. *Phil.* 4.2–6.2). As Christianity emerged as a "third race" from the beginning of the second century onward, the attention given to the manner of dress and conduct in public increasingly (sometimes forcefully, often hysterically) also reflects that of the sociological conventions of the Roman world. See 1 Cor 11:2–16; 1 Tim 2:9–15; Hippolytus, *Trad. ap.* 18.5; Tertullian, *Virg.* 2.7.

from allegations of such practices that might, in addition to impeding the preaching and reception of the gospel, result in mob-driven violence and the instigation of imperial persecution against the Christian community.

III. Allegations and Accusations against the Early Christian Community

Often, and importantly for the textual transmission of the Lukan institution narrative, the latter of these concerns is experienced most acutely at the point of the Christian community meal, which was, from the beginning, the central and defining act of corporate worship among the Christian community.[23] The Christian meal practices seem to have attracted particular suspicion among their social peers because the ritual was observed in either predawn or nocturnal darkness and because the content was treated with reserve if not secrecy.[24] Tacitus (*Ann.* 15.44) had accused the Christians of unspecified *flagitia*.[25] The term, a common one in forensic language of the era, is used by Pliny in the course of his investigation into Christian practices.[26] His response, in the celebrated letter to Trajan (*Ep.* 10.96) is illuminating. Pliny reports finding no *flagitia* and says that, in contrast,

[23] Despite the lack of evidence about how it was celebrated in the first century, there is no doubt that the Eucharist was at the heart of the life of the church "from the very beginning" (K. W. Noakes, "From the Apostolic Fathers to Irenaeus," in *The Study of Liturgy* [ed. Cheslyn Jones, Geoffrey Wainwright, and Edward Yarnold; London: SPCK, 1978], 170). See also Paul S. Minear, "Paul's Teaching on the Eucharist in First Corinthians," *Worship* 44 (1970): 90.

[24] Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96; Hippolytus, *Trad. ap.* 23; Tertullian, *An.* 9; *Cor.* 3; *Ux.* 2.4–5. The early morning or evening meetings were a necessity for Sunday, the "Lord's day" and from the beginning the normative time for Christians to gather. This was a working day in the Roman Empire and was not declared a public holiday until 321 by Constantine. See John O. Cobham, "Sunday and Eucharist," *Studia Liturgica* 2 (1963): 10. This practice, nevertheless, affirmed the suspicions of those such as Tacitus—"debauchees are emboldened to practice by night the lusts they have imagined by day" (*Ann.* 14.17).

[25] Glanville Downey assumes that the unspecified *flagitia* referred to here are cannibalism and incest ("Un-Roman Activities," 432n).

[26] For the investigation conducted by Pliny as a response to popular allegations and not evidence of official Roman policy, see F. Gerald Downing, "Pliny's Prosecutions of Christians: Revelation and 1 Peter," *JSNT* 34 (1988): 119. The contrary view is maintained by Gerhard Krodel ("Persecution and Toleration of Christianity until Hadrian," in *Early Church History: The Roman Empire as the Setting of Primitive Christianity* [ed. Stephen Benko and John J. O'Rourke; London: Oliphants, 1971], 262–63), but this depends somewhat shakily on Pliny's unexpressed intentions and speculation that he glossed over or covered up his real reasons for investigating the Christian sect in his appeal to Trajan. In the similar letter of Hadrian to the Roman proconsul in Asia (ca. 117–138) preserved by Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 4.9), the accusations against Christians are brought by the populace and must be proved in a court of law.

the Christians eschew adultery and that their food is that of an ordinary and harmless type (*cibum promiscuum et innoxium*). The particular mention by Pliny of the Christian meal practices is certainly significant and indicates that one of the central allegations made against the Christian community (which Pliny reports were perpetuated by the circulation of anonymous pamphlets) concerned the content and conduct of the communal meals in which they partook.[27] The *flagitia* of which Christians stand accused and to which the letter of Pliny points are made explicit for the first time in the extant literature by Justin Martyr (ca. 152 C.E.), who refutes accusations that the Christian ritual meal involves infanticide, cannibalism, and orgiastic sex (*1 Apol.* 26).[28] Following Justin, the apologetic literature of the next few decades bears witness to an increasing body of detailed and vigorous refutations of such allegations and, in particular, of the seemingly popular charge that the Christian communal gathering involved "Oedipodean intercourse" and "Thyestean banquets."[29] Accusative language invoking a charge of Thyestean banquets and Oedipodean intercourse would have been immediately recognized and understood in the cultural milieu of the Greco-Roman world. The Oedipus story is well known still today, most prominently through Sophocles' trilogy, and the term "Oedipodean" has of course passed into the modern vernacular through the agency of Sigmund Freud. As an accusative term, "Oedipodean intercourse" clearly refers to incestuous, or at least "abnormal" sexual relations, which disrupt the good order of the social world.[30] Although the allegation of "Thyestean

[27] This indicates that the charges of "Thyestean banquets" (cannibalism) and "Oedipodean intercourse" (incestuous orgies) were almost certainly current in the early second century; so Joseph M. Bryant, "The Sect-Church Dynamic and Christian Expansion in the Roman Empire: Persecution, Penitential Discipline, and Schism in Sociological Perspective," *British Journal of Sociology* 44 (1993): 313; Allen Cabaniss, *Pattern in Early Christian Worship* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1989), 14; Albert Henrichs, "Pagan Ritual and Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians: Some New Evidence," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann; 2 vols.; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:20; Casper J. Kraemer, "Pliny and the Early Church Service: Fresh Light from an old Source," *Classical Philology* 29 (1934): 299; Andrew McGowan, "Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism against Christians in the Second Century," *JECS* 2 (1994): 418; Frans Jozef van Beeck, "The Worship of Christians in Pliny's Letter," *Studia Liturgica* 18 (1988): 125; Robert L. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 17–18.

[28] The nature of the charges, "feasting on human flesh" and "the drinking of human blood," are more specific in the second apologetic work of Justin (*2 Apol.* 12).

[29] Theophilus, *Autol.* 3.4–15; Tertullian, *Nat.* 1.7; *Apol.* 7; Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 7–9; Melito, *Petition*, apud Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.26; Tatian, *Or.* 25; Lactantius, *Inst.* 7.26; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 31–35; Origen, *Cels.* 6.27.

[30] Plutarch reports that adultery was not known in Sparta because the state was in "good order" (*Mor.* 227C). The Mosaic Law expressly forbids a range of incestuous relationships (see Lev 18:6–18). Paul almost certainly draws on this in condemning an incidence of incest at Corinth (1 Cor 5:1–13). In the light of the Oedipodean allegations, Christian teaching against adultery and sexual promiscuity, and the chastity of Christian women in general, is a constant theme of

banquets" might seem more obscure to modern ears, this was not the case in the ancient world. In Greek mythology Thyestes and Atreus are rival kings elect of the Pelopid house, a family that was to the tragic poets the ancient equivalent of a modern television "soap opera" family. The Thyestes cycle of stories is itself post-Homeric;[31] however, the fortunes, trials, and atrocities of the Pelops family (including the Thyestes episode) are a constant favorite of the tragic poets, being told and retold and embellished at length by Sophocles (in at least one extant play, *Electra*, and almost certainly in three others now lost), Euripides, and Aeschylus, and being widely known and referred to by various other Greek and Roman writers of later antiquity.[32] To reduce the tragedians to sound bytes: Thyestes is a claimant to the throne of Mycenae who is forced to flee into exile after committing adultery with Aerope, the wife of his rival, Atreus. The cuckold plots a terrible revenge, luring Thyestes to his home on false pretenses and serving him a banquet consisting of the flesh of his own sons, whose severed heads are later presented to the shocked father on a platter. Rightly does Seneca's Thyestes cry out, "Canst thou endure, O earth, to bear a crime so monstrous?"[33] In addition to the cannibalistic connotations implied by the accusatory term "Thyestean banquets," the Christian meals were widely believed to include also the drinking of human blood, a ritual practice associated in Greco-Roman texts with sorcery, magic, and the making of oaths ("blood covenants," or *sacramentum*) that carried with it the further implication of the presence of a sacrificial victim, usually assumed to be an infant.[34] In

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the apologists. For example, Justin says that "promiscuous intercourse is not one of our mysteries" (*1 Apol.* 29), and Tatian insists that "all our women are chaste" (*Or.* 23). Similarly, Tertullian, *Virg.* 4–5.

[31] Homer (*Od.* 4.517) mentions the brothers Thyestes and Atreus but says nothing of their subsequent feud or family history.

[32] Seneca, writing in Latin in the first century, pays lengthy attention to it in his tragedies (*Agamemnon; Thyestes*). Dio Chrysostom, a near contemporary exiled in Asia Minor, also makes reference to the legend, with the advice to his readers that "one should not disbelieve these things, for they have been recorded by no ordinary men—Euripides and Sophocles—and also are recited in the midst of the theatres" (*Disc.* 66.6). Similarly, Cicero, *Nat. d.* 3.66-68. The story told by Herodotus of Harpagus, a Persian general, is close enough in detail to warrant some dependence on the Thyestes myth (*Hist.* 1.90).

[33] *Thyestes* 1008. For all its moral revulsion at the act, Greek mythology is replete with abominable acts committed by both gods and humans, including cannibalism. Christian apologists and orators occasionally cited the capricious and often bloodthirsty and immoral actions of the gods. See Tertullian, *Apol.* 10; Tatian, *Or.* 25; *Clem. Hom.* 4.15–23; 5.11–16.

[34] According to Sallust, the Roman general Cataline passed around "bowls of human blood mixed with wine" at an oath-making ceremony (*Bell. Cat.* 22). Cassius Dio says that Cataline "sacrificed a boy, and after administering the oath over his vitals, ate these in company with others" (37.30). According to Plutarch, in addition to the above atrocity, Cataline was also guilty of "deflowering his own sister" (*Cic.* 10.4–5). Apollonius was accused of a similar atrocity by Domitian ("sacrificing a boy"), and then, when this charge could not be proved, of conducting "secret rites"

sociological terms such allegations entail that the group so accused be perceived to be a serious threat to human society, something that is especially true and all the more alarming when the threat is from within the same social world.[35]

IV. Implications for the Christian Community and Its Meal

The association between the accusations of cannibalism and the drinking of human blood and a misunderstanding or misappropriation of the Christian ritual meal whereby the "body of Christ" is said to be eaten and the "blood of Christ" consumed is the obvious and most convincing explanation of the charge of "Thyestean banquets." There is no doubt that the language and imagery of the institution narratives, heard literally, are "provocatively cannibalistic."[36] The manner in which early Christians commented on the Last Supper and the Eucharist would have increased the association in the public mind and in the minds of their opponents, should they have gained access to it.[37] From the beginning there was

(Philostratus, *Vita. Apoll.* 7.9–8.5; cf. Herodotus, *Hist.* 3.11; Diodorus Siculus 22.5.1). Tertullian raises the Cataline incident and claims that such oaths are part of the mystery cults as well (*Apol.* 9). Sorcery or divination was the motivation for human sacrifice carried out for the purposes of reading the entrails of the victim, after which the flesh was often eaten (Horace, *Epod.* 5.85; Juvenal, *Sat.* 6.548). Jesus was derided as a magician by Celsus (Origen, *Cels.* 1.6), and Paul and Silas were vilified as "magicians" by those seeking to arouse public sentiment against them at Philippi (see Craig de Vos, "Finding a Charge that Fits: The Accusation against Paul and Silas at Philippi [Acts 16.19–21]," *JSNT* 74 [1999]: 51–63).

[35] "Armchair travelers might see distant flesh-eaters as a curiosity rather than a threat, but the relative comfort of reading Herodotus or Strabo would be lost when such are perceived as being within the society rather than outside where they belong, which would seem to be the case with the Christians" (McGowan, "Eating People," 427).

[36] John Nolland, *Luke* (3 vols.; WBC 35A–C; Dallas: Word, 1989–93), 3:1056. Cyril of Jerusalem reports a similar misunderstanding of John 6:53, where the language is even more provocative—"Christ, on a certain occasion discoursing with the Jews said, Except you eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you. They not having heard his saying in a spiritual sense were offended, and went back, supposing that he was inviting them to eat flesh" (*Myst.* 4.4). See also the homily by Augustine, *Tract. Ev. Jo.* 26.15, written well after a time when such misunderstandings were lethal. The cannibalistic language has reemerged to a smaller extent as problematic in recent years with the lapsing of the Christian hegemony and a return, in the Western world, to a missionary context not entirely unlike that of the first three centuries. For examples, see John Fenton, "Eating People," *Theology* 94 (1991): 414–23, where the uniquely Anglican "Prayer of Humble Access" (citing John 6:53) is the catalyst; and the reply by Robert Morgan, "A Response to John Fenton," *Theology* 94 (1991): 423–25.

[37] For example, "I take no pleasure in corruptible food. . . . I want the bread of God, which is the flesh of Christ . . . and for drink I want his blood" (Ign. *Rom.* 7.3); "they [heretics] refuse to acknowledge that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Ign. *Smyrn.* 6.2);

considerable caution exercised within the Christian community about the nature and content of shared meals.[38] Such concern over meals, both with what is eaten and with whom, reflects the manner in which participation or nonparticipation in meals represents one of the principal ways in which communal groups created and maintained boundaries within their social world.[39] Whereas shared meals in the Greco-Roman world were generally as homogeneous as possible, the Christian corporate meal proceeded on the grounds that there was to be no distinction between peoples. In this the gospel imperative was both radical and countercultural, even dangerously so.[40] As Frank C. Senn further reminds us, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that Christianity began and flourished as an essentially urban phenomenon.[41] The social world of early Christianity was, predominantly, that of the Greco-Roman city, an urban landscape characterized by overcrowding, narrow streets, and a density of housing and population that was "astonishing."[42] This produced a demographic environment of "face-to-face com-

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"Let everyone take care that no unbeliever eats of the Eucharist . . . for it is the Body of Christ" (Hippolytus, *Trad. ap.* 37).

[38] The resolution of the Jerusalem Council required that Gentile converts abstain from consuming food "polluted" by idols and from meats that have been strangled (Acts 15:19–20). The issue of "idol meat" is an ongoing missionary concern in the NT (1 Corinthians 8; 10; Rev 2:14) and beyond (Justin, *Dial.* 35); however, the parallel requirement to refrain from meats that have been strangled (in accordance with the Jewish food laws) was received as equally binding by the patristic authors and continued well beyond a time when table fellowship between Gentile and Jewish converts had ceased to be an issue (see *Did.* 6.3; Tertullian, *Apol.* 9; Origen, *Cels.* 8.30; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 5.1.26). Lucian reports (with a shade of uncertainty) that the Cynic philosopher Peregrinus was expelled from the Christian fellowship after being seen to eat some food forbidden to them, but he does not say what this was (*Peregr.* 16–17).

[39] Hence the importance of Paul's corrective to Peter in Gal 2:11–21 (cf. Acts 10:1–44). S. Scott Bartchy explains: "even everyday mealtimes were highly complex events in which fundamental social values, boundaries, statuses, and hierarchies were reinforced. Anyone who challenged these rankings and boundaries would be judged to have acted dishonorably, a serious charge in cultures based on the values of honor and shame" ("The Historical Jesus and Honor Reversal at Table," in *The Social Setting of Jesus and the Gospels* [ed. Wolfgang Stegemann, Bruce J. Malina, and Gerd Theissen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002], 176; cf. Ekkehard W. Stegemann and Wolfgang Stegemann, *The Jesus Movement: A Social History of Its First Century* [trans. O. C. Dean; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999], 268).

[40] Bradley B. Blue, "The House Church at Corinth and the Lord's Supper: Famine, Food Supply, and the Present Distress," *CTR* 5 (1991): 238.

[41] Frank C. Senn, "Liturgy and Polity in the Ancient and Medieval Church: Lessons from History for a Church Renewed," *CurTM* 12 (1985): 220.

[42] Stark, *Rise of Christianity*, 149; Ben Witherington, *The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 593. The physical environment is such that privacy and private space were extremely hard to find. "Depending upon the hospitality of a patron-householder" was one way in which the Christian community "followed a well-tried pattern by which clubs, guilds, and immigrant cults found space in the city" (Meeks, *Origins of Christian Morality*, 45).

munities" in which the differentiation between private and public space and gatherings was blurred, a situation compounded by the natural curiosity of neighbors and the efficacy of the "gossip" networks.[43] In such an enclosed environment the "face-to-face" nature of communal life meant that material barriers such as walls, buildings, and yards did not necessarily separate people.[44] Social differentiation was, instead, emphasized by personal markers such as ethnicity, religion, familial heritage, and economic status.[45] In this culture the shared meal at table was much more than an occasion for eating and fellowship; it was the locus of social differentiation and status and the place where religion, ethnicity, economic status, and social standing were established and defined and, ultimately, exposed.

The historical record bears witness to sporadic and localized persecutions of the Christian communities scattered around the Greco-Roman world throughout the course of the second century. Because meals and eating were primary sociocultural events and because scrutiny was focused most acutely on the meal practices of the Christian community, texts such as the institution narratives presented ominous difficulties. Should they fall into the possession of hostile neighbors, words attributed to Jesus such as "this is my body" and "this is my blood" combined with covenantal language and exhortations to ongoing observance might further endanger the already precarious social status of the Christian community and, worse, provide quasi-legal grounds for authenticating the popular allegations being made against them in the volatile period of the later second century. The essentially realistic interpretation of the words of institution among the Christians themselves might also be used by lapsed or apostate members in complaints or allegations made against them.[46] All of these factors, together with the specific

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[43] Craig de Vos, "Popular Graeco-Roman Responses to Christianity," in *The Early Christian World* (ed. Philip F. Esler; 2 vols.; London: Routledge, 2000), 2:880. Cf. *Acts of Paul & Thecla* 7–9, where Thecla is converted by listening "night and day" from a nearby window as Paul preached in a neighboring home; and Acts 19:28–29, where the chanting of the artisans at Ephesus was sufficient in itself to attract a large crowd.

[44] This was especially so in regard to important social rituals such as meals and hospitality. See L. Michael White, "Architecture: The First Five Centuries," in *Early Christian World,* 1:696. Hence Margaret Y. MacDonald writes: "Paul understands the rituals of community gatherings to be publicly visible, undoubtedly subject to the evaluation of curious neighbours, and circulated by means of gossip networks" *(Early Christian Women and Pagan Opinion: The Power of the Hysterical Woman* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 145). This was further exacerbated by the "proselytizing" nature of Christianity as a "conversionalist sect" in which there was a constant tension between the imperative of preaching the gospel to all and the privacy of the community.

[45] Stanley Kent Stowers, "Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: The Circumstances of Paul's Preaching Activity," *NovT* 26 (1984): 81–82; see also Christopher D. Stanley, " 'Neither Jew nor Greek': Ethnic Conflict in Graeco-Roman Society," *JSNT* 64 (1996): 101–24.

[46] A realistic view of the Lord's Supper is possible as early as the eucharistic homily preserved in John 6:33–58. A "real presence" of some nature is certainly present in Ignatius, *Phld.* 4.1, *Smyrn.* 6.2; *Rom.* 7.3, and Justin, *1 Apol.* 66; *Dial.* 70. Hence J. N. D. Kelly concludes that eucharistic teach-

and already simmering accusations of "Oedipodean intercourse" and "Thyestean banquets" reach their zenith in the terrible events at Lyons in the Rhone Valley. There occurred in the summer of 177 C.E. in Lyons and at nearby Vienne a persecution of the Christian community living there that, according to W. H. C. Frend, "for the sheer horror of the events it describes . . . is unmatched in the annals of Christian antiquity."[47] Although eventually carried out under imperial auspices, the initiative for the persecution came from among the people and is clearly both popular and mob driven.[48] Eusebius describes at length the Lyons persecution (*Hist. eccl.* 5.1–3) and gives the content of the allegations used to justify the massacre that followed.[49]

> And some of our heathen servants also were seized, as the governor had commanded that all of us should be examined publicly. These, being ensnared by Satan, and fearing for themselves the tortures which they beheld the saints endure, and being also urged on by the soldiers, accused us falsely of Thyestean banquets and Oedipodean intercourse, and of deeds which are not only unlawful for us to speak of or to think, but which we cannot believe were ever done by men. (*Hist. eccl.* 5.1.14–15)[50]

Clearly in Lyons (but no doubt elsewhere also) the accusations of "Thyestean banquets" and "Oedipodean intercourse" had stamped themselves so indelibly in the public mind that, despite the efforts of near contemporary apologists such

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ing was from the outset "unquestionably realist" (*Early Christian Doctrines* [4th ed.; London: A. & C. Black, 1968], 440). What came to be called transubstantiation appears as early as Irenaeus, *Haer.* 4.17.5; 5.2.3; Tertullian, *Marc.* 1.14; 3.19; Origen, *Cels.* 8.33; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Myst.* 4.6, and extensively thereafter. Paul Bradshaw notes that, paradoxically, "the use of realistic language" in eucharistic contexts "appears to be older than the more careful symbolic language" of later apologists (*Early Christian Worship: A Basic Introduction to Ideas and Practice* [repr., London: SPCK, 1996], 60).

[47] W. H. C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 1. The period in between the persecution at Smyrna in 165 and that at Lyons in 177 is witness to a steady rise in the incidence of sporadic and often violent persecution.

[48] Almost all historians and commentators concur with Michael Walsh that "it was the mob which took the initiative" at Lyons (*The Triumph of the Meek: Why Early Christianity Succeeded* [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986], 233).

[49] Frank D. Gilliard notes that it is in this document that "Christianity in Gaul becomes historical" ("The Apostolicity of Gallic Churches," *HTR* 68 [1975]: 23). Eusebius claims as his source a written account of the persecution sent to the most prominent churches in Asia and Phrygia shortly after the fact. For the Greek text, see *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (*trans. Herbert Musurillo; Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 63–85. On the themes of persecution and martyrdom in Eusebius in general, see Robert M. Grant, *Augustus to Constantine: The Thrust of the Christian Movement into the Roman World* (London: Collins, 1971), 114–25.

[50] The cry of Biblis, "How . . . could those eat children who do not think it lawful to taste the blood even of irrational animals?" (*Hist. eccl.* 5.1.26), reflects the common allegation that the victim of the Thyestean meal was an infant.

as Justin, they could not be overcome.[51] The rumors and allegations simmered beneath the surface of the society and emerged, at Lyons, with a vengeance when the provincial governor was absent at which time the mob broke loose. Upon his return, as described by Eusebius, a public trial was ordered and the charges given pseudo-credence by "witnesses" dragged before the imperial court. Even those who had previously been friendly became enraged while, no doubt, those already hostile demanded the full wrath of Roman law. For Gregory Dix, the events at Lyons are an example of "just what associations the word Eucharist would have in the minds of any decent Lyonnians" and "what sort of hysteria a rumour of the holding of Christian worship would be likely to work up in the city."[52]

V. Why Codex Bezae Was Altered: A Sociological Explanation

As N. H. Bate argued long ago for another reason, one can quite readily conceive that a manuscript containing Luke's narrative might be produced "under circumstances which made it inadvisable to disclose the inner meaning of Christian worship."[53] The period between 150 and 200 C.E. provides such a circumstance. The concentration of apologetic literature at this time is "entirely unique."[54] The nature of the accusations, as evidenced by the responses to them, focuses attention most acutely on the Christian meal observance and the ritual practices associated with it. The allegations of Thyestean cannibalism, which have already led to the outrages in Lyons, mean that the words of institution attributed to Jesus are, in this climate of suspicion, rumor, and hysteria, highly likely to be misunderstood and/or misappropriated (as already familial language among the believers and other rituals such as the kiss of peace are with less serious consequences). As we have seen, the Christian communities of the first two centuries,

[51] The citizens of Lyons suspected Christians of committing sexual atrocities and cannibalism (Elaine Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels* [London: Penguin, 1979], 100). "Few seem to have had any doubts that the Christians were in fact cannibals" (Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution*, 10). "The church had not met the charges of cannibalism and incest, which the man in the street honestly believed" (Gregory Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy* [2nd ed.; London: Dacre, 1945], 149). "There is little doubt . . . the Roman mob disliked Christians because they believed them to be guilty of a range of anti-social vices . . ." and this is most apparent at Lyons (de Vos, "Popular Graeco-Roman Responses," 876–77).

[52] Dix, *Shape of the Liturgy*, 146.

[53] Bate, "Shorter Text," 368.

[54] Paul Keresztes, "Marcus Aurelius a Persecutor?" *HTR* 61 (1968): 334. Christianity was, in this period, being attacked prominently by figures such as Fronto (whose accusatory speeches are probably reflected in the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix) and Celsus (refuted by the lengthy reply of Origen).

almost everywhere in the extant literature, understand and interpret the Eucharist in essentially realistic language, increasing dramatically the possibility of "outsiders" misunderstanding or misappropriating eucharistic language.[55] The external manuscript evidence overwhelmingly testifies that the Lukan autograph included at the point of the institution narrative (Luke 22:15–20) the highly traditional "longer text" (vv.19b–20) that was already essentially liturgical at the time Luke wrote and among the community for whom he composed his Gospel. The extensive proliferation of the "longer reading" in the manuscript tradition confirms it as almost unquestionably genuine. What has never been adequately explained is the origin and presence of the enigmatic "shorter reading" in Codex Bezae and its few allies.[56] An explanation does emerge, however, if the following represents an acceptable reconstruction of the historical data.

1. That the textual tradition underlying Codex Bezae, containing the "shorter reading" at the point of the Lukan institution narrative, was current in the second century, as indicated by the Italic and Syriac witnesses.[57]
2. That, during this same period, the Western text of Luke circulated in conjunction with Acts separate from the other Gospels.[58]

[55] Irenaeus, and so the Lyons church, strongly reflected this view (*Haer.* 4.18.5; 5.1.3; 5.2.3). So David Power says that Irenaeus is everywhere "emphatic" that what is blessed in the Eucharist is indeed the body and blood of the risen Lord (*Irenaeus of Lyons on Baptism and Eucharist: Selected Texts with Introduction, Translation, and Annotation* [Grove Liturgical Studies 65; Bramcote, UK: Grove, 1991], 27). Eric Osborn concludes of the teaching of Irenaeus on the Eucharist that, "whilst there is no precise formula of substantiation, a constant attention to material reality is present in the account of the Eucharist" (*Irenaeus of Lyons* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001], 134). See also Mary Ann Donovan, *One Right Reading? A Guide to Irenaeus* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 110–11.

[56] Among those who recognize the importance of this often ignored point are Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke: Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (2 vols.; AB 28, 28A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981, 1985), 2:1388; I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Exeter: Paternoster, 1978), 800; Dix, *Shape of the Liturgy*, 62n; and Ehrman, *Orthodox Corruption*, 208.

[57] Prominent advocates of this were Westcott and Hort, followed by a succession of others: A. F. J. Klijn, *A Survey of the Researches into the Western Text of the Gospels and Acts* (Utrecht: Kemink, 1949), 53; Henry A. Sanders, "The Egyptian Text of the Four Gospels and Acts," *HTR* 26 (1933): 95; Kirsopp Lake, *The Text of the New Testament* (3rd ed.; London: Rivingtons, 1906), 78; Eldon Jay Epp, *The Theological Tendency of Codex Bezae Cantabrigiensis in Acts* (SNTSMS 3; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 12; idem, "Coptic Manuscript G67 and the Role of Codex Bezae as a Western Witness in Acts," *JBL* 85 (1966): 198; Matthew Black, *An Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and Acts* (3rd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), 31; Everett Ferguson, "Qumran and Codex D," *RevQ* 8 (1972): 79; Dix, *Shape of the Liturgy*, 62.

[58] This would explain why the emendation was made only to Luke's Gospel and has not affected the textual histories of Matthew, Mark, or 1 Cor 11:23–26. An interesting orthographic

3. That the exemplar underlying the primary witness to the Western text of Luke (Codex Bezae) was produced in, or brought to, Lyons at an early date, probably from Galatia.[59]

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variant of Codex Bezae that is present also in some other early witnesses (including P^{75}), which may to some extent corroborate the theory, is to be found in the spelling of the proper noun Ἰωάννης, which varies in D according to the following table:

	double ν	*single* ν
Matthew	25	1
John	17	4
Luke	1	27
Mark	24	2
Acts	2	21

At the turn of the twentieth century Eberhard Nestle and Friedrich Blass had argued on the basis of these data that the text of Luke-Acts in Codex Bezae reflected that of an early exemplar in which the two were still united and circulated as a single volume (Eberhard Nestle, "Good News about Codex Bezae," *ExpTim* 9 [1897]: 93–97); Friedrich Blass, *Philology of the Gospels* [New York: Macmillan, 1898], 75–77). See also J. Chapman, "The Order of the Gospels in the Parent of Codex Bezae," *ZNW* 6 (1905): 342; Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*, 159; Bruce M. Metzger, "The Bodmer Papyrus of Luke and John," *ExpTim* 73 (1962): 202; George E. Rice, "Is Bezae a Homogenous Codex?" *PRSt* 11 (1984): 53; T. C. Skeat, "Ireneaus and the Four-Gospel Canon," *NovT* 34 (1992): 199.

[59] Although it is possible that the emendation to Luke 22 might have been made by a cautious scribe in any place reached by the circular letter preserved by Eusebius so as to reduce the possibility of a Lyons-style persecution occurring there, there are strong links between Codex Bezae and Lyons, and between the Gallic and Galatian churches. The Reformation scholar Theodore Beza acquired Codex Bezae from the monastery of St. Irenaeus in Lyons during the 1562 civil war and later presented it to Cambridge University, where it remains. The strong connections between D and Lyons are further supported on paleographical grounds demonstrated by E. A. Lowe, who finds two features (a peculiar interrogation mark and the use of blue ink by a later corrector) "for which Codex Bezae is remarkable" among the extant ancient manuscripts ("The Codex Bezae and Lyons," *JTS* 25 [1924]: 274). Identical phenomena are present also in at least five other uncials (484, 478, 604, 431, 9550), all of which are themselves associated with Lyons. The Lyons theory of provenance goes back to J. M. A. Scholtz (1794–1852) and was strongly advocated in the English-speaking world by Frederic Kenyon, "Codex Bezae," *JTS* 1 (1900): 293–99; Frederick H. Scrivener, ed., *Bezae Codex Cantabrigiensis: Being an Exact Copy, in Ordinary type, of the celebrated Uncial Graeco-Latin Manuscript of the Four Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, Written Early in the Sixth Century, and Presented to the University of Cambridge by Theodore Beza, A.D. 1581* (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, 1864), xlv; Alexander Souter, *The Text and Canon of the New Testament* (rev. C. S. C. Williams; London: Duckworth, 1954), 24, among others—perhaps most recently John C. Cooper, "The Problem of the Text in Luke 22:19–20," *LQ* 14 (1962): 48. A Gallic origin for the Codex has been strongly contested by most recent commentators, who have generally supported either an Eastern or an Italian provenance. For the latter, see the influential article by Kirsopp Lake, "On the Italian Origin of Codex Bezae: 1. Codex Bezae and Codex 1071," *JTS* 1 (1900): 441–45. D. C. Parker has argued for Berytus (*Codex Bezae*, 266–78); A. C. Clark for Egypt (*The Acts of the Apostles: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Notes on Selected Passages* [London: A. & C. Black, 1933], lxii); and A. F. J.

If this is to be accepted, the following scenario becomes possible: that sometime between 150 and 200 C.E. the Lukan text of a still conjoined Luke-Acts volume was altered at the point of the institution narrative, producing the enigmatic "shorter reading" represented in Codex Bezae and its small number of Syriac and Italic allies, so as to safeguard the Christian communities for whom the texts were produced from further allegations of *flagitia* and from further outbreaks of the violence experienced at Lyons.

VI. Conclusion

It has not always been readily appreciated by theologians and historians that individual manuscripts constitute primary source documents in understanding the sociohistorical situation of early Christianity and are, therefore, worthy of critical examination in their own right. In the case of Codex Bezae at the point of the Lukan institution narrative (to which this study is confined), the intense local persecutions carried out against the Christians in Gaul (ca. 177 C.E.), carefully documented by Eusebius, provide a plausible *Sitz im Leben* that might have necessitated the alteration of the textual tradition represented by Codex Bezae. A scribe working in this environment from a Luke-Acts recension brought to, or produced in Lyons, might conceivably have considered it prudent to omit the words of institution from Luke 22:19b–20 as they came to him in the exemplar. Although it is generally true that scribes were reluctant to alter the textual tradition (as evidenced by the small number of manuscripts that witness the omission of Luke 22:19b–20), the extremity of the Lyons persecution and the climate of fear and danger that remained after it were, no doubt, weighty and critical influences. It might, quite literally, be a matter of life and of death. So as to avoid any further politically dangerous or socially incapacitating allegation being attached to his community, and to extinguish the possibility of texts being used as evidence of *flagitia* or to instigate fresh allegations or popular hysteria, it is quite reasonable that a scribe working in this environment might omit the problematic words from the Last Supper narrative in Luke, leaving Τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ σῶμά μου as a cue for the initiated (baptized) who would have been quite familiar with the well-established liturgical formula and capable of then supplying the missing sentences.[60] This had

Klijn for Antioch (*A Survey of the Researches into the Western Text of the Gospels and Acts*, part 2, *1949–1969* [NovTSup 21; Leiden: Brill, 1969], 68).

[60] Whether resulting from a truncated text like that represented by Bezae or not, the practice of supplying liturgical words and formulas from memory was widespread in the pre-Nicene period. Scholars have long noted that the form of the institution narrative cited by many of the patristic authors has never been found in any extant manuscript but represents a form of citation drawn from oral tradition and/or the liturgical practices of their particular community. See Gordon D.

the effect of leaving the association of the bread with the flesh of Jesus as unclear and, importantly, of removing both the invocation to remembrance and the association of the wine with the blood of Jesus, thus removing the most objectionable cannibalistic overtones together with the ritual element suggested by the drinking of a blood-filled chalice (the blood being supplied by the victim sacrificed), and by words such as "remembrance" and "covenant," which would have evoked images of a *sacramentum* among pagan readers. From this time on, and in the immediate aftermath as circular letters such as that preserved by Eusebius describing the events at Lyons and Vienne alerted the Christian communities of the Roman world of the events and their cause, the ritual and customs surrounding the Christian Eucharist become increasingly guarded, and knowledge of it is increasingly and more meticulously restricted to the initiated only; while the language used to describe it is more carefully symbolic and increasingly philosophical and sophisticated, a process that ultimately culminates in the rise and proliferation of the *Disciplina Arcani* in the subsequent centuries.[61] If this theory of the textual problem represented by Codex Bezae is correct, the origins of the enigmatic "shorter reading" may be accounted for, thus removing the strongest argument against the authenticity of the "longer reading" and affirming it as undoubtedly genuine. This carries with it the further theological, liturgical, and pastoral implication that the command to remembrance and perpetual observance ("Do this in remembrance of me" [Luke 22:19]) is genuine and is to be located in the Gospel tradition alongside the traditional formula recited by Paul (1 Cor 11:23–26).[62]

Fee, "The Text of John in Origen and Cyril of Alexandria: A Contribution to Methodology in the Recovery and Analysis of Patristic Citations," *Bib* 52 (1971): 357–94. The form known to Justin (*1 Apol.* 66.3) is drawn from phrases in Matthew and Luke and has the distinct appearance of a quotation; see Ratcliff, "Eucharistic Institution Narrative," 99. The citation in Eusebius is a "curious conflation" of Matthew and 1 Corinthians that D. S. Wallace-Hadrill notes is unlike any other citation of the biblical text in Eusebius in the extent of the variation and almost certainly comes to him from liturgical usage ("Eusebius and the Institution Narrative in the Eastern Liturgies," *JTS* 4 [1953]: 41–42).

[61] John W. Matthews notes that "overt pagan hostility" occasioned the rise of the secret discipline in early Christianity and draws interesting parallels to this and to the means by which the concept of the *Disciplina Arcani* became an attractive theological principle to Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Confessing Church in the context of Nazi Germany ("Responsible Sharing of the Mystery of Christian Faith: *Disciplina Arcani* in the Life and Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," *Dialog* 25 [1986]: 19–25). See especially Bonhoeffer's letter from Tegel prison (May 5, 1944), in his *Letters and Papers from Prison* (London: SCM, 1953).

[62] "Do this in remembrance of me" is lacking from the parallel accounts of Matthew and Mark. If the "longer reading" of the Lukan institution narrative were not genuine, this would mean that the Pauline account would be the sole authority for the command to remembrance and the perpetual observance of the Lord's Supper.

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From the Holy to the Most Holy Place: The Period of Hebrews 9:6–10 and the Day of Atonement as a Metaphor of Transition

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The Day of Atonement is one of the most conspicuous OT rituals to be referenced in the central section of the Letter to the Hebrews (8:1–10:18) and plays, certainly, an important role in it.[1] Almost all scholars agree that the imagery of the Day of Atonement is used in typological fashion to explain Jesus's death on the cross as a sacrifice that provides forgiveness. Paul Ellingworth, for example, comments that Hebrews' author concentrates in the Day of Atonement "all his think-

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[1] In his study of the Day of Atonement, William R. G. Loader rightly concluded: "Einerseits muss klar gesehen werden, dass diese Typologie eine wichtige Rolle in den Gedanken des Vf in 9,1–10,18 spielt; andererseits darf ihre Besonderheit nicht so weit hervorgehoben werden, dass sie als eigentliches Thema oder vorherrschender Gedanke dieses Abschnittes bezeichnet wird" (*Sohn und Hoherpriester: Eine Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Christologie des Hebräerbriefes* [WMANT 53; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1981], 172). In his study of Yom Kippur, James P. Scullion agreed: "it should be noted that the key to this central section is not Yom Kippur itself, but the connection that the author makes between the cult and the new covenant" ("A Traditio-Historical Study of the Day of Atonement" [Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1991], 252). Unchallenged references to the Day of Atonement in the central section include 9:7, 25; 10:1, 3. Possible references outside this section are Heb 1:3; 2:11; 4:14–5:10; 6:19–20; 13:9–16 (Scullion, "Traditio-Historical Study," 250–52). Daniel Stökl Ben Ezra adds 2:14–15, which refers to the victory over the forces of evil, a motif associated with Yom Kippur in Second Temple Judaism (*The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity: The Day of Atonement from Second Temple Judaism to the Fifth Century* [WUNT 163; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 185, cf. 122).

ing about sin and forgiveness under the old covenant."[2] Nevertheless, Harold W. Attridge has warned that "the application of the model of the Yom Kippur ritual to the death of Christ in Hebrews is a complex and subtle hermeneutical effort."[3]

The difficulties include, in the first place, an incomplete typology. For example, Azazel is not mentioned.[4] Affliction of the soul, an important element of the celebration of Yom Kippur, is also absent; instead, the atmosphere that surrounds Jesus's entrance is that of feasting and rejoicing.[5] It is argued that this absence is because Hebrews focuses on the blood ritual of the Day of Atonement and not the whole feast. However, Jesus's sacrifice is also described in terms inconsistent with that blood ritual. First, the author departs from the language of the LXX to describe the manipulation of blood by the high priest on the Day of Atonement: the blood is not "sprinkled" on the sanctuary but "offered" (9:7).[6] Second, when the sprinkling of blood is mentioned, it has to do not with the Day of Atonement but with the inauguration of the covenant (9:15–23).[7] Third, the sacrifices of τράγοι (male goats) were not offered on the Day of Atonement.[8] Fourth, the purification of sins is effected *before* Christ's entrance into the most holy place (e.g., Heb 1:3; 9:7), which "turns upside down Leviticus 16, where the entry is the precondition for the purification sprinkling."[9] Fifth, when Jesus's death is described as a purification offering (Heb 9:11–23), the author of Hebrews follows a typology

[2] Paul Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 435–36; see also Stökl Ben Ezra, *Impact of Yom Kippur,* 180, 193; Scullion, "Traditio-Historical Study," 250; Loader, *Sohn und Hoherpriester,* 171–72; Kenneth Schenck, *Understanding the Book of Hebrews: The Story behind the Sermon* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 83; Erich Grässer, *An die Hebräer* (EKKNT 17; Zurich: Benziger, 1990), 2:123–29; Victor C. Pfitzner, *Hebrews* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 126; F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (rev. ed.; NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 207, 213–14; Craig R. Koester, *Hebrews: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 36; New York: Doubleday, 2001), 121–22; William L. Lane, *Hebrews* (WBC 47; Dallas: Word Books, 1991), 2:223.

[3] Harold W. Attridge, "The Uses of Antithesis in Hebrews 8–10," in *Christians among Jews and Gentiles: Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl on His Sixty-fifth Birthday* (ed. George W. E. Nickelsburg and George W. MacRae; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 9.

[4] Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews,* 207; Barnabas Lindars, "Hebrews and the Second Temple," in *Templum amicitiae* (ed. William Horbury; JSNTSup 48; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 420.

[5] Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews,* 212. By NT times, Yom Kippur could be referred to simply as "the fast" (e.g., Acts 27:9); however, there are indications in later literature of rejoicing at the end of the ritual, when the high priest came out from the most holy place and greeted the multitude that waited for his appearance (e.g., Sir 50:5–21). See also Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:250. For additional information, see Roy Gane, *Leviticus, Numbers* (NIV Application Commentary; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 403–4, citing *m. Yoma* 7:4 and 8:9.

[6] Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:223.

[7] Stökl Ben Ezra, *Impact of Yom Kippur,* 187.

[8] Richard M. Davidson, "Christ's Entry 'Within the Veil' in Hebrews 6:19–20: The Old Testament Background," *AUSS* 39 (2001): 183–85. See the dialogue on this issue with Norman Young in *AUSS* the years 2001 and 2002.

[9] Stökl Ben Ezra, *Impact of Yom Kippur,* 189.

that conflates "Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16), the Red Heifer (Numbers 19), the institution of the covenant (Exodus 24), and the ordination of the priests (Leviticus 8)."[10] Finally, in this and subsequent sections, the author of Hebrews does not use the Day of Atonement as the primary typology for Jesus's death; instead, it is the ratification of the covenant that plays that role (Heb 9:15–23).[11] In fact, Jesus is described mainly as the mediator of a new covenant (7:22; 8:6; 9:15), and his sacrifice is referred to primarily as the "blood of the covenant" (10:29; 12:24; 13:20).

The question is, then, how do we explain, on the one hand, the pervasive nature of the imagery of the Day of Atonement in this central section of Hebrews but, on the other hand, account for the inconsistencies in the Day of Atonement typology for Jesus's death on the cross? I suggest that in Heb 9:6–10, by means of a period as a rhetorical device, the author of Hebrews defines the role that the imagery of the Day of Atonement will play in his argument. In other words, this passage functions as a programmatic statement. The exegetical difficulties of this passage have distracted scholars from giving due weight to the rhetorical function of this long period for the rest of the argument.[12] It is concluded that Hebrews' author *primarily* intended the Day of Atonement not as a typology of Jesus's death but as a "parable" or illustration of the transition from the "current age" and its old covenant into the "age to come" and its new covenant. This, I hope, will make possible a new assessment of the imagery of the Day of Atonement and Jesus's sacrificial death in Hebrews 8–10.

I. The Day of Atonement and the Period of Hebrews 9:6–10

The Period as a Rhetorical Device

The first unambiguous reference to the ritual of the Day of Atonement in Hebrews is found in 9:7.[13] It is the main element of a long sentence that goes from v. 6 to v. 10. Several scholars have identified this sentence as a period.[14]

[10] Ibid., 187.

[11] See n. 1 above. Scott W. Hahn has shown that Jesus's death in Heb 9:15–22 is consistently intended as a purification offering that cleanses the people from past transgressions under the old covenant and enables them to enter a new covenant ("A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death: A Study of Hebrews 9:15–22," *CBQ* 66 [2004]: 416–36).

[12] The exegetical difficulties include, for example, the author's assertion that the Day of Atonement offering was for the "sins committed unintentionally by the people" (9:7); the identity of the "first tent" (9:8); the "standing" of the "first tent" (9:8); and, the meaning of "food, drink, and various baptisms" (9:10).

[13] For allusions to the Day of Atonement in Hebrews, see n. 1.

[14] E.g., Norman H. Young, "The Gospel According to Hebrews 9," *NTS* 27 (1981): 200; Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:216; Grässer, *An die Hebräer,* 2:130–31. According to Quintilian, other rhetoricians referred to the same structure by different names (*Inst*. 9.4.124).

R. Dean Anderson defines the period as a "carefully structured sentence wherein a certain balance is created by the word order or syntax which may be described in terms of a path 'around.'"[15] Rhetorical treatises from the fourth century B.C.E. to the first century C.E. did not agree, however, on how this balance was achieved or precisely what this "path 'around'" was.

The varying definitions offered by these treatises can be divided into two general categories: broad definitions that could apply to any complete sentence, and more restricted understandings.[16] Authors who offer broad definitions, however, further divide the period into simple and complex categories—the latter being roughly equivalent to a restricted definition of the period—or add balancing statements implying a restricted definition of the period.[17] In general, the two more constant characteristics of the period are its circular nature—from which it derives its name—and the crowdedness or density of ideas forming a complete thought.[18]

Aristotle's definition of the period remains a controversial matter; however, his discussion of the different kinds of clause constructions in connection with the period is helpful for understanding the often mentioned circular structure of the period.[19] In his work *On Rhetoric* (3.9) he distinguishes two kinds of styles or sentences (λέξις): strung-on (εἰρομένην) and turned-round (κατεστραμμένην).

[15] R. Dean Anderson, *Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figures and Tropes from Anaximenes to Quintilian* (CBET 24; Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 94. Cf. Craig R. Koester's definition: The period is "a complex sentence that integrates a number of thoughts into a unified whole" and whose main characteristic is a circular structure ("Hebrews, Rhetoric, and the future of Humanity," *CBQ* 64 [2002]: 105).

[16] Treatises with broad definitions of the period are, e.g., Aristotle, *Rhet*. 3.9; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp*. 2, 9, 22, 23; and Quintilian, *Inst*. 9.4.19–22, 122–30. Treatises with restricted definitions of the period are, e.g., Demetrius, *Eloc*. 10–35; *Rhet. Her.* 4.26–28; and Cicero, *De oratione* 3.191, 198; *Brut*. 33–34, 162, *Orator* 204, 221–26. See also Anderson, *Glossary*, 94–101.

[17] Authors who divide the period into simple and complex categories are Aristotle, *Rhet*. 3.9.5–6; Quintilian, *Inst*. 9.4.124. Those who add balancing statements are Aristotle, *Rhet*. 3.9.6; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp*. 9.

[18] That Demetrius grasped the essence of the period can be seen in his definition: "the form of the rhetorical period is compact and circular . . . [it] is a rounded structure (hence its name in fact) . . ." (*Eloc.* 20, 30). Translations of *De elocutione* are from Doreen C. Innes, trans., *Aristotle XXIII* (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

[19] The question is whether Aristotle conceived of the period in terms of prose rhythm or in terms of logical structure (see Anderson, *Glossary*, 95; George A. Kennedy, notes to Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* [trans. George A. Kennedy; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], 239). The extent of the influence of Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* in antiquity remains uncertain. We know, however, that it was quoted (sometimes extensively) by some rhetoricians like Demetrius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (R. Dean Anderson, Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* [rev. ed.; CBET 18; Leuven: Peeters, 1999], 52; David E. Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003], 154–55).

The first is paratactic in nature, that is, places its clauses side by side by means of conjunctions. The second is the period itself, which he defines as "a sentence [λέξις] that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped" (*Rhet.* 3.9.3).[20] The all-important difference is that while the structure of the "strung-on" sentence has no magnitude in itself and its content is able to continue indefinitely, the structure of the "turned-round" sentence, the period, preestablishes the borders or limits of its content; namely, it suggests an end from the very beginning.

Aristotle suggests three figures of speech that can give the period a circular structure: ἀντίθεσις (antithesis), παρίσωσις (two clauses with an equal number of syllables), and παρομοίωσις (two clauses with similar sounds, either at the beginning or at the end).[21] The one more important for him is the antithesis, which he discusses at considerable length.[22] Each of these three figures of speech consists of at least two members. The first member of the period creates a suspense that will be solved in the second member either with the opposite (antithesis), a clause of the same length (parisosis), or with a similar sound (paromoiosis). This is why Aristotle argues that the period "has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped."[23] The period is, then, circular in nature; hence, Aristotle's classification of it as a "turned-round" sentence.

To Aristotle's antithesis, paromoiosis, and isocolon, Demetrius adds the hyperbaton. His definition of the period follows closely that of Aristotle: "The period is a combination of clauses and phrases arranged to conclude the under-

[20] Λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον (*Rhet*. 3.9.3; texts and translations of *On Rhetoric* are from Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric* [trans. John Henry Freese; LCL; London: Heinemann; New York: J. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926]). Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of periods: the simple and the compound. The first consists of one κῶλον (clause) and the second of two or more κῶλα (clauses). The arrangement of the clauses of the compound period can be either parallel (lit. "divided") or antithetical (*Rhet.* 3.9).

[21] Demetrius offers the following example of παρίσωσις from Thucydides: ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελὲς εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων, "since neither do those who are questioned disown the deed, nor do those who are concerned to know censure it" (*Eloc*. 25). See also Anderson, *Glossary*, 90–91. Regarding παρομοίωσις, the similar sound could be either at the beginning (ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, "for he received from him land untilled") or at the end (δωρητοί τ᾽ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί, τ᾽ ἐπέεσιν, "they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words" [*Rhet*. 3.9.9]). See also Demetrius, *Eloc*. 25–26; and Anderson, *Glossary*, 91–92.

[22] He offers ten examples of it. One of them, which illustrates all three figures of speech, is συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν, "it often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are unsuccessful, while the fools succeed" (*Rhet*. 3.9.7). Παρομοίωσις is also important for him; he offers six examples of it (*Rhet.* 3.9.9).

[23] Regarding the fact that the magnitude of the period can easily be seen, Demetrius notes: "Those who crowd periods together are as lightheaded as those who are drunk, and their listeners are nauseated by the implausibility; and sometimes they even foresee and, loudly declaiming, shout in advance the endings of the periods" (*Eloc.* 15).

lying thought with a well-turned [εὐκαταστρόφως] ending" (*Eloc.* 10).[24] This "well-turned ending" is what gives the period its circular structure.[25] From his treatment in *Eloc.* 22–29, it can be inferred that Demetrius considers that this "well-turned ending" can be achieved by Aristotle's already mentioned figures of speech; however, it is clear from *Eloc.* 11 that he has in mind primarily his own addition: the hyperbaton, a "subordinated syntax where a key element is suppressed until the end."[26]

I define the period, then, as a sentence that compresses several ideas into a complete thought and has a circular structure. This structure may be achieved by, though is not limited to, four figures of speech: antithesis, paromoiosis, isocolon, and hyperbaton.[27]

[24] Of Aristotle's definition, Demetrius says: "His definition is excellent and apt" (*Eloc.* 11). Demetrius's *De elocutione* "may well be the earliest post-Aristotelian treatise on literary theory to survive complete" (Doreen C. Innes, introduction to "On Style," by Demetrius, in *Aristotle XXIII,* 311). This Demetrius was probably not Demetrius of Phalereus, student of Aristotle, governor of Athens, and famous orator in the fourth century B.C.E. Traditionally, the treatise has been dated to the first century B.C.E. or the first century C.E. (e.g., Anderson, *Glossary*, 9 n. 6); however, a growing consensus tends to assign the work to earlier times, even to ca. 270 B.C.E. (see Innes, 312–13; Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 52).

[25] Demetrius's term for "well-turned," εὐκαταστρόφως, is taken from Aristotle's κατεστραμμένην (turned-round), which describes the period (*Rhet.* 3.9.1). Demetrius also notes that "the period is not a form of reasoning but purely a combination of words. . . . If its circular form should be destroyed and the arrangement changed, the subject matter remains the same, but there will be no period" (*Eloc.* 33, 11; cf. 20, 30).

[26] Anderson, *Glossary*, 97, 121–22. Demetrius's example shows this clearly: μάλιστα μὲν εἵνεκα τοῦ νομίζειν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει λελύσθαι τὸν νόμον, εἶτα καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς εἵνεκα τοῦ Χαβρίου, ὡμολόγησα τούτοις ὡς ἄν οἷός τε ὦ συνερεῖν, "chiefly because I thought it was in the interest of the state for the law to be repealed, but also for the sake of Chabrias' boy, I have agreed to speak to the best of my ability in their support" (*Eloc.* 10). See also Doreen C. Innes, "Period and Colon: Theory and Example in Demetrius and Longinus," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* (ed. William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady; Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 4; London: Transaction, 1994), 46.

[27] There is less agreement on other characteristics of the period in the treatises of the time. Some suggest that the last clause of the period should be longer than the previous ones so as to "contain and envelope them all" (*Eloc.* 18; cf. Cicero, *De oratione* 3.184–87). The average period is thought to consist of two to four clauses; however, some make room for one-clause periods (*Eloc.* 16–18; Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.9.5–6); others deny it (Cicero, *Orator* 221–22; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp.* 23); and still others allow for longer periods (Cicero, *Orator* 221–22; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.4.125). It is commonly agreed that the period should be "easy to repeat in a breath" (Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.9.5) and "not too long to be retained in the memory" (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.4.125; translation from Quintilian, *The Orator's Education* [trans. Donald Russell; LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001]); however, Dionysius of Halicarnassus takes this breath as a measure and analyzes the first complete sentence in the opening paragraph of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* concluding that is composed of three periods (*Comp.* 22; see also Anderson, *Glossary*, 100). Thus, either Dionysius does not consider the period to be a complete sentence, or the period

The compression of several units of thought in one unit of expression and the logical or syntactical suspense created by its circular structure gave the period a rhetorical punch that orators and writers could not neglect.[28] The period was considered the most perfect form of expression.[29] As a result, periods were commonly used by Greco-Roman writers as rhetorical devices to introduce or conclude sections of the argument "by summarizing the points that preceded [or followed] the sentence itself."[30] Quintilian, the most influential rhetorician of the first century C.E.,[31] emphasized the importance of the period in the art of persuasion: "The Period is well suited to the Prooemia of important Causes, where the subject calls for anxiety, recommendation of the client, or pity; it also suits Commonplaces and every kind of Amplification. A severe type is required for prosecution, a more diffuse type for praise. The Period is also very important in the Epilogue" (*Inst*. 9.4.128).

Rhetorical treatises of the time give numerous examples of writers who used periods to introduce their works or of orators who used them to introduce their arguments at the forum.[32] Periods are relatively uncommon in the NT.[33] The

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is in this case longer than the speaker's breath. Philodemus pointed out the same problem when he complained that the extensive periods of the sophists were difficult to deliver (*Rhet*. 1.198).

[28] Longinus wrote: "Nothing is of greater service in giving grandeur to what is said than the organization of the various members. . . . In a period, one might say, the grandeur comes from the multitude of contributors" (*Subl.;* translation from *Aristotle, The Poetics; "Longinus," On the Sublime; Demetrius, On Style* [trans. W. H. Fyfe; LCL; London: Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927], 289–91).

[29] Heinrich Lausberg summarizes ancient definitions of the period in the following statement: the period is "the most perfect union of several ideas into one sentence" (*Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study* [ed. David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson; trans. Matthew Bliss et al.; Leiden: Brill, 1998], 414). The exception is Dionysius of Halicarnassus: "As to periods, it does not, for the most part, even attempt to compose them as self-contained units in which the sense of each is complete; and if it drifts into this accidentally, it aims to emphasize its own unstudied and simple character, neither using any additional words which contribute nothing to the sense, merely in order to complete the period, nor taking special care that the rhythmic movement should have a certain showy or polished character; and certainly not measuring their length so that it is just sufficient for the speaker's breath, nor paying attention to any other such matter" (*Comp*. 22; translation from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *The Critical Essays* [trans. Stephen Usher; LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974–85]).

[30] Koester, "Rhetoric," 105.

[31] "His *Institutio Oratoria* is the longest and most complete technical treatise on rhetoric to survive from Antiquity." However, it was Cicero (first century B.C.E.) who became "Rome's greatest orator and most influential writer on rhetorical technique" (Ruth Majercik, "Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism," *ABD* 5:711).

[32] See references in nn. 16, 41.

[33] Varying definitions of the period in modern times cause differing opinions among scholars regarding the number of cases in the NT, e.g., BDF, 242; George Alexander Kennedy, *New Testa-*

author of Luke-Acts introduces the two-volume work with a long period (Luke 1:1–4) that is generally considered the best stylized sentence of the whole NT. Tertullus, a "rhetor," introduces the case against Paul before Felix with a period (Acts 24:2b–3). The proem of Paul's defense, on the other hand, is also a period (vv. 10b-11).[34] The period is more common in Hebrews, where commentators have identified several examples.[35] The author of Hebrews uses periods both to introduce and to conclude important sections of his argument. For example, he introduces his work with a period (Heb 1:1–4).[36] Major themes of the letter such as God's speaking, the exaltation of the Son in heaven, and Christ's purification of sin are introduced in these four verses.[37] The last clause of this period introduces the topic of the following section: Jesus has inherited a more excellent name.[38] The period of Heb 10:19–25, on the other hand, sums up the argument of the letter thus far.[39] William Lane considers the author of Hebrews to be a "master" of the periodic sentence, and he thinks that complex periods are an important element of this biblical author's literary signature.[40]

I suggest that the function of the period in Heb 9:6–10 is to introduce the argument to follow in chs. 9–10. In other words, the elements introduced in our period will be elaborated, explained, and fleshed out in 9:11–10:18.

Hebrews 9:6–10 as a Rhetorical Device

Hebrews 9:6–10 is a long periodic sentence consisting of twelve clauses.[41]

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ment Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (SR; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 30.

[34] Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation,* 135–36.

[35] Lane, for example, identifies twelve passages as periods: Heb 1:1–4; 2:2–4; 3:12–15; 4:12–13; 5:1–3, 7–10; 7:1–3; 7:26–28; 9:6–10; 10:19–25; 12:1–2; 12:18–24 (*Hebrews,* 1:5, 34, 84, 96, 113, 160, 179; 2:216, 281, 407, 448, respectively).

[36] This is also the best known by scholars (Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation,* 30).

[37] BDF §464.

[38] A similar case is the period of Heb 7:1–3, which ends with the phrase "he remains a priest forever," an idea that will dominate the rest of ch. 7. See also Heb 5:7–10 and 12:1–2. One of the problems that have prevented scholars from noticing this phenomenon is that scholars hold diverse views of what a period is. See, e.g., A. T. Robertson's critique of Blass and Debrunner (*A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* [Nashville: Broadman, 1934], 432; cf. BDF §242).

[39] See the analysis provided by Koester ("Rhetoric," 116).

[40] Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:448.

[41] I provide here the NRSV; as in the following, unless otherwise noted. I have arranged the text in clauses to make easier the reader's access to the text:

[1] Such preparations having been made,
[2] the priests go continually into the first tent
[3] to carry out their ritual duties;

[1] Τούτων δὲ οὕτως κατεσκευασμένων
[2] εἰς μὲν τὴν πρώτην σκηνὴν διὰ παντὸς εἰσίασιν οἱ ἱερεῖς
[3] τὰς λατρείας ἐπιτελοῦντες
[4] εἰς δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἅπαξ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ μόνος ὁ ἀρχιερεύς, οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος[42]
[5] ὃ προσφέρει ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων,
[6] τοῦτο δηλοῦντος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου,
[7] μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδὸν
[8] ἔτι τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς ἐχούσης στάσιν,
[9] ἥτις παραβολὴ εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ἐνεστηκότα,[43]
[10] καθ᾽ ἣν δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι προσφέρονται

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[4] but only the high priest goes into the second, and he but once a year, and not without taking the blood
[5] that he offers for himself and for the sins committed unintentionally by the people.
[6] By this the Holy Spirit indicates
[7] that the way into the sanctuary has not yet been disclosed
[8] as long as the first tent is still standing.
[9] This is a symbol of the present time,
[10] during which gifts and sacrifices are offered
[11] that cannot perfect the conscience of the worshiper,
[12] but deal only with food and drink and various baptisms, regulations for the body imposed until the time comes to set things right.

Clauses 2 and 3 are the only two independent clauses, and they stand in correlation to each other (μέν . . . δέ); the remaining are subordinate clauses. For an introduction to Greek clauses, see Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar beyond the Basics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 656–65.

This period exceeds the measure of an orator's single breath, at least by modern standards. As shown above in n. 27, however, this was not unusual for other rhetoricians of the time. Famous periods, such as the opening statements in Demosthenes' *De Corona* and Cicero's *Pro Archia*, also seem to exceed these limits (see Galen O. Rowe, "Style," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B.C.–A.D. 400* [ed. Stanley E. Porter; Boston: Brill Academic, 2001], 152).

[42] There is an ellipsis in this clause: the verb εἰσιέναι should be understood in the construction.

I have placed the phrase οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος in clause 4 even though UBS[4] and NA[27] place a comma before it. The reason is that I believe οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος modifies the implied verb εἰσιέναι, not the verb προσφέρειν; in other words, the author of Hebrews is saying that the high priest cannot enter the second tent without blood. Clauses 2 and 4 contrast the entrances to the first and second tents. Although no restrictions are mentioned for the first (though there was a strong restriction of previous washing of hands and feet [Exod 30:18–21]), two are mentioned for the second tent: entrance could be made only once a year and "never without blood" (see also nn. 47, 74). This brings into focus one of the central concerns of Hebrews: "access to God" (Heb 4:14–16; 6:19–20; 7:19; 10:19–22; 12:18–24; see Marie E. Isaacs, *Sacred Space: An Approach to the Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews* [JSNTSup 73; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992]). In this sense, the relative pronoun ὅ at the beginning of clause 5 performs its usual function of "hinge" between clauses (Wallace, *Greek Grammar,* 337; for the opposite view of the antecedent being placed in the same clause as the relative pronoun, see BDF §294).

[43] The copula (ἐστίν) is omitted; a frequent phenomenon (BDF §127).

[11] μὴ δυνάμεναι κατὰ συνείδησιν τελειῶσαι τὸν λατρεύοντα,
[12] μόνον ἐπὶ βρώμασιν καὶ πόμασιν καὶ διαφόροις βαπτισμοῖς,
δικαιώματα σαρκὸς μέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως ἐπικείμενα.[44]

Two types of figures of speech give this sentence a circular structure: hyperbaton and antithesis.

Antithesis and Transition

The period is divided in two sections that are antithetical in nature. Each part is clearly introduced by a genitive absolute (clauses 1 and 6):

Vv. 6–7: Τούτων δὲ οὕτως κατεσκευασμένων . . .

Vv. 8–10: τοῦτο δηλοῦντος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου . . .[45]

The first genitive absolute looks back forming an *inclusio* with v. 2 (note the use of the verb κατασκευάζειν), but the second looks forward.

The first section (vv. 6–7; clauses 1–5) describes a transition from the ministry in the outer room to the ministry in the inner room of the Mosaic sanctuary as it occurred in the ritual of the Day of Atonement. This section itself contains several antithetical structures very important for the argument. Clauses 2 and 3 are set in antithetical correlation to clauses 4 and 5. The antithetical structure is very clear and is signaled by a tight syntactic μὲν . . . δέ construction that describes and compares the ministries in the first and second tent that correspond to the outer and inner rooms of the sanctuary.[46] Three antithetical elements are set out in clear terms: (a) multiple priests (οἱ ἱερεῖς) versus one high priest (ὁ ἀρχιερεύς), (b) continuous entering (διὰ παντὸς εἰσίασιν) versus one entrance (ἅπαξ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ [εἰσίασιν]), and (c) unrestricted access versus the requirement of blood (οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος).[47]

[44] The syntactical placement of the adverbial phrase μόνον ἐπὶ βρώμασιν καὶ πόμασιν καὶ διαφόροις βαπτισμοῖς is a difficult matter (see Ellingworth, *Epistle,* 443–44). Though the adverbial phrase μόνον . . . βαπτισμοῖς is placed closer to the infinitive τελειῶσαι (clause 11), its modification of the participle ἐπικείμενα (clause 12) seems to make better sense. In my opinion, Paul Ellingworth (p. 443) evaluates the main options with great clarity: "the point is not that the OT cultus can only perfect the officiant on the basis of certain foods, drinks, and purifications, but on the contrary that it cannot do so at all."

[45] Genitive absolutes are not strange in a period. See, for example, the genitive absolute in the period of Heb 2:2–4.

[46] See clauses 2–5 in our period. This comparison brings to its climax the description of the setting up and furnishing of the outer and inner rooms of the sanctuary in vv. 1–5.

[47] The construction of the sentence implies that the high priest cannot enter the inner room without the blood of the sacrifice. The case for the outer room was different because the priests could enter the outer room without bringing any sacrifice. The author's understanding could be derived from Lev 16:1–3, where the blood of the bull and that of the ram are described as prerequisites so that Aaron may not die as he enters the inner room.

This annual transition in the OT cultus as it occurred in the ritual of the Day of Atonement is considered a parable (παραβολή [v. 9]) which the Holy Spirit interprets for the believer in the second section of the sentence (vv. 8–10; clauses 6–12): the annual transition in the ministry of the Mosaic sanctuary *illustrates* the transition from the present to the coming age, which is also a transition from the cleansing of the body to the cleansing of the conscience.[48] It involves a transition from the ministry of several priests to the ministry of one, from several sacrifices to one sacrifice, and from unrestricted access to the outer tent to access only "through blood" into the inner tent. The author of Hebrews will use this transition to illustrate in 9:11–10:18 the transition from the present to the coming age, which includes a transition from the ministry of many levitical priests to one heavenly high priest, from many animal sacrifices to the "once for all" sacrifice of Jesus, and from access to the earthly sanctuary to access to the presence of God at the heavenly sanctuary. In other words, it is suggested that the parable contains *in nuce* the argument for the central section of Hebrews. The period of Heb 9:6–10 introduces, then, the Day of Atonement not as a typology for Jesus's sacrifice but as an illustration (παραβολή) of the transition between ages.

The whole period has a circular structure. The first section of the period (vv. 6–7) introduces a parable creating a logical suspense that is solved in the second section (vv. 8–10) when the interpretation is presented. The first section introduces an antithesis between the first and the second apartments of the Israelite sanctuary, while the second interprets it in terms of a second antithesis: flesh and conscience.

This parabolic use of the Day of Atonement is possible because of the Holy Spirit. The author of Hebrews introduces the Holy Spirit as the "interpreter" who discloses the inner meaning of the sanctuary's service; and the author is understood as the disciple or the scribe perhaps. The "text" the Spirit interprets is the two-phased ministry of the two-room Israelite tabernacle. The annual transition in the sanctuary's service that occurred on the Day of Atonement becomes a parable, the secret of which the Holy Spirit reveals for the believer.[49] Though the identity of the "first tent" in v. 8 remains a crux for the interpretation of this section, the general thrust of the passage is clear: the cultus of the present age with its

[48] Notice the intentional analogy between the temporal standing (acc. of στάσις; v. 8) of the "first tent" and the description of the present age as "standing/present" (pf. ptc. of ἐνίστημι, v. 9). In addition, notice the antithesis between flesh (σάρξ) and conscience (συνείδησις) in clauses 11 and 12. The antithesis is signaled now not by a μὲν . . . δέ construction (on the one hand . . . on the other hand) but by the adverb μόνον ("only"). The NRSV recognizes the antithetical function of both constructions and translates them in the same way: "but only."

[49] See Grässer, *An die Hebräer,* 2:133. I agree with him that the interpretation implies some secret γνῶσις. I disagree, however, with his general bent toward Gnosticism (see L. D. Hurst, *The Epistle to the Hebrews: Its Background of Thought* [SNTSMS 65; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 67–75). In my view, the Holy Spirit's actions should be understood in the context of Jesus's explanation to his disciples of the meaning of the parables (e.g., Matt 13:10–17).

old covenant is both partial and provisional; therefore, about to disappear.[50] It is partial because it provides only for the purification of the flesh, not the conscience (v. 9). It is provisional because it is in effect only until "the time comes to set things right" (v. 10).

My reading implies, then, a use of the term παραβολή in the sense of "a narrative or saying . . . designed *to illustrate* a truth especially through comparison or simile"[51] (emphasis mine). A majority of commentators and translators have

[50] See Grässer, *An die Hebräer,* 2:130. There are two main variables in the exegesis of Heb 9:8. First, does the expression πρώτης σκηνῆς have a "spatial" or a "temporal" sense; that is, does it refer to the outer room (spatial) or the whole sanctuary (temporal)? Second, does the expression ἐχούσης στάσιν have a physical or a legal meaning; namely, is the tent destroyed or does it just lose its legal significance? These two variables make possible four interpretations: (a) the outer room is destroyed (e.g., George Wesley Buchanan, *To the Hebrews: Translation, Comment, and Conclusions* [AB 36; New York: Doubleday, 1972], 144–45), (b) the first sanctuary is destroyed (e.g., Gerhard Delling, "στάσις," *TDNT* 7:570); (c) the outer room loses cultic standing (e.g., Koester, *Hebrews*, 397–98, 405; Donald A. Hagner, *Encountering the Book of Hebrews: An Exposition* [Encountering Biblical Studies; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002], 120; Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:223–24; Hans-Friedrich Weiss, *Der Brief an die Hebräer: Übersetzt und Erklärt* [KEK 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991], 457–59; Grässer, *An die Hebräer,* 2:132–34; Harold W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989], 240; and especially Otfried Hofius, *Der Vorhang vor dem Thron Gottes: Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Hebräer 6, 19 f. und 10, 19 f* [Tübingen: Mohr, 1972], 60–65; see also idem, "Das 'Erste' und das 'Zweite' Zelt: Ein Beitrag zur Auslegung von Heb 9:1–10," *ZNW* 61 [1970]: 271–77); and (d) the first sanctuary loses cultic standing (e.g., Simon Kistemaker, "Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews," in *Exposition of Thessalonians, the Pastorals, and Hebrews* [ed. William Hendriksen and Simon Kistemaker; New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995], 243; Ellingworth, *Epistle,* 437–38; Ray C. Stedman, *Hebrews* [IVP New Testament Commentary Series 15; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992], 95; esp. Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews,* 208).

As indicated in the sample of supporters mentioned above, the majority of scholars choose the third option and interpret Heb 9:8 in the following way: The Holy Spirit is signifying that the way into the inner room of the sanctuary (τὰ ἅγια) has not yet been disclosed as long as the outer room (τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς) still has cultic standing (ἐχούσης στάσιν). A very important tenet of this interpretation is that the term ἅγια in Hebrews 8–10 denotes the inner room of the sanctuary, the Most Holy Place. It is recognized that the term τὰ ἅγια normally denotes the whole sanctuary in the LXX (see Carl Cosaert, "The Use of ἅγιος for the Sanctuary in the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus," *AUSS* 42 [2004]: 91–104). Harold W. Attridge and others argue that the author of Hebrews is following the special use of Leviticus 16, a passage very important for the argument of Hebrews. This argument, however, has a problem that has not been satisfactorily addressed by them: Leviticus 16 uses the singular (ἅγιος) consistently to refer to the inner room, while Hebrews consistently uses the plural (ἅγια).

[51] BDAG, 759. I understand that ὁδός is the antecedent of ἥτις in vv. 8–9: "By this the Holy Spirit indicates that the way into the sanctuary has not yet been disclosed, as long as the first tent is still standing. This [i.e., the way into the sanctuary] is an illustration of the present time . . . ." A majority of interpreters consider the phrase τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς—which is closer to the relative pronoun—to be the antecedent (e.g., Attridge, *Hebrews*, 241; Ellingworth, *Epistle,* 439; Grässer, *An die Hebräer,* 2:135; Koester, *Hebrews*, 398; Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:224). This position, as I will argue below, has the problem of the awkward relationship between the symbol ("first tent") and the referent ("present time"). Others argue that the antecedent is the whole situation of vv. 6–8 (e.g.,

understood it, rather, in the sense of a *symbol*; namely, "something that serves as a model or example pointing beyond itself for later realization."[52] The main

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Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews,* 209; Loader, *Sohn und Hoherpriester,* 164; Otto Michel, *Der Brief an die Hebräer* [KEK 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966], 307; Hugh Montefiore, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* [HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1964], 149). Though this interpretation is tempting for my argument, it has the problem of the awkward explanation of the relative pronoun whose gender is defined not by the antecedent but by παραβολή, an element of its own clause. In my view, it is unnecessary.

The "way into the sanctuary" refers to the cultic system, which requires a sequence of ministries; first in the outer tent (daily), then in the inner tent (annually). In fact, the carrying on of a ministry in the first tent impedes access into the second (Lev 16:17). Therefore, the "way into the sanctuary" was more an evidence of restriction than of access (Heb 9:6-7). Nevertheless, the author of Hebrews plays with the concept of the "way into the sanctuary" brilliantly by transforming the annual transition between tents and their cultic systems on the Day of Atonement (vv. 6–8) into an illustration of the transition between ages and their respective cultic systems (vv. 9–10).

Admittedly, the antecedent (ὁδός) is somewhat removed from the relative pronoun (ἥτις); however, this is not strange in Hebrews (cf. 9:2; 8:5). Moreover, the use of the transition in the ministry of the tents in the ritual of the Day of Atonement as a parable removes a hurdle in the current interpretations of the "first tent" (τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς) and its alleged relationship to "present time" (τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ἐνεστηκότα) of v. 9. Neither the "Mosaic tabernacle" nor the "outer room" (understood as the referents of "first tent" [v. 8] in a majority of interpretations; see above) is an appropriate symbol of the "present time" (e.g., Attridge, *Hebrews*, 241–42). Both refer to nonfulfillment and imperfection; however, the main thrust of Hebrews is that Jesus *has inaugurated* the time of fulfillment and perfection. He is the "high priest of the good things that *have come*" (9:11; emphasis mine). Attridge has argued, following J. H. Davies, that Hebrews uses "the inverse image" (first tent/imperfection) to symbolize the "present time" of perfection (Attridge, *Hebrews*, 241–42; J. H. Davies, *A Letter to Hebrews* [CBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967], 86). This is unconvincing, however, because the author of Hebrews had a better option. If the main point of Hebrews is that Jesus "is seated at the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the heavens" (8:1; cf. 1:3); that he has "entered the inner shrine behind the curtain" (6:19; cf. 4:14–16; 10:19–22); why did he not use the "second tent" (the inner room), a symbol of God's throne room and presence, to symbolize the "present age"? It seems a poor choice in one of the better argued documents of the NT. Craig R. Koester, on the other hand, rightly points out that the author holds a view of an overlap of ages similar that of Paul (Koester, *Hebrews*, 398). His identification, however, of the "present time" as the time when the first covenant regulations are still in force and the "time of correction" as the time when those regulations are set aside is awkward. It would say that the author uses the phrase "present time" to refer to what he thinks is only one of the two aspects of the "present time." In any case, the "first tent" continues to be an ill-adapted symbol for the "present time" where the two ages overlap.

The Day of Atonement, however, as a time of transition between the ministries of the first (outer) and second (inner) rooms is a fitting illustration of the "present time," which is also a time of transition. In the OT cultus, the ministries in the outer and inner rooms were juxtaposed on the Day of Atonement. The regular rituals, performed every day in the morning and the evening in the outer room, were *also* performed on the Day of Atonement; however, between the morning and evening ritual, the special ritual of purification of the sanctuary was "inserted," which included the "once a year" ministry in the inner room (see Roy E. Gane, *Ritual Dynamic Structure* [Gorgias Dissertations 14, Religion 2; Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2004], 297–305). The ritual in the inner room implied not only coexistence but also a supersession of the outer room cultus (Heb 9:8; cf. Lev

reasons have been their identification of the "first tent" (an object, not a saying or narrative) as the referent of the parable as well as its prefigurative function.[53] Nevertheless, as I argue above, Hebrews' use of παραβολή as illustration does not preclude its prefigurative function.[54] Therefore, the main difference between the interpretations of παραβολή is the kind of object referred to. I believe the term παραβολή is used again in Heb 11:19 in a manner similar to Heb 9:9. There, as James Swetnam argues, παραβολή refers not only to Isaac's "resurrection" from the sacrifice but also to the wider narrative, which includes Abraham's offering of Isaac.[55] Abraham's offering of Isaac prefigures an offering; his reception of Isaac, a resurrection. The narrative, then, illustrates and foreshadows Jesus's sacrifice as well as his resurrection.

Parables played an important role in rhetoric. Παραβολή was a "Greek rhetorical term for one of two types of proof in argumentation."[56] Generally, proofs in argumentation were divided into παράδειγμα (examples) and ἐνθύμημα (arguments or syllogisms). Λόγοι (fables) and παραβολαί (comparisons) belong to the type of fictional παραδείγματα.[57] Though the author of Hebrews probably did not use παραβολή as a technical term, he certainly used a parable for his argument.[58]

Hyperbaton and Transition

Of the several hyperbata that can be identified in our period, the one in the last clause is the most important because it closes the whole sentence: "but deal only with food and drink and various baptisms, regulations for the body imposed

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16:17). The Day of Atonement illustrates appropriately, then, what is happening in the "present time": Jesus has come and made the old covenant cultus "obsolete" so that it "will soon disappear" (8:13). This transition, however, has not totally transpired. The new covenant has been inaugurated, but the old has not yet vanished (8:13; see Koester, *Hebrews*, 398).

[52] BDAG, 759. E.g., NASB; NRSV; Attridge, *Hebrews*, 241; Ellingworth, *Epistle,* 440; Koester, *Hebrews*, 398; Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:224.

[53] See nn. 50, 51. For the prefigurative or typological interpretation of the "first tent," see Friedrich Hauck, "παραβολή," *TDNT* 5:752.

[54] In the case of 9:6–10, the transition of ministries between the outer and inner tents prefigures the transition of ministries between the old and new covenants.

[55] James Swetnam, *Jesus and Isaac: A Study of the Epistle to the Hebrews in the Light of the Aqedah* (AnBib 94; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1981), 119–23.

[56] Aune, *Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature,* 329.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Helmut Löhr analyzed the possible use of rhetorical terminology in Hebrews and reached the following conclusion: "The phrases and expressions I have selected can certainly be understood without any reference to the language of rhetoric. But taken together they might provoke—and indeed they did provoke in me—the impression that our author could have used them consciously, being well aware of their rhetorical background" ("Reflections of Rhetorical Terminology in Hebrews," in *Hebrews: Contemporary Methods—New Insights* [ed. Gabriella Gelardini; Biblical Interpretation Series 75; Leiden: Brill, 2005], 201).

until the time comes to set things right" (v. 10).[59] The participial form ἐπικείμενα ("being imposed," from ἐπίκειμαι) is placed at the end and closes not only the clause but the whole period and its argument. It should be noted that the hyperbaton emphasizes the transition theme of the period.

The rhetorical effect of the final clause becomes clear only when considered from the perspective of the wider logical structure of chs. 8–10. Hebrews 8 introduces Jesus's ministry in the heavenly sanctuary as the inauguration of a new covenant and a new age. The chapter closes in v. 13, saying that "in speaking of 'a new covenant,' he has made the first one obsolete. And what is obsolete and growing old will soon disappear." Immediately following (9:1–5), the author describes and emphasizes the two-room structure of the first covenant's sanctuary. It is not clear for the reader, however, why this description is important if the old covenant is about to disappear and a two-room structure is not clear, much less emphasized, for the heavenly sanctuary of the new covenant.[60] The description of the two-room Israelite sanctuary creates, however, a logical suspense that is not solved until 9:6–10. It is there that it becomes clear that this description is necessary to describe the two-phased ministry of the Israelite sanctuary, which in turn illustrates the transition between two ages represented by the old and new covenants. The "path around" begun in 9:1 is closed in the last clause of our period. What may appear a digression in 9:1–5 is just the preparation of the elements that will illustrate the "passing away" of the first covenant asserted in vv. 6-10. Therefore, 9:10 closes the circle that began in 8:13.

Hebrews 8:13 and 9:10 emphasize the same idea: the old covenant cultus is "passing away."

> 8:13 "In speaking of 'a new covenant,' he has made the first one obsolete. And what is obsolete and growing old will soon disappear."[61]
>
> 9:10 ". . . but deal only with food and drink and various baptisms, regulations for the body imposed until the time comes to set things right."[62]

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[59] The hyperbaton is a figure of speech that "arises when certain words belonging together are grammatically separated by another word or phrase that doesn't belong" (Anderson, *Glossary*, 121). This was a very common figure of speech. Several hyperbata can be identified in the period. For example, the prepositional phrases in clauses 2 and 3—εἰς μὲν τὴν πρώτην σκηνὴν and εἰς δὲ τὴν δευτέραν—contain a hyperbaton, a syntactical suspense that is solved toward the end of the clause when the verb is introduced. In the phrase τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων of v. 7, the insertion of τοῦ λαοῦ creates a hyperbaton. See also τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδόν (v. 8) and μὴ δυνάμεναι κατὰ συνείδησιν τελειῶσαι (v. 9).

[60] See Ellingworth, *Epistle,* 447.

[61] ἐν τῷ λέγειν καινὴν πεπαλαίωκεν τὴν πρώτην· τὸ δὲ παλαιούμενον καὶ γηράσκον ἐγγὺς ἀφανισμοῦ.

[62] μόνον ἐπὶ βρώμασιν καὶ πόμασιν καὶ διαφόροις βαπτισμοῖς, δικαιώματα σαρκὸς μέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως ἐπικείμενα.

The first covenant of 8:13 is parallel to the "regulations for the body" in 9:10 consisting of "food and drink and various baptisms." The phrase "what is obsolete and growing old will soon disappear" (8:13) is parallel to the phrase "imposed until the time comes to set things right" (9:10). These parallels show that the point of emphasis of the period is found in its last clause. By placing the participle ἐπικείμενα in the last position, the author is using a hyperbaton to close the period; however, and more important, by placing the fundamental idea at the end, the author not only gives a circular structure to the logical flow of the whole sentence but reserves the rhetorical punch for the end.

The author of Hebrews, then, presents us in this final clause a fit example of what Demetrius called a "well-turned ending" (*Eloc.* 10). It should be noted that this last clause not only gives expression to the central idea of the period but is also the longest. Demetrius described the desired characteristics of the last clause in the following terms: "In compound periods the last clause should be longer than the rest, and should as it were contain and envelope them all. This is how a period will be imposing and impressive, if it ends on an imposing, long clause; otherwise it will break off abruptly and seem to limp" (*Eloc.* 18).[63]

The fundamental idea of the period of Heb 9:6–10—that the old covenant is "passing away" and a new one is "coming"—is developed in the section that follows the period (9:11–10:18). For example, this section is introduced in 9:11 with a description of Christ as the "high priest of the good things that *have come*" (emphasis added). Verses 15–23 present Jesus's sacrifice as the *inauguration* of the new covenant, which in the logic of Hebrews is coterminous with the coming age. Verse 26 says that Jesus "appeared . . . at the *end of the age* to remove sin by the sacrifice of himself" (emphasis added). Hebrews 10:1 refers to the old covenant as "a shadow of the good things *to come*" (emphasis added). Hebrews 10:9 asserts that Jesus's sacrifice "abolishes the first [meaning the sacrifices of the old covenant] and establishes the second." The section closes in 10:18 with a crystal-clear statement of the abolition of the old covenant's order: "where there is forgiveness of these, there is no longer any offering for sin." Thus, the idea that the old age and its covenant are "passing away" not only pervades Heb 9:10–10:18 but is also emphasized in it. This shows that the author of Hebrews is using the period (Heb 9:6–10) as a rhetorical device that introduces the argument that will immediately follow (9:11–10:18).[64]

[63] Cf. Cicero, *De oratione* 3.184–87, quoted by Anderson, *Glossary*, 96.

[64] Another element strengthens this position. Koester argues that the tight μὲν . . . δέ construction of the period (Heb 9:6–7), which contrasts the ministries in the outer and inner rooms of the sanctuary, is enclosed in a broader, but also tight μὲν . . . δέ construction that contrasts the OT two-phase priestly ministry described in 9:1–10 with Jesus's sacrifice and ascension, the transitional events inaugurating the "coming age" of the new covenant in 9:11–14 (Koester, *Hebrews*, 412). In this sense, the two-room structure of the Mosaic sanctuary presented so forcefully in 9:1–10 emphasizes the two-age nature of the history of salvation. The author of Hebrews, then, uses the first to illustrate the latter.

I have suggested above, however, that the period introduces not only the main concept of the argument of Heb 9:11–10:18 but also its constitutive elements. In other words, the Day of Atonement as a parable with its three constituent antitheses provides the arguments for the superiority of the new age and Jesus's high-priestly ministry described in 9:11–10:18: the new covenant is superior because it provides the ministry of one high priest (as opposed to the multiple priests of the old covenant), one sacrifice (as opposed to the multiple sacrifices of the old covenant), and access to the presence of God (as opposed to ministry in the outer room). All these arguments are epitomized in a fourth and final antithesis: the new covenant provides cleansing for the conscience (as opposed to the cleansing of the flesh provided by the old covenant).

II. The Day of Atonement as a Metaphor of Transition

Multiple Priests versus One High Priest

Jesus's appointment to a superior high priesthood vis-à-vis the levitical priesthood of the OT was introduced in chs. 5–7.[65] Christ's high priesthood is shown to be superior because the old covenant required *many* priests, since "they were prevented by death from continuing in office" (Heb 7:23). In contrast, the new covenant provides one high priest who lives forever and "is able for all time to save those who approach God through him" (vv. 24–25).[66] Therefore, the transition from the old to the new covenant implies a transition from *many* to *one* priest. The Day of Atonement illustrates this transition because its ritual implies the transition from the ministry of *many* priests during the year to *one*, the high priest, on the Day of Atonement. This is clearly indicated in Lev 16:17: "No one shall be in the tent of meeting from the time he enters to make atonement in the sanctuary until he comes out and has made atonement for himself and for his house and for all the assembly of Israel."

This transition from many to one priest implies a transition from *many* sacrifices to *one,* which will be foundational for the rest of the argument. This observation introduces us to the second element of the period: *continuous* entrance versus *one* entrance.

Continuous Entrance versus One Entrance

That the priests enter "continually" into the outer room during the year (διὰ παντός [Heb 9:6]) agrees with the repetitive nature of the sacrifices offered on a

[65] George H. Guthrie, *The Structure of Hebrews: A Text-linguistic Analysis* (NovTSup 73; Leiden: Brill, 1994), 144.

[66] In addition, Jesus is a superior high priest because he "is holy, blameless, pure, set apart from sinners, exalted above the heavens" (7:26), whereas the levitical high priest needs to offer sacrifices "first for his own sins, and then for those of the people" (v. 27).

daily basis.[67] This continuous entrance is contrasted with the "once a year" (ἅπαξ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ) sacrifice offered on the Day of Atonement.[68]

This antithesis of many sacrifices versus one is heavily emphasized in chs. 9 and 10.[69] The sacrifices of the old covenant are always referred to in plural.[70] When sacrificial animals are mentioned, they appear in pairs (9:12, 13, 19; 10:4, 6).[71] In contrast, the uniqueness of Jesus's sacrifice is clearly emphasized: Christ did not enter heaven "to offer himself again and again" (πολλάκις [9:25]) nor "to suffer again and again" (πολλάκις [v. 26]), but he was "offered once to bear the sins of many" (ἅπαξ [v. 18]). The contrast reaches its climax in 10:11–13, where the old covenant priests *stand* (ἕστηκεν) "day after day . . . offering again and again the same sacrifices," while Jesus is *seated* (ἐκάθισεν) waiting the fulfillment of the Father's promise after having "offered for all time one sacrifice." The Day of Atonement in the period of 9:6–10 illustrates, then, a transition from *many* sacrifices to *one* sacrifice. In fact, it is an allusion to the end of the sacrificial system. Regarding the multiple old covenant sacrifices, the author says: "He abolishes the first in order to establish the second" (Heb 10:9).

This transition from many to one sacrifice sets the stage for the third antithesis of our period: unrestricted access versus the requirement of blood.

Unrestricted Access versus the Requirement of Blood[72]

The Day of Atonement was the only time in the year when the high priest was permitted to enter the inner room of the sanctuary (Lev 16:1–3). Of the sev-

[67] Gane, *Ritual*, 288–300.

[68] The author is evidently dealing with the multiple ritual actions performed on the Day of Atonement as consisting of one ritual event. Jacob Milgrom has calculated that there were fifty ritual actions performed on the Day of Atonement (*Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 3; New York: Doubleday, 1991], 1038–39). For the Day of Atonement as a unified ritual complex, see Gane, *Ritual*, ch. 7.

[69] This emphasis is prefigured in 7:27: "he has no need to offer sacrifices day after day, first for his own sins, and then for those of the people; this he did once for all when he offered himself." However, the nature of the contrast is different. Whereas in Heb 9:6–7 the contrast is many sacrifices versus one, 7:27 contrasts many sacrifices versus none. The priests needed to offer sacrifices for their own sins, but Jesus, who is sinless (v. 26), does not need any.

[70] Hebrews 9:9, 12, 13, 19, 23, 25, 26–28; 10:1, 4, 6, 9–10, 11–12.

[71] If the reading "καὶ τῶν τράγων" in 9:19 is not original, this would be an exception. For a short discussion of the text, see Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; New York: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft and United Bible Societies, 2002), 599.

[72] Access is a very important theme of Hebrews. "Entering" language is applied to Jesus and his followers. For example, Jesus *enters* "into the world" in Heb 1:6; "through the heavens" into the presence of God in 4:14–16; and "the inner shrine behind the curtain" in 6:19–20. In a similar

eral conditions required of the high priest in Leviticus 16 in order to enter into the inner room of the sanctuary,[73] Hebrews' author emphasizes only one: the necessity of blood. While no requirements are mentioned in vv. 6–7 for the priests' daily entrance into the outer room, the author adds that the high priest could not enter the inner room "without blood."[74] Blood, then, acquires supreme importance for the argument because it is what makes possible the transition from the ministry in the outer room to that in the inner room.

Αἷμα (blood) appears for the first time in a cultic sense in 9:7, the period under discussion, but twelve additional times from here until the end of ch. 10.[75] Its importance resides in the fact that blood is the basic means of atonement in the old covenant cult (9:22; cf. Lev 17:11).[76] The argument is made that Jesus's blood provides better access than that of animals because Jesus's blood has greater "atoning" power (9:13–14; cf. 10:4). Once we have our "hearts sprinkled clean from an evil conscience" through Jesus's blood, we are invited to "draw near . . . through the curtain" into the very presence of God (10:19–22). Therefore, just as it was blood that made possible the high priest's access to the inner room of the sanctuary (9:6–7), Jesus's sacrifice makes confident access to the presence of God itself possible; first for himself, then for us (9:11–14; 10:19–21).

The superior atoning power of Jesus's blood takes us to the last antithesis: flesh versus conscience.

Flesh versus Conscience

The word συνείδησις appears for the first time in 9:9, the period under discussion. After that it shows up in 9:14; 10:2, 22 and refers to the individual's *internal* awareness of sin. It always appears in opposition to flesh (σάρξ).[77] This

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fashion, believers are urged to follow Jesus's example and *enter* God's "rest" in 3:7–4:13 (passim); to "approach the throne of grace" in 4:16; and *enter* "the [heavenly] sanctuary" in 10:19–22. The pervasive use of such language leads Marie E. Isaacs to propose that the main concern of the work is to create "a new and powerful theology of access" (*Sacred Space,* 67).

[73] For example, in addition to the blood of a bull and a goat, Leviticus 16 indicates that various bathings (v. 4), special clothing (v. 4), and incense are necessary (v. 13).

[74] There was indeed a stern requirement of ablutions in order to enter the outer room of the sanctuary (Exod 30:18–21). There was in practice, then, a contrast between the water that provided access to the outer room and the blood that provided access to the inner room; however, Hebrews does not refer to this contrast in vv. 6–7.

[75] In Heb 2:14, "blood" appears together with "flesh" as determining humanness.

[76] See William George Johnsson, "Defilement and Purgation in the Book of Hebrews" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1973). The author's knowledge of Hebrew ritual is made evident in his assertion that "almost everything is purified with blood" (9:22) because there were means of expiation that did not include blood (Lev 5:11–13).

[77] Gary S. Selby, "The Meaning and Function of Συνείδησις in Hebrews 9 and 10," *ResQ* 28

concept constitutes the center of the argument of Hebrews 8–10. The inefficacy of the old covenant and its cultus resides in its external nature. It consists only of "regulations for the body" (δικαιώματα σαρκός [9:10]) that purified only the flesh (9:13); thus, its sacrifices cannot cleanse the conscience (10:2). In fact, these sacrifices are a reminder of sins (v. 3). There is a need, then, for a better sacrifice (9:23) because "it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins" (10:4).

The underlying reasoning is that the blood of animals, since it belongs to the realm of the flesh, purifies only the body. Jesus's sacrifice is superior in this respect because it belongs to both realms: flesh and conscience. Hebrews 10:5–10 explains that Jesus's sacrifice included his body—"a body you have prepared for me"—as well as his will—"See, God, I have come to do your will."[78] Hebrews concludes that it is the volitional nature of Jesus's sacrifice that cleanses our conscience: "by this will [that is, Jesus's determination to obey] we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."[79] There is, then, a transition here from the external efficiency of the old covenant to the internal cleansing power of Jesus's blood. This transition is essential in the new covenant passages of the OT. They expressly indicate that the difference between the Sinaitic covenant and that which God will institute is that God will transform the inner self of the people, enabling them to obey. It is the inward thrust of God's action that is new in the new covenant (see Jer 31:31–34; Ezek 36:24–28).[80] This transition from the realm of flesh to the realm of conscience is rooted not in the ritual of the Day of Atonement but in the Holy Spirit's interpretation of it, presented in the second part of the period (Heb 9:8–10).

(1986): 145–54. The exception is 13:18, where no opposition to flesh is present. Selby contrasts Paul's understanding of conscience as a "positive moral guide" with Hebrews' understanding of it as "the individual's personal cognizance of sin" (p. 147); however, Philip Bosman's study of the linguistic and conceptual development of the term in Philo and Paul shows that the concept of conscience as the awareness of sin was present from the earliest stages (*Conscience in Philo and Paul: A Conceptual History of the Synoida Word Group* [WUNT 166; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003], 276–83). Bosman's work brings to the fore another element in the discussion of conscience that is important for Hebrews: παρρησία. The cleansing of the conscience provides παρρησία to the individual, which is essential in his approach to God (Heb 3:6; 4:16; 10:19; 10:35).

[78] See Attridge, "Uses of Antithesis," 9.

[79] I take issue here with the NRSV translation: "And it is by God's will . . . ," which makes univocal what is ambivalent in the text. The phrase ἐν ᾧ θελήματι explains the phrase τοῦ ποιῆσαι ὁ θεὸς τὸ θέλημά σου (v. 7). In other words, Jesus's will is to do God's will. Therefore, there are two wills involved in the passage, not only one as the NRSV would make us believe (see Lane, *Hebrews,* 2:265).

[80] See Walther Zimmerli, *Ezekiel 2: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel Chapters 25–48* (ed. Paul D. Hanson and Leonard Jay Greenspoon; trans. James D. Martin; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 248.

III. Conclusion

The period of Heb 9:6–10 is a microcosm foreshadowing the argument that follows in chs. 9 and 10. I propose that the period presents the Day of Atonement *primarily* as a "parable" of the transition from the "present" to the coming age and not as a typology for Jesus's sacrifice. This "parable" introduces the main elements of the subsequent discussion: from multiple priests to one high priest, from multiple sacrifices to one sacrifice, from unrestricted access to the requirement of blood, and from the cleansing of the flesh to the cleansing of the conscience. Therefore, the transition from the ministry in the outer room to that of the inner room, as it happened on the Day of Atonement, functions as a "parable" of the transition from the ineffectiveness of the old age to the achievements of the new. Jesus's accomplishments are understood as a change in the law; that is, the inauguration of a new covenant. This explains the prominent role of imagery of the Day of Atonement in the central section of Hebrews and at the same time avoids the inconsistencies between the blood ritual of the Day of Atonement and Jesus's sacrifice as described by the author of Hebrews.

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Just a Busybody? A Look at the Greco-Roman Topos of Meddling for Defining ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Peter 4:15

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Near the end of 1 Peter, the author of the letter lists four activities that his audience is to avoid as they suffer for Christ's sake. The first three are not surprising: "But let none of you suffer as a murderer (φονεύς), a thief (κλέπτης), an evildoer (κακοποιός)" (1 Pet 4:15). The final activity, however, has caused much consternation for scholars and translators more particularly. Is ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος to be translated "embezzler," "informer," or "errant bishop"? Or should it be rendered as in most modern English translations with one of a number of related English equivalents: "meddler" (NIV, ESV [English Standard Version]), "busybody" (KJV, NKJV, CEV) or "mischief-maker" (RSV, NRSV)?

I will argue that the latter constellation of ideas (busybody, meddler, mischief-maker) reflects the author's purpose for using ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος, but without the rather innocuous associations of these terms in English. In fact, the Greco-Roman idea of meddling or interfering in other people's affairs was an activity that caused serious opposition and may have even evoked revolutionary overtones. More pointedly, it could refer to inappropriate movement outside of one's assigned role in society. This connotation may adhere to the author's usage of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Pet 4:15. In the larger purview of 1 Peter, the prohibition against this particular behavior would fit well with the admonition in the *Haustafel* for Christians to submit to and remain within the sphere in which they find themselves (2:11–3:12). In the end, the author of 1 Peter entreats his audience to refrain from activity that will impede the progress of the gospel, in the case of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος, to refrain from meddling, that is, transgressing prescribed social boundaries.[1]

[1] John H. Elliott uses the language of transgressing social boundaries, although he focuses on the social boundaries between the Petrine church and society rather than, as I do, on the particular

I. Lexical Discussion of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος

The term ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος (1 Pet 4:15) is a *hapax legomenon* in the NT that does not occur elsewhere in extant ancient Greek writings prior to the fourth century C.E. Though the two occurrences in Epiphanius (*Anc.* 12 and *Pan.* 66.85; both fourth century C.E.) and the single occurrence in Dionysius the Areopagite (*Ep.* 8.1; fifth century C.E.) lend support for understanding ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in connection with the Greco-Roman concept of meddling,[2] the lateness of the three instances and their lack of direct dependence on 1 Pet 4:15 make these later sources suggestive rather than definitive for the meaning of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Peter.

Given the lack of lexical evidence from contemporaneous Greek sources, scholars have been forced to move to etymological considerations to define ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος. That the word is clearly a compound may allay fears of committing an etymological fallacy, especially if, as is likely, the author of 1 Peter coins the term for his particular situation.[3] In addition, early precedent for drawing on etymological considerations is evident in the Greek manuscripts. Two variant readings, ἀλλότριος ἐπίσκοπος and ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπίσκοπος, indicate that etymology was at least one way that scribes attempted to define the obscure ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος.[4] The combination of ἀλλότριος (not one's own) and ἐπίσκοπος (one

social boundaries upheld in the Petrine household code (Elliott, *1 Peter: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 37B; New York: Doubleday, 2000], 788; idem, *A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981], 141). Of recent commentators, Elliott provides the most detailed discussion of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος, especially his illumination of relevant Greco-Roman literature.

[2] Particularly Epiphanius's use of περιεργάζομαι ("to meddle") in close proximity to and as a mutually defining term for ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος lends support for understanding the latter term to be within the conceptual sphere of meddling (*Anc.* 12). As J. Ramsey Michaels notes more generally, "The common idea in these [three] uses of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος appears to be that of meddling in things that are none of one's business" (*1 Peter* [WBC 49; Waco: Word Books, 1988], 267); see p. 267 for a brief summary of each usage in its context.

[3] William M. Ramsey, *The Church in the Roman Empire before A.D. 170* (3rd ed.; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1894), 293; Charles Bigg, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901), 177; Elliott, *Home*, 141; James Moffatt, *The General Epistles: James, Peter, and Judas* (MNTC; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1928), 158; contra Michaels, *1 Peter*, 267. Since the term occurs in no extant literature prior to 1 Peter and considering that a number of such compound terms related to the concept of meddling are coined by earlier Greek authors, it is more than plausible that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος was coined by the author of 1 Peter. In this regard, Plato coins ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνη, and Aristotle is the first to use μονοπραγματέω, which expresses the opposite of meddling (Victor Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics," *JHS* 67 [1947]: 60 n. 43, 61).

[4] Michaels, *1 Peter*, 257. For a discussion of the nature of the compound, see also Elliott,

who observes or watches over) would, at first blush, seem to point to a person who concerns himself/herself in the affairs of another.[5] In support of this, Hermann W. Beyer indicates, "[w]henever ἀλλότριος is used [in a compound], it always denotes an activity which is foreign to the doer, or which is not his concern."[6] The sense of concerning oneself in another's affairs, that is, meddling, is what many have argued that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος means.[7] In fact, most modern English translations move in this direction, as the examples above indicate.[8]

Nevertheless, the apparently anomalous nature of the final English equivalent in the fourfold list has raised questions about the appropriateness of such a definition. "Murderer, thief, evildoer . . . busybody": Does not the latter provide a poor fit with the former three?[9] In an argument for ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος as a more serious offense, BDAG suggests that "it is questionable whether such [meddling] behavior would merit the kind of reprisal suggested by the context" and notes that "a more serious type of crime has been suggested."[10] Here the range of possibilities includes embezzler, informer, revolutionary, and errant bishop (a bishop who misuses funds belonging to widows and orphans).[11]

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1 Peter, 785. As Paul J. Achtemeier notes, "The variety of forms presented in the [manuscripts] for this word indicate[s] its obscurity" (*1 Peter: A Commentary on First Peter* [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996], 303).

[5] For further discussion of these individual terms, see BDAG, 47 and 379, respectively.

[6] Hermann W. Beyer, "ἀλλοτρι(ο)επίσκοπος," *TDNT* 2:621. For example, note Plato's use of ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνη in the same context and with similar meaning to πολυπραγμοσύνη, a word that more commonly denotes meddling activity (Plato, *Resp*. 444b).

[7] E.g., Elliott, *1 Peter*, 787; Michaels, *1 Peter*, 267–68; Thomas R. Schreiner, *1, 2 Peter, Jude* (NAC; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2003), 225; Ernest Best, *1 Peter* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 164–65; Peter H. Davids, *The First Epistle of Peter* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 169; Edward G. Selwyn, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (London: Macmillan, 1947), 225; Edwin A. Blum, "1 Peter" (Expositor's Bible Commentary 12; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), 248; Leonhard Goppelt, *A Commentary on 1 Peter* (trans. J. Alsup; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 309, 326. As already mentioned, this connotation fits well with the three later occurrences of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος from the fourth–fifth centuries.

[8] In addition to the translations cited in the first paragraph, the following translations render ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος with some variation on this theme: NEB, REB, and ASV. The exception is the *Jerusalem Bible,* which translates it as "informer."

[9] Struck by the perceived incongruity, C. E. B. Cranfield even suggests that "[t]here is possibly a trace of humour in introducing the busybody into this disreputable list" (*The First Epistle of Peter* [London: SCM, 1950], 103).

[10] BDAG, 47.

[11] For embezzler, see Johannes Bauer, "Aut maleficus aut alieni speculator (1 Petr 4,15)," *BZ* 22 (1978): 115; Bo Reicke, *The Epistles of James, Peter, and Jude: Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (AB 37; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 126; Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 310. For informer, see Beyer, *TDNT* 2:622. For revolutionary, see Moffatt, *Peter*, 158; Francis W. Beare, *The First Epistle of Peter* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947), 163 ("agitator"); and John Knox, "Pliny and 1 Peter: A Note on 1 Pet 4.14–16 and 3.15," *JBL* 72 (1953): 188. For errant bishop, see K. Erbes, "Was bedeutet ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος 1 Pt 4,15?" *ZNW* 19 (1919–20): 41, 44. Certainly each of these concepts includes

It is unnecessary, however, to propose a more serious form of activity than the one suggested by the English translation equivalents "meddler" or "busybody" (although these terms are less than adequate, I will argue).[12] If we look at Greco-Roman conceptions of meddling, we find significant concern about and censure of such activity. In fact, we find that interfering in the concerns of others is not only frowned on by the ancients, but it is considered by some to be subversive to the fabric of society. Thus, ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος warrants association with such terms as φονεύς, κλέπτης, and κακοποιός.

II. Greco-Roman Topos regarding Meddling

Terminology

If the component parts of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος suggest its association with the idea of meddling, then a look at the wider semantic range surrounding the topos of meddling in the Greco-Roman context may illuminate other possible connotations of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος.[13] A number of Greek terms are used to express the concept of meddling, including περίεργος (and its cognate verb, περιεργάζομαι), πολυπραγμοσύνη (and its cognates, πολυπραγμονέω and πολυπράγμων),[14] φιλοπραγμοσύνη, and ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνη (also ἀλλοτριοπραγία).[15]

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an element of acting outside one's proper sphere and so might be thought to fit under the rubric of meddling. This provides all the more reason to examine the Greco-Roman topos of meddling to ascertain its particular connotations.

[12] In most cases, discussion of the term by commentators reveals a need for further exploration. The definitional divergence, even among those who agree that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος should be rendered something like "meddler," calls for further study of the term. Examples of the range of options given for the kind of meddling envisioned in 1 Pet 4:15 include (1) "missionary activity [that] resulted in the splitting of families or the stirring up of riots" (Best, *1 Peter*, 164–65); (2) "denouncing [of] idolatry" (Davids, *1 Peter*, 169); (3) "Christians who considered themselves . . . guardians of public morality" (Michaels, *1 Peter*, 267); and the more general (4) "an overenthusiastic convert creating disturbance by crude defiance of accepted customs" (J. N. D. Kelly, *A Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and of Jude* [HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1969], 189).

[13] The term "meddling" will be used at this point in the essay to refer to the general concept described by the Greek terms. It remains to be determined (and it is one of the goals of this article) whether "meddling" is an adequate description of the Greco-Roman concept under study.

[14] An entire essay of Plutarch's *Moralia*, for example, is taken up with the topos of περὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης ("On Being a Busybody," *Mor*., *Curios*. 515b–523b). Numerous commentators connect ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος to the topos of meddling and/or to various Greek terms associated with meddling; see Bigg (*1 Peter*, 178) and Selwyn (*First Peter*, 225), who tie ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος to πολυπραγμοσύνη. Michaels connects ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος to the term περίεργος, which is the preferred term in the Pauline corpus for meddling (*1 Peter*, 268).

[15] Two of the antonyms used for meddling in discussions of the topic are ἀπραγμοσύνη and μονοπραγματέω. See Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne," 46, 61.

In the NT, the cognates περιεργάζομαι and περίεργος are used in the Pauline epistles to express the idea of meddling in someone else's affairs.[16] The contexts of the Pauline usages of these terms indicate that such meddling is associated with idleness (ἀτάκτως, ἀργός), that is, not working or fulfilling one's proper function (2 Thess 3:11–12; 1 Tim 5:13–14). The antidote for such meddling is for those who have been interfering to "do their work quietly and . . . earn their own living" (2 Thess 3:12 NRSV)[17] and, in the case of Christian widows who are meddlers (περίεργος [1 Tim 5:13]), to marry, bear children, and manage their (own) household (οἰκοδεσποτέω [1 Tim 5:14]).

The language of meddling is not limited to the NT or to Christian literature more generally. In fact, language that signals the topic of meddling is used extensively in the ancient world. One significant composite of terminology is used by Epictetus in his discussion of Cynic philosophy. Epictetus (55–135 C.E.) uses περίεργος and πολυπράγμων as virtual synonyms[18] in a passage frequently cited in commentaries on 1 Pet 4:15, owing to its verbal ties to the elements of the compound ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.97). In the context of defending why the Cynic, in spite of his oversight of people outside his own family, should not be considered a meddler (indicated by περίεργος in *Diatr.* 3.22.82), Epictetus argues that "the Cynic has made all [humanity] his children . . . in that spirit he approaches them all and cares for them all" (*Diatr*. 3.22.81, Oldfather). He concludes with a strong affirmation that the Cynic is not a meddler (3.22.97).

> Διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε περίεργος οὔτε πολυπράγμων ἐστὶν ὁ οὕτω διακείμενος· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀλλότρια πολυπραγμονεῖ, ὅταν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐπισκοπῇ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἴδια.
>
> On account of this, neither a meddler nor interferer is the one who thinks in this way, for he does not interfere in the affairs of others when he oversees human activity but [attends to] his own affairs. (my translation)

Not only are περίεργος and πολυπράγμων joined as synonyms in this passage (they are related terms that do not rightly describe the Cynic, according to Epictetus), but, in describing why such a person is not a meddler, Epictetus defines interference or meddling by using the two terms that make up the compound

[16] In addition to the already mentioned lexical tie between ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος and περιεργάζομαι in Epiphanius (*Anc.* 12), their connection is affirmed also by E. A. Nida and J. B. Louw, who group περιεργάζομαι and περίεργος together with ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος under the heading, "Being a Busybody" (L&N, 768). Other Greco-Roman writers use περίεργος in their discussion of meddling as well (e.g., Plutarch and Epictetus; see subsequent examples).

[17] In 2 Thess 3:12, the author speaks of working μετὰ ἡσυχίας (rendered here as "quietly"). The noun ἡσυχία is frequently used in association with (and as an opposite to) words for meddling. See subsequent discussion on 1 Pet 3:4.

[18] According to Ehrenberg, these two words have significant overlap of meaning and "are sometimes used almost as synonyms" ("Polypragmosyne," 62).

from 1 Pet 4:15, ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος. A meddler is one who oversees (ἐπισκοπῇ) affairs that are not one's own but belong to others (τὰ ἀλλότρια).

The Serious Nature of Meddling

From this text, we not only have an indication that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος may well fit the Greco-Roman topos of meddling, but we also get a sense of the seriousness of the activity so described. After vigorously defending the Cynic's right to oversee general human activity, Epictetus clearly shows this right to be the exception rather than the rule. Only a few have this right to oversee the activity of others. He chides his reader (who presumably is not one of these few) for any such interference:

> What have you to do with other people's business (τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις)? Why who are you? Are you the bull of the herd, or the queen bee of the hive? Show me the tokens of your leadership, like those which nature gives the queen bee. But if you are a drone and lay claim to the sovereignty over the bees, don't you suppose your fellow-citizens will overthrow you, just as the bees so treat the drones? (*Diatr*. 3.22.99, Oldfather)

Interference or meddling, then, is overseeing the activities of others when one has no proper right to do so. And interfering in this way is likely to get one "overthrown" by those who are the recipients of the interference. The seriousness of the repercussion hints at the seriousness of the transgression.

The seriousness of the offense of meddling is even more apparent in Plutarch's extended discussion on the topic, περὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης. Plutarch describes πολυπραγμοσύνη (along with synonyms περίεργος and φιλοπραγμοσύνη[19]) as searching for what is hidden or concealed (*Mor*., *Curios*. 516d–e, 517c, 518c) and seeking what does not concern that person (*Mor*., *Curios*. 520e). He closely links meddling to κακοήθεια ("bad disposition, malignity" [*Mor*., *Curios*. 515d; 518c])[20] and ἐπιχαιρεκακία ("joy over one's neighbor's misfortune" [*Mor*., *Curios*. 518c]).[21] Plutarch also speaks of meddlers as of the same family as informers (συκοφάντης [*Mor*., *Curios*. 523a–b]), a group he describes as especially despised.[22] Association

[19] Both terms denote meddling according to LSJ, 1373, 1989.

[20] LSJ, 861; BDAG defines κακοήθεια as "a basic defect in character that leads one to be hurtful to others" (p. 500).

[21] LSJ, 672.

[22] See LSJ, 1671. The connection between informing and interfering can be seen in Aristophanes' play *The Plutus*. One of the characters, an informer (sycophant, συκοφάντης), has an extended conversation with a just man (δίκαιος). The sycophant speaks of his involvement in both public and private matters (907). The just man then questions whether this is not interference (πολυπραγμονέω [913]) and calls him (in his meddling) a housebreaker (τοιχωρύχος [909]). See also the connection between πολυπραγμοσύνη and συκοφάντης in Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*, as cited in Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne," 57.

of the idea of meddling with activities of such a serious nature lends support for understanding meddling with similarly serious connotations.

In addition, Plutarch uses a number of potent metaphors to communicate the abhorrent nature of meddling. He likens this activity to a chicken that ignores its own nearby food and instead searches out one single grain of barley from the dung heap (*Mor*., *Curios*. 516d). He also uses the image of a maggot feeding on dead matter to illustrate the nature of interference (*Mor*., *Curios*. 517e). Both images evoke a sense of revulsion at the activity described and could hardly be termed innocuous, as might the English word "busybody."[23]

Finally, Plutarch speaks of meddling as an action of similar severity to adultery. He speaks of a certain legislator who banned "the lampooning on the comic stage of all citizens except adulterers and busybodies" (μοιχοὺς καὶ πολυπράγμονας) (*Mor*., *Curios*. 519b, Helmbold). It seems that these two personages alone merit such inconsiderate treatment. Plutarch then points out the similarity between meddling and adultery by noting that "adultery does seem to be a sort of curiosity about [better, "meddling in"; πολυπραγμοσύνη] another's pleasure . . . while curiosity (πολυπραγμοσύνη) is an encroaching, a debauching and denuding of secret things" (*Mor*., *Curios*. 519c, Helmbold).[24]

Meddling: Connotations of Injustice and Improper Roles

In Plato's foundational discussion of the proper basis of the *polis*,[25] he speaks of the ruinous consequences of meddling (πολυπραγμοσύνη and verbal cognate). He begins by defining justice (δικαιοσύνη), the cornerstone of the *polis*, as attending to one's own business (τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν) and not being one who meddles (προσπραγμονέω) (*Resp*. 433a).[26] For Plato, this is tied to each person's fulfilling of his/her proper, nature-given, singular task.

[23] Ehrenberg flags the inadequacy of the translation "busybody" for πολυπραγμοσύνη when he says, "though this translation may be adequate in some passages of Greek literature, it is only too apt to conceal the full implications of the word" ("Polypragmosyne," 46).

[24] In addition to the authors cited in this section, Elliott speaks of widespread disapprobation of meddling, which is "condemned not only by Hellenistic moralists but by Israelite and Christian authors as well." In regard to Jewish authors, Elliott mentions Sir 3:23; *T. Iss.* 5:1; *T. Reu.* 3:10 (Elliott, *1 Peter*, 787). Nevertheless, the words used to denote meddling are not given a negative shading in all instances. Plutarch, for example, does acknowledge a potentially positive side of πολυπραγμοσύνη, namely, curiosity for learning (*Mor*., *Curios*. 520f–521a). Ehrenberg also mentions that Polybius often uses the verbal form of πολυπραγμοσύνη to indicate "any kind of intensified activity" as well as "investigating . . . , reconnoitering, or even instructing" ("Polypragmosyne," 62 n. 46).

[25] In the *Republic*, the dialogue is set between Socrates and Glaucon, who challenges Socrates on the nature of the ideal *polis*.

[26] Plato cites this definition as essentially proverbial: "a saying that we have heard from many and have very often repeated ourselves" (*Resp.* 433b, Shorey). Ehrenberg ("Polypragmosyne," 60)

> ἕνα ἕκαστον ἓν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη.
>
> each [person] must perform one social service in the state for which his[/her] nature was best adapted. (*Resp*. 433a, Shorey)[27]

Plato's argument for the integral connection between justice and nonmeddling proceeds as follows. He has previously argued (*Resp*. 427d–432) that three virtues are foundational to justice in the *polis*: σωφροσύνη (self-control, moderation), ἀνδρεία (courage), and φρονήσις (understanding, wisdom).[28] The remaining quality, which preserves the other three in the pursuit of justice, is "the principle embodied in child, woman, slave, free, artisan, ruler, and ruled, that each performed his[/her] one task as one [person] (τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος εἷς ὢν ἔπραττε) and was not a versatile busybody (οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει)" (*Resp*. 433d, Shorey). He concludes that the principle of nonmeddling (that is, each attending to her or his own task: ἡ τοῦ ἕκαστον . . . τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις) rivals the other three virtues in its contribution to the *polis* and so can be termed justice (δικαιοσύνη) (*Resp*. 433d–e; also 441e).

Plato then elaborates on the nature of πολυπραγμοσύνη and its relationship to assigned roles and functions. According to Plato, while minor interchange (μεταλαμβάνω) of social roles is not particularly destructive to the *polis* (for example, that of a carpenter and a cobbler), wholesale interchange *between social strata* can bring about the state's destruction (*Resp*. 434b). In this regard, Plato speaks of three distinct "classes": those who deal with commerce or business (χρηματιστικός, e.g., artisans), the military (ἐπικουρικός), and guardians (φύλακος, i.e., those who rule the state) (*Resp*. 434c).[29] The concept of role substitution (μεταβολήν) between major social strata provides further clarification of Plato's definition of πολυπραγμοσύνη. Such role substitution promotes "the greatest injury to a state and would most rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works its harm" and so is rightly termed injustice (ἀδικία [*Resp*. 434c, Shorey]).[30] In contrast, the proper functioning of the three groups, defined as ἑκάστου τούτων τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττοντος ("each of these [groups] performing its own task") is δικαιοσύνη. Plato briefly comments on meddling as crossing social or class

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sums up Plato's position with these words, "when Plato maintains his fundamental claim that justice and moderation consist in τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, he expressly contrasts this with πολυπραγμονεῖν, that is to say, he envisages the true way of life as one opposed to πολυπραγμοσύνη."

[27] As it is here, the concept of φύσις (nature) is frequently connected to the discussion of meddling. For other examples, see Plato, *Resp.* 374b–c, 434b; Xenophon, *Oec*. 7.31.

[28] The term σοφία is also used to describe the third virtue.

[29] LSJ, 2005, 640, 1960; see also *Resp*. 374e, 375–76, 456a; and Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne," 60.

[30] Interchanging of honor (τιμάς) between social strata is considered a serious breach (*Resp.* 434b; see also *Resp.* 444b).

boundaries later in the *Republic*, when he notes that one detriment of an oligarchy is the propensity for its citizens to meddle (πολυπραγμονέω), that is, to be farmers, those engaged in business (χρηματιζομένους), and soldiers at the same time (*Resp*. 551e–552a).[31]

It is clear thus far that the concept of meddling expressed by any number of Greek terms (including πολυπραγμοσύνη, περίεργος, and their cognates) often receives serious approbation from Greco-Roman writers. In addition, one connotation of the meddling concept is movement outside of one's assigned sphere of activity or proper role.[32] This may involve moving outside of one's assigned place in society and, as we shall soon discover, moving outside of gender roles more specifically. The key to social and to political life (that is, to justice in the state), in contrast to such meddling, is for all persons to fulfill their designated tasks without presuming to fulfill functions not rightfully theirs.[33]

Meddling: Connotation of Improper Gender Roles

If the connotative range of meddling as a topos includes moving outside of one's assigned sphere of activity, then it might be helpful to explore a couple of Greco-Roman texts that explicate this connotation in terms of gender roles. Xenophon, a historian of the same era as Plato, delineates indoor and outdoor

[31] The Loeb translator, Paul Shorey, uses the combination of "busybodies" and "jack-of-all-trades" to express πολυπραγμονέω. Although in certain twenty-first-century cultures, being a jack-of-all-trades is an admirable quality, in the ancient context (as well as some contemporary contexts), this characteristic is not only undesirable; it is unachievable. As Plato elsewhere states, "it is impossible for one [person] to do the work of many arts well" (*Resp.*, 374a, Shorey). Ehrenberg ("Polypragmosyne," 61) states that "[Aristotle] regards large States as fortunate for having many officials each of whom is restricted to one kind of work only—a strange remark in our ears."

[32] In the context of his discussion of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος, Dionysius the Areopagite speaks of the value of a priest staying within the order (τάξις) of his cultic service or ministry (*Ep*. 8.1). The concern for τάξις in religious, social, and political hierarchies is thematic in Greco-Roman ethical discourse. See Elliott, *1 Peter*, 486–87.

[33] Since the relationship between household and state is closely construed in Greco-Roman thought (e.g., Plato above), one could argue that the concept of meddling had political as well as social overtones. For instance, Isocrates sets meddlers in opposition to those who are "good men with reference to the *polis* . . . and to their own households" (*Antid*. 99). As David Balch notes, the connection between household and state (*polis*) was such that "insubordination in the one led to insubordination in the other" (*Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in I Peter* [SBLMS 26; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981], 94). See also Elliott, "1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy: Discussion with Balch," in *Perspectives on First Peter* (ed. Charles H. Talbert; NABRP Special Studies Series 9; Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), 63. In a sense, then, commentators whose impulse it is to translate ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος as a "revolutionary" may have hit upon a legitimate nuance, though not an adequate translation of the term (e.g., Moffatt, *Peter*, 158; Beare, *Peter*, 167; Knox, "Pliny and 1 Peter," 188).

tasks in relation to gender roles: the woman's sphere involves indoor duties, and outdoor tasks belong to the men (*Oec.* 7.29–32). Xenophon grounds this distinction in divine appointment and law (ὁ νόμος [*Oec.* 7.29–30]). He then infers from this that if a man disregards his own work (τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ) or performs his wife's work (πράττων τὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἔργα), he will be punished (*Oec.* 7.31–32). The language Xenophon uses here is quite similar to the grammatical/linguistic construction Plato uses to describe activity that is the opposite of meddling, τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν ("performing the activities which are one's own" [see *Resp.* 433a, 433d, 434c]).[34] To perform one's own assigned work and not interfere in the assigned tasks of another—here those of one's spouse—is to be commended; it is the honorable (καλός) thing (Xenophon, *Oec.* 7.30).

The connection between meddling and gender (marriage) roles is even more apparent in Philo (*Spec.* 3.169–77). According to Philo, women are "best suited to the indoor life," that is, confinement at home (οἰκουρία [*Spec.* 3.169, Colson]).[35] Their task is to govern the household (οἰκονομία), while men have been fitted for the work of public life or statesmanship (πολιτεία [*Spec.* 3.170]). After delineating appropriate spheres of influence, Philo ties movement outside of assigned roles to meddling. "A woman (wife) should not meddle in tasks outside of the household" (ἔξω τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν πολύπραγμονείτω [*Spec.* 171]).[36] A wife's meddling, in this instance, is seeking tasks outside of the sphere assigned to her.

To summarize the evidence from Greco-Roman discourse, a distinct aspect of meddling as a concept involves attention to tasks outside of one's own designated sphere of activity. In a few writers (Xenophon and Philo), we hear this particular connotation for meddling applied to women seeking to move outside of the (proper) sphere of their own role in the household.

III. ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος Defined: Corroborating Evidence from 1 Peter

This semantic association of the Greco-Roman topos of meddling seems particularly helpful to the discussion of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in the context of 1 Peter. Assuming, as already argued, that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 4:15 is meant

[34] Specifically, both use the grammatical construction of a verbal form of πράσσω + a genitive showing to whom the activity or task belongs. In addition, the word ἔργον ("work") often is included or the idea of one's task is implied by inclusion of a substantival neuter article.

[35] The term οἰκουρία can refer to "housekeeping and its cares" or "keeping at home" (indoors) (LSJ, 1205).

[36] Philo contrasts this with what a woman ought to do, namely, ζητοῦσα μοναυλίαν ("seek a life of seclusion" [*Spec.* 171, Colson]).

to evoke the concept of meddling, we might try out the connotation of moving outside of one's proper role as a possible meaning for ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 4:15. Does the context of 1 Peter support such a reading?

The Petrine Context: Fitting a Theme

In examination of the broader context of 1 Peter, a prominent exhortation across the whole of the letter is toward honorable and holy conduct (1:15–16, 22; 2:11–12, 15, 20; 3:1–2, 13–14, 16–17; and 4:1–2).[37] Woven with this theme is the idea that suffering will often accompany good conduct (2:12, 20; 3:13–14, 16–17; 4:3–4; see also 4:16). Ironically, in fact, what believers know to be right behavior will often be misjudged as evil by nonbelievers (2:12; 3:16; cf. 4:3–4) and so may result in unearned suffering. In the context of the intersection of these themes, the author admonishes believers to be sure that their "maligned" behavior is truly good and not evil. "Keep your conscience clear, so that, when you are maligned, those who abuse you for your good conduct in Christ may be put to shame" (3:16–17 NRSV; see also 2:20; 3:13–14). This is where 4:15 enters the picture thematically. "But none of you ought to suffer as a murderer, a thief, a criminal, or as a meddler" (μὴ γάρ τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω ὡς φονεὺς ἢ κλέπτης ἢ κακοποιὸς ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος).

The author of 1 Peter seems bent on preparing his readers for suffering at the hands of unbelievers that might arise from their obedience to God; what he does not want is for them to mistake this for justified suffering that results from wrongdoing. As Elliott notes, "the addressees should lead irreproachable lives . . . and offer no occasion for justifiable accusation on the part of outsiders."[38]

The Immediate Context: 1 Peter 4:12–19

Beginning in 4:12, the author of 1 Peter returns to the refrain that believers should expect suffering. He explains that such suffering comes not only as a test

[37] The Greek term καλός, often rendered "good" in English, is one of many terms associated with the concept of honor in the first-century world. See LSJ, 870, where the translation equivalents "noble" and "honourable" are provided. The NRSV helpfully renders the dual occurrence of καλός in 2:12 as "honorable/bly." For the word applied to the fulfillment of proper gender tasks, see Xenophon, *Oec*. 7.30. As Elliott notes regarding Greco-Roman ethics, "[t]o behave honorably was to conduct oneself in accord with one's social station and given roles" (*1 Peter*, 487; see also 488). For the ancient connection between honor and women remaining in the private sphere, see David A. deSilva, *The Hope of Glory: Honor Discourse and New Testament Interpretation* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 13–14.

[38] Elliott, *1 Peter*, 788.

(4:12) but also as a signal of the initiation of God's final judgment (4:17).[39] Rather than being caught off guard by such suffering (4:12), believers should rejoice, since current suffering indicates their blessed state and future joy (4:13–14). It is at this juncture in his argument that the author qualifies his discussion of suffering. His audience is to make sure that their suffering results from Christian identification rather than from wrongdoing.

The activities denounced in 4:15 are particular examples of wrongdoing that in the previous context of 1 Peter has been described only in general terms as sinning (ἁμαρτάνω [2:20]) and evildoing (κακοποιέω [3:17]).[40] The relationship of the four activities in 4:15 (ὡς φονεὺς, ἢ κλέπτης ἢ κακοποιὸς ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος) is pertinent to an understanding of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος. Most commentators have understood the third term κακοποιός ("evildoer"; cf. the cognates in 2:12, 14; 3:17) to be a more general category than the preceding two mentioned, murderer and thief (φονεύς and κλέπτης).[41] Debated among scholars is the issue of whether this more general term refers to illegal activity, as the first two terms clearly do.[42] The relevance of this issue for an understanding of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος becomes clear as we recall that the English renderings of it fall into two camps, reflecting either illegal activity (e.g., embezzler) or socially censured behavior (e.g., meddler). It seems more likely, given the general nature of κακοποιέω earlier in 1 Peter, to allow κακοποιός in 4:15 similar latitude.[43] If this is the case, then the list alone would not necessarily suggest that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος indicates illegal activity (since the preceding term does not likely refer to illegal activity specifically).[44] The nature of the list, along with the evidence above,

[39] Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 315.

[40] The list in 4:3, although containing quite specific activities, is not mentioned as provoking Gentile *opinion* that the activities themselves are evil (only that the Gentiles are surprised that Christians no longer participate in them).

[41] E.g., Elliott, *1 Peter*, 785; Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 310; Michaels, *1 Peter*, 267; Schreiner, *1 Peter*, 224. In a slightly different vein, Davids (*1 Peter*, 168) understands κακοποιός to sum up the previous two illegal activities.

[42] For κακοποιός as illegal activity, see Michaels, *1 Peter*, 266, 268; Davids, *1 Peter*, 168; Reicke, *Peter*, 125. Contra Best, *1 Peter*, 164; Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 310; Goppelt, *1 Peter*, 325–26; and Schreiner, *1 Peter*, 224.

[43] The meaning of κακοποιέω in 2:12 and 3:17 is quite general in scope, referring to the antithesis of good behavior (καλῶν ἔργων and ἀγαθοποιοῦντας, respectively). In 2:14, the same verb (as a substantival participle, κακοποιῶν) refers to those whose activity is rightly punished by governing authorities and so may be more narrowly understood as illegal activity. Yet the contrast to κακοποιέω in this verse is still (those who do) good behavior (ἀγαθοποιῶν) more generally. So unless we have clear contextual reasons for narrowing κακοποιέω solely to illegal activity, it is better understood in 4:15 as a general term for wrongdoing, as earlier in the letter. So Goppelt, *1 Peter*, 325–26 n. 36.

[44] Best indicates that "[u]nlike the first three categories it is difficult to take [ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος] as denoting a criminal" (*1 Peter*, 165). Elliott speaks of the second two terms as "likely involving offenses against expected decorum" (*1 Peter*, 788). Contra Achtemeier, who avoids defining

indicates that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος refers not to illegal activity (such as embezzling) but to socially censured meddling, which although not an illegal activity is a weighty social transgression in the first-century world.

Another issue raised by the list is the placement of ὡς immediately prior to the list of four activities and its recurrence directly before ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος. Does the additional ὡς before the final word indicate that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος is distinct in some way from the first three activities? Although numbers of commentators argue for some kind of distinction,[45] Achtemeier helpfully points to both text-critical and linguistic indicators to argue that the additional ὡς does not likely signal a significant distinction of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος from the previous three terms.[46] Instead, it may be that the presence of ὡς before ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος can be explained at least in part by reference to 4:16. Since in the subsequent verse the author is going to provide a potent contrast to suffering as a murderer, a thief, an evildoer, or a meddler, the repetition of ὡς at the end of the list helps to heighten the impending contrast. It is suffering "as a Christian" (ὡς Χριστιανός) that incurs no shame for the believer. Because both the subject and imperatival verb of this phrase are implied from 4:15, the repetition of ὡς immediately prior to ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος not only strengthens the contrast but also reiterates the relationship between the two contrasting ideas.

μὴ γάρ τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω	ὡς φονεὺς
	ἢ κλέπτης
	ἢ κακοποιὸς
	ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος
εἰ δὲ . . . [τις πάσχει] . . .	ὡς Χριστιανός

The repetition of ὡς at the end of 4:15 highlights that it is the *manner* of suffering that distinguishes shameful suffering from suffering that actually brings glory to God: not "as a murderer a thief, a criminal, or as a meddler, but . . . as a Christian."

κακοποιός as solely illegal activity ("this word could . . . include reference to legally punishable acts, but it need not be restricted to such acts, and so is broader than the first two words [of the list]" [p. 310]) but in the end argues in rather circular fashion that interference in social matters as the meaning of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος is less defensible, since this meaning "would not be, like the others [in the list], a legal offense; as such it would abruptly change the direction of the list of acts to be avoided" (*1 Peter*, 310).

[45] With ὡς introducing a "fresh category" (Kelly, *Commentary on Peter*, 189); distinguishing ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος as noncriminal activity (Michaels, *1 Peter*, 268; see also Selwyn, *First Peter*, 225) or as a "less serious" activity (Schreiner, *1 Peter*, 225); or even indicating that the final term "sum[s] up all possible offences in a comprehensive *et cetera*" (Bigg, *St. Peter*, 179).

[46] Achtemeier argues his point by reference to "the fact that some early scribes did not understand ὡς to have such a [distinguishing] function [since the particle shows up in some manuscripts before the second and/or third nouns as well] and the fact that some such device is often used in the NT to indicate the end of a list" (*1 Peter*, 310).

In other words, while its inclusion is not absolutely necessary, there is rhetorical justification for the second ὡς of 4:15.

Finally, if we understand ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος to refer to meddling, it can easily be argued that the list of 4:15 retains its coherence. In contrast to assertions by some that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος cannot refer to meddling since it does not cohere with the serious nature of the preceding three terms of the list,[47] we have noted the serious nature of meddling in the ancient context. To interfere outside of one's assigned sphere of activity is no small transgression. Instead, it merits severe censure because it disrupts the ordained order of the sociopolitical realm.

So then, understood in the larger context of 1 Peter, the list of activities in 4:15 provides specific cases of wrongdoing to be avoided, so that any suffering by Christians arises not from wrong behavior but from pagan misrepresentation of good behavior based in Christian identity. What is to be eschewed by the Petrine audience is suffering for actual wrongdoing. The examples given in 4:15 include ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος, which likely refers to interference outside of one's assigned roles.

This connotation aptly fits the admonitions of the household code given earlier in 1 Peter. In fact, the use of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος at this point in the letter may be a nod back to the general thrust of the exhortations of 2:11–3:12.[48] Conversely, the import of the Petrine household code provides support for understanding ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος as moving outside one's assigned sphere of activity.

The Petrine Context: The Relevance of the Petrine Household Code

The Petrine *Haustafel* (2:11–3:12) is an important part of the author's emphasis on Christians exhibiting good behavior in a hostile, pagan environment. The introduction to the household code (2:11–12) contains the thematic admonition to "conduct yourselves honorably among the Gentiles" in the same breath as the proviso "though they malign you as evildoers" (2:12 NRSV). Honorable conduct in relation to Gentiles is then elaborated: ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει ("submit to every human creature" [2:13]). After applying this to submission to king and governors (2:13–17), the author in the rest of the code describes the appropriate responses for particular members of the household: slaves (2:18–25),

[47] E.g., BDAG, 47. This is often the (at least partial) legitimation provided for rendering ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος as "embezzler" rather than "meddler."

[48] I understand the household code to include 2:11–3:12, though I recognize that, given its more general introduction (2:11–12) and conclusion (3:8–12), one could refer to 2:13–3:7 as the household code proper. So also Balch, *Wives*, 125; Goppelt, *1 Peter*, 153; Best, *1 Peter*, 110; and Beare, *Peter*, 133; cf. Achtemeier for a defense of 2:11(13)–3:7 as the delimitation of the code (*1 Peter*, 169).

wives (3:1–6), and husbands (3:7). The code concludes by returning to a more general audience and exhorting believers to peace and right behavior (3:8–12).

Common to these various segments of the domestic code is the value of remaining within one's prescribed role in the household (and hence in society or the *polis*) as much as possible given one's prior and primary Christian convictions.[49] Slaves are to submit to masters, whether kind or harsh (2:18), and wives are to submit even to unbelieving husbands (3:1).[50] The expectation in the household code of 1 Peter is for believers to enact allegiance to Christ while remaining in their assigned (societal) sphere of activity. The goal of such behavior is to minimize, for the sake of the gospel, the social disruption caused by conversion to Christianity. As Balch argues in his detailed work on the Petrine domestic code, "the author was especially concerned about divided households: many masters and husbands were still pagans, while some slaves and wives had converted to Christianity. In these divided houses, the harmony demanded by the Hellenistic moralists had been disturbed, which was judged to be a negative reflection on the new religion."[51] According to Balch, the function of the household code is apologetic; it reassures those in authority that those who have converted "are obedient slaves and wives, just as the culture expected them to be."[52]

Such an expectation, especially the call to wives in 3:1–6, has affinities with Philo's admonition to wives to avoid meddling in tasks outside of their household. Meddling (πολύπραγμονέω) undermines cultural expectations and, for Philo, disrupts the natural order (ἐφαρμόζω, what is suitable [*Spec.* 3.169]). So a connection exists for Philo between meddling and moving outside social boundaries (particularly, boundaries of the household). The same may be the case for the author of 1 Peter, if 4:15 provides the obverse to the exhortation to wives in 3:1–6.

Corroborating evidence in this regard is the use of ἡσυχία (with adjectival cognate ἡσύχιος) as an ideal for Christian wives in nonbelieving households (3:4) and its connection to proper submission within the household (3:5). "Let your adornment be the inner self with the lasting beauty of a gentle and quiet (ἡσύχιος) spirit, which is very precious in God's sight. *It was in this way* long ago that the holy women who hoped in God used to adorn themselves by accepting

[49] See Balch's extensive work on the domestic code of 1 Peter (*Wives*).

[50] Though not to the extent of leaving their new-found faith; see Jeannine K. Brown, "Silent Wives, Verbal Believers: Ethical and Hermeneutical Considerations in 1 Peter 3:1–6 and Its Context," *Word and World* 24 (Fall 2004): 400. The call to husbands moves beyond societal expectations by commanding them to assign honor to their wives. Nevertheless, the hierarchical framework of the household is by no means eliminated in the Petrine *Haustafel.* Instead, the social order is essentially maintained (ibid., 399, 401–2).

[51] Balch, *Wives*, 109. Balch points out the emphasis on reestablishing (household) harmony in the conclusion to the household code—3:8–12.

[52] Ibid.

the authority of [ὑποτάσσω, submitting to] their husbands" (3:4–5 NRSV [italics mine]). If engaging one's proper role in the societal hierarchy is associated with ἡσυχία (as is implied in the comparative relationship between 1 Pet 3:4 and 3:5), then the significant conceptual connection between ἡσυχία and meddling in Greco-Roman literature provides additional support for the link between 1 Pet 3:1–6 and 4:15.

The term ἡσυχία is frequently used in direct contrast to the concept of meddling in Greek literature (e.g., πολυπραγμοσύνη).[53] According to Ehrenberg, ἡσυχία denotes "harmonious quiet," that peaceful demeanor opposed to public interference and striving.[54] Though the contrast between ἡσυχία and public interference surfaces time and again in Greco-Roman commentary on meddling, a couple of texts illustrating this connection will suffice. In Aristophanes' play *The Plutus*, a just man accuses a sycophant of interference (τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν [*Plut*. 913]) and calls him instead to "lead a quiet life" (ἡσυχίαν ἔχων [*Plut*. 921]). Further description of ἡσυχία is given by Isocrates, who in defending his students characterizes them using the two terms ἀπράγμων (the opposite of one who practices πολυπραγμοσύνη) and ἡσυχία. He defines the latter as "giving their minds to their own affairs and confining their intercourse to each other, and living, furthermore, day by day in the greatest simplicity and decorum" (*Antid*. 227–28, Norlin).[55]

New Testament usage of the term outside of 1 Peter demonstrates the positive connection between ἡσυχία (or its cognate) and role acceptance in addition to the antonymous connection between ἡσυχία and meddling. In 1 Timothy 2, the concept of ἡσυχία is invoked three times (ἡσύχιος in 2:2 and ἡσυχία in 2:11 and 12). In 2:1–2, the author commends prayer for those in positions of authority (ὑπεροχή), including kings, for the purpose of his readers leading a tranquil and quiet (ἡσύχιος) life. Here ἡσυχία is linked to proper alignment with governing authorities (by praying and thanking God for them).[56] In 1 Tim 2:11–12, ἡσυχία is explicitly tied to proper submission. Women are to learn in quietness (ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ), that is, in full submission (ἐν πάσῃ ὑποταγῇ).[57] The call to ἡσυχία is

[53] Ibid., 112 n. 41.

[54] Ehrenberg draws in part on a definition by Pindar ("Polypragmosyne," 47, 56). In discussion of Greco-Roman usage, BDAG provides one definition of ἡσυχία as "of a quiet scholar's life w. implied contrast of being engaged in public affairs" (p. 440).

[55] For numerous other examples, see Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne," 47, 54, 56, 58, 59. Ehrenberg (p. 57) refers to Isocrates' statement, "the least meddlesome people [ἀπραγμονέστατοι] in the city" are those who "keep πλείστην [much] ἡσυχίαν" (*Areop*. 15, 227).

[56] This is reminiscent of the first segment of the Petrine household code, which speaks of proper submission to governing authorities (1 Pet 2:13–14).

[57] The two parallel prepositional phrases (both beginning with ἐν) seem to be mutually defining to some degree. So William D. Mounce, *Pastoral Epistles* (WBC 46; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2000), 117.

heralded again in the end of 2:12, where it is contrasted with (improper) exercise of authority over a man, that is, exercising an improper social role (αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ).[58] Earlier we noted the opposition of meddling and ἡσυχία in 2 Thess 3:11–12, where idle, meddling (περιεργαζομένους) persons are exhorted instead to "work quietly" (μετὰ ἡσυχίας ἐργαζόμενοι). This strikes a familiar chord with 1 Thess 4:11, where the readers are urged to live quietly (verbal cognate, ἡσυχάζω) and to perform their own tasks (πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια) and to work (ἐργάζεσθαι) with their own hands.[59] Thus, the evidence tying ἡσυχία to proper role fulfillment in contrast to meddling provides additional support for hearing a connection between ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Pet 4:15 and the domestic code of 2:11–3:12, especially the exhortation addressed to wives (with ἡσυχία in 3:4).

Nevertheless, only a few commentators have noted the connection (entire or partial) between the domestic code and ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 4:15. Balch is one who affirms a connection between the Petrine household code (2:11–3:12) and the prohibition against meddling (4:15). For Balch, however, this connection stems from the criticism garnered from outsiders:

> Given the apologetic function of the conduct described in the household code, that is, that such behavior is a response to outsiders' criticisms, I suggest that the "evil speaking" and "minding others' affairs" forbidden to Christians (2:1 and 4:15) were being practiced also by pagans toward Christians. Certain busybodies spoke against . . . the Christians' *household* relationships and their impiety.[60]

According to Balch, the conduct that the Petrine author disavows for his audience in relation to unbelievers is behavior being practiced by pagan neighbors toward believers.

While Balch's reconstruction of antagonism between believers and their detractors may very well be accurate, a more direct link also seems likely between the domestic code and the prohibition of meddling in 4:15.[61] The prohibition of movement outside one's assigned sphere of activity in 4:15 (ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος) finds its antidote in the commended submission within the household in 2:11–3:12. Balch does seem to approach affirming this connection when he states, "Christians are not to exacerbate the situation [of newly converted wives and

[58] The *inclusio* that frames 2:11–12 (with 2:11 beginning γυνὴ ἐν ἡσυχία and 2:12 ending ἐν ἡσυχία) strengthens the conclusion that these verses are focused on the concept of proper role fulfillment.

[59] The latter has verbal similarities to Plato and Xenophon when they describe proper role fulfillment in contrast to meddling. See discussion above, p. 558. Xenophon: πράττων τὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἔργα (*Oec.* 7.31); Plato: τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν (*Resp.* 4.433a, 433d, 434c).

[60] Balch, *Wives*, 94 (author's emphasis).

[61] And may best explain the presence of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 4:15.

slaves] by meddling in others' domestic affairs (4:15). The readers are warned that governors punish insubordinate persons but are reassured that the authorities praise those who accept their role in the socio-political system (2:14)."[62] This is the only point where Balch hints that the meddling referred to in 4:15 might be linked to what he terms insubordination within the sociopolitical system, with the (contrasting) proper response being to accept one's role in that system. I believe this link is exactly right. Even as he is hinting at this relationship, however, Balch provides a more standard definition of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος as "meddling in others' domestic affairs" rather than moving outside of one's assigned role (a more suitable and specific definition if insubordination is in mind).[63]

Elliott ties the idea of meddling in 4:15 with inappropriate transgression of social boundaries, although he does not connect ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος explicitly to the household code of 2:11–3:12.[64] The "proscription of meddling may well have been intended to warn the addressees to respect the social boundaries distinguishing them from outsiders, to keep their own house in order and beyond reproach, and to focus on attracting others rather than on criticizing them or meddling in their affairs."[65] Elliott's emphasis in this regard, however, is on the Christian household (i.e., church) rather than familial households. As he indicates in *A Home for the Homeless*, ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος "describes a type of person who acts contrary to the norm, and transgresses the boundaries, of *the household of God*."[66]

If, as Elliott argues, the meaning of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Pet 4:15 points to the transgressing of social boundaries, the contextual (as well as the lexical/conceptual) evidence suggests that social transgression occurs when individuals move outside their assigned role or sphere of activity. This fits well with the thrust of the household code earlier in 1 Peter, especially the admonition to wives in 3:1–

[62] Balch, *Wives*, 109.

[63] Balch exhibits a more generic understanding of ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in his implicit agreement with Zeller that it refers to Petrine missionaries who are meddling in pagan affairs (*Wives*, 93).

[64] The only connection made by Elliott between the two is in relation to participation prior to conversion in industrial guilds, which "were sources of social and political ferment in this period. Previous membership in such guilds could have been a . . . factor in the tensions which existed between the Christians and their neighbors, particularly their employers (see the charges leveled against them in 4:15 and the law-abiding admonition of 2:13–17)" (Elliott, *Home*, 70).

[65] Elliott, *1 Peter*, 788.

[66] Elliott, *Home*, 141 (emphasis mine). See also his discussion of the purpose of the household code: John H. Elliott, "1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy," in *Perspectives on First Peter*, 66, where he states "the household code (2:13–3:12; 5:1–5) provides a schema for delineating behavior, norms, and values typical of persons belonging to the household of God." For Balch's critique of Elliott's emphasis on the household of God, see David L. Balch, "Hellenization/Acculturation in 1 Peter," in *Perspectives on First Peter*, 98–99.

6 to submit to unbelieving husbands and to be characterized by ἡσυχία. It also resonates with attempts by various scholars to argue that ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος has political ramifications, since good citizenship in the sphere of the household helps to ensure the same in the *polis*.[67] Viewed from an ancient perspective, transgression of social boundaries by moving beyond acceptable sociocultural roles sows seeds of political unrest, since such behavior encourages insubordination to the *polis*.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος in 1 Pet 4:15 fits the parameters of the Greco-Roman topos of meddling and likely refers to movement outside of culturally appropriate social boundaries. This type of interference in the social order has political ramifications and as such would be understood as involving insubordination to the *polis*. The admonition in 4:15 to avoid this insubordinate behavior fits the Petrine concern for ensuring that Christian behavior reproached by pagan neighbors is truly good and not evil (cf. 2:11–12; 4:15–16). In fact, the prohibition against behaving as an ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος provides a thematic parallel to the submissive behavior commended earlier in the domestic code (2:11–3:12).

This proposed reading contributes to the ongoing discussion of the purposes of 1 Peter, with the focus on accommodation or distinctiveness at issue. Balch has argued that the purpose of the Petrine household code is acculturation in order to minimize local persecution currently being experienced by the Christian community. Elliott has countered that accommodation does not do justice to the overarching goal of the letter, which focuses on Christian distinctiveness in society. For Elliott, the letter is in part "advocating means for preserving the distinctive identity, internal cohesion, and continued commitment of the addressees."[68] Balch has answered Elliott's critique by pointing out that his own work has focused specifically on the household code, which in his assessment involves acculturation. Nevertheless, for Balch, the whole of 1 Peter "is written in the context of an active Christian mission" (i.e., distinctiveness is a factor in the letter as well).[69] Given the contributions of both Elliott and Balch, it would seem wise to maintain this tension in any construal of the purposes of 1 Peter.[70] As

[67] See n. 33 above. Interesting in this regard is the direct contrast between φιλοπράγμων and φιλόπολις in Lycurgus (*Leocr. 3*), with the implication that meddling is antithetical to loyalty to the *polis*; as cited in Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne," 58. See also in this regard Cicero's call to foreigners "to attend strictly to [one's] own concerns, not to pry into other people's business, and under no condition to meddle (*curiosum*) in the politics of a country not [one's] own" (*Off.* 1.125).

[68] Elliott, "1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy," 69.

[69] Balch, "Acculturation in 1 Peter," 82 n. 13.

[70] As both Elliott and Balch seem to do, despite their decided differences.

Miroslav Volf notes, "There is a strange tension in 1 Peter between the stress on difference and attempts at acculturation."[71]

My work suggests that the tension between acculturation and distinctiveness in 1 Peter arises not only through the prominence of the Petrine household code in 1 Peter 2–3, which itself points toward distinctiveness as well as accommodation.[72] The author reiterates accommodation to existing social structures in 4:15–16, while also providing a counterbalancing emphasis on Christian distinctiveness. "Let none of you suffer . . . as one who moves outside of your assigned role, but if any of you suffers as a 'Christian' . . . you ought to glorify God because of this name that you bear."[73] The Petrine community is to ensure that any suffering they experience arises from their identity with and allegiance to Christ rather than from a lack of conformity to societal designations and expectations. In this way, a distinctive Christian identity is the primary lens through which to understand and evaluate suffering and persecution.

In the very movement between accommodation when possible and distinctiveness when required, the reader of 1 Peter is guided toward the higher purposes of God's honor and Christian mission (see 2:11–12; 3:1–2, 15–16; 4:15–16). By fulfilling the exhortations of the household code and refraining from acting as an ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος, these higher purposes are served.[74]

[71] Miroslav Volf, "Soft Difference: Theological Reflections on the Relation between Church and Culture in 1 Peter," *Ex Auditu,* online at http://www.northpark.edu/sem/exauditu/papers/volf.html (accessed October 18, 2005).

[72] It is precisely at the moment accommodation to societal roles is emphasized that we hear the surprising and rather implicit call to remain true to Christian allegiance and mission (3:1). See Brown, "Silent Wives, Verbal Believers," 399–400. For a discussion of the importance of discerning implications in the interpretive process, see Jeannine K. Brown, *Scripture as Communication: Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, forthcoming).

[73] My own periphrastic rendering of 4:15–16.

[74] See the fuller discussion of purposes such as Christian mission in relation to the household code in Brown, "Silent Wives, Verbal Believers," 402–3.

JBL 125, no. 3 (2006): 569–625

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The Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts, by James P. Allen. SBLWAW 23. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature; Leiden: Brill, 2005. Pp. x + 471. $39.95/$199.00 (paper/cloth). ISBN 1589831829/9004137777.

The Pyramid Texts comprise the oldest body of religious literature produced by the priests of Old Kingdom Egypt (late third millennium B.C.E.). Written in primitive Egyptian hieroglyphic, they can be extremely difficult to read much less understand. Thus, any new translation is a welcome event, not least because the texts exercise such a profound influence upon later Egyptian literature (the Coffin Texts, e.g., often cite the Pyramid Texts as "canonical"). Inscribed on the walls of the royal tombs of several pharaohs (Unis, Teti, Pepi I, Merenre, Pepi II, and Queen Neith), the Pyramid Texts were first discovered in 1880, but new finds have been made as recently as 2001 (the texts of Ankhesenpepi II). Important to both Egyptologists and scholars of comparative religion, the Pyramid Texts preserve a fascinating portrait of the nature and structure of the universe, the character and color of the afterlife, and the gods' role in helping the pharaoh's *ka* (individual life force) reunite with its *ba* (individual "soul") to transform the dead monarch into a fully-functioning *akh* (cosmic being).

This volume includes a short introduction (1–14) followed by clear English translations of the Pyramid Texts of Unis (15–64), the Pyramid Texts of Teti (65–96), the Pyramid Texts of Pepi I (97–208), the Pyramid Texts of Merenre (209–38), the Pyramid Texts of Pepi II (239–308), and the Pyramid Texts of Neith (309–36). This is followed by variant readings of each text (337–74), a concordance of text numbers (375–418), a bibliography (419–24), a glossary of Egyptian terms (425–44), and a subject index (445–71). Overall the book sets out to do two things: (1) provide an updated English translation of all the Pyramid Texts (with the exception of Iput II, Wedjebetni, and Ibi); and (2) rearrange them in their most likely order of ritual incantation. From the standpoint of sheer intellectual achievement, it is hard to imagine another contribution to the Society of Biblical Literature's Writings from the Ancient World series more erudite, more comprehensive, or more accomplished than this one.

The introduction addresses the history of the translation and editing of the Pyramid Texts, their various genres (offering and insignia rituals, resurrection rituals, mourning

rituals, etc.), their religious function, and their portrayal of the Unseen World. Like other Egyptologists (e.g., S. Quirke, *The Cult of Ra: Sun-Worship in Ancient Egypt* [New York: Thames & Hudson, 2001]), Allen interprets these texts traditionally and exactingly, yet without sacrificing clarity (the glossary is helpful, if not exhaustive). According to Allen, the Egyptians believed that the sun's eclipse over the western horizon signaled the beginning of its nightly journey through the dim blackness of the netherworld. Like most ancient solar myths, the Egyptian version symbolized this journey as a circuit across the sky (via a Dayboat in the day and a Nightboat at night). Where it differs, however, from, say, the Anatolian (Hattian) myths about the sun-goddess of Arinna (M. Stone, *When God Was a Woman* [New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976], 96–97), lies in the way it (1) imagines each day as a new birth and (2) graphically describes this birth as the regeneration of the sun-god within the womb of Nut (the sky-goddess), before (3) connecting this (re)birthing process to the pharaoh as Osiris's "humanized clone."

One of the most interesting of the Pyramid Texts is the so-called "Cannibal Hymn" (PT 273–274//Unis 180a–b), in which the pharaoh's spirit is urged to devour "the essence and power of all the forces of the universe" (16), including the "bowels" of "every god . . . when they have come from the Isle of Flame with their belly filled with magic" (51). One need not speculate (à la A. Rosalie David, *The Ancient Egyptians* [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982], 1–24) that the Egyptians themselves must have engaged in such cannibalism to appreciate the function and purpose of this old incantation. The priest reciting this spell wanted to make sure that his master found the nourishment he needed to claim his "proper place in front of all the privileged ones in the Akhet" (51—the place in the netherworld where the sun first unites with Osiris). Breaking this down into separate meals, the priest planned out the pharaoh's menu with alacrity and precision: adult gods in the morning, mid-sized gods in the evening, and young gods for late-night snacking. This is one of the oldest examples of what Paula Brown calls "the efficacy of consumption to acquire the body and spirit of the object consumed" (*Encyclopedia of Religion* 3:60).

While this translation does not (and does not pretend to) replace Kurt Sethe's standard six-volume edition (*Übersetzung und Kommentar zu den altägyptischen Pyramidtexten* [2nd ed.; Hamburg: Augustin, 1962]), its author and publisher are to be commended for providing beginning students with a comprehensive edition of this aboriginal literature.

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The Place of the Law in the Religion of Ancient Israel, by Moshe Weinfeld. VTSup 100. Leiden: Brill, 2004. Pp. xiv + 162. $98.00 (hardcover). ISBN 9004137491.

Few persons are better qualified to take up the subject reflected in the title of this book than Moshe Weinfeld, whose varied works on Deuteronomy have been seminal for the modern study of Deuteronomic literature. The reader, however, should be prepared for a somewhat narrower focus than the title suggests. While the title is not inaccurate,

the "place" to which the title refers is largely a historical matter, more specifically, the question of how and where to date the Priestly Code. An appropriate subtitle would be something like "A Critique of Wellhausen's Dating of P." As such, the book joins a number of other works, largely by Jewish scholars, as Weinfeld notes. Indeed the persistence of Wellhausen's sequencing of the pentateuchal strata among Christian scholars is surely one of the reasons behind Weinfeld's detailed investigation of Wellhausen's thesis and its underlying assumptions.

Weinfeld begins by identifying in some detail the prejudice against Judaism that underlay Wellhausen's analysis of the Priestly law. Through various extended quotations, he uncovers Wellhausen's reading of Pharisaic Judaism as a ritualistic obedience to the law that stands in sharp contrast to the ethical teachings of Jesus. Weinfeld demonstrates Wellhausen's willful ignorance of Jewish sources or, at best, his superficiality in handling them and sets over against that the various ways in which Jesus and the Pharisees shared a common ground, especially with regard to the centrality of love of God and love of neighbor. As Weinfeld and others have observed, Wellhausen's views on Judaism as a religion of dry rules and ritual totally transcended by Jesus's teaching were widely shared among biblical scholars and theologians of his era.

Chapters 2 and 3 may be the most important in the book, for there Weinfeld engages directly the literary-critical arguments of Wellhausen and brings the ancient Near Eastern data into engagement and critique of his position. He takes up each of the five categories of Israel's religious life that Wellhausen used to argue the lateness of P and sets forth counterarguments, for example, the mention of Shiloh as predecessor and prototype to the Jerusalem temple in Jer 7:12 and Ps 78:60 rather than Wellhausen's interpretation of it as a retrojection of the temple. Many of the arguments are cogent, and many of them presume a logical movement that makes good sense but could well have been the reverse of the way Weinfeld proposes. For example, the provision in Deut 12:15 allowing the slaughter and eating of meat in any of the towns and not simply at the sanctuary where the blood can be expiated is seen as a development out of Leviticus 17, where such slaughter is confined to the sanctuary. Also allowing gazelle and deer in Deut 12:15 means that the distinction between the sheep and cattle and hunted animals relative to their being eaten in a state of impurity no longer holds. The domestic animal can now be eaten in an impure state like the hunted animals, which were already free of that restriction in the prior Priestly law. Weinfeld also sees Deuteronomy taking over the Priestly prohibition against eating the blood of the animal (Deut 12:23). The argument is cogent. One nevertheless can ask if the process may not have worked in reverse. That is, there may have been a movement toward restriction rather than away from it. The primary weight in favor of Weinfeld's ordering of events would be the development of a fixed central sanctuary, which would inhibit the requirement of slaughter at the sanctuary and so lead to an opening of the requirements for persons far from the sanctuary.

On sacrificial practices, Weinfeld rightly points to evidence from outside the legal material that suggests a more extensive and complex sacrificial system earlier than Wellhausen presumes. To his texts from prophetic and narrative texts, I would add the sequence of sacrifices in Amos 5:22, which corresponds to the first three types of offerings in Leviticus 1–6. Not only does this demonstrate that the sacrifices and their order to that extent were known at least as early as the eighth century, but it is likely that Amos

is simply listing the first three of a catalogue of sacrifices that would have corresponded to the whole list and sequence in Leviticus 1–6.

In his treatment of the sacred feasts, Weinfeld suggests with regard to Passover that "it is both illogical and historically incorrect to suppose that a centralized, communal offering transformed into a home sacrifice" (29). He also suggests, again, that nonsacrificial slaughter could not have been prohibited after it has been permitted. I am inclined to agree, but I also note that the argument assumes a certain logic, without being able to demonstrate in either case that the process could not have been reversed. One could argue that practices changed under changing circumstances, which would have included the disappearance of the central sanctuary in the exile. Wellhausen's problem was that he often made logical inferences that are capable of being turned on their head, e.g., that New Year and Day of Atonement were not connected to nature and so must have been conceived in the exile. The operation of assumptions and logic is hard to avoid.

Comparison of the statutes regulating *sukkôt* in Leviticus and Deuteronomy leads Weinfeld to conclude that the Deuteronomic Code "represents a more spiritualized character of the festivals. . . . The 'joy' in Deuteronomy . . . represents an inner religious feeling . . . and is therefore devoid of the cultic acts prescribed in Lev 23:39–41" (56). In fact the Leviticus statute is not highly cultic in its form and has joy at its center.

The problem of dating the texts, which Weinfeld several times acknowledges, makes one perhaps too prone to depend upon logical analysis. Certainly, the dating issue hangs over any discussion of P and lies in the background here. That is, one may identify elements that can reflect an earlier time, materials in the P literature that have to do with matters that were aspects of Israelite religion before the exile. That does not, however, tend to the specific dating of the Priestly stratum of the Pentateuch. As often suggested, for example, in the work of Frank M. Cross, the Priestly tradent(s) may have drawn on much older material while still producing the final form of the Tetrateuch in the exilic period. Weinfeld's logical reasoning often helps in pushing for an earlier time, but that is why it is necessary to recognize that the logical arguments are often capable of operating in reverse.

In the second part of the book Weinfeld treats what he calls "Theological Features in the Pentateuch." In one chapter he focuses at length on the differences between the Deuteronomic and Priestly schools, arguing that those differences reflect different sociological backgrounds rather than different historical-chronological settings. In a final chapter on the depiction of God as creator in Deutero-Isaiah and the Priestly account in Genesis 1, Weinfeld seeks to show how the Priestly ideas of God are more primitive and rooted in early myth than the different views of Deutero-Isaiah. An appendix argues that while the character of the Sabbath was different in P than elsewhere does not mean that it was not stringently observed in the preexilic period and that circumcision, contrary to Wellhausen, did not gain a much greater emphasis during the time of exile.

The issue of the historical locus of the Priestly stratum needs to be separated from the value judgments Wellhausen made when he located it at the end of the OT period and assessed it as the postexilic constitution of Judaism. The issues of dating are very complex and very open, as Weinfeld makes clear. If, however, one is going to make a case for the late dating of the final form of the Priestly stratum it will have to be done without Wellhausen's major assumptions about both the law and Judaism. Many of the

critiques Weinfeld makes have been made before, but rarely have they been assembled in one place and with as much concrete textual argument as is found here. The argument is vigorous but not simply polemical. It often makes sense, and treatments of the Priestly stratum especially need to take account of Weinfeld's analysis, whether or not they are engaged with Wellhausen.

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Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy, by Roy E. Gane. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005. Pp. xxii + 394. $39.50 (hardcover). ISBN 1575061015.

In *Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy,* Roy E. Gane, Professor of Hebrew Bible and Ancient Near Eastern Languages at the Theological Seminary of Andrews University, joins in the ongoing quest for the interpretation of cultic atonement and shows how the Day of Atonement rituals ultimately portray the character of YHWH. Considering recent scholarly claims that all ritual activity is necessarily polyvalent and ambiguous, Gane makes an important contribution by presenting a comprehensive and integrated system of atonement based on meticulous attention to the goals of sacrificial rituals explicitly stated in biblical texts. In doing so he engages in a detailed discussion with past and present research, especially that of Jacob Milgrom. In light of these features and its technical language, the book is primarily written for the scholarly community.

The volume is organized in four parts. In part 1, "Ritual, Meaning, and System" (1–42), Gane defines ritual as an activity system that receives its meaning through a goal explicitly assigned to it in the biblical text. This goal is typically a process of transformation "involving interaction with a reality ordinarily inaccessible to the material domain" (15). Gane goes on to outline the entire history of source criticism and diachronic analysis of both the material of Exodus 25–Leviticus 16 that J. Wellhausen identified as priestly codex and the Day of Atonement ritual in Leviticus 16. Gane concludes that a scholarly consensus regarding the history of composition of these texts has not yet been achieved. By contrast, he provides observations on how the ritual of Leviticus 16 is integrated functionally into the larger context of the Pentateuch and argues for its unity. He takes these results to legitimate a synchronic approach to the Day of Atonement rituals as an integrated system. In the final chapter of part 1, Gane reviews scholarly discussions dealing with the relationship between the כפר (atonement) processes that occur throughout the year and those of the Day of Atonement.

Part 2, titled "Purification Offerings Performed throughout the Year" (43–213), deals primarily with חטאת rituals in Lev 4:1–5:13 and ch. 16. Gane maintains that the meaning of these rituals is determined ultimately by goals stated explicitly in the biblical text: as a prerequisite for forgiveness, they purge sin and impurities (hence he follows Milgrom's translation of חטאת as "purification offering"). Gane makes a basic distinction

between two kinds of purification offering rituals depending on where the sacrificial blood is applied: he labels the ritual in Lev 4:22–26 "outer-altar purification offering" and that in Lev 4:3–12 "outer-sanctum purification offering." After listing all ritual activities of these kinds of sacrifice, he provides detailed summaries of scholarly discussions of their purposes. Here Gane distinguishes himself from most recent scholarship by recognizing that animal slaughter is not the culmination point of the ritual and that the elaborate blood application rite, while the central ritual element of this type of sacrifice, is not the sole element to constitute its goal. Rather, Gane recognizes that "it is the entire ritual, including the suet 'debt payment,' that is necessary for achieving כפר" (67). A much-debated problem in this context is whether the officiating priests' consumption of the meat of certain purification offerings contributes to the expiatory process as such. Gane affirms this by calling their meat consumption a "postrequisite" part of expiation through which the priests participate in the process of divine forgiveness. Gane then challenges Milgrom's theory that the purification offering always purges the altar and/or sanctuary because sacrificial blood is applied there. He attempts to establish a "revised" interpretation (108) through an extensive and detailed study of כפר formulas and their prepositions—especially the preposition "from" (מִן)—describing the objects of purification (illustrated by a total of twelve tables). He finds that, in the context of altar consecration, purification offerings purge the sanctuary; yet in all other cases he rejects Milgrom's interpretation and arrives at the conclusion that "purification offerings . . . remove evil from their offerer(s)" (142). This conclusion becomes the basis of further analysis of the purification offering: Gane questions Milgrom's theory that the severity of sin or impurity determines how deeply they penetrate into the sanctuary. Then he develops his own *modus operandi* of the purification offering (which partially parallels that of Noam Zohar): human defilement is transferred to the sacrificial animal through the hand-leaning gesture. When sacrificial blood is applied at the sanctuary, this defilement is further transferred to YHWH (169, 176, 180).

In part 3 (215–302) Gane studies "Phases of כפר." Foundational to this section is his distinction of terms specifying evil. On the one hand, טמאה refers to physical ritual impurity that results from the general human state of mortality. On the other hand, Gane carefully distinguishes between פֶּשַׁע and חטאת, the former defining inexpiable defiant sin, the latter expiable nondefiant sin; finally, the term עון refers to human culpability as the consequence of sin. Gane then determines that different ritual procedures correspond to these expressions of human evil: The purgation of human impurity requires only one outer-altar purification offering, while removal of nondefiant sin requires two phases, accomplished through one purification offering during the year plus corporate purgation through the inner-sanctum purification offering on the Day of Atonement. In addition, the scapegoat is a unique ritual that returns sins and transgressions to Azazel, YHWH's enemy, who is seen as the source of evil and chaos. Gane thus identifies five individual rituals that form the Day of Atonement complex.

In part 4, "Cult and Theodicy" (303–81), Gane attempts to construct both the profile of YHWH and the divine–human relationship as they emerge from the interpretation of the purification rituals in parts 1–3. Applying his understanding of two phases of atonement, Gane holds that Israelites need to prove their loyalty to YHWH twice: throughout the year

by following purification rituals and on the Day of Atonement by practicing self-denial and abstaining from work. The disloyal are condemned—following talmudic traditions, Gane labels the Day of Atonement "Israel's judgment day" (307). These texts ultimately portray YHWH as a just king who is responsible for enforcing laws but who also chooses to show mercy by granting forgiveness. The latter, however, can only happen at a price for the divine king: ultimately, YHWH becomes the bearer of human sin, which is symbolized by the notion that the sanctuary gets defiled through human sin and impurity. An alternative way of describing the purpose of the Day of Atonement, therefore, is to say that "YHWH sheds judicial responsibility that he has incurred by forgiving guilty people . . . and clears his name of association with those who have been disloyal" (323). Gane concludes with a chapter devoted to biblical narratives that confirm several aspects of divine justice as they are revealed in ritual texts and a chapter that studies how theodicy is enacted in two Sumerian and Babylonian celebrations. Gane's book includes indexes of modern authors and of Scriptures.

This remarkable resource will easily find its place next to many other established studies on the purification offering and/or ritual atonement, such as those of Jacob Milgrom, Bernd Janowski, Nobuyoshi Kiuchi, Adrian Schenker, Baruch J. Schwartz, and Noam Zohar. Nonetheless, I would like to offer a few critical comments. First, Gane seems to assume that a synchronic approach in biblical interpretation is only legitimate if the prehistory of a text does not emerge as composite (see 36–37). Modern structuralist exegetes, however, would challenge this point of view and suggest that texts with a complex prehistory can also be interpreted on the level of final redaction. Second, Gane calls the burning rite on the altar of burnt offering "a mandatory payment of an obligation or 'debt' to YHWH" (66; see also 67, 239). He supports his understanding with scholarship dating from 1862 (J. H. Kurtz) and 1925 (George Buchanan Gray), but such scholarly opinions are outdated. A sacrifice is not a payment; this understanding is already contradicted by the fact that every sacrifice is an "offering for YHWH." Third, Gane notes that consumption of sacrificial meat by the officiating priest is a requirement and concludes that it therefore contributes to the overall atonement (92). Yet there is a difference between a ritual activity that, as part of the ritual, is prescribed and thus needs to be carried out by the priest, and the question whether this ritual activity actually contributes toward atonement. Priestly portions are also available from other types of sacrifice (see Lev 7:28–35), even though they do not contribute to their cultic goal. Fourth, Gane's observation has been highlighted above that the atoning effect of the purification offering is not limited to the blood rite, but he does not follow through with it. When discussing the atonement rituals for the parturient woman in Leviticus 12, Gane understands the atonement formula to refer exclusively to the blood application of the purification offering, even though the text explicitly states (12:7), *and* Gane himself acknowledges (112; see also 119), that atonement is the result of both a burnt offering and a purification offering. He thus neglects the fact that atonement is accomplished through two distinct ritual components: a blood rite and a burning rite. Once this is acknowledged, a basic distinction between their respective effects emerges: blood rites do purge the sanctuary and its components, while burning rites accomplish forgiveness for sins that the offerer bears. Accordingly, table 1 on "Components of Language Governed

by כִּפֶּר" (110–11) would more accurately reflect the cultic reality of ritual atonement if it included a column indicating whether atonement is accomplished by blood rites alone (Lev 16:16, 17b, etc.), by combined blood and burning rites (Lev 4:20b, 26b, etc.), or by purification offerings and other offerings (Lev 12:6; 16:33). Later Gane attempts to explain that the combination of a burnt offering and purification offering "amounts to a greater purification offering" (219), but are not the rituals of these different types of sacrifice and the explicit statements of their goals substantially different?

My last criticism pertains to Gane's overall understanding of the purification offering's *modus operandi*. Gane concludes that both the outer-altar and outer-sanctum purification offering as a whole absorb sin and impurity from the offerer (176-78). However, his interpretation leads to several problems, of which I will address no more than three. First, Gane assumes that the hand-leaning gesture can have two different meanings: while in most types of animal sacrifice it indicates ownership (or the end of ownership, as Gane specifies), it is supposedly only in the context of the outer-altar and the outer-sanctum purification offering that this gesture transfers sin to the animal. Such sin transfer is, in fact, indicated in Lev 16:21 when Aaron leans both hands on the scapegoat. This demonstrates the awareness of the priestly writer(s) that a change in the meaning of similar ritual activity requires explanation. But precisely the lack of any such explanation in the sacrificial rituals of Leviticus 1–7 should be taken as a signal that one and the same hand-leaning gesture that is performed in an identical fashion for (most) sacrificial animals can hardly have two different meanings. In addition, Gane proposes that a purification offering purges the offerer at the moment of physical contact during the hand-leaning gesture. This leads him to interpret the red cow purification offering in an analogous fashion: human defilement from corpse contamination is transferred to the cow when its red ashes are applied to the person. Yet because this reverses the chronological sequence of the red cow ritual, Gane explains that "it is as though this pollution is transmitted back through time and space to the burning of the cow" (182; see 190). How much more straightforward would be the assumption that the red ashes that contain the cow's blood are holy as such and purge the human being by virtue of this holiness? Finally, Gane argues that the bodies of the outer-altar and outer-sanctum purification offering become the vehicle for human sin and impurity. If this were true how could the suet of such ritually defiled sacrificial animals consequently be offered on the most holy altar as an offering for YHWH (Lev 4:23, 28, 32; 5:11)? Only blemish-free and pure materials are fit for sacrifice. In this context it should be mentioned that the *torah* of the purification offering (Lev 6:17–23) does not describe sacrificial meat and blood as impure, as both Milgrom and Gane claim; rather, the purification offering is explicitly labeled "most holy" (6:18, 22), and the required measures are supposed to prevent the uncontrolled spreading of such ritual holiness.

I offer these comments in the hope of broadening the scholarly perception of atonement that has so far tended to focus on rituals of blood application. Despite these issues I consider Gane's new book stimulating and—considering the complex and technical nature of its subject matter—well written.

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Military Practice and Polemic: Israel's Laws of Warfare in Near Eastern Perspective, by Michael G. Hasel. Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2005. Pp. xix + 193. $24.99 (paper). ISBN 1883925479.

In this brief volume, the author of *Domination and Resistance: Egyptian Military Activity in the Southern Levant 1300–1185 B.C.* (Brill, 1998) continues his research in the area of ancient warfare by focusing on the regulations in Deut 20:10–20. In particular Hasel examines the rules related to the destruction of trees in times of war (vv. 19–20), arguing that they must be interpreted within a context of the second millennium B.C.E. In the foreword to the book, Kenneth A. Kitchen praises Hasel's work and underscores its importance as a corrective to the "fixation over a supposed (wholly theoretical!) seventh-century date for Deuteronomy" that has "warped [not a few scholars'] attitude to the external sources" (ix).

After discussing in the introduction the prejudices of past research on Deuteronomy and laying out the basic historical-critical premises of his own approach, Hasel presents in the first chapter a contextual, syntactical, and linguistic analysis of Deut 20:10–20. In the remaining two chapters he turns his attention to v. 20, which proscribes the destruction of fruit-bearing trees or the use of them in the construction of siegeworks. Assuming that this prohibition must represent a polemic against practices by foreign nations, he examines all the relevant material from ancient western Asia in search of a context in which the prohibition would make sense. The only match he finds is a second-millennium source, the annals of Thutmose III, which refers to fruit trees being cut down and employed in siege warfare. Hasel summarizes the findings of his study: "After a comprehensive survey of currently available iconographic, textual, and archaeological evidence, it can only be concluded that such a destruction of fruit trees points to an Egyptian background [for Deut 20:19–20] in the second millennium B.C.E." (128).

Hasel has helpfully collected and discussed a wide range of data relating to destruction of trees in western Asian warfare during second and first millennia, and his argument initially seems quite persuasive. Yet before one fixes the date of Deuteronomic legislation to the mid-second millennium B.C.E., there are several things one should consider.

To begin with, Hasel's interpretation of Deut 20:19–20 may be too literal and unduly limit the scope of the prohibitions. The ancient author seems to be presenting Israel with a general ethos for the way Israel should treat the environment of its military opponents. To this end, the author moves within the narrative setting or *Textwelt* portrayed in ch. 20. Beginning in v. 12, this *Textwelt* is the situation of a siege. If this siege were to last "many days," Israel should not retaliate by destroying its enemy's life-support systems (v. 19a). The implication is that Israel should *never* destroy these life-support systems, even when tempted to do so in situations such as a lengthy siege. (The rationale for this prohibition is provided in v. 19b.) The only trees Israel is permitted to cut down are those that "you know do not yield food" (v. 20a). But even those should be cut down, as Ramban points out, only when necessary, such as when materials are needed to build a siegework (v. 20b). By referring to a siegework here, the ancient author is simply working within the *Textwelt* created in v. 12.

This interpretation has direct ramifications for Hasel's study: instead of confining

the search for parallels solely to sources depicting the use of fruit trees in the construction of siegeworks, one should look for depictions of life-support systems being destroyed, and perhaps specifically in siege activities. In so doing, one finds a vast range of such depictions in both iconographic and textual sources. Significantly, the Neo-Assyrian exemplars are especially numerous.

The quantity of Assyrian parallels would seem to support the widely accepted dating of the Deuteronomic legislation to the seventh century B.C.E. However, caution is warranted since it is not at all clear that the text polemicizes against non-native, rather than Israelite, war practices. In a book such as Deuteronomy, when foreign nations are in view the authors tend to say so explicitly. Insofar as the text does not polemicize against foreign military conduct, one would not need to search for descriptions of foreign siegeworks.

The most immediate context for understanding Deut 20:19–20 is the Bible itself. In 2 Kgs 3:19 Elisha pronounces a war oracle according to which the Israelite-Judahite-Edomite military coalition would destroy the life-support systems of their enemy: "you shall fell *every good tree* and stop up all the wells of water, and every fertile field you shall hurt (or cause pain: *takʾibû bāʾăbānîm*) with stones." If it is not already sufficiently clear that Deut 20:19–20 prohibits this scorched-earth policy required by the oracle (see also the fulfillment in v. 25), then one could compare Elisha's anthropomorphic description of the land in the phrase "to hurt with stones" with the rationale for not destroying trees in Deut 20:19b: "Is the tree of the field a human . . . ?" Thus one does not need to assume that the Deuteronomic prohibition relates to foreign, rather than Israelite, war practices. Indeed, it seems quite possible that Deut 20:19–20 is responding, by means of inner-biblical exegesis, to 2 Kings 3.

Yet Hasel's understanding of Deuteronomy 20 does not permit him to acknowledge these connections. He treats the prohibitions in vv. 19–20 as an extension of the legislation on cities within Israelite territory in vv. 15–18. In 2 Kings 3 the coalition crosses the borders of this territory, and hence the text would not come into consideration as a context for understanding Deuteronomy 20.

This approach to the structure of Deuteronomy 20 poses problems. First, the city in view in vv. 19–20 seems to represent any city Israel would attack, not just those within the borders of the land. This conclusion is supported by the similarity in the constructions in v. 10 and v. 19 ("when you approach/besiege a city . . . to capture it"). Accordingly, vv. 15–18 should probably be read in the final form of the text as a parenthetical paragraph directly related to the specifications in v. 14. After this paragraph, vv. 19–20 resume the presentation of general principles for Israel's warfare begun in vv. 10–14. The references to "siege" in vv. 13b and 19a guide the reader in understanding vv. 15–18 as remarks qualifying v. 14. A long line of scholarly tradition, from modern exegetes to ancient Jewish commentators, has understood the chapter's structure in this way. The rabbinic tradition explains the tension between Deut 20:19–20 and 2 Kgs 3:19 by arguing either that Deuteronomy 20 applies only to a situation of siege (see above for the arguments against this approach) or that 2 Kings 3 represents an exception for a unique situation, yet it does not treat the cities in v. 19 as solely those within the land.

Second, it is quite likely that Martin Rose, Alexander Rofé, Yair Hoffman, and many

others are correct in arguing that vv. 10–14 and 19–20, which begin with the exact same construction (see above), contain the oldest stratum. Accordingly v. 15—or, more likely, all of vv. 15–18—represents a redactional insertion that draws upon the Deuteronomistic concept of *ḥērem*. It corrects the laxer legislation in vv. 10–14, 19–20 by confining its applicability to cities outside the borders of the land. Now if 20:15–18 is the product of a redactional reworking of the chapter, then the original formulation of the rules would not have distinguished between cities within and beyond the borders of the land. Only after the insertion of vv. 15–18 would it perhaps be possible to locate the city referred to in v. 19 outside the land. Yet, as pointed out above, such an approach would do injustice to the final shape of the text and has the history of interpretation against it. Hasel's discussion of the chapter fails to devote adequate attention to this problem and thus does not recognize 2 Kings 3 as a context for understanding the Deuteronomic legislation.

Hasel's book may, therefore, fail to succeed in building a consensus for a mid-second-millennium dating of the Deuteronomic legislation. Indeed, the connections to 2 Kings 3 suggest that Deut 20:19–20 is quite late. The study nevertheless helps us reconsider the destruction of life-support systems in ancient warfare. And even when its conclusions cannot be accepted, Hasel must be commended for a well-written and thoroughly researched work. He not only consults many foreign-language publications (an increasing rarity in biblical scholarship), but above all brings together a wide range of relevant archaeological, textual, and iconographic evidence.

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A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple Period. Volume 1, *Yehud: A History of the Persian Province of Judah,* by Lester L. Grabbe. Library of Second Temple Studies 47. London: T&T Clark International, 2004. Pp. xxi + 471. US $110 (hardcover). ISBN 0567089983.

Lester Grabbe's *Yehud: A History of the Persian Province of Judah* is a stunning achievement. This volume deserves recognition as the premier synthesis of historical research on Persian Yehud; it sets a new foundation for future scholarship on this important period. In some respects, the volume is similar to the first part of Grabbe's *Judaism from Cyrus to Hadrian: The Persian and Greek Periods* (2 vols.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992). However, the additional detail makes Yehud a much stronger volume than its predecessor, and the amazing growth of research in the Persian period since the early 1990s provides a deeper underpinning for Grabbe's historical work.

After an introduction on methodology, Grabbe provides a thorough discussion of sources (part 2), dealing systematically with archaeological artifacts, fragmentary writings such as ostraca and coins, biblical writings, Persian and other contemporary written sources, and Greek and Latin histories. This section of the book is an exceptional resource for students of Persian Yehud. The archaeological survey provides key data for

and reference to nearly fifty different sites, referring to classic reports and new studies alike, and the material on coins, stamps, and ostraca summarizes a good variety of findings. Grabbe's treatment of biblical writings does not replace a good commentary's analysis of the full range of historical questions pertinent to each text, but his helpful comments connect each biblical book to relevant historical matters and show how he intends to use the documents in historical reconstruction. Grabbe's chapter on Persian sources provides translations of a few key inscriptions with minimal comment; the chapter, as such, functions best as a guide to the location of primary texts in other publications. The discussion of Greek and Latin sources actually contains more evaluation of these sources' import and value for reconstructing Persian history. This selectivity underscores Grabbe's focus on writing a history of Jews and Judaism. This volume spends fewer pages discussing Persian and Yehudite history than some scholars might prefer, but it gives a very thorough introduction to the archaeological sites of Judah and surrounding areas as well as the biblical sources that are relevant for understanding Judaism in the period. One does not quite come to an understanding of the Persian Empire; Grabbe's focus throughout remains Jewish experience during the Persian period.

In part 3, Grabbe provides a synthesis of "Society and Institutions." First is administration, dealing with large-scale and regional political relations. Next is a chapter (ch. 8) on "Society and Daily Living," which examines identity, classes, laws, gender and sexuality, and the calendar. Chapter 9 focuses on the economy, moving from general comments on the ancient economy to description of the Persian imperial economy and then to the province of Yehud in particular. After this follow two chapters on religion. The first (ch. 10) discusses temple, cult, and practice; the second (ch. 11) surveys law, Scripture, and belief.

Part 4 offers Grabbe's "Historical Synthesis" and is divided into three chapters: early Persian period (including the initial return and the construction of the temple), fifth century (including Nehemiah), and fourth century (including Ezra, the development of law, and new literary forms of wisdom, songs, and novels). In each of these, Grabbe sketches the Persian rulers and then moves to a discussion of the salient religious events of the period.

Part 5 presents "A Holistic Perspective," a series of reflections on how one can know about the Persian period, the nature of Yehud as a province, the question of ethnicity, and the continuing importance of the Persian period for Judaism. An appendix discusses possible Persian influence on Jewish thought. The volume concludes with seventy pages of bibliography and thirty-seven pages of indexes.

Grabbe writes from a middle ground between some of the extremes of historiography present in our field. In contrast to those who would write a history of Israel as a purely local affair or as an ideological endeavor, Grabbe sets all of his discussions within a context of material culture involving not only Judah but also its region. Grabbe dispels some of the most lingering myths in Persian-period studies, presenting strong evidence and argument against the favoritism of Persian emperors in Yehudite affairs, the emptiness of the land during exile, and a mass return. By basing historical reconstruction on archaeological evidence and a cultural context that includes the Persian Empire's influences, Grabbe builds a stronger foundation for understanding Judaism in Yehud.

At the same time, scholars more attuned to the concerns of New Historicists or postmodern historians may find Grabbe's more traditional focus to be a limitation. Certainly, more skeptical historians would disagree with some of Grabbe's findings, such as his high estimation of Nehemiah's historical credibility (294) or his concluding emphasis on intellectual and religious development as accomplishments of the spirit (360). Some scholars in Persian-period studies have begun to concern themselves with postcolonialism or imperialism (the provincial or colonial experience of Yehud as determined within a larger empire and its complexity of power relations), bodies (including sexualities, genders, and ethnicities), spatialities (involving regionalities and globalization), and other such issues, in ways that Grabbe's work does not quite engage. Grabbe's middle ground is an intentional one, and he presents it in a careful and judicious manner that continually returns to the evidence of artifact and text. Although scholars who occupy other positions may find Grabbe's centrism to be detrimental, Grabbe has produced a volume from which a very wide range of scholars can learn and with which they can dialogue profitably while conducting their own historiographical investigations.

Grabbe intends this book as the first of four volumes in a sweeping *History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple Period,* beginning with the construction of the Second Temple in the early Persian period. As this project progresses, scholars of the Hellenistic world and the Roman Empire stand to gain much new insight from Grabbe's attention to Judaism in those periods as well. This first volume is a splendid contribution, and one can be thankful that the publisher has announced already the release of a paperback edition.

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The Origins of the 'Second' Temple: Persian Imperial Policy and the Rebuilding of Jerusalem, by Diana Edelman. BibleWorld. London: Equinox, 2005. Pp. xvi + 440. $29.95 (paper). ISBN 1845530179.

This book by Diana Edelman, senior lecturer in the Department of Biblical Studies at the University of Sheffield, contests a scholarly consensus up to the 1990s that Ezra 1–6, Haggai, and Zechariah can be relied upon for information about the "origins" of the Second Temple. These biblical texts presuppose 515 B.C.E. as the date when the exiles returned to Jerusalem and rebuilt its temple and 445 B.C.E. as the date when Jerusalem became fortified (7–8). According to Edelman's challenging hypothesis, historical priority should instead be accorded to the claim in the book of Nehemiah "that the resettlement of Jerusalem only took place during the governorship of Nehemiah, which began in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes, 444 BCE." Concomitantly, Edelman holds that the rebuilding of the temple and Jerusalem's fortification took place at the same time (8). After a concise introduction (1–12), Edelman elaborates her hypothesis, discussing the literary evidence of Nehemiah, Haggai–Zechariah 8, and Ezra 1–6 in, respectively,

chs. 1 (13–79), 2 (80–150), and 3 (151–208). She then turns more specifically to the archaeological evidence about Yehud's boundaries and its settlement patterns in chs. 4 (209–80) and 5 (281–331). A final, sixth chapter (332–51) synthesizes insights drawn from the previous chapters.

Chapter 1, "When Generations Really Count: Dating Zerubbabel and Nehemiah Using Genealogical Information in the Book of Nehemiah," does a meticulous job of historical identification of generations on the basis of a list of priests and Levites in Neh 12:1–26. The combined reference to Persian military (2:9) and Jewish civil (7:2) appointments in Jerusalem constitutes important evidence for Edelman's hypothesis (26–27). Edelman concludes from the genealogical information and the chronological information in Elephantine papyrus *AP* 30 that Nehemiah belonged to generation 3, while the return from exile under Zerubbabel and Yeshua (generation 2) should be dated around 465 B.C.E. (75). A critical point should be made with regard to Neh 7:6–72. While this genealogical list of returned exiles appears to be less relevant for the discussion (36, 37, 39, 74, 77), Edelman does not give due emphasis to the fact that Neh 7:6–72 and Ezra 2 present parallel versions. The differences—which can be discerned between Ezra 2:2 and Neh 7:7; Ezra 2:10 and Neh 7:15; Ezra 2:17–20 and Neh 7:22-25; Ezra 2:30 having no equivalent in Neh 7:6-73; and Ezra 2:50 and Neh 7:52—need to be accounted for in a discussion about generations starting with the return from exile. This is not to deny the otherwise richly documented character of Edelman's discussion, which pays detailed attention to the ways in which historical information may be derived from both literary and documentary sources, including papyri, inscriptions, coins, and bullae.

Chapter 2, "What's in a Date? The Unreliable Nature of the Dates in Haggai and Zechariah," analyzes Haggai–Zechariah 8, deferring discussion of Ezra 1–6 to ch. 3 in view of the literary dependence of the latter on the former. Edelman puts the divergent references to the date of the temple-building in the books of Haggai (Hag 1:1, 15; 2:1, 10, 20) and Zechariah (Zech 1:1, 7; 7:1) in perspective. The dating formulae are first compared to Judean, Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian, Persian, Seleucid, and Ptolemaic contexts (82–90). Examples of Persian dating practices include the Behistun inscription, whose English translation is presented in appendix 1 (353–61). Edelman explains the various dates in Haggai and Zechariah in view of prophetic genre conventions (90–106), observing that they deliberately fit "Jeremiah's prophecies in 25.11–12; 27.6–7" (106) and 29:10 (95) about the seventy-year wrath of God against the people of Israel and the land. It may be added here that Dan 9:2 most explicitly refers to Jeremiah's prophecy. Edelman further reconsiders the "month and day-elements in the date formulae" in Haggai (107–23) and Zechariah 1–8 (123–31), as well as the "internal organization of Haggai and Zechariah 1–8 as temple-building accounts" (131–39). Edelman concludes that "the dates are secondary and are used in part as a way to interrelate the two texts" (131). She explains the insertion of the seventy-year tradition from the distance in time in the "common collective memory," when the combined edition of Haggai–Zechariah 8 was composed, roughly 325–275 B.C.E. (146).

Chapter 3, "It's All in the Sources: The Historicity of the Account of Temple-Rebuilding in Ezra 1–6," provides new answers to historical problems surrounding the account of Cyrus's commission of rebuilding, the delay in the completion of the temple,

and the opposition to the rebuilding of Jerusalem in Ezra 1–6 (154–59). Edelman explains the first two problems in light of the diversity of biblical sources used by the author of Ezra. According to Edelman, these sources are Second Isaiah (Isa 44:28), the books of Chronicles, Jeremiah, Haggai–Zechariah 8, Nehemiah, and Ezekiel 40–48, while the Cyrus Cylinder provides further contextual information for Cyrus's policy of religious restoration (163–66 and appendix 2 [362–63]). On the other hand, she contests the scholarly assumption that historical sources underlie Ezra 1:2–5 and the Aramaic documents in Ezra 4:11–16, 17–22; 5:7–17; 6:2–5, 6–12 (180–201), attributing a "later, editorial origin" to the section on opposition to rebuilding in Ezra 4:6–24 (159), and thereby removes the basis for the evaluation of Ezra 1–6 as an independent historical source.

Chapter 4, "Setting the Bounds: The Territory Comprising Yehud under Artaxerxes I in the Mid-Fifth Century BCE," examines the biblical evidence in Nehemiah 3; 7:6–69; and 11:25–35 (210–32), the artifactual evidence of jar stamps (233–38), and the relation between literary and archaeological evidence (238–75). Edelman suggests that the control over the Beersheva Valley and the Negev, exerted by Jerusalem before 586 B.C.E., was reassigned from Edom to Jerusalem by Artaxerxes I as part of the mid-fifth-century redevelopment of the province of Yehud (275–76). According to Edelman, the evidence of Nehemiah does not provide an accurate account of the boundaries of Yehud (233, 275), while the evaluation of archaeological evidence demonstrates the historical unreliability of other prophetic indications, such as in Second Isaiah (276). Yet it is unclear whether and how the supposed ideological motivation and secondary character of Neh 11:25–35 (228–33) could also impact the evaluation of the immediately following section of Neh 12:1–26.

Chapter 5, "Excavating the Past: Settlement Patterns and Military Installations in Persian-Era Yehud," provides an extensive survey of archaeological excavations while still pointing to their limitations as sources of information about the redevelopment of Yehud. The chapter includes a table of settlement patterns, based on Ph.D. theses and publications, many of them from the 1990s up to 2003 (291–310). According to Edelman, the archaeological evidence still allows for the general conclusion that new settlement activity and the establishment of government facilities took place in the Persian period (328–30).

Chapter 6, "Piety or Pragmatism? The Policy of Artaxerxes I for the Development of Yehud," draws the evaluation of literary and artifactual sources together and concludes that the establishment of Jerusalem as a provincial seat, accompanied by new settlement activity, the appointment of a new governor, and the fortification and rebuilding of Jerusalem, including its temple, should be dated to the early reign of Artaxerxes I (465–425 B.C.E.). Edelman observes that pragmatism rather than piety was the motivation of Artaxerxes' policy that made the rebuilding of the temple possible.

Edelman's book provides a major challenge to the scholarly consensus about the "origins" of the Second Temple. It will stimulate much discussion, if only for the need to rethink the historical and literary evaluation of Ezra 1–6 and Haggai–Zechariah 8, on the one hand, and Nehemiah, on the other. Yet certain questions still remain unanswered by this hypothesis, starting with Edelman's own "open question" about whether Nehemiah

succeeded Zerubbabel in office or whether the two "represent the same historical person who has been split into two different people . . . as a result of the decision to place the rebuilding of the temple almost seventy years earlier than the rebuilding of Jerusalem, for ideological reasons" (351). It further remains unclear why Edelman's interpretation of Neh 2:8 takes the building of the "gates of the fortress of the temple" (*šaʿărê habbîrâ ʾăšer-labbayît*) to stand for the "the building of a new temple" (345). Edelman's reading depends on an emendation of Neh 2:8, which deems the present text to be the result of "inadvertent scribal error" and supposes that the original reading puts "four major building projects" next to each other (345). Yet the MT could presuppose the idea that the gates belonged to fortifications surrounding the temple hill, an idea that 1 Macc 13:52 further attests.

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Defending God: Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil, by James L. Crenshaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. viii + 288. $37.50 (hardcover). ISBN 0195140028.

Most readers of this review will be aware of the noteworthy contributions of Professor James L. Crenshaw of Duke University Divinity School to the study of the Hebrew Scriptures, especially his work on wisdom. In the preface to this volume, Crenshaw has suggested that most of his research agenda has related to questions of theodicy, an issue of personal interest for him and with signal importance in contemporary theological discourse. The Festschrift published in Crenshaw's honor in 2000 also relates to the subject (David Penchansky and Paul L. Redditt, eds., *Shall Not the Judge of All the Earth Do What Is Right: Studies on the Nature of God in Tribute to James L. Crenshaw* [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000]). The publication in 2005 by Oxford University Press of *Defending God: Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil* is a salutary event for biblical studies and for sensitive interpreters of the Hebrew Scriptures. Crenshaw's writings are characteristically interesting, creative, and provocative; this volume is no exception.

Crenshaw sets out the task in a substantial introduction. There are various ways to address the issue of theodicy, the attempt to justify a supposedly benevolent deity in the face of the undeniable presence of evil in the world. Crenshaw refers to the "conflict within the soul of Israel" (4) between divine justice and mercy as reflected in Exod 34:6–7 and the widely differing portraits of divine conduct in Psalms 104 and 77. In Psalm 104, the creator makes a well-ordered life possible and enjoyable for all creatures. In contrast, Psalm 77 portrays a sense of divine betrayal in which the psalmist finds neither justice nor mercy. Crenshaw then seeks "to trace the biblical evidence of the search for a convincing response to the problem of evil and God's perceived injustice" (18). Crenshaw does not shrink from voicing the strengths and weaknesses of each position he explores.

The volume's typology is in three sections. Part 1, "Spreading the Blame Around,"

begins with a chapter treating what has been designated "practical atheism," alluded to in Psalms 10 and 14 and Prov 30:1–14. The need to explain the way the universe is run disappears when there is, for all practical purposes, no God. Chapter 2 deals with Psalm 82 and the polytheistic context of the ancient Near East; with many gods, evil can be blamed on one or more of them. Chapter 3 turns to the ancient Israelite belief "that their God had a dark side, one that eventually manifested itself as an independent being, at first as a servant of the deity but ultimately as a powerful opponent" (56). Here Crenshaw treats the testing of Abraham in Genesis 22 and the testing of Job in that book's prose prologue and epilogue. The connections he sees between these two texts are intriguing.

Part 2 is titled "Redefining God" and begins with an emphasis on human freedom at the expense of divine power and knowledge. The "deity's self-limitation for the sake of human freedom" (19) ascribes dignity to humans and places the responsibility for their suffering squarely in their own laps. This chapter concentrates on the Prophets. Chapter 5 explores the conflict within the deity "between strict justice and gracious mercy" (19) with attention to the story of Sodom and Gomorrah and texts in Jonah and Joel. Chapter 6 explores disciplinary theodicy, that the deity disciplines children so that they will grow and learn. This deity "does not shrink from inflicting pain to effect growth in character" (108). Here Crenshaw treats Sir 4:11–19 and Wis 11:15–12:27. The volume gives attention to several deuterocanonical texts. The final chapter in this middle section of the book probes "the direct link between sin and punishment that pervades the Bible" (130), as illustrated in the speeches of those often designated as Job's friends.

Part 3, "Shifting to the Human Scene," begins with a chapter on atonement, and, in particular, the Servant Song in Isaiah 52–53; redemption of evil is possible. Chapter 9 traces the development of belief in an afterlife. In Crenshaw's view, the problem of theodicy was the driving force in the fledgling move toward the notions of an immortal soul and of a bodily resurrection deriving from "a powerful sense of communion with YHWH and belief in the deity's creative might" (163). A number of readers will remain unconvinced that the texts he treats from Psalms 49 and 73 allude to an afterlife, but Crenshaw's description of the development is provocative. Chapter 10 treats Qoheleth and the view that God's ways are mysterious, that humans have no answer to the problem of theodicy. The book's final chapter raises the question of whether the entire theodicean enterprise is an anthropocentric one. Crenshaw first recognizes that the biblical portrait of God is a limited one and, second, attends to the call of the book of Job to a disinterested righteousness in which one serves God not for some just reward but because God has given the greatest gift of all: life itself. This chapter carries a more personal tone; I have already indicated that the issues treated in this volume are of personal interest to its author. Crenshaw indicates that, in spite of the inability to offer a fully consistent biblical theodicy, he is unwilling to abandon the enterprise, a "testimony to the power of a literary construct and a religious community shaped by poetic imagination" (182). At the end of his reflections on the book of Job, Crenshaw comes to the conclusion that creation is "an act of pure grace. . . . Life in its most fragile form far surpasses whatever evil exists in the world" (190). This conception moves beyond the problem of theodicy. In the end, Crenshaw is confronted with the problem of good. Crenshaw's concluding position comes to the fore on 189–90. The book's conclusion issues a call for humans to

participate, empowered by divine mercy, in the noble effort of a theodicy "establishing justice for the victims of oppression" (195). The volume includes endnotes, bibliography, and indices brimming with possibilities for readers. I find this volume to be eloquent and learned. It is broad in its sweep. It is a notable achievement.

Each reader of this review holds a variety of perspectives on theodicy; the question is how one brings those perspectives into coherence and how much tension one can embrace in that coherence. What Crenshaw has done is articulate a number of those perspectives on theodicy in helpful ways. He has also shown that there are various biblical responses to the issues. The Hebrew Scriptures do not characterize theodicy as a one-dimensional problem, nor does the canon give one answer to the problem; the various responses voiced in the Hebrew Bible are complex.

Crenshaw makes it clear that there are many biblical texts that could be included in this study; one cannot treat all of them in one volume. A variety of possible additional relevant texts will come to mind for readers of the volume. Readers may find it helpful to supplement the reading of this volume with Crenshaw's treatments of additional relevant texts elsewhere. The book's first two chapters treat texts not often a part of the conversation on theodicy. It is helpful to have these treatments of texts alluding to "practical atheism" and polytheism. At the same time, my response to this volume is that the opening chapters take a rather dispassionate tone. Crenshaw's passion only comes to full bloom in the book's last chapter. One of the volume's surprising omissions has to do with protest literature. It is not absent from the volume, but I am surprised we do not get more attention to the lament psalms. There is little of the unsettling and powerful complaint at the beginning of Psalm 22 or the unrelenting and dark poetic images of Psalm 88. Such texts focus on the troubling blank spaces where the deity is silent or absent. These poets yearn for a God who vulnerably embraces their pain, and the psalmists' portrayal of God moves in that direction, as do other texts noted in the volume. I find the stunningly honest laments to be important texts on issues of theodicy and am surprised they are not more present in a treatment of biblical responses to the problem of evil. Crenshaw articulates an important insight in his opening treatments of Psalms 104 and 77. It would be helpful to see that issue articulated in the context of the canonical Psalter.

Crenshaw does talk of the dark side of ancient Israel's deity and of divine vulnerability; indeed, divine pathos is central to his conclusion, but there is little of the raw protest that seems so pervasive in the Psalter. One of my concerns is Crenshaw's claim that the move to a vulnerable deity "risks the possibility that the reason for religious allegiance has at the same time been jettisoned" (194). My response is that it is precisely a vulnerable deity who can come to terms with the problems of evil and suffering. I take a dichotomy between divine pathos and divine power to be a false one.

The issues I have raised do not detract from the achievement of this volume. We are indebted to Crenshaw for his mature and challenging treatment of a central biblical theme. This significant volume is and will be for some time essential reading for those interested in theodicy and the Hebrew Scriptures. On this subject, the volume is without equal.

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Enochic Judaism: Three Defining Paradigm Exemplars, by David R. Jackson. Library of Second Temple Studies 49. London: T&T Clark International, 2004. Pp. xi +316. $69.95 (paper). ISBN 0567081656.

The Enoch-Metatron Tradition, by Andrei A. Orlov. TSAJ 107. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005. Pp. xii + 383. €99.00 (hardcover). ISBN 3161485440.

The two works reviewed here belong to the current efflorescence of scholarly interest in the Enoch traditions. They represent important new developments in the study of these traditions and deserve wide readership. Both works build upon earlier doctoral research, Jackson at the University of Sydney, and Orlov at Marquette University. While the weight of Orlov's study falls on *2 (Slavonic) Enoch,* Jackson's focuses on the Enochic literature attested at Qumran that became the bulk of *1 (Ethiopic) Enoch.* Both works are essential reading for scholars and graduate students working on any aspect of the Enoch traditions. The readership of Jackson's study should include students of the Qumran literature, the book of *Jubilees,* the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,* and the Jewish context of earliest Christianity, while the readership of Orlov's should also include students of any aspect of early Jewish mysticism, especially heavenly mediator figures, and of the transmission of the Slavonic Pseudepigrapha.

Jackson begins by challenging the view that book(let)s of Enoch found at Qumran are to be regarded as part of the common heritage of late Second Temple Judaism, given that they, along with the so-called "sectarian" texts from Qumran, make exclusive claims for God's end-time elect: "The fact that works such as *1 Enoch* or *Jubilees* have been preserved since 70 CE through other/Christian channels need not indicate that they were accepted as authoritative within Second Temple Judaism beyond the pale of the sect which came in part to occupy Qumran" (7).

Jackson uses the sections of *1 Enoch* found at Qumran as a basis for defining "Enochic Judaism," and proceeds to find in *Jubilees,* the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,* and the Qumran literature evidence for the development of this tradition. To define the system of belief that constituted Enochic Judaism, Jackson borrows Thomas Kuhn's language of "paradigm," "paradigm shift," and "exemplar," and he adopts the notions of "anti-society" to describe the sect implied by the Enochic literature, and "anti-language" to describe terms whose "meaning and significance in *1 Enoch* . . . are determined by their place in the Enochic paradigm and which were not shared by those whose world-view stood outside of that paradigm" (20).

The fundamental Enochic paradigm is that of regularity/deviance (*1 Enoch* 2–5). Three exemplars developed by which the paradigm could be applied. The first is the "Shemikhazah exemplar," which ". . . concerns the going astray of a cohort of angels, under the leadership of one Shemikhazah . . . their sexual union with women and the resultant creation of an anomalous race of violent and destructive creatures whose disembodied spirits live on as demons after they had slaughtered each other" (22). The second, termed by Jackson the "ʾAzaʾel exemplar," "concerns the revelation to humans of heavenly secrets by angels under the representative leadership of ʾAzaʾel" (loc. cit.). Just as Shemikhazah and ʾAzaʾel represent exemplars of deviation, Noah and the "plantation

of righteousness" represent an example of the righteous elect. The third or "cosmic" exemplar "concerns the going astray of the spirits whom God placed in leadership over the cosmic phenomena related to the calendar" (26).

Jackson seems not to be drawn by the notion that a text can be more or less fully understood if one can reconstruct the tradition history of its constituent parts, and his approach thus differs significantly from attempts to distinguish the various underlying traditions that now form *1 Enoch,* and to trace their origins. The three exemplars are examined in turn, beginning with the evidence of the Enochic books found at Qumran and proceeding through *Jubilees,* the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,* and related works. The 364-day calendar is tabulated in Appendix 1 (222–23), with a second appendix tabulating the evidence for each exemplar in all of the extant scrolls from Qumran (234–52). Jackson concludes that "Enochic Judaism was an exclusive sect seeing itself as definitive of elect status, and . . . was in part manifest in the sectarian communities identified among the Qumran 'sectarian' literature. . . . It is not so much that *1 Enoch* or *Jubilees* are works of the Qumran sect, but rather that the Qumran sectarian works are works of 'Enochic Judaism'" (221). This tradition was cut off by the catastrophe of 70 C.E., though faint echoes may be heard in the later works *Syriac Baruch* and *4 Ezra,* as well as the NT.

The title of Jackson's book might lead the reader to expect a study within the framework of Boccaccini's Enochic-Essene hypothesis, but apart from a few brief rebuttals of Boccaccini's reconstruction, Jackson is moving in a different direction. He sees no basis for reconstructing a split between Enochic and Essene Judaisms, seeing the *yaḥad* as an example of a community that stood firmly within Enochic Judaism. One might have expected a more thorough rebuttal of Boccaccini's position, however, particularly given the influence it has had in recent scholarship (see G. Boccaccini, ed., *Enoch and Qumran Origins* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005], 327–435). Indeed, with a few exceptions, such as the question of delimiting the "sectarian" corpus (9–14), or the issue of the origins of the 364-day calendar (204–7), *Enochic Judaism* exhibits a relative lack of direct engagement with wider scholarly debates. This has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the reader is not forced to trudge doggedly through a ponderously exhaustive *Forschungsbericht,* with the consequence that neither author nor reader runs the risk of missing the wood for the trees, and the book's argument is allowed to shine through clearly. The engagement first-hand with the *texts* rather than with all the current scholarly debates about them is refreshing and is perhaps an antidote to the work of authors determined to read every drop of ink spilt on their subject and share all of it with their readers before venturing their own analysis. On the other hand, there are very good reasons for attempting to be comprehensive in scholarly writing. There are some noteworthy omissions from Jackson's bibliography that would have added depth to his discussion, the consequence being that it isn't always crystal clear precisely where Jackson stands in relation to current scholarship. For example, Markus Bockmuehl, *Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity* (WUNT 2/36; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990) and Armin Lange's *Weisheit und Prädestination* (STDJ 18; Leiden: Brill, 1995) would have nuanced Jackson's otherwise excellent discussion of varieties of special revelation (114–36), and Crispin Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory of*

Adam (STDJ 42; Leiden: Brill, 2002) would have nuanced his discussion of links between the sectarian priesthood and the angelic priesthood (163–70). For a work on the Enoch traditions, the absence of Pierre Grelot, Helge Kvanvig, and Paolo Sacchi from the bibliography is somewhat surprising.

Enochic Judaism nevertheless bristles with intriguing suggestions. For example, the idea that the phrase *rz nhyh* alludes to the Divine Name, while not entirely convincing and asserted rather than argued, deserves consideration. The notion that Qumran was used as "an academy for new converts, elders-, teachers-, or priests-in-training to serve, upon their graduation, the wider Enochic communities in their places of residence or their assemblies" (168–69) is worth adding to the various views on the nature of the Qumran site and its relationship to the scrolls of the nearby caves. But there are problems. Jackson does not pay enough attention to the complex literary development of *1 Enoch,* despite being well aware of scholarly debate on the subject, nor to the fact that *1 Enoch* has been transmitted in its present form by Christians. While the question of defining "sectarian" texts is discussed, it is not clear where Jackson's study leaves texts such as 4Q381, which is cited as evidence for the Enochic cosmic exemplar but is generally regarded by scholars as "nonsectarian" (152–53, cf. 245; missing from index of refs.). Most seriously, the absence of any discussion of *Slavonic Enoch* or *Sefer Hekhalot,* or even of any mention of these works, is deeply problematic, particularly given that Enochic Judaism as such is supposed to have been decimated by the events of 70 C.E. The persistence of speculation about the figure of Enoch after this date clearly suggests otherwise.

Enochic Judaism contributes to the study of Jewish sectarianism, the 364-day calendar, and the relationship between the Enoch literature and the scrolls from Qumran. Jackson's understanding of Enochic Judaism should be developed further so that light is shed on the NT and other early Christian documents, and on the development of the traditions embodied in *Slavonic Enoch,* the rabbinic corpus, and the *Hekhalot* tracts, especially *Sefer Hekhalot*.

This is an appropriate point at which to discuss Orlov's work, which treats both *Sefer Hekhalot* and *Slavonic Enoch* in detail. *The Enoch-Metatron Tradition* is a thorough and compelling discussion of the development of early Jewish speculation about the seventh antediluvian patriarch, with special reference to *Slavonic Enoch.* Orlov advances the bold thesis that not only can the original text of *Slavonic Enoch* be convincingly dated in the first century C.E. prior to the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, but the roles and titles of Enoch in this work represent a transitional phase between the early speculation of *Jubilees,* the *Genesis Apocryphon,* the Book of Giants, and *Ethiopic Enoch* on the one hand, and the later speculation of *Sefer Hekhalot* and related works on the other. This is a powerful antidote to the "philosophy of super-prudence" (Paolo Sacchi's phrase) exhibited by scholars who would argue that the extreme uncertainty of the date and provenance of this pseudepigraphon render it unusable for historical purposes (see Francis I. Andersen in *OTP* 1:97). Orlov's argument is presented in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, delaying a detailed discussion of the date of *Slavonic Enoch* until the last chapter of the book (320–33), but it is largely persuasive, drawing on a broad range of primary and secondary literature in an impressive range of ancient and modern

languages, and it is presented in often splendid prose that manages to convey a real sense of the joy, excitement, and absorption that scholarly research can inspire.

Orlov's study is divided into two parts, the first focusing on the evolution of the roles and titles of the seventh antediluvian hero from the Mesopotamian King Enmeduranki (ch. 1) through the early Enochic material, including the Similitudes (ch. 2), via the traditions represented by *Slavonic Enoch* (ch. 4) to *Sefer Hekhalot* and related texts (ch. 3). The second part zooms in on the factors that enabled the development from the Enoch of the Second Temple material to the exalted Enoch-Metatron of the later rabbinic and *Hekhalot* materials. Orlov argues that this development was enabled by polemics between Enochic traditions and Adamic (ch. 5), Mosaic (ch. 6), and Noachic (ch. 7) traditions.

In the process of developing his fascinating argument, Orlov employs a slightly unusual methodology. Rather than dealing exhaustively with matters of special introduction at the outset, unraveling the labyrinthine textual tradition of *Slavonic Enoch* and the tradition history of its constituent parts, and determining the date and provenance of the "original" text before proceeding, Orlov expects his readers to take a certain amount on faith while he focuses on the roles and titles of Enmeduranki, Enoch, and Enoch-Metatron. He begins by discussing Enmeduranki's roles as diviner, expert in secrets, mediator of heavenly knowledge, scribe, and priest. These roles are absorbed by Enoch in the early Enochic booklets, where Enoch is presented as oneiromantic, primeval sage, expert in cosmic secrets, scribe, mediator (of knowledge and divine judgment), eschatological witness, and heavenly priest. Orlov skillfully demonstrates how the various roles and titles do not stand alone, but are interdependent, complementing each other in subtle ways. In an important section on Enoch's titles in the Similitudes, Orlov shows how the titles "righteous one," "anointed one," "chosen one," and "son of man" reflect both a deep reliance on "biblical" texts and an independence from other Enochic traditions. In relation to the "son of man," Orlov offers a particularly helpful discussion of the notion of the heavenly counterpart, which is fundamental not only to the Enochic traditions but to early christological speculations (which Orlov does not discuss).

Orlov then leaps over *Slavonic Enoch* to *Sefer Hekhalot*. He distinguishes two clusters of roles and titles for Enoch-Metatron. The first, "old" roles and titles, are connected with the early Enochic booklets but have undergone substantial reshaping. This category includes Metatron's scribal role, his expertise in heavenly secrets, his high priestly/liturgical roles, and his role as mediator of knowledge, divine judgment (encompassing intercession and witness against the evil generation of the flood), and the presence and authority of God. In discussing these "old" roles, Orlov includes a useful excursus on the name מיטטרון/מטטרון, summarizing nine theories on the etymology of this name (92–96). The second category contains "new" roles and titles, which cannot be shown to be directly derived from the early Enoch booklets, and include Metatron as Prince of the Presence, Prince of the World, Prince of the Law, the Youth, the Lesser YHWH, and the Measurer (or Measure) of the Divine Extent (שיעור קומה).

At this point we return to *Slavonic Enoch,* in which Orlov perceives two conceptual developments. First, there are the beginnings of roles and titles for the seventh

antediluvian hero that were previously unknown in Mesopotamian and early Enochic lore. Second, the "old" roles and titles are developed in the direction of the new, elevated profile of Enoch-Metatron. Thus we see in the Slavonic pseudepigraphon embryonic forms of the roles and titles of Enoch-Metatron in *Sefer Hekhalot,* such as Servant of the Face, Youth, Governor of the World, and God's Vice-Regent. Orlov also discusses here the relevance of the notion of the heavenly counterpart for the portrait of Enoch in *Slavonic Enoch.* In terms of "old" roles and titles, we see developments in terms of Enoch as diviner, mediator of divine judgment and the divine presence, expert in the secrets of creation, heavenly priest, and scribe.

Orlov includes a brief excursus in his discussion of "old" roles and titles on the deeply puzzling Slavonic word *prometaia,* which appears, in a variety of different forms, in ch. 43 of the short recension of *Slavonic Enoch* and in *Merilo Pravednoe* (176–80). He advances the bold suggestion that this word is etymologically related to the Hebrew מטטרון, while allowing the possibility that it might be derived from the Greek προμήθεια (180 n. 127), in the sense of protection, care, or providence. Both possibilities deserve consideration, but a third, very tentative possibility might be added, in light of the second: could *prometaya* be related to the Greek name Προμηθεύς? The connection between the Prometheus myth and the ʾAsaʾel story of *1 Enoch* 6–11 was elucidated by George Nickelsburg in a 1977 article not cited by Orlov. Certainly another son of Iapetus, namely, Atlas (Hesiod, *Theogony* §509; Apollodorus, *Library* §1.2.3), is associated with Enoch elsewhere (Ps.-Eup. 8–9), and both Prometheus and Enoch take the role of transmitters of heavenly secrets, though of course in Enoch's case the revelation is sanctioned by God, while in the case of Prometheus and ʾAsaʾel divine displeasure is incurred. Could the "theological embarrassment among the scribes" to which Andersen refers (*OTP* 1:217 n. l) derive from the similarity between Enoch's title and the name of one whose illicit revelation incurred divine censure?

In the second part of the book, Orlov shows how, in *Slavonic Enoch,* there is evidence that the portrait of Enoch has been shaped by intense polemical interaction with canonical and extracanonical speculation about Adam, Moses, and Noah. Thus Enoch is portrayed as one who regained, through his ascent and transformation, the glory of Adam that was lost through the transgression of the protoplast. Enoch thus takes a redeeming role, decisively removing Adam's sin. This anticipates a comparable portrayal in *Sefer Hekhalot.* There follows a thorough discussion of the two-way polemics between exalted Moses traditions, especially the *Exagoge* of Ezekiel the Tragedian, and the traditions in *Slavonic Enoch,* Orlov stressing the extent to which the authors of the texts "often did not hesitate to borrow the imagery and exegetical strategies of their opponents in order to build up the exalted profile of their own hero" (277). Finally, Orlov discusses how, in *Slavonic Enoch,* Noah has been replaced by Methuselah as the originator of the tradition of animal sacrifice, and by Melchizedek as the one who carries the priestly tradition across the period of the flood. Unlike the polemical interaction with Adamic and Mosaic traditions, the denigration of Noah took place *within* the Enochic lore itself.

While generally persuasive, there are two potential weaknesses in Orlov's discussion of mediatorial polemics. First, these polemics are implicit, not explicit, which suggests that Orlov's trenchant criticisms of Christfried Böttrich for not recognizing these

polemics are somewhat overdrawn. Second, if the interaction between these mediatorial traditions is polemical, there must have been real people behind the texts for whom much was at stake in this polemical interaction. But who were they? While deriving "sects from texts" (Philip Davies's phrase) is a notoriously troublesome procedure, it would have been helpful if Orlov had offered more discussion on this issue than he does (see 295–99). This would have been especially helpful in his concluding chapter on Noachic polemics, where the issues of halakhah and the sacrificial cult loom so large.

It would be difficult to overstate the significance of Orlov's monograph, which not only contributes in important ways to the study of the development of the Enoch-Metatron tradition, but also convincingly rehabilitates *Slavonic Enoch* in the context of Second Temple Judaism and the evolution of early Jewish mysticism. There are gaps in this study, but that is inevitable and leaves the way open for some exciting research in the future. Two areas in particular should be noted. There is relatively little said about the Qumran scrolls, though Orlov's study suggests that the relationship between the traditions in *Slavonic Enoch* and those preserved at Qumran needs to be investigated more intensively. For example, how might the study of the *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice* be affected by this study? On a more microscopic level, how might Orlov's study of Enoch's role as King of the Earth (215–19), the counterpart of the prelapsarian kingship of the protoplast, affect our understanding of the significance of the root משל in 4QInstruction? More puzzling is the almost total lack of reference to early christological speculation. Only three NT texts are even mentioned (Matt 18:10; Acts 12:15; 2 Cor 12:2), which is surprising given the overlap between the material covered by Orlov and that covered by Fletcher-Louis in his equally bold study *Luke-Acts* (WUNT 2/94; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997). Orlov's study of polemics between competing mediatorial traditions needs to be extended to incorporate the interaction between Christ and Adam, Enoch, Noah, Melchizedek, and Moses traditions, particularly given the proliferation of studies focusing on the relationship between christological speculation and Jewish exalted patriarch traditions published since Larry Hurtado, *One God, One Lord* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988; 2nd ed., Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998). Also, Orlov's discussion of the polemic between Enochic and Mosaic traditions touches on the luminous face of Moses and Enoch (289–91), and could have been extended to discuss 2 Cor 3:1–18.

Orlov leaves us much in his debt as a result of this study of *Slavonic Enoch,* and his work shows clearly the degree to which scholars need to devote much more time and energy to the Slavonic pseudepigrapha, and to acquiring and refining the research skills necessary to their study. It might be suggested that we do not need too many more new commentaries on Deuteronomy or Romans, but that we do have a pressing need for much more intensive study of hitherto relatively neglected works such as *Slavonic Enoch,* the *Apocalypse of Abraham,* and the *Ladder of Jacob,* not to mention neglected works in other, better known languages, such as the Greek *Testament of Solomon.*

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Is the mystery of both Essene and Qumran origins largely hidden in the Enoch literature (thus Boccaccini, 417)? *Enoch and Qumran Origins* deals with the relationship between Qumran literature and Second Temple Jewish texts relating to Enoch, in addition to a host of other related questions, and thus belongs to the current blossoming of scholarly interest in the Enoch tradition, which is also represented by, *inter alia*, the first volume of George Nickelsburg's commentary on *1 Enoch* (*1 Enoch 1: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1–36; 81–108* [ed. K. Baltzer; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001]), two new translations of *1 Enoch* (George W. E. Nickelsburg and James C. VanderKam, *1 Enoch: A New Translation* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004]; Daniel C. Olson, *Enoch: A New Translation* [North Richland Hills, TX: BIBAL, 2004]), and monographs by David Jackson (*Enochic Judaism: Three Defining Paradigm Exemplars* [London: T&T Clark International, 2004]), Siam Bhayro (*The Shemihazah and Asael Narrative of 1 Enoch 6–11: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary with Reference to Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Antecedents* [AOAT 332; Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2005]), and Andrei Orlov (*The Enoch-Metatron Tradition* [TSAJ 107; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005]) (for Jackson and Orlov, see preceding review). The volume under review here constitutes the proceedings of the second meeting of the Enoch seminar (Venice, July 1–4, 2003). Since the work of the Enoch seminar is surveyed by Boccaccini himself in his introduction (7–11), and by Thomas Kraus in his review in *RBL* (http://www.bookreviews.org), there is no reason to cover it again here. Furthermore, subjecting the minutiae of each of the positions presented in this volume to detailed scholarly critique would be a vast task, unnecessary in the context of a review and inappropriate given that many of the essays present short statements of a scholar's position rather than detailed arguments. This review will focus instead on identifying the main questions and issues with which the essays engage (for a different assessment, see the contribution by James H. Charlesworth, 444–54).

Enoch and Qumran Origins is organized around five topics: Dream Visions and Daniel (15–72), Enoch and *Jubilees* (73–182), the Apocalypse of Weeks (183–246), the Groningen hypothesis revisited (247–326), and the Enochic-Essene hypothesis revisited (327–435). There is, naturally, a certain amount of overlap among the five parts in terms of the questions and issues discussed. Each part concludes with a response from a leading scholar in the field, to whose earlier work the essays respond, and an up-to-date bibliography, the volume as a whole concluding with an assessment by Charlesworth (436–54). The overall impression the reader is given is of listening in on a rich, vibrant, ongoing conversation.

If this volume is taken as a guide to the major questions and issues exercising the minds of scholars working on Qumran and the Enoch literature, what are those questions and issues? In part 1, which concludes with a response by John Collins (59–66), a key issue is the relationship between the authors and tradents of texts associated with Daniel and Enoch, especially the canonical Daniel apocalypse and *1 Enoch* 85–90.

This emphasis touches on the deeper question of whether we can meaningfully discuss the sociohistorical contexts out of which such texts emerged. To what extent may a concrete sociohistorical context be extrapolated from purely textual evidence—and often allusive, symbolic textual evidence at that (the problem is well illustrated by Émile Puech's essay in part 4 [298–302], which implicitly affirms our ability to read precise historical data from Qumran texts without wrestling with the manifold methodological pitfalls attached to such a position)? Do Daniel and *1 Enoch* reflect communities with clearly defined boundaries, or simply the concerns of the particular sages responsible for them (Patrick Tiller, 23–26)? To what extent may we speak of cross-fertilization between the Daniel and Enoch traditions, especially in light of the Enochic Book of Giants and the pseudo-Daniel texts from Qumran cave 4 (Matthias Henze, 17–22)? How does the milieu out of which the Enochic and Danielic literatures emerged relate to the milieu out of which *Jubilees* emerged (Armin Lange, 27–34)? Echoing misgivings aired by Michael Stone back in 1976 ("Lists of Revealed Things in the Apocalyptic Literature," in *Magnalia Dei: The Mighty Acts of God: Essays on the Bible and Archaeology in Memory of G. Ernest Wright* [ed. F. M. Cross, W. E. Lemke, and P. D. Miller, Jr.; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976, 443]; cf. the response to James Davila by Collins, 59–60), is it at all meaningful to speak of the shared matrix of Daniel and the Animal Apocalypse as "apocalyptic" (Davila, 35–38)? How are Zadokite covenantal theology and the (Enochic?) idea of the degeneration of history dovetailed in the book of Daniel (Boccaccini, 39–44)? How might particular communities, such as the *yaḥad*, have appropriated apparently incompatible texts, such as the Enochic and Danielic dream visions, into their libraries of authoritative works (Florentino García Martínez, 45–46; cf. Albert I. Baumgarten, 258; Benjamin G. Wright 286–90, 399–400)? Do such incompatible works reflect an underlying conflict between communities or groups with contrasting theological convictions or not? With specific reference to Daniel, how might the three major categories of explanation for the identity of *kbr ʾnš* in Dan 7:13 (a messianic figure, a collective symbol for the Jewish people, an angelic being) be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive (Matthias Albani, 47–53)? How does this phrase in Dan 7:13 relate to other occurrences of the phrase in Old and Middle Aramaic sources, and how does this passage relate to ancient visions of the heavenly sanctuary (Stefan Beyerle, 54–58)?

The discussion in part 2 relates very broadly to "the ideological relationship between *Jubilees* and other Enoch literature" (Jeff S. Anderson, 132). A variety of questions are explored, concluding with carefully judged responses to each essay by James VanderKam (162–70). How might *Jubilees* be read narratively? In other words, how might we read *Jubilees* as a narrative in its own right, rather than simply as a derivative work, parasitic upon Genesis and Exodus (Helge S. Kvanvig, 75-83)? Such a question rightly troubles the canonical boundaries that continue to govern too much of our thinking about Second Temple Jewish literature (but cf. Charlesworth, 440, 446–47, 452). The implications of the fluidity of "the boundaries of scriptural authority" in the second century B.C.E. are central also to Annette Yoshiko Reed's brief reflections (94–98). What influence did the OG of Genesis have on apocryphal writings in Greek relating to Enoch and the fall of the Watchers (Erik W. Larson, 84–89)? How exactly does Jubilees relate to the different strands of the Enoch tradition (Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, 99–101;

Liliana Rosso Ubigli, 137–40; Ida Fröhlich, 141–47), and to Qumran texts such as the *Temple Scroll* (Fröhlich, 146–47)? What might we learn from the polemic of *Jubilees* and *1 Enoch* about the communities behind these texts and their ideological opponents (Anderson, 132–36)? Does the evidence allow us to assert that *Jubilees* is dependent on the *text* of *1 Enoch* or only on traditions shared by both works (Jacques van Ruiten, 90–93)? This latter question has major implications for the relative dating of these works and thus for our understanding of the development of the traditions they embody.

Some essays in part 2 have only a tangential connection to the relationship between *Jubilees* and the Enoch tradition, such as Ithamar Gruenwald's consideration of the relationship between the "ethos" of apocalyptic and early Christian texts and that of biblical material such as the patriarchal narratives (148–52), and Lawrence Schiffman's exploration of the relationship between *1 Enoch* and the later Hebrew Enoch (152–61). Schiffman touches here on a subject that deserves deep and thorough investigation, yet is only beginning to ignite the scholarly imagination. It would be profitable to explore Schiffman's comments in relation to those of Torleif Elgvin in his contribution to part 4, which touch on possible connections between Qumran texts and *hekhalot* literature (279). Though Qumran literature hovers in the background of most of the essays in part 2, it does not take center stage before Hanan Eshel's reading of 4Q390 as an update of the 490-year prophecy of Dan 9:24–27, and as evidence for the complex calendrical controversies of the Second Temple period (102–10). Issues of calendar and worship, as they bear on understanding *Jubilees* and the Qumran community, are well represented in this volume (Henry Rietz, 111–18; Michael A. Daise, 119–28; Charlotte Hempel, 254–55). Such issues relate to the key question of the relationship between *Jubilees* and "sectarianism," a theme touched on by Martha Himmelfarb (129–31) and Ubigli (140).

Part 3 is relatively short, comprising essays on the brief Apocalypse of Weeks and a response by George Nickelsburg (234–41). Several (though not all) essays concern the relationship between the Apocalypse of Weeks, other Enochic works, and the Qumran sect (Michael A. Knibb, 218–19). How does the antagonism between *qwšṭ* and *šqr* in the Apocalypse of Weeks relate to that between *hᵓmt* and *hʿwl* in 1QS 3:13–4:26, and how do these oppositions relate to ideas found in Iranian sources (Klaus Koch, 185–99)? What might 4Q306 have to contribute to the study of the relationship between the Animal Apocalypse and the *Damascus Document,* and thus of the relationship between the Hasidim, the Qumran sect, and the "lambs" of the Animal Apocalypse (Timothy H. Lim, 204–6)? How does the phrase *mṭʿt ʿwlm,* in 4Q418 81.13 relate to the Enoch tradition (e.g., *1 En.* 93:10), and to what social realities do these texts point (Loren T. Stuckenbruck, 210–12; cf. Elgvin, 274–75; Collins, 348–50)? How is the Aramaic of 4QEn^{g} ar to be evaluated in relation to the Ethiopic text of the Apocalypse of Weeks and the Greek of Chester Beatty XII Enoch (Tigchelaar, 220–23)? What is the significance of identifying 7Q4, 8, 11–13 as evidence for Greek Enoch at Qumran (Peter W. Flint, 224–33, esp. 229–33), an identification Nickelsburg strongly disputes (237–39)?

Questions dealt with in part 3 that do not pertain directly to Qumran include the following: Has the Apocalypse of Weeks dispensed with the notion of a covenant between Israel and God? How might the work be read against the background of the persecution of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (Andreas Bedenbender, 200–203)? What

different perceptions of time are reflected in the Apocalypse of Weeks and how do they relate both to "biblical" precedents and to the contents of other historical apocalypses (Henze, 207–9)? How might the Apocalypse of Weeks be read as an integral part of the Epistle of Enoch, and to what extent is the Epistle to be read as a coherent literary unity (Knibb, 213–18)?

The final two parts deal with the major current theories about the origins of the Qumran sect and the movement from which it emerged, the Groningen hypothesis and the Enochic-Essene hypothesis, though as García Martínez notes (316), the contributions of Shemaryahu Talmon (294–97) and Puech (298–302) state their own position on Qumran origins rather than engaging other hypotheses. García Martínez (310–16) and Boccaccini (417–25) are, appropriately, the respective respondents. Perhaps the most searching questions of hypotheses of Qumran origins are asked by Baumgarten: Should we be so concerned about identifying the filiation of the Qumran group, or should we focus first of all on placing our evidence for ancient Jewish movements alongside one another for purposes of comparison, eschewing the worship of the "idol of origins" (256–62)? Shemaryahu Talmon also continues in this vein, asking searching questions regarding the use by scholars of texts not obviously authored by "those who entered the renewed covenant," such as the Enoch literature and the references to Essenes in the classical sources, in understanding the Qumran group (294–97). Baumgarten's assessment is one of the most important methodological issues dealt with in this volume and demands deeper sustained reflection, particularly in connection with the not-unrelated question of how we read sociohistorical information off textual evidence in the first place.

One aspect of this issue is whether we need to move beyond theories of filiation altogether, or whether such theories are simply in need of further refinement in light of deeper analyses of the available evidence and deeper reflection on our methodological presuppositions. While Baumgarten follows the former path, other contributors seem to favor the latter, which is, in a sense, the path of least resistance, avoiding as it does the need to trouble the very foundations of the dominant epistemological paradigms in the field. Thus, scholars such as Hempel pursue searching questions within the framework of the Groningen hypothesis itself. How helpful is it to think in general terms of a "Palestinian Apocalyptic Tradition" (Hempel, 250–51)? What are the difficulties with using classical sources as evidence for the "Essene Parent Movement" rather than the *yaḥad,* and how are we to discern in the texts of the *yaḥad* evidence for its parent movement (Hempel, 251–53; cf. Elgvin, 278–79; Lester L. Grabbe, 283–84; Collins, 346–48)? To what extent is the emergence of the offshoot group a separate issue from the settlement of Qumran (Hempel, 254–55)? Was the Qumran community one of many similar Essene communities, the center of the Essene movement (cf. Puech, 298–302), or a marginal splinter group of Essenes, and what are the implications of deciding in favor of or against each of these possibilities (Boccaccini, 303-9)? How much weight can specific passages in the sectarian texts be expected to bear in reconstructing Qumran origins (Mark A. Elliott, 263–68)? From whom, exactly, did the Qumran group separate (Elliott, 268–72; cf. Grabbe, 282–85)? From wider Essenism? Or from apostate Israel in general? When did the split take place (Elgvin, 410)? Was the *yaḥad,* as such, limited to Qumran or does

it represent a wider movement beyond the Qumran settlement (Elgvin, 273–79)? If so, where might the boundaries be between the *yaḥad* and other Jewish streams (cf. Elgvin, 278–79)? On a more microscopic, though not less significant level, how is 1QpHab 5:9–12 correctly to be understood, and how does the exegesis of this passage inform the Groningen hypothesis (Lim, 291–93)?

Part 5 consists of reflections on the Enochic-Essene hypothesis, represented principally by Boccaccini's seminal *Beyond the Essene Hypothesis: The Parting of the Ways between Qumran and Enochic Judaism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). While drawing a different conclusion from Boccaccini on the relationship between Enochic Judaism and the Essenes of Philo and Josephus, the contribution closest to Boccaccini's methodology is Paolo Sacchi's, which attempts, by systemic analysis, to trace the relationship between the books of *Enoch, Jubilees,* Daniel, and the Qumran texts, before comparing the results with the classical sources on the Essenes (401–7). Claudio Gianotto assumes the validity of Boccaccini's position, asking how it might be developed more extensively in relation to the study of Christian origins (414–16). Other scholars focus on more specific questions raised by the hypothesis. How can we convincingly reconstruct, on the basis of the available evidence, meaningful connections between the Enochic literature and the Essenes of Josephus and Philo (David W. Suter, 330–32; Collins, 346–47; Boccaccini, 423)? This relates to VanderKam's reflections on the absence of the story of the angels who sinned from the discussions of the Essenes in those classical sources (392–93). What exactly are the implications of the different approaches to theodicy in "Enochic Judaism" and Qumran (Suter, 332–34)? How certain can we be that there was a split between the Enochic-Essene movement and Qumran (David W. Suter, 334–35; Collins, 347–48)? More broadly, can theodicy be used to write *social* history (Suter, 335 n. 2)? Suter's question brings us, once more, to the problem of extrapolating sociohistorical data from textual evidence, which connects directly with Yoshiko Reed's discussion of the use of *1 Enoch* as a source for a "Judaism" (339–42; cf. Reeves, 378; Boccaccini, 418–21). What is the nature of the continuity within the Enoch tradition: is it sociohistorical, religious, philosophical, literary or intertextual (Yoshiko Reed, 339)? Why should *theodicy* be the criterion for defining, distinguishing, and tracing the development of different Judaisms (Yoshiko Reed, 340–41)? If we cannot extrapolate evidence for a social group from *1 Enoch,* is it at all meaningful to speak of Enochic Judaism as a "Judaism" at all? Why not think "in terms of an Enochic literary tradition which crossed the boundaries of different groups and influenced different streams of tradition in different ways" (Yoshiko Reed, 343)? If we do reconstruct a specific social group behind the Enoch literature, does our evidence allow us to say that there is a direct link between the "plant root" of the *Damascus Document* and the Enoch group (Collins, 348–50)? Jeff Anderson aptly summarizes the methodological pitfalls of this whole discussion by highlighting the dual danger in reconstructing hypothetical social groups of elevating ideal types to social reality, on the one hand, and reductionism, on the other, before discussing the problems created when we simply discuss the relationships between texts, not those between groups (351–55).

Davila, who is in broad agreement with Boccaccini's position, addresses a slightly different set of questions (356–59). Can the hypothesis of Qumran as a celibate, extremist

Essene settlement be maintained? Can it be maintained that late, non-extremist Essene works were censored out of the Qumran library? Are the Qumran finds a single library at all? Corrado Martone (360–65), like Davila, is in broad agreement with Boccaccini, seeking to refine the Enochic-Essene hypothesis by examining the question, "Why did a Zadokite group originate from an anti-Zadokite movement" (361)? This relates to Wright's questions about how exactly the Mosaic Torah became so significant in documents, such as the *Temple Scroll* and 4QMMT, that belong to Boccaccini's formative age of Enochic Judaism, a movement that was supposedly opposed to the Mosaic Torah of the Zadokites (398–99). This, in turn, relates to Elgvin's questions about whether we can actually deny the authority of Moses and the Prophets for *all* Jewish groups before ca. 200 B.C.E., and whether 4QMMT should be placed as early as Boccaccini suggests (408–10).

Pierluigi Piovanelli also advocates refinements. How might the Enochic-Essene hypothesis be refined in light of recent archaeological syntheses (367)? What sorts of questions might a sociologist of sectarian movements explore in relation to both textual and archaeological evidence from Qumran (368–70)? What can we learn from the evidence of other sectarian groups about the selectivity of the Qumran group regarding the content of its libraries (370–71; cf. Wright, 399–400)? Elgvin poses the further question of how the text types represented by the "biblical" scrolls from Qumran might relate to socio-religious streams of the Second Temple period (410–13). William Adler probes two potential cracks in the Enochic-Essene hypothesis: is the generative idea of Boccaccini's Enochic Judaism, that is the superhuman origin of evil, really so original, or is it simply a natural religious impulse in an embattled sectarian community (386–87)? If the books of Enoch were so central, why do the Qumran texts not reflect more extensive wrestling with them (387)?

Respectfully critical of Boccaccini is VanderKam, who asks, among several other major and minor questions, whether the angel story can really be said to be the central thread in Enochic Judaism (393). More critical of Boccaccini's methodological assumptions is John Reeves, who rightly interrogates the reconstruction of a binary opposition between Enochic and Zadokite Judaisms (373–83). A hugely important question, which demands more extensive investigation, is: "How does an alleged Enochic Judaism relate to the construction and promulgation of the Pentateuch and other scriptural collections" (Reeves, 376)? In its troubling of the "tyranny of canonical consciousness" (Robert Kraft's phrase), this question is not unrelated to the essays by Kvanvig and Yoshiko Reed in part 2. How might the Enoch tradition relate to the Priestly source of the Pentateuch (376–77)? What are the implications of the often overlooked fact that *1 Enoch* 1–108 only exists as a textual unit in the Ethiopian Christian tradition, as a *Christian* compilation? At the very least this makes reconstructing an Enochic group within late Second Temple Palestinian Judaism behind *1 Enoch* deeply problematic (cf. Yoshiko Reed, 336–44), and has serious implications in particular for Sacchi's discussion of the *books of Enoch* (401–4). Perhaps the most searching question Reeves poses is whether there was ever any such thing as an Essene sect (378–83). Are the Essenes really more tangible than the emperor's new clothes, or would they be more at home in the fables of Umberto Eco's Baudolino?

In conclusion to an unduly expansive review, I would commend most highly this important and exciting volume to all scholars and students of Second Temple Jewish literature and early Christianity. It should provide a stimulus to future research on several critical issues. The book is essential reading for scholars and research students working on any aspect of Second Temple Judaism and the Jewish framework for the origins of Christianity. The general readability of the essays in the volume, combined with the fact that the collection offers insight into the current state of several key areas of research, suggests that this volume as a whole, or one or more of its constituent parts, would make an interesting basis for a graduate seminar.

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A Critical Introduction to the New Testament: Interpreting the Message and Meaning of Jesus Christ, by Carl R. Holladay. Nashville: Abingdon, 2005. Pp. xxiv + 609 + Expanded CD-ROM Version. $49.00 (paper). ISBN 0687085691.

This is a slightly revised version of comments presented at the session of the 2005 SBL Annual Meeting (S20-57) devoted to a review of this book. The oral nature of the presentation is preserved.

Make no mistake about it. Carl Holladay has dropped a bombshell on NT scholarship and pedagogy, or at the very least fired a warning shot across the bow of the ship of the status quo. I am not referring to the technical innovation of including an expansive CD version of the text, but to the hermeneutical innovation of excluding what has been, up to now, a standard feature of NT introductions. There is no chapter on "The World of the NT"! All recent introductions that I consulted have at least one chapter—and often several—on the cultural, political, social, and religious worlds of the NT. Holladay has none.

This is clearly not a decision mandated by matters of space. The CD version opens up almost limitless possibilities for broadening the scope of the introduction, but it contains no chapter on the world of the NT either. Holladay's radical departure from the introductory canon was fueled by conviction, not expedience. He writes, "Biblical scholarship over the last century or so has called for reading the NT like any other ancient writing. Placing the NT writings within their larger Greco-Roman context arose out of the Renaissance and Enlightenment as a corrective to dogmatic construals of the NT. While this has been a helpful corrective, in its more extreme forms this approach downplays the sacred character ascribed to these texts within Christian communities" (588). Holladay's *Introduction,* I believe, is intended as a corrective to this corrective. He is not, of course, returning to pre-Enlightenment naiveté, and he is certainly not ignoring the culture and history of the Greco-Roman world. Cultural and historical information is presented at appropriate points throughout the various chapters on the NT writings. But by eliminating an introductory chapter (or chapters) on this topic, he is symbolically (and emphatically) "backgrounding" the historical context. He is also making it difficult

for readers to access historical and cultural information if they feel it is important at different points of the discussion (see below on the index).

Holladay is interested in the "foreground" of the text—the way the NT now functions and has historically functioned for believers as an authoritative dialogue partner in the ongoing task of theological reflection. This is clearly signaled by the bookends that he provides for his discussion of the NT writings. Instead of an opening chapter orienting readers to the world of the NT, his opening chapter orients the reader to the task of theological reflection; and his closing chapter picks up the same theme with its reflections on the formation and function of the canon. The message conveyed is that these are not documents whose meaning is imbedded in the past, but writings whose meaning is actualized in the ongoing life of the church and of every Christian believer. Thus he is not primarily interested in, for example, how the Gospel of Mark represented and challenged the first-century Mediterranean world (cf. Paul J. Achtemeier, Joel B. Green, and Marianne Meye Thompson, *Introducing the New Testament: Its Literature and Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 20)—though Holladay does (occasionally) mention challenges to this world (122). Holladay is interested in how Mark engaged in theological sense-making almost as an activity unto itself, that is, without frequent reference to the cultural or political or communal issues that may have precipitated it. (It is worth noting here that Holladay reports, with apparent approbation, the suggestion of some scholars that the Gospels were written, not to discrete communities with discrete problems, but to the larger church [69]). He deals with cultural and political realities of the first-century world, but only—or primarily—insofar as this serves his larger goal of presenting an interpretation that will facilitate the contemporary church's theologizing.

This is strikingly confirmed by the index. An index reveals a lot of things, not only where to find discussions, but also which discussions are important to the author (and which the author thinks will be—or should be—important to the reader). Cultural categories are largely missing from the index of this book: there are no entries for marriage, family, honor. Political categories are also missing: there are no entries for Alexander the Great, or Bar Kokhba, or Roman procurators, or the Jewish War, or Antiochus IV. There are no separate entries for the christological titles: Son of God, Son of Man, Messiah, or for the Suffering Servant; one must look under the entries for each NT writing for these topics. There is no entry for the Septuagint. There is one topic with two citations under the entry for the Roman Empire, no entry for Judaism or for any of the sects of Judaism save a lone entry for Sadducees. There are, however, long lists of topics under the entries for Augustine of Hippo, Clement, Eusebius (thirty-four subtopics filling five inches of the index!), Ignatius, Irenaeus, and even one entry for Ludolf of Saxony. But none for Junia. This index, even more than the orienting opening chapter, shows how radically Holladay has redefined the genre. How have these writings been used and valued in the church? is the question the index promotes and supports; not, How did these writings emerge and respond to their own culture? I repeat: Holladay does address this second question. And I repeat: He does not orient his textbook around it.

I conducted a couple of test probes to see how some NT documents fared under this approach. Nothing in the chapter on Mark attempts to orient this Gospel in space or time (though in his comments in the chapter on the Synoptic problem Holladay

suggests a date several decades after Jesus's death). There is nothing in this chapter on authorship, nothing on the probable or possible circumstances of Mark's community. To be sure, all of these issues are hotly debated and all claims about them are highly speculative, but Holladay does not mention this uncertainty as the reason for his silence on these matters. He is simply silent. In another innovative move, he omits the section-by-section summary of the contents of the Gospel that is typical of most commentaries, and by doing so he forces students to read and engage the NT texts themselves (a very salutary and deliberate outcome!). A two-page chart listing the contents of each chapter provides an overview of the organization of the Gospel without eliminating the necessity of actually reading it. Holladay does a wonderful job of describing the enigmatic quality of Mark's Jesus and the literary artistry of Mark's Gospel, but the heart of the chapter is the lengthy section on "Jesus in Mark," recapitulated in the concluding section entitled "Mark's Theological Achievement."

Unconstrained by hypotheses about the context of the Gospel, which usually focus on the putative persecution of the Markan community and thus evoke a concomitant christological emphasis on the suffering Son of Man, Holladay plumbs the theological depth of all christological titles: charismatic teacher and healer, Son of David, Son of God, Son of Man. He does not mention the Suffering Servant—often regarded as the key to Mark's christology—and though he does mention Mark's messianic secret, that concept does not control the discussion of the Gospel. As Holladay reads the Gospel, the suffering Son of Man (a phrase introduced on 107 but not explained until 118) is a concept of great significance, but he sees and treats it as one of the "constellations of images" that define the figure of Jesus: "At one level he is a charismatic teacher . . . at a much higher level, he is a particular blend of Messiah, Son of God, and Son of Man" (119). Note that "suffering" is not explicitly mentioned in this summary of Mark's christology. It was something of a shock to realize upon reading this chapter how much and how often presuppositions about the setting of Mark's Gospel have limited the apprehension of the breadth and depth of Mark's rich christology. In contrast, this is a fresh, surprising, and thought-provoking analysis.

The second probe was into the chapter on the Pastoral Epistles. (It should be noted that there is no chapter on Paul, another typical feature of introductions that has been set aside.) These letters are treated as post-Pauline, which, says Holladay, probably makes what he calls their "problematic features" easier to digest. Holladay does not explore the ethical implications of the letters' pseudonymity (cf. R. E. Brown, *An Introduction to the New Testament* [New York: Doubleday, 1997), 583–88, 668–71); for him their canonical status is of overriding importance. He recognizes that their unusual features could derive from unusual circumstances, but he does not explore those circumstances very aggressively. They include, according to Holladay, a date at the end of the first or the beginning of the second century. He notes that Christian writings of that period emphasize order, stability, and continuity, but he does not report what was going on in the empire at that time (there is, e.g., no reference to the martyrdom of Ignatius). He also notes that the circumstances include the presence of opposing teachers who were threatening the church. Holladay describes them briefly, but he does not explore the possibility of a connection between their opposition to marriage and the emphasis on marriage and childbirth within these letters.

Holladay does not comment on external relations, that is, on the possibility of hostility from outsiders and how that might have affected the direction of the ethical admonitions. He notes that the Roman household provides "analogies for ecclesial practice," but without some discussion of the nature of the Roman household, that observation does not communicate much information. The problematic aspects of these letters—their superficial portrait of women, their endorsement of rigid social hierarchy—are all acknowledged, but (in my view) too lightly dismissed. "There is room," Holladay says, "within the hierarchy for mutuality of relationships" (438). I would like for that to be the case, but I don't see it. The discussion of how the letters promote Christian *paideia* is excellent, but surprisingly (given Holladay's theological interest), there is no section on the epiphany christology of these letters. Overall, this discussion seems to suffer more than the discussion of Mark from Holladay's reluctance to vigorously engage the social, cultural, and political contexts. In my view, the letters come more alive when read in closer dialogue with the unusual circumstances of their composition; they then become a vividly concrete example of the importance of "context" on the process of theological reflection (18). Nevertheless, Holladay is again thought-provoking, and almost any paragraph of his section on the theological vision of the Pastorals could become the basis for a very lively classroom discussion.

(My comments in the annual meeting review session did not cover the CD version, but much of the discussion did. The following points were raised during that discussion. The technical innovation of the text—the provision of a CD version—expands the content of the textbook, but it does not change or supplement the nature of the learning experience. The CD text is not searchable and so does not encourage students to track a topic or chase an idea on their own. It also creates the impression of different levels of importance: material in the hard-copy version seems more important than that found only in the CD version. That can have unfortunate consequences. This innovation certainly anticipates the future of textbooks, but an electronic format offers far more possibilities than were realized in this publication).

In the preface of his book Holladay says that the task of writing it caused him to rethink what ministers really need to know about the NT (xi). The shape of the book provides his answer: They really need to know how the NT writers went about reflecting on the meaning and message of Jesus Christ in order to inform their own activity of theological reflection. I think he is absolutely right, and his text is exemplary in that regard. But I would argue that ministry students—at least my ministry students—need to be reminded again and again that these letters were written in and for a different culture, a different world. Many of these students—no, most of them—come without any sense of the enormous cultural and social and economic and political differences between the first-century NT world of the Mediterranean basin and the twenty-first century world of Texas, and most of their congregations have even less sense of this. They (and their congregations) are all too prone to "do theology" by plugging a NT verse into their situation. Understanding how to "theologize" will help correct that, and Holladay's textbook, especially the opening chapter, provides excellent resources and models for this; but a clear awareness of the differences in the situations then and now is also necessary for good theologizing. Holladay does not in any way promote theology-

by-plugging, and he would not condone it, but the format of this textbook does not, in my view, reinforce the cultural divide enough for my students.

Ministry students—at least my ministry students—also need to hear a feminist critique of these writings. Fifty percent of my students are women, and many are living in a culture that still, STILL, resists their leadership in churches. In my view, they need to hear a stronger critique of those passages that restrict women's roles, a stronger discussion of those passages that enhance them, and a clearer explanation of the cultural factors that influenced the way these documents express those roles. This is important for the sake of the students and for the sake of their churches, whose primary access to this information will be through them. "You could provide that critique yourself in your lectures," one might argue. And I could and I do. But it is important for the textbook to support this message, because there is a not insignificant number of students who resist it and need to hear it from a variety of sources. In Holladay's hard-copy edition there is no discussion of 1 Corinthians 7 or Gal 3:28, and 1 Cor 14:35–37 is assumed to be Pauline (without discussion in the hard-copy edition). He does not refer to the *Haustafel* in Colossians and gives the one in Ephesians only a few lines, concluding with the true (but in my view inadequate) comment that "the overall expectations are cast in terms of mutual respect and love" (418).

Ministry students—my ministry students—need to be enabled to critique the NT text when that is necessary. They have no trouble accepting its sacred character (588). They have a great deal of trouble acknowledging that such sacred books could contain a message with a potential for harm. They are very good at accepting the NT as God's Word, but far less good at accepting the presence of social and cultural influence on it. Holladay's discussion of "the Jews" in the Fourth Gospel is an excellent example of addressing this influence, but (in my view) the anti-Pharisaic tirades of Matthew need equal attention, as do problematic passages in Paul's letters and Revelation.

Holladay has done all teachers of ministry students a tremendous service by producing a text that keeps the needs of the church so clearly and constantly in view. I have expressed some points of disagreement on how to construe those needs, but that should not detract or distract from his accomplishments. This is an amazing work, learned and wise and eloquent and ambitious. In one volume (well, two actually, if you count the CD) he introduces students not only to the writings of the NT but also to the discipline of theological reflection, the issue of biblical authority, and the history of biblical interpretation. Too frequently these are the topics of separate courses. Holladay's premise is that they must all be held together in one course. When I use the text, though, I will have to dramatically reshape my lectures. In the past I have counted on the textbook to provide adequate orientation to the context. Now I will have to spend more time on that myself. On the plus side, though, I can take considerable comfort in the fact that the text will provide stimulating orientation to the unending task of interpreting the message and meaning of Jesus Christ.

I am left with two questions—minor ones, perhaps, but perhaps not. Holladay says he was prompted to write it by "the changed environment of the twenty-first century." There are many changes in this environment—the rise of postmodernism and the decline of the confidence of modernism; the rise of the evangelical right; the decline of the "Mainstream" church. What aspect of the changed environment was he responding

to? What aspects of the current social, cultural, political, and religious contexts were influential in shaping this text? (Carl's response at the annual meeting was that he had in mind two things: the diversity—at every level—of ministry students and the general decline in their biblical literacy).

And why is the word "critical" so oddly highlighted on the cover? By it Holladay means that "[the text] deals with interpretive issues related to the literary, historical, social, and religious dimensions of the New Testament" (1). But that is what all major introductions do—usually without highlighting the word "critical" in the title. The typeface of the word also distinguishes it from the rest of the title, like a later insertion. Was Holladay responding to something by including that word so prominently—should I say "defensively"—in the title?

The final words, though, come down to these: Thanks, Carl. This is a gift and a challenge to ministry students, and to all of us who try to nurture in them an effective understanding of these documents of faith.

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Dialogue and Drama: Elements of Greek Tragedy in the Fourth Gospel, by Jo-Ann Brant. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004. Pp. 320. $19.95 (paper). ISBN 1565639073.

The purpose of this book is to explore the relationship of the Fourth Gospel (FG) to Greek tragedy (GT). It is not intertextual analysis that Brant undertakes, but rather the more generic study of the influences that the Greek tragedians may have exerted on the Gospel of John. Brant's overarching perspective is that in many ways the form of the FG is a performance text. Theatrical criticism, particularly of the structuralist variety, provides the perspective and tools with which the text is studied. Four chapters examine how Greek tragedy can enlighten the FG's dramatic structure (ch. 1), speeches (ch. 2), characterization (ch. 3), and distinctive portrayal of Jesus's death (ch. 4). As for how the FG could have knowledge of these tragedies when they appear to no longer have been performed publicly in the first century C.E., Brant notes that educational training in Greek was heavily influenced by past classics. Quintilian ranked the great tragedians with Homer as models to be studied, claims Brant. Quintilian appears to place, however, the comedic poets of Aristophanes, Eupolis, and Cratinus as second to Homer in Attic style (*Inst.* 10.1.65). But there is no need to cavil because Quintilian also holds up the three great tragedians as exemplars (10.1.67). Moreover, I note that another justification for this type of investigation comes from Dio Chrysostom, who placed the works of Euripides on par with those of Homer and Menander for the training of public speakers (*Dic. exercit.* 6–8).

Under the rubric of "Dramatic Structure," Brant proposes nine areas of similarity between the FG and the GT. The first two of them concern prologues and epilogues. Although not formally similar, the prologues in each are distinct from the start of the

narrative and provide perspective, not shared by the characters, that allows the audience to jump into the story *in medias res.* Brant also argues that both Euripides and the fourth evangelist (FE) have contrapuntal imagery in their prologues, which sets up the tension in the body of their works, and that the first person plural pronouns in John 1:14 draws the audience into the performance of the Gospel. She provides but two examples of comparable devices to pull spectators into the tragedies, and only one of them, from Euripides' *Alcestis,* appears to unambiguously do so. As for the epilogues, in both the GT and the FG they encourage the reader's affirmation of the events that have preceded them.

The third through sixth areas of dramatic structure which Brant compares are the settings, the entrances and exits of characters, the transitions between episodes, and the unity of composition. Brant contends that the FE is more attentive to the spatiotemporal matrix of the episodes than are the Synoptics, and that this attention is comparable to the careful location of the episodes by the tragedians. The appearance of characters in the FG is also considered by Brant to be more purposeful than in the Synoptics and more in correspondence with the way characters appear in the tragedies. Scenes are often demarcated by the appearances of characters whose ingresses and egresses have dramatic significance. Some transitions in the FG are said to resemble the choral ode (στάσιμον) in tragedies by apprising readers of the feelings and beliefs of characters. The concern for the unity of composition found in the tragedies is said to be marked in the FG by (1) creating suspense by frequent references to Jesus's death (which, I note, has an analogue in the references to Jerusalem in the Lukan travel section); (2) a plot line with climax and closure; and (3) a logical set of movements within the plot.

Peripeteia, anagnorisis, and pathos constitute the final three foci of this chapter. In both the GT and the FG reversals are signaled by the inversion of words used to describe the protagonist and by redirecting praise away from him. The examples provided from GT come from Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus.* In this work, however, precise terms are the medium of the reversal, whereas a number of the Gospel examples are less specific, sometimes involving complexes of ideas. Accepting R. Alan Culpepper's analysis of there being not one anagnorisis in the FG but a number of them that occur whenever a character recognizes Jesus's identity, Brant views the results of recognition in both the FG and the GT to be a change in the relation between characters, usually toward alienation. She also considers pathos in each body of literature to be expressed in terms of the dialectic between necessity and choice with the former trumping the latter. This is an element of the plot, however, and not indicative of a deterministic view.

Chapter 2 deals with the way speech is handled in the FG and GT. Ancient drama needed to specify in speech which characters are present in a scene, the spatiotemporal location of the scene, and the movements between places that are occurring. Brant finds the speeches of characters in the FG similarly rich in deictic language, as shown in (1) their frequent use of the words ἄρτι, νῦν, ὧδε, and οὕτως; (2) personal pronouns with accompanying verbs; (3) demonstrative pronouns; and (4) speech that specifically describes the action that is occurring and the space in which it occurs. Thus, she determines that at times what is spoken about by the characters makes redundant what the narrator says. Moreover the deictic language is often ambiguous and generates irony and misunderstanding in the FG and in the GT.

The next section in this chapter focuses on how antitheses, flyting contests, and formal debates advance the plot of the FG and the GT. Antitheses occur when a single character or several characters progress in speech through a thesis–antithesis pattern or through using opposing images. Flyting is a verbal dual that displays wit and has an ad hominem focus. Brant finds this literary device also in the Homeric epics. The forensic speeches of Jesus are compared to the formal debate (ἀγών) in Greek tragedy but with the caveat that the connections may not argue for a dependence of the former on the latter. In my view, the prophetic *rîb* offers a more plausible background to these speeches.

Brant then moves to similarities in the characterization of the FG and GT (ch. 3). These include a penchant for referring to the cognition or dispositions of characters and for presenting the self-identification of protagonists in ways that exalt them above others and cause friction. In regard to the latter point, Brant provides a number of intriguing tragic examples on a range of issues revolving around the naming of the protagonist and the results to which this gives rise. Brant also suggests a movement from the protagonist's alienation from his community to reconciliation with them in each body of literature. In the FG she finds the alienation to be from his disciples in that Jesus is distant from them before the resurrection and "becomes a social being" after it. Her argument is that this later warmth of Jesus is shown in the farewell discourses by his calling his disciples "little children" and expressing his love and care for them and in the resurrection appearances by calling some disciples by name. But one may respond that the estrangement in the FG is not between Jesus and the disciples who remain with him, but between this group and the world, and this gap is never bridged. Moreover, there appears to be some confusion in Brant's assessment of when the movement to Jesus's becoming a social being occurs: after the resurrection (176) or beginning with the farewell discourse (177). Why should one view the differences in Jesus's warmth of expression that exist between the Book of Signs and the Book of Glory as influenced by a dramatic precedent rather than by the exigencies of a narrative in which Jesus exhibits a single-minded focus on first gathering a community (9:4–5; 12:35–36) and only after that task is completed, and his physical departure from them imminent, on strengthening that community? What is important to him in this first stage is not calling others by name, but rather manifesting the Father's name (17:6, 26). In a somewhat similar vein as the last set of arguments, Brant asserts that the disciples are seldom present during Jesus's conversations with other characters. This point is in need of more argumentation because there are a good number of passages in which, although not mentioned, the implication is that the disciples are present, especially in a Gospel where remaining with Jesus is so important.

Brant also contends that οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι function in the FG as a chorus, which in the GT are usually spectators rather than participants in the action, and which take minor, terse roles in the dialogue. According to Brant, the Jews are always on the verge of acting, of trying to arrest or kill Jesus, but never doing so. This appears to neglect the actual arrest attempt on their part in 10:31. Brant says that while οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι seek Pilate's action, they remain but a witness to what Pilate does. It seems to this reviewer, however, that οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in the FG are more effectively active than Pilate, manipulating him into doing what he would rather not do. Like οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι the Beloved Disciple (BD) is said to be a spectator, a "bystander" rather than a participant in the events of the story, as is

Simon Peter. The function of the BD is to give witness to future generations. It is the paucity of his speech that leads to this assessment by Brant, who claims that "he is beloved because he never says anything to give offense" (199). But the actions of the BD, who is present at the cross, appear (proverbially) to speak louder than words and merit the view that he is an active participant and beloved for more than a wise taciturnity. There are more female characters who speak in drama than in other ancient Greek genres, a fact Brant correlates with the vocal women characters in the FG. The specific traits of feminine characters in the FG seem to this reviewer to be more representative of the social roles of women in that time and place than specific to the function of female characters in the GT. Brant sees the concern in the GT with the dialectic between Fate and free will as behind the two reasons given for (different) actions of Judas: Satan's entering into him (13:27) and Judas's love of money (12:6). Finally, Brant thinks that the actions of characters in the FG "are determined not by moral courage, not by the integrity of their convictions" (225) so that one is able to judge them. Rather, their actions are a function of the plot. The radical, unrelenting anthropological dualism in the FG argues, however, against the assertion that "the Fourth Gospel does not invite us to line up characters into categories of good and evil, saved and damned, or to view our deliberations as the guarantor of our future" (225). The purported parallels from the GT that are adduced are not extensive and tend to be between individual characters in the FG and a single character in a tragedy, rather than from broad-ranging tragic conventions. Moreover, the use of similar features does not necessarily imply a similarity of function.

The main point of the fourth chapter is that the tragic trope of the beautiful death applies to Jesus's death in the FG. Her examples are from the *Iliad* and especially from Iphigenia's sacrificial death in Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*. Brant continues, however, by suggesting that the trope of marriage to death may also be at work in the FG. The first link between marriage and death that she posits comprises John the Baptist's identification of Jesus as "the Lamb of God" (1:29, 36) and later as "the bridegroom" (3:29). This association admits of other interpretations. Brant attempts to support this connection by linking bridegroom and death imagery together in the wedding at Cana and at the death of Jesus. She cites a proposal that, in providing more wine, Jesus is acting in the role of the bridegroom and that the blood that flows from his side is to be linked to the wine that Jesus as bridegroom provides. The ideas are intriguing, and I look forward to a more extensive treatment of them than the page in which they are presented (247). Brant does explore other possible allusions to bridegroom imagery in the FG, and acknowledges that the evangelist is not consistent in his use of this imagery.

There is an impressive wealth of suggested similarities between different sections and characteristics of the FG and GT. Inevitably there are some arguments that a reviewer may find thinner than others. At times what is missing is some discussion on how distinctive the selected literary features are to tragedy, and so some treatment of comparable elements in other Greco-Roman genres would be helpful. Nevertheless, this book is a trove for the exploration of links between the FG and GT.

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Hebrews: Contemporary Methods—New Insights, edited by Gabriella Gelardini. Biblical Interpretation Series 75. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Pp. viii + 304. €99.00/$129.00 (hardcover). ISBN 9004144900.

Of making many books there is no end. It therefore comes as a bit of a surprise that the volume under review is the first-ever published compilation of essays by multiple authors devoted exclusively to the epistle to the Hebrews. The fourteen essays collected here originated as papers delivered at International Meetings of the Society of Biblical Literature (2001–2004). In part because a number of the contributors are relatively new to the scholarly conversation generated by Hebrews, the volume delivers on the promise of "new insights" made in its subtitle.

The volume is divided into three sections. Part 1 ("Cultic Language, Concepts, and Practice in Hebrews") includes: "Does the Cultic Language in Hebrews Represent Sacrificial Metaphors? Reflections on Some Basic Problems," by Ekkehard Stegemann and Wolfgang Stegemann (13–23); "Some Remarks on Hebrews from the Viewpoint of Old Testament Exegesis," by Ina Willi-Plein (25–35); "Characteristics of Sacrificial Metaphors in Hebrews," by Christian Eberhart (37–64); "Covenant, Cult, and the Curse-of-Death: Διαθήκη in Heb 9:15–22," by Scott Hahn (65–88); "The Epistle to the Hebrews as a Jesus-Midrash," by Elke Tönges (89–105); and "Hebrews, an Ancient Synagogue Homily for *Tisha be-Av:* Its Function, its Basis, its Theological Interpretation," by Gabriella Gelardini (107–27).

Stegemann and Stegemann reflect on what happens when the pervasive sacrificial language in Hebrews is declared to be "metaphorical." To distinguish "between a metaphorical and a nonmetaphorical interpretation of the death of Jesus depends on our assessment of the historical referent to which a textual passage is related" (18), which in turn reveals the particular, Western ontological presuppositions of most critical commentators. Their view is that the sacrificial language functions not simply as an interpretation of the cross but also as a representation of it. Willi-Plein reads Leviticus 16 with an eye to understanding Hebrews' theological interpretation of the high priesthood and the Yom Kippur rituals. She also resists the urge to classify the cultic language in Hebrews as metaphorical. Jesus's priestly offering is best seen as bringing about the removal of pollution caused by sin rather than as vicarious atonement or as expiation. Eberhart likewise considers the nature of the sacrificial imagery in Hebrews as he undertakes a study of the Israelite and Judean cult as it appears in the Hebrew Bible. Hahn employs social-scientific method to make sense of the seemingly ambiguous senses of διαθήκη in Heb 9:15–22. Should it be understood in its Jewish sense or in its Greco-Roman sense? The solution "is not to abandon the cultic-covenantal framework, with its unity of liturgy and law" (85), but to recognize, with reference to Exod 32, that the author is drawing out the legal implications of the liturgical ritual that established the first covenant. Tönges examines Hebrews' quotations from the LXX, their introductory formulas, and the author's theological commentary on the texts. The letter's form-critical setting is the synagogue. In its formal structures it resembles the homiletic midrashim (e.g., *Sipre Deut.*) with the key difference that it seeks to describe the messianic role of Jesus in cultic terms. Gelardini considers the production and reception aesthetics regarding synagogue homilies and then reconstructs the readings from Torah and the Prophets, which "hint

at the most important day of fast in Jewish tradition" (124). Hebrews, she argues, is a homily of the type *petichta* and functions as an interpretation of the *sidrah* from Exod 31:18–32:35 and the *haphtarah* from Jer 31:31–34.

Part 2 ("Sociology, Ethics, and Rhetoric in Hebrews") includes: "Portraying the Temple in Stone and Text: The Arch of Titus and the Epistle to the Hebrews," by Ellen Bradshaw Aitken (131–48); "How to Entertain Angels: Ethics in the Epistle to the Hebrews," by Knut Backhaus (149–75); "The Intersection of Alien Status and Cultic Discourse in the Epistle to the Hebrews," by Benjamin Dunning (177–98); and "Reflections on Rhetorical Terminology in Hebrews," by Hermut Löhr (199–210).

Aitken correlates the letter's christology and community ethic with Flavian propaganda related to the events and monuments surrounding the triumph of Vespasian and Titus. She sees the author as articulating resistance to the imperial ideology, albeit indirectly by means of typological reflection on the Yom Kippur rituals and the Levitical priesthood. In the process the author promotes an ethic that is consonant with the identity of Jesus, the true conquering hero. Backhaus examines the mundane ethics of Hebrews—the author, some say, "imposes on the massive base of doctrinal exposition the statue of an ethical dwarf" (150)—by means of a sociology of knowledge. Rejecting a premature resort to *Sachkritik,* Backhaus focuses on the relationship between the indicative and the imperative wherein both function to create a space "that protects the self-definition of the community from the cognitive majority and the pressure of cultural assimilation and enables the individual to internalize specifically Christian standards of practice" (168–69). Dunning makes use of sociological studies of minority religious groups, such as nineteenth-century Mormons, that employ the rhetorical motif of outsiderhood as a self-designation in order to construct and maintain social and religious identity. In Hebrews' appeal to its readers' alien status he sees a similar dynamic at work whereby the author defines Christianity over against Judaism as well as the myriad other social and cultic identities available in the Roman world. Löhr approaches Hebrews through the categories of classical rhetoric. The author's use of technical terms (e.g., κεφάλαιον, ἀναγκαῖον) does not by itself demonstrate his reliance on rhetorical handbooks. Löhr nevertheless builds a cumulative case that the letter is best understood as an early Christian example of deliberative rhetoric.

Part 3 ("Textual-Historical, Comparative, and Intertextual Approaches to Hebrews") includes: "Locating Hebrews within the Literary Landscape of Christian Origins," by Pamela Eisenbaum (213–37); "Hebrews and the Heritage of Paul," by Dieter Georgi (239–44); "Paul and Hebrews: A Comparison of Narrative Worlds," by James C. Miller (245–64); and "Constructions and Collusions: The Making and Unmaking of Identity in Qoheleth and Hebrews," by Jennifer Koosed and Robert Seesengood (265–80).

Eisenbaum argues that the textual history of Hebrews has been underutilized in considering questions about authorship, audience, setting, and date. Her attention to the circulation of Hebrews in the papyri allows her to contextualize the text within the literary landscape of early Christian texts. She concludes that the deliberate concealment of the author's identity functions as an implicit form of pseudonymity, that Hebrews was written in the late first or early second century and aimed at a general Christian audience, and that its "supersessionism" may be designed to forge "a unique form of

Judeo-Christian religiosity that perhaps existed briefly when Rome was the common enemy of Jews and believers in Jesus" (237). Georgi considers Hebrews' ambiguous place in the Pauline corpus. He argues that the letter was written during Domitian's reign by an independent member of the Pauline "school" who understands faith and justification in such a way that they function not to create distance from Judaism but rather to provide a common base. Miller likewise compares the undisputed letters of Paul with Hebrews on the basis of the narrative world each corpus constructs. He finds parallels in the way each writer describes Jesus's journey and its exemplary function for the believer as well as in the tensions one sees in the (dis)continuity between the two covenants. Koosed and Seesengood's eclectic interweaving of newer methods (e.g., reception history, reader-response, and cultural criticism) breathes new life into the question of authorship for both Qoheleth and Hebrews. Critical scholarship has led to the rejection of the traditional ascription of authorship to Solomon and to Paul. The consensus view that both texts are anonymous, however, is not the end of the matter: "In the erasure of the author and tradition . . . there is the erasure of authority" (280), which in many ways comports with the interests of the contemporary critic.

To remark that the "contemporary methods" employed in these fine essays and the resulting "new insights" remain focused on many of the issues familiar from the history of Hebrews-forschung is in no way to denigrate the collection. Questions such as covenant theology, cultural setting, the relationship between exposition and exhortation, and even authorship do not cease to be important simply because sure answers have long eluded commentators. Hebrews invites the application of an even wider range of methods—e.g., feminist approaches come to mind. Gelardini is to be commended for bringing together a volume that opens up many new avenues of inquiry while simultaneously engaging interpreters who may be nervous about abandoning the standard concerns emerging from the historical-critical paradigm.

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Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, by Francis Watson. London: T&T Clark International, 2004. Pp. xii + 584. $54.95 (paper). ISBN 0567082326.

In *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith,* Francis Watson has produced a magisterial work that significantly challenges existing readings of Paul on all sides and will influence subsequent interpretations for decades to come. Henceforth, responsible readers of Paul will need to wrestle with Watson's provocative and nuanced arguments regarding Paul's own responsible interpretation of Scripture. The book begins by setting forth two central interlocking assertions. First, Paul is above all a reader: his construal of the gospel derives from the sacred text, particularly the Pentateuch. Second, the Pauline doctrine of righteousness by faith is the "hermeneutical key to his interpretation of Scripture," and as such is of fundamental importance to understanding Paul's thought. But the reverse is even more to the point in Watson's argument: Scripture itself is the hermeneutical key to "righteousness by faith." Watson's claims are polemical, and he argues them with

meticulous passion by situating Paul as a reader of Habakkuk and the Pentateuch in conversation with other Jewish interpreters, from Wisdom of Solomon to *4 Ezra*. The detail of his textual analysis is breathtaking, and the consequent discussion is fascinating and instructive on many levels. We are all in his debt.

The title of the book is *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith;* "hermeneutics" and the faith to which it relates stand in an independent relationship to Paul. We might say that *hermeneutics* is the middle term between *Paul* and *faith.* Indeed, "Christ" is a hermeneutical event, and Watson assigns pride of place to texts and their interrelationships in his understanding of the faith that Paul proclaims. And he also privileges Paul's reading of texts, rather than, for example, Jewish practices, in his depiction of Paul's identity as a first-century Jew. These initial observations about the title of the book highlight three issues among many: the relationship between the gospel and Scripture, the understanding of righteousness and faith in relationship to divine and human agency, and Paul's positive references to the law in the life of the faith community. Each issue concerns tensions within this lengthy and ambitious book.

First, Watson argues that any "narrative substructure" for Paul's preaching is to be found in the apostle's reading of the five books of Torah, and not in any story of Christ. Galatians 3, where Paul quotes from four of the five books of Torah, sets the pattern: in Genesis God gives an unconditional promise to Abraham; in Exodus God gives the Law, which within the stories of the exodus immediately become associated with death; Leviticus sets forth the promise of life through the Law, but the wilderness stories in Numbers give the lie to that promise. Finally, the extended curses in Deuteronomy anticipate Israel's rebellion against God, showing that the final word of the Law for Israel is not blessing but curse.

This narrative discloses a fault line within the Torah itself, between two conflicting accounts of reality and of divine agency. One proclaims the unconditional divine promise given to Abraham; the other proclaims the Law's blessings and curses, contingent on human observance of the commandments. The promissory strand highlights divine agency, while the conditional strand highlights human agency. Paul's reading of Torah is distinctive in the way that it exploits this tension, which is already present in the text itself. That is, Torah itself sets up a problem, a plight, if you will, to which Christ is the solution. In a beautiful summary sentence, Watson says, "Scripture is promise and law, and Christ is the promise's fulfillment and the law's end" (517).

Watson's delineation of this tension within the Torah demonstrates that "inconsistencies" in Paul's letters may derive from tensions within the texts Paul reads. Furthermore, by highlighting the theme of promise, Watson rightly demonstrates that Paul's interpretation of the Abraham stories and his distinction between Abraham and Sinai are not as arbitrary as is usually claimed.

There are also difficulties, however, with Watson's bold thesis. He emphasizes a shared hermeneutical stance as well as "a single intertextual field" (5) in which a "3-way" conversation can occur between the text, other Jewish interpreters, and Paul himself. As a participant in this "conversation," Paul agrees with his fellow-Jews that "exegesis of the sacred text is the way to normative saving truth" (26). Such a claim suggests that Paul's gospel can be derived from the text; exegesis will get you there.

This is a provocative claim, and indeed difficult to sustain. In practice, Watson's

own analyses of Paul's scriptural hermeneutic repeatedly lead him to emphasize rather the priority of Paul's christological convictions. He develops an elegantly nuanced account of the circular interaction between "transforming events" and Scripture, concluding that the Christian invocation of Jesus as Lord is the irreducibly distinct "event" that distinguishes Paul's hermeneutic from that of his fellow-Jews. Here the adjudication between different interpretations of a text inevitably leads to adjudication between the different experiences of interpreters. I wonder if Watson's account of circularity does not disclose a tension within his book itself. The book argues for recognition of Scripture as the intertextual "playing field" for interfaith dialogue. But if indeed Paul's gospel cannot be arrived at by exegesis alone, then Paul cannot agree with his fellow Jews that "exegesis of the sacred text is the way to normative saving truth." To the contrary, without the revelation of Christ "apart from the law," exegesis does not lead to a confession of Jesus as the Messiah. There is no through train from Torah to faith in Christ. If there were, one might expect more of Paul's contemporaries to share his faith. They do not, and the reason is not difficult to discern: they do not share Paul's experience of Christ—a Christ who is clearly more than a hermeneutical event.

Second, the danger of a hermeneutic that starts with exegesis of Torah is that it ends up with a "gospel" in which christology is sidelined. This danger plays out in a tension between the way christology is treated in Watson's discussion of the role of Hab 2:4 in Rom 1:16–17 and the related verses, 3:21–22, and his analyses of Paul's hermeneutic in the remainder of *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith.* Arguing that Paul's language about faith and righteousness derives from Habakkuk, Watson assumes that Paul "respects the fact that this pre-Christian text cannot explicitly refer to Christ" (38). Rather, the prophetic text speaks of a "human righteousness that is approved by God" because it is attained by human faith (48). To be sure, Watson notes that in 3:22 Paul clarifies the meaning of "faith" as "faith of Jesus Christ." But because his pre-christological reading of Hab 2:4 governs subsequent understandings of "faith," even here "faith" is still "human faith." Christ is not the subject of this faith, but its "origin and object." God initiates, in a sense, human faith, and then responds to it by acknowledging the one who has such "faith" as righteous.

But does Paul read Habakkuk as having no reference to Christ? Leaving aside issues regarding both the identity of ὁ δίκαιος and the interpretation of ἐκ πίστεως as a reference to Christ's faithful obedience, what of the clause that governs Rom 1:16–17: "I am not ashamed of the gospel"? Paul is the subject of this clause, and the gospel is its object and the subject matter of the clauses that follow. "The gospel" is the "power of God for salvation to all who believe." "In it"—not apart from it—"the righteousness of God is being apocalypsed from faith to faith, as it is written, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται." Paul may well derive the correlation of righteousness with faith from the Habakkuk text, as Watson argues. But he does so in order to call Habakkuk as a witness to the gospel. Surely therefore the content of that gospel must govern Paul's interpretation of ὁ δίκαιος and ἐκ πίστεως in the prophetic text. As Paul's programmatic statement in the first four verses of the letter proclaims, that gospel, promised through the prophets in the Scriptures, is the gospel of God concerning his Son. Paul amplifies the point in 3:21–26. Christ's atoning death was "to show forth God's righteousness" (3:25). It makes no sense here to speak of God's righteousness as a human "conduct of life" or "faith" that God

accounts as righteous. Rather, this righteousness, enacted and demonstrated through the christological gospel, is all about Jesus Christ, and God's rectifying activity through Christ.

Therefore I find it remarkable that Watson can say of 1:17, "The righteousness of God was said to be revealed in the gospel, but nothing was said about Jesus Christ as either the object or the subject of faith" (73). What is the gospel if not news of Jesus Christ? Watson's emphatically pre-christological reading leaves us with two important questions. First, if in Romans 1–4 Paul intends to show that his gospel can be articulated through Scripture alone, how does one get from Scripture to Christ? What is the logic linking "faith" and "Christ"? Second, does Watson's transactional account of "righteousness by faith," in which God responds to (divinely instigated) human faith, conflict with his accounts of the relationship between divine and human agency in the rest of the book? Time and again he notes the ways Paul, in contrast with other Jewish exegetes, exploits the tension between promise and law as a sharp distinction between divine and human agency. This hermeneutical move correlates with explicitly christological readings and even rewritings of Scripture by Paul, as in Romans 10, where "the law's soteriology is superseded by the gospel's claim that salvation takes place solely by God's action in the death and resurrection of Jesus, which intends its own acknowledgement" (352).

So which is it? Does God operate independently of human agency, "solely by God's action in the death and resurrection of Jesus"? Or does God contingently operate through human agency, by creating (somehow through Christ) faith that in turn constitutes a pattern of human conduct that God acknowledges as righteousness? And if the latter, is this really much different in kind from an account of divine agency in which God gives the power to obey the law and thereby be righteous before God? In both cases there is a condition to be met by human action, whether law-observance or faith. Yet the contrast that Watson discovers in Paul's own christological readings of Scripture is not between two kinds of human action, but between God's unconditional saving action in divine faithfulness to the promise, and human actions that secure either blessing and curse. Thus it seems to me that Watson's pre-christological reading of Habakkuk in Romans 1–3 is belied by the christological hermeneutic that he beautifully explicates in the remainder of his book.

Finally, while Watson recognizes that Paul has positive references to the law in the life of the community that lives "in Christ," his analysis of the law is almost unremittingly harsh and negative. His solution to this tension is to conclude that the "inconsistencies" in Paul's use of the law derive from inconsistencies in Torah itself (426, 520). Once again, might a reading of Torah through the lens of Christ's faithfulness further illumine the matter? Christ gives access to the law in a non–death-dealing way, by bearing its curse (Gal 3:13), and by fulfilling it (Gal 5:14). Through Christ the law is ended as a false promise of life, but remains as a witness to God's faithfulness. To say this is not to equate the gospel and the law, but to wrestle with the christological basis for Paul's positive as well as negative references to law.

In conclusion, I hope these comments hint at the richness and complexity of this magisterial work and entice every serious student of Paul to buy, read, and reread it. Watson fruitfully challenges us to reconsider the textual matrix of christology, the centrality of rectification by faith, the relationship between Scripture and gospel, and central

issues of "Jewish" and "Christian" identity. This is a richly theological work in the best sense of the term, and it is this richness that makes this book, like Paul's own letters, so extremely interesting, provocative, and rewarding.

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Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches, edited by Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen. HTS 53. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 523. $50.00 (paper). ISBN 0674016602.

Scholars studying Paul's letters have been slower than their counterparts in historical Jesus studies to make use of the archaeological record relevant to their work. Hence, a book that presents an orchestrated exchange between Corinthian archaeologists and NT scholars (along with historians of ancient Mediterranean religion) is most welcome—and long overdue. Like the two other members of the series, books edited by Helmut Koester on Ephesos and Pergamon, whose prefaces claim to be presenting a new model for biblical archaeology, this volume seeks to promote interdisciplinary dialogue leading to a critical examination of long-established truths and the introduction of new perspectives (3). All chapters in the book were first presented at a 2002 conference convened to address, as the introduction notes, "a number of important approaches to evaluating the material culture and textual evidence for religious practice in Corinth" and to open "theoretical discussions on how those who work predominantly with texts can be informed by those who deal with archaeological remains, and vice versa" (4).

The book's seventeen chapters fall under four headings: the physical arrangement of Corinth (topography and built environment), the polytheistic aspect of Roman Corinth (its religion and culture), essays on Paul's Corinthian correspondence (sociohistorical and textual studies), and Christian Corinth (Corinth in late antiquity). Under the first heading, G. D. R. Sanders, director of the Corinth Excavations, discusses Corinth's geographical setting, with some attention to geology, and the history of archaeological excavation there. After this introduction to Corinth come chapters on specific features of Corinth and its environs: David Romano shows how Roman survey work is evident in the form Corinth's forum took and in the subdivision of the surrounding territory (centuriation); Michael White offers readers a detailed look at the forum by attempting to coordinate its physical remains with what Favorinus intimates about it in his "Corinthian Oration" (traditionally Dio Chrysostom's *Oration* 37); and Betsey Robinson examines the Roman handling of two public fountains from the Greek period (Peirene and Glauke) as indicators of Roman cultural identity.

The second and longest part of the book has six essays on what the editors call Corinth's polytheistic aspect. A survey of religion in early Roman Corinth, presented by Nancy Bookidis, assistant director of the Corinth Excavations, is followed by chapters with a tighter focus: Elizabeth Gebhard, director of the University of Chicago Excavations at Isthmia, examines Melikertes-Palaimon rites; John Lanci visits claims about cult prostitution associated with Aphrodite at Corinth; and Charles K. Williams II, former

director of the Corinth Excavations, reconstructs the history of cult facilities at a site east of the theater, including their demise. Then come two chapters employing funerary data: Mary E. H. Walbank describes the variation in Roman Corinthian burial practices based on a group of burials that has yet to see full publication; and Christine Thomas contrasts early Roman funerary practices at Corinth and Ephesos.

NT scholars will be familiar with most, if not all, of the contributors to the third part of the book. In it, Margaret Mitchell proposes a chronology for the exchange between Paul and the Corinthians, with a composition analysis of 2 Corinthians; Helmut Koester reads Paul through the lens of eschatology; Steven Friesen sheds light on the debate about the social status of Christians in the Pauline churches; Richard Horsley describes Corinthian Christians as constituting an alternative society; and James Walters considers how the changing civic identity of Corinth's residents may have reduced the potential for conflict between the Corinthian Christians and their neighbors.

The book closes with a brief look at late Roman Corinth and the evidence for Christianity there. In separate chapters, Guy Sanders presents the archaeological record, while Vasiliki Limberis considers what episcopal records and local hagiography tell us about the presence, influence, and profile of Christianity in the Corinth of late antiquity.

Multiauthor volumes, especially those whose chapters began as conference papers, often exhibit an uneven quality. In this case, however, the chapters are consistently well written and documented. Inconsistency in focus can also be a problem as editors can find it difficult keeping contributors—especially *éminences grises*—on task. In this case, the chapters in parts 2, 3, and 4 all address the issue of religion in Roman Corinth to some extent. Essays in part 1, however, do not. The opening chapter by Sanders may be excused because of its introductory nature, but what about the other three? White's essay on Favorinus—one of best (and few) examples in the book of how to coordinate textual and archaeological evidence—fails to address the issue of religion altogether. The essays by Romano and Robinson could have but do not. Archaeologists informed by postprocessual theory consider the symbolic, not just the functional, significance of material finds, which naturally broaches the subject of religion. Did the Roman manipulation of the landscape and sources of water—the subject matter of the essays by Romano and Robinson—have religious import? Scholars like Susan Alcock would say yes emphatically so (see, e.g., *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], ch. 5). By failing to explore the religious ramifications of their respective topics, Romano and Robinson miss an opportunity to address the primary subject matter of the book.

Inadequate theoretical grounding is not limited to a handful of the volume's essays, however. It is so pervasive that one wonders how serious the editors can be about what they claim for the book: that it promotes an interdisciplinary perspective, explores a range of approaches, and opens theoretical discussions between textual scholars and archaeologists (3–4). The book's footnotes and extensive bibliography—the editors deserve high praise for compiling the latter—reveal virtually no attention to theoretical developments in archaeology over the last fifty years. The key studies connected with both processual and postprocessual archaeology go unmentioned. Moreover, considering that Robinson's essay concerns itself with cultural identity, Walters's looks at civic identity, and Friesen's undertakes an analysis of social status, reference to the relevant

anthropological and cross-cultural studies is strikingly absent. (Thomas makes some use of the social sciences, as she should, but her essay is thinly grounded in them.) Even the book's title raises questions: how can the text adequately address *urban* religion in Roman *Corinth* without some attention to theories of urbanization and the ancient city? Yet the sizable literature on these topics is not consulted.

When scholars assembled from various disciplines fail to be explicit about their methods, assumptions, and theoretical approaches, the dialogue among them—if it can be called dialogue—is more like conversation partners talking past each other than with each other. The lack of genuine interaction manifests itself at several levels in the book. In one chapter, Lanci, a NT scholar, concludes definitively that cultic prostitution at Corinth never happened—Hans Conzelmann reached the same conclusion forty ago—but in another Williams casually refers to its practice at Corinth as though it were common knowledge. Worse, four of the five chapters in part 3—the textual and socio-historical studies by NT scholars—show no engagement with Corinth's archaeological record (even when such engagement would have strengthened the author's argument, as is the case with the Horsley essay). Walters's essay on civic identity in Roman Corinth is the lone exception, and it is, not coincidentally, one of the volume's best. The lack of theoretical grounding and authentic exchange mean that at best this book is a multidisciplinary study; its various chapters reflect various disciplines. It is a far cry, however, from being an interdisciplinary study, as the book's subtitle claims.

The chapters by Corinthian archaeologists also fail to achieve the interdisciplinary aims of the volume, but at least their content might be useful to NT scholars and early church historians. For instance, Walbank's chapter is an inviting foretaste of what promises to be an invaluable study of Roman graves she is completing with Kathleen Slane, Corinth's Roman pottery expert. Their final report will provide an important supplement to the publication of Corinth's North Cemetery (C. Blegen, H. Palmer, and R. Young, *Corinth*, vol. 13, *The North Cemetery* [Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1964]).

On the other hand, most of that content is readily available elsewhere, including multiauthor volumes that provide broader and deeper treatment of Roman Corinth's archaeological record. Bookidis and Gebhard, for example, wrote substantial chapters for the Corinth centenary volume (C. K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, eds., *Corinth*, vol. 20, *The Centenary, 1896–1996* [Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003]). The latter also contributed to *The Corinthia in the Roman Period* (ed. T. E. Gregory; Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 8; Ann Arbor, MI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1993). Romano also wrote for both volumes, and his chapter in the book under review is a slight reworking of what appears in the centenary volume. For interested readers, the best archaeologically informed overview of Roman Corinth remains James Wiseman's synthetic and thorough essay in *ANRW*, although it is becoming dated ("Corinth and Rome I: 228 B.C.—A.D. 267," *ANRW* II.7.1 [1979]: 438–548).

If the organizers of this book (and the conference leading to it) had been more serious about framing an interdisciplinary approach that explores the intersection between Corinth's material and literary records, they would have taken a different course and recruited different collaborators. Instead of soliciting two chapters on Christian Corinth,

one on the material evidence, the other on the literary record—thus keeping the two sets of data apart—they would have asked historian Richard Rothaus, who draws competently from both records, to characterize Corinthian religion in late antiquity (see his *Corinth: The First City of Greece: An Urban History of Late Antique Cult and Religion* [Religions in the Graeco-Roman World 139; Leiden: Brill, 2000]). Rothaus studied with Timothy E. Gregory, who directs the Ohio State University Excavations at Isthmia and is the strongest advocate of interdisciplinary collaboration among the Corinthian archaeologists. Gregory's absence from the list of contributors to the volume is surprising—and disappointing.

Even though NT essays by Mitchell, Koester, and Horsley bring prestige to the volume, none of them articulates an interpretive program that integrates textual and material records. Nor do they correlate Corinth's archaeological record with the NT. That would better have come from scholars who have actually undertaken the task. For example, John Fotopoulos's recent study of food offered to idols makes full use of the archaeological evidence for the dining practices associated with Corinth's Asklepios sanctuary (*Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1* [WUNT 2.151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2003]). Jorunn Økland is especially worthy of mention because of her attention to both theory and Corinth's material record (*Women in Their Place: Paul and the Corinthian Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space* [JSNTSup 269; London: T&T Clark, 2004]). If the goal really is to establish a new model for biblical archaeological research and interpretation—the expressed aim of the series in which this book appears—then recruiting scholars who are committed to such an enterprise is a fundamental starting point.

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A Woman's Place: House Churches in Earliest Christianity, by Carolyn Osiek and Margaret Y. MacDonald with Janet H. Tulloch. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006. Pp. 352. $20.00 (paper). ISBN 0800637771.

For several decades scholars, especially feminists, have tested new methods and theories in the study of women and gender in early Christianity and in antiquity more broadly. In *A Woman's Place: House Churches in Earliest Christianity,* Carolyn Osiek and Margaret MacDonald, with a chapter by Janet Tulloch, read these topics within the framework of early Christian families. They thus extend the work of a Society of Biblical Literature group of that name that has produced much interesting research in the last half decade or so. (Consider Halvor Moxnes's *Putting Jesus in His Place* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003]; and Osiek and David Balch's edited volume, *Early Christian Families in Context* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003]). *A Woman's Place* also belongs alongside collections such as the new one by Osiek and Kevin Madigan, *Ordained Women in the Early Church: A Documentary History* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), or Ute Eisen's earlier work on the topic (*Women Officeholders in Early Christianity: Epigraphical and Literary Studies* [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press,

Michael Glazier, 2000]), and it builds on MacDonald's previous study, *Early Christian Women and Pagan Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This volume contains a wealth of references to and information about concepts of the family in the ancient world and it places an admirably large set of early Christian writings under analysis, bringing them into conversation with contemporaneous "pagan" literature.

The first chapter introduces and challenges three dichotomies commonly used for analyzing women in the early church: "patriarchy versus the discipleship of equals, public versus private, and ascetic versus domestic life" (1). Scholars have long argued that poverty and outsiders' suspicions prevented earliest Christians from building free-standing structures early on. Thus the movement originated within households, a situation which, the argument goes, facilitated women's leadership. Osiek and MacDonald rightly challenge this assumption, although at times the rest of the book seems to fall precisely back into this reading. They place early Christian women's leadership within a broader context of women's leadership in antiquity. Early Christian women's participation was not unique to Christians (a paradigm the authors rightly understand to reinforce anti-Judaism). This chapter challenges the long-held notion that the house church was private space available for women's leadership by following the lead of scholars who have argued that the boundaries between private and public in the Roman house were more complex than we had previously thought. Moreover, women leaders were not only ascetic, but many were married or widowed. The introduction also insists that masculine plural language must be understood to include females and that the cultural framework of the ancient Mediterranean is an honor-shame system; it further offers the welcome, clear statement that women participated in all activities of the Christian house church, from patronage to dining to leadership. The chapter concludes with a list of activities in the house churches and with an overview of the chapters to come.

What this programmatic chapter misses is the opportunity to delineate the authors' methods for deciding which ancient sources are relevant and the temporal and geographical range that this volume will cover. (The volume is heavily tilted toward the Aegean, Italy, and North Africa, and misses material like the Babatha archive.) Moreover, archaeological evidence of the earliest Christian communities, scarce but available in Michael White's work (used elsewhere in the book) is absent, and evidence of other cultic meetings in domestic spaces, as with synagogues in Ostia and Stobi or the Dionysos cult in the slope houses in Ephesos, is missing. How do the earliest Christian spaces relate to other physical spaces and thus to kinship and social networks and leadership norms of contemporary cults? Moreover, a clearer articulation of method at the outset would have helped Osiek and MacDonald to avoid arguments about what "must have been" and about what is "unlikely." Because the book has not systematically delineated a method by which one reads information about women, it sometimes argues from "common sense." Such arguments often distract from the frameworks which we use to analyze ancient texts, as feminist NT scholar Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza—whose insights about rhetoric are underutilized in this book—has shown.

Chapter 2, "Dutiful and Less than Dutiful Wives," corrects what Osiek and MacDonald evaluate to be a scholarly overattention to ascetic women in earliest Christianity, insisting on the leadership not only of celibate women but also of women who had no means or inclination to celibacy. Providing a useful introduction to recent scholarship on the Roman family, this chapter pays sensitive attention to the social insecurities of

marriages, unions, or even control over one's own body, depending on a woman's place in society. The chapter focuses on Colossians and Nympha's role, on Prisca, on the stories of Ananias and Sapphira, Valens and his wife (in Polycarp *Phil.*), Hermas and his wife, Justin's Roman matron, and wives as heroines in the *Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas*.

Chapters 3 and 4 trace birthing, nursing and infant care, and the education of children within the ancient household. Topics include abortion, infanticide, exposure, and early Christian rejection of all three; a fascinating discussion of birthing, nursing, and infant care draws upon the medical writings of the time. Osiek and MacDonald are sensitive to the tragedies of the Roman world, paying due attention to the role of slaves in the household; we find here as well sobering demographics regarding the intertwining of death and birth for both mother and child in the ancient world. Texts under discussion range admirably from Soranus and the *Protevangelion of James* to the *Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas* and the *Life of Macrina*, from Plutarch to John Chrysostom and Quintilian to the *Infancy Gospel of Thomas*—and beyond. Given their interest in recent research on the Roman family, Osiek and MacDonald wish to offer "a deliberate focus on the physical setting of the house church" to think about "the broad scope of women's involvement in the care of children in house churches and the impact of the presence of children themselves in these communities (with a special emphasis on girls)" (70). They remind us of the close quarters of the house churches and, influenced by reader reception theory, provoke us to wonder what might have happened as children ran about and infants squalled.

One of the methodological quandaries of the book is evident in these chapters. For example, readers are encouraged to wonder how the story of Jesus's nativity would have been heard in a culture where many infants died (55). On the one hand, this question helps us to think about the material conditions of early Christian families and we want to hear more from the authors. On the other hand, such a question domesticates and limits a passage that is redolent with references to myths of the births of gods (which the authors recognize) and to the story of the people of Israel.

The fifth chapter, on female slaves and their double vulnerability, draws on an important new direction in NT and Early Christian studies, found in the recent work of Jennifer Glancy and J. Albert Harrill. It somehow misses, however, Sheila Briggs's work on slavery and the important scholarship of Bernadette Brooten and Stephen Moore on the sex-gender system of the ancient world, even as it recognizes that male slaves are not truly men and female slaves are not women in the understanding of elites in antiquity. This chapter is rich with details from Roman law, non-Christian authors, and rabbinic writings. Whereas ch. 4 sometimes tends toward a sentimental tone about the bonds of family, ch. 5 starkly brings forward early Christian materials that show Christian involvement in slave holding and Christian perpetuation of slave oppression.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to "the politics of marriage" and considers the roles of wives who might hear the household codes. Although Osiek and MacDonald are careful to state that they do not want to exonerate the writer of Ephesians, and although in the end they label such ideology both "conventional and countercultural," they also hypothesize that the rhetoric of the *ekklēsia* as pure bride might have allowed for an increase in women's honor and perhaps even real power within the community. They encourage us to rethink "some of the most patriarchal-sounding texts in early Christian literature" and

to consider whether injunctions to marry and bear children might not "[create] opportunities for women to exercise influence in a house-based movement" (132). Engagement with the work of Cynthia Kittredge and Clarice Martin on the household codes, as well as work of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza more recent than her *In Memory of Her*, would have encouraged more reflections on method here and elsewhere in the book. The question of whether the feminized, bridal *ekklēsia* lends some authority to women begs two further questions and avenues for research. First, how can we square the pure and submissive bride of Ephesians with *ekklēsiai* more broadly represented as places of tussle and struggle in deliberative discourse in Greek cities, and with our knowledge of women's roles as leaders and authoritative benefactors in the public square? Second, how does the image of the bridal *ekklēsia* place both women and men in a profoundly passive, feminized position vis-à-vis someone higher in the hierarchy of power?

Chapter 7 turns to women as "leaders of households and Christian assemblies." The chapter presents a wealth of evidence, considering women depicted as incarnations of Wisdom, the role of wife as mistress of the house or household manager as presented in the Pythagorean letters, Musonius Rufus, Philo, Plutarch, and other texts. Detailed information about the role of women at meals in the Roman world provides an important context for reading the roles of Christian women as heads of households and as integrated into and leaders of meals. Meals in the Roman world, of course, are scenes not only of food and drink but also of the gatherings of associations and of ritual practice.

Chapter 8 moves from literary evidence of women and meals to material culture. In this strong chapter, Janet Tulloch argues that funerary frescoes of women raising cups at meals—images from the Roman catacombs—present women as hosts at a banquet, raising glasses and leading in ritual speech/toasting. Tulloch provides evidence of women's leadership as well as information about meals for the dead in the ancient world and early Christian critiques of over-zealous and drunken funerary rituals. Interwoven with this argument is another about a "changed cultural perception of female respectability" as Christian women are depicted both as respectable *and* as engaged in raising glasses at meals, a depiction that does not usually extend to respectable Roman *matrona*. Yet Tulloch puzzlingly concludes by asserting these women's authority as hosts must derive from their role as those who have "reared children and provided hospitality" (192), information difficult to plumb from the visual materials. Although in this chapter the photographs are fairly clear, the publisher clearly did not prioritize images: other photographs in the book are poorly reproduced and serve as illustrations, rather than presenting material objects as texts for analysis alongside literary writings.

Chapter 9 uses literary and epigraphic evidence to explore the role of women in the client–patron system of the Roman world. It gives a rich picture of ancient women engaged in business, leading religious communities as priestesses and presidents, hosting voluntary associations, and giving lavish benefactions: of women as patrons. This chapter also discusses the role of patronage in early Christian communities, including an analysis of patronal relationship as applied both to Jesus and to Paul. Osiek and MacDonald also suggest that while benefaction was once a fluid system among early Christians, as early as Justin and Tertullian the patronage system was consolidated under the bishop. This may be true the majority of the time, but such an approach overlooks evidence we find elsewhere—think of the story of Macrina (which the book treats else-

where) and her mother in Cappadocia. Osiek and MacDonald conclude that the women were indeed patrons in earliest Christian communities, using their wealth for the benefit of many, even as some strands of Christianity sought to reduce the powers of women's benefaction.

Chapter 10 turns to women's roles as "agents of expansion" in early Christianity—by which missions are meant, although consideration of Musa Dube's work on missions in NT texts is missing. Osiek and MacDonald wonder if Celsus was right that women and low-status artisans played key roles in leading the young away from (in Celsus's view) proper behavior and toward the nonsensical teachings of Christianity. The chapter returns several times to Rodney Stark's concept of social networks and wonders how much Christian women were established and extended these networks, especially in the situation of mixed marriages. Important writings that surface are Paul's letters, deutero-Pauline materials and the Pastorals, the *Acts of Thecla*, the *Didascalia Apostolorum*, and the *Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas*. It is especially here that a kind of model of devolution of women's leadership appears: The "hierarchical ethical organization" of the *Haustafeln* emerges in the context of persecution and fear; a "cautious" attitude leads to Christian accommodation of women's (and slaves' and children's?) subordination (234). Nevertheless, such restrictions do not necessarily mean the end of women's influence; their influence on the growth of the movement continued even as women's leadership roles were curtailed. It is in the context of their marriages that Christian women might win husbands and could certainly influence children and slaves (238–39). The book does not explain why we should imagine such a restriction of Christian women's roles in the same century that we see authoritative prophetesses as leaders of the so-called Montanists. Was there a monolithic shift in women's leadership, or were there continuing and plural sites of struggle over women's authority?

As this chapter ends, the book already begins to move toward synthesis and conclusion. The diverse roles of women "as patrons, heads of households, mothers, teachers, and various kinds of ambassadors of the faith" have a "unifying element: household life. The attempt to identify the specific activities of women that contributed to the expansion of the gospel leads time and time again to the household" (243). Yes. But why keep women at home, narrowly defined? The book's title, of course, emphasizes that the discussion is about *house* churches. But Osiek and MacDonald rightly insist in their introductory chapter that reading the house church as private, or indeed the *domus* or *oikos* as private, is incorrect. How could we do so in a world where the household of the emperor became a model for the *oikonomia* of all, where the house was one unit in an interlocking system of power and domination in Aristotle's *Politics*, to reach further back, as Osiek and MacDonald know well? Yet even as Osiek and MacDonald provide rich data about women patrons and missionaries and leaders in antiquity, we often feel the confines of the walls of the house and the limitation of women's leadership. Thus, despite its resistance to the same, the book sometimes assumes a devolutionary model, assuming women's robust leadership at Christian origins, especially within the household and the realm of family, and then a decline of their leadership as public Christian institutions came into being.

In the conclusion Osiek and MacDonald discuss their hopes for "historical reconstruction of the lives of early Christian women" (244) and their recognition of colleagues'

cautions about the rhetorical-literary construction of these very women. Osiek and MacDonald have indeed "discovered more than the dutiful wife" and "more than a static image of obedience and compliance" (245). They also have put early Christian materials in conversation with recent scholarship on the Roman family. This is extremely helpful and a benefit to the field. Yet this very strength of the work also leads to its weakness. It is within the framework of the family and the household that texts about early Christian women are read, and thus this book tenses between expanding our understanding of women's strong and authoritative roles in the ancient world and putting many early Christian women back into the *oikos*.

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Postcolonial Biblical Criticism: Interdisciplinary Intersections, edited by Stephen D. Moore and Fernando F. Segovia. The Bible and Postcolonialism Series. London: T&T Clark International, 2005. Pp. viii + 206. $79.95 (cloth). ISBN 0567084396.

This volume, which both charts and flows out of the creation of the New Testament Studies and Postcolonial Studies consultation, endeavors to cover the widening of this field precisely by considering its interdisciplinary connections with a range of theoretical developments. As reflected by the contributions to this volume, poststructuralism, feminism, critical race/ethnicity studies, and Marxism are addressed by those scholars most apt to theorize these intersections. Since there are relatively few entries (especially considering the scope of this volume), this review will survey the individual contributions before offering a few critical reflections on the volume as a whole.

The first contribution ("Postcolonial Biblical Criticism: Beginnings, Trajectories, Intersections," 1–22) by the co-editors, Moore and Segovia, serves as an efficient introduction to the whole. Moore and Segovia briefly explain some of the institutional history of postcolonial approaches in the Society of Biblical Literature, while highlighting the oft-ignored work of scholars such as Susan VanZanten Gallagher and Mark Prior. Aside from the perfunctory summary of the contents to follow, the introduction also helpfully outlines three different (though not wholly separate) trajectories in postcolonial biblical criticism: a focus upon contextual or cultural hermeneutics, the study of empire (though not necessarily with postcolonial tools), and a heavier engagement with extrabiblical postcolonial studies (5–10).

The second entry ("Mapping the Postcolonial Optic in Biblical Criticism: Meaning and Scope," 23–78) by Segovia, a literature review of extrabiblical postcolonial work, is the lengthiest contribution, taking up nearly a quarter of the volume. Segovia ambitiously seeks to examine the domain and the definitions of postcolonial analysis, itself a commendable task, as matters of definition are often slippery in the realm of theory and made all the more difficult when applied in biblical studies. Key dictionary entries and some of the better known introductory volumes from the likes of Ania Loomba, Leela Gandhi, and John McLeod are surveyed to address questions of scope, relevant period(s), and field of inquiry. Segovia sums up the major variations while stating his

own preference over the force of the term, the nomenclature used, the area covered, and the nature, result, and reference emphasized. The overview demonstrates the necessity of postcolonial work on biblical materials, given the gaps in the examination of matters both religious and ancient in postcolonial studies (as well as spatial or geographic lacunae in the examination of the United States, Russian and Soviet republics, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean).

The third entry ("Questions of Biblical Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi; or, the Postcolonial and the Postmodern," 79–96) by Moore examines the interaction of poststructuralism with or within postcolonialism, in a fashion now characteristic of Moore, by eclectically ruminating on a number of topics. Poststructuralism is posited as an adjudicating third "post" term between postmodernism and postcolonialism, especially since the high profile postcolonial trinity of Said, Spivak, and Bhabha are each in some ways practicing or indebted to poststructuralist analyses. Moore rehearses some of the critiques of postcolonial theory, most notably those of Aijaz Ahmad, addressing them in part by attesting to personal and pedagogical experiences of their relevance and utility for students. As the title indicates, this contribution reconsiders the historical anecdote that Bhabha himself reconsidered about the introduction of the Bible as a book that is simultaneously imperial and native, English and Indian (in "Signs Taken for Wonders"). This instance of a text's complex re-location(s), then, typifies an opportunity to reflect on which strategies are best for interpreting colonized and colonizing texts, including biblical texts. In the spirit of the volume, Moore maps Bhabha with relation to Derrida, Lacan, and Fanon, among others, remapping along the way the "use" of Bhabha for biblical criticism, highlighting especially ambivalence, hybridity, and mimicry.

The next contribution ("Gospel Hauntings: The Postcolonial Demons of New Testament Criticism," 97–113) by Laura E. Donaldson is meant to address the intersections of postcolonialism and feminism(s). This is the only entry with any amount of exegetical reflection, as Donaldson reconceptualizes an analysis of the gospel story involving the Syro-Phoenician or Canaanite woman by addressing the woman's ignored "demon-possessed" daughter. A number of Spivak's concepts are fruitfully implemented in this reading: ethical singularity, planetarity, and most profitably, spectrality (in this reader's experience, a first of its kind in biblical scholarship). By highlighting the dehumanizing process of deploying the disabled only as demonstrations of divine power, her analysis weaves in a concern with corporeal representation by incorporating disability studies. By passing through the Gerasene "demoniac" and the woman at Endor, Donaldson does not seek to replicate a kind of "neocolonial anticolonialist" reading of possession that passes over the ambiguously troubling connections of health, power, gender, sexuality, and indigeneity. Rather, by activating a reading of the daughter in terms of shamanism, she hopes: "a poetic (and uncanny) description of postcolonial feminist criticism might be allowing ourselves to be haunted by those ghosts whose suffering undergirds the routine banalities of everyday life" (110).

The fifth contribution ("Margins and [Cutting-]Edges: On the [IL]Legitimacy and Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, and [Post]Colonialism," 114–65) by Tat-siong Benny Liew begins by rehearsing some of the disciplinary objections and debates over the utility of "race" as a distinctly modernist category and/or ideology, while staking his own

focus upon how race is utilized (rather than whether). Though none of the categories race, ethnicity, and postcolonialism is itself unitary or identical, they are thoroughly linked, leading to an inevitably multidirectional analysis. Liew argues that race analysis historicizes the postcolonial, while cautioning against an essentializing nativism as a decolonizing solution. Liew productively traces the state of these questions in biblical studies, where race/ethnicity are commonly naturalized as categories. Despite this tendency some scholars have profitably focused upon the text, scholarly ideology, and the agency of the other in this process. This leaves several issues still to be reexamined: the vernacular, diaspora, sexuality, psychoanalysis, community, and authority. In a concluding illustration, Liew demonstrates how Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's Dictée translates, displaces, and resets biblical texts in interwoven competition(s) with other traditions.

The two final contributions ("Marx, Postcolonialism, and the Bible," 166–83; and "'Very Limited Ideological Options': Marxism and Biblical Studies in Postcolonial Scenes," 184–201), by Roland Boer and David Jobling, respectively, address the troubled and still potential relations between Marxism and postcolonialism. Boer outlines how postcolonial theory not only lacks a Marxist element, but in this lack it also "forgets its own history" (166). According to his reading, the ascendance of Said, Spivak, and Bhabha too often leaves out foundational analyses by Marx and Lenin or historical intermediates, such as Fanon or Du Bois. Instead we find a "Derridean Marx" or a "demarxified Bakhtin" (169) in postcolonial theory and in postcolonial biblical criticism, as Boer illustrates through some of the work of R. S. Sugirtharajah and Mark Brett. For Jobling, contextualizing his study in the struggle against South African apartheid, the greatly limited options of the title are Marxism, postcolonialism, and the Bible/Christianity. While postcolonialism might still be inadequately theorized, this may prove a virtue, rather than a fault, especially insofar as it might facilitate a renewed focus on the local. The other two options tend to be totalizing or globalizing grand narratives, which ironically might be the primary way they would be serviceable to postcolonialism (as may be the case with Marxism's focus on modes of production). Establishing a pragmatic criterion of utility for the struggle, Jobling adapts postcolonial terminology to suggest that a hybrid of Marxism and biblical studies might, in the end, prove most serviceable for this task.

It is difficult to evaluate such a varied and occasionally eclectic collection. At its heart, the goals of the volume are commendable, and Moore and Segovia have certainly assembled some of the key players for the initial phase(s) of biblical studies' engagement with postcolonialism. Yet the means whereby these goals are achieved present the effort with unique difficulties.

For example, Segovia's contribution demonstrates one such problem for the volume: how to strike a balance between explicating the state of a field or a disciplinary question and critically engaging with and developing strategies from the field. Too frequently, Segovia limits his critical comments to lengthy footnotes (nn. 9, 15, 22, 26, 34, 42, 47, 52, 53), instead of integrating them into his review. Yet the route chosen to explicate the field makes the entry a useful tool for biblical studies, as too often methodological innovations are embraced in our field without a wider or deeper comprehension of the context of the approaches (here, extrabiblical postcolonial studies). In another instance, the inclusion of two entries on Marxism means a gain in critical back-and-forth (missing

or deemphasized in Segovia's contribution), but a loss in overall coherence. To be completely candid, this reviewer sees no obvious resolution to such tensions.

Other concerns are more easily addressed, as some entries more smoothly grapple with the inherently trans- or interdisciplinary nature of the volume. The structural conceit that each entry deals with "postcolonialism and X" has its own limitations. Here, one might recall previous feminist critiques of "women and X" studies because of their potential heterosexist and sexist-complementarian resonances. The question remains if the structure is meant to posit postcolonialism as the dominant partner in the pairing, or if it could signal still something else. One way out of this impasse is sparked upon reading entries like Donaldson's and Liew's that grapple with a number of disciplinary questions, not just the ones they were "assigned." These contributions address not only their "primary" topics, but also fields as diverse as psychoanalysis, disability studies, anthropology, Jewish studies, sexuality studies, and Native American studies, and topics as varied as nationality or nationalism, diaspora, nativism, and indigeneity. That they do so adeptly and provocatively commends these entries to a close reading and a careful engagement.

However, the relative strengths of portions of the volume raise another set of issues, regarding which questions or fields are suitable "partners" for postcolonialism. It is striking that there are two entries on Marxist intersections, but none dedicated to queer theory or critical sexuality studies. This absence is all the more remarkable given at least two of the contributors' previous work in this vein (Moore and Boer) and, based on the introductory comments (5), the entry that most engages sexuality (Liew's) had to be commissioned only after the initial session neglected race/ethnicity. That there was no accompanying recognition of other lacunae highlights the still fertile possibilities for other "interdisciplinary intersections" (postcolonialism and queer theory, Orientalism and anti-Semitism, inter alia). This particular gap might also be an indication of what a minor role gender plays in much postcolonial biblical scholarship. This is unfortunate, given a great deal of postcolonial or decolonizing feminist scholarship that addresses the intersections between race/ethnicity, class, colonial status, gender, and sexuality (see, for example, the work of Anne McClintock, cited nowhere in this volume). This lack highlights a final, minor concern: that a larger concluding bibliography on the various intersections could have at least minimized some of the oversights that the sometimes brief bibliographies that follow each of the individual entries cannot cover.

As a result of these and other concerns, this volume is recommended with some reservations for the reader interested in postcolonial approaches to biblical literature. While parts of the first two entries are recommended for those with more introductory or intermediate familiarity with postcolonial criticism, it is the middle two contributions by Donaldson and Liew that are most effective and attend most closely to the interdisciplinary intersections the subtitle promises. Overall, then, Moore and Segovia's collection, like postcolonial theory at large, is to be engaged critically and carefully in order to discern what in the end will be most useful and liberating.

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

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

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



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

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

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

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